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This dissertation explores the factors that influence immigrant reception and 
integration in new immigration spaces like Dublin and Madrid.  Through the case studies 
of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, the thesis 
provides a response to three research questions: 1) How do Western European receiving 
societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant?; 2) Why do immigrants 
belong or fail to fit in?; 3) How do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants’ 
perceptions affect incorporation outcomes? The project contributes to migration 
scholarship by emphasizing the understudied cultural and local aspects of incorporation 
and bringing immigrant agency back into the integration equation.  
The central argument is that culture and identity matter. While acknowledging the 
significance of material self-interest, social contact, or national policy regimes, the 
dissertation finds that identity characteristics, both those of the newcomers and their host 
societies, are primary in determining the welcome or rejection of different ethnic 
communities in receiving cities. Further, the study shows that migrants are agents who 
form their own perceptions of belonging or isolation on the basis of cultural identity. 
These perceptions determine the foreigners’ stake in the host context and what they do 
with the openings and closures they face. The thesis concludes that political, economic, 
and social incorporation outcomes are ultimately conditioned on the interplay between 
  
the inclusion-exclusion dynamics in the receiving context and the immigrants’ 
perceptions of welcome or rejection.  
Analysis of in-depth interviews, survey data, and relevant documents and 
legislation for all four case studies confirms the main argument. The comparison among 
European and non-European immigrants in Dublin and Madrid attests to the significance 
of culture and identity for integration outcomes and contributes to the broader 
understanding of immigrant incorporation in Europe and beyond. 
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INTRODUCTION: FOLLOWING THE “EUROPEAN DREAM” 
 
 
I.1. Puzzle, Research Questions, and Significance  
Migration is in Europe to stay. Immigrants from European countries’ former 
colonies are joined by workers from farther away in the global South, refugees escaping 
conflicts in Syria and beyond, and post-communist migrants seeking their fortunes in the 
West after European Union expansion. A variety of foreign populations are changing 
European societies’ labor markets, political dynamics, way of life, and very self-
definition (Messina, 2014). They are influencing profoundly not only traditional countries 
of immigration, such as Germany or France, but also countries like Ireland and Spain that 
have little experience of managing diversity or accommodating ethnic minorities.   
Along with migration, xenophobia is on the rise throughout the Continent. Just as 
receiving countries, and especially new migration locations, are hard pressed to 
accommodate their de facto multicultural societies, the impulse is to engage in ethnic 
stereotyping instead. Right-wing parties and movements campaigning on immigrant 
exclusion and freedom from EU prerogatives are gaining ground among European 
publics and elites (Brändlin, 2013; Karnitschnig, Troianovski, & Gross, 2015). 
Occurrences like the threat to remove East Europeans cheating on the German social 
welfare system, the deportation of a French Roma girl off a school bus, or the description 
of Muslim migration to Italy as “an attempted military and cultural occupation” are 
common to all immigrant receiving countries in Europe (Dahl, 2014; Karnitschnig et al., 
2015; Rubin, 2013). Even the migrant workers so necessary to close labor and 
demographic gaps are politicized, racialized, and scapegoated.  
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Despite the burning significance of the migration issue, however, current 
scholarship leaves the question of what contributes to the integration and inclusion of 
foreigners unanswered. Preoccupation with the economic costs and benefits of migration 
(Castles & Kosack, 1985; Miles, 1986, 1987) or the preferences of national interest 
groups (Freeman, 1995) results in little attention to the issues of culture and ethnicity that 
increasingly determine how Europeans talk about and deal with the migration question. 
Emphasis on citizenship laws (Brubaker, 1992; Howard, 2006) or the structure of 
domestic institutions (Ireland, 2000) obscures the implications of immigrant agency for 
shaping immigrant integration outcomes. Discussion of the power or decline of the 
nation-state, especially among traditional host countries, detracts from scholarship 
explaining the trajectories of new immigration localities (Joppke, 1998; Jacobson, 1996).  
 The migration literature does not account for the significant variations in 
immigrant reception and integration that persist in Europe’s cities and neighborhoods. 
For instance, while Nigerians have come to settle in Dublin, they experience rejection in 
the social sphere and are displaced by the Polish from the city’s lower-skilled labor 
market (Central Statistical Office [CSO], 2006-2011; Immigrants Council of Ireland 
[ICI], 2008). They fail to acquire or exercise the full array of social, economic, and 
political rights in the host city. While the Polish were welcomed by their Irish hosts in the 
mid-2000s as part of the “new” Europe, they are still exploited in the economic sphere 
and do not fully belong in Ireland (Kelbie, 2006; Krings, 2010). Yet, they are on their 
way to successful incorporation into the receiving society. Bulgarians travelled to Madrid 
due to a shared European identity and citizenship with the Spanish, but were received 
with suspicion by their hosts and remain far from integrated. While somewhat 
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disadvantaged economically and despite their legal status as third-country nationals, 
Ecuadorian immigrants are included in their new home in Madrid.1     
What explains these patterns? Why do reception and integration outcomes vary in 
similar new Western European immigration spaces? This dissertation addresses these 
questions by studying the experiences of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians 
and Bulgarians in Madrid. Three empirical sets of questions shape the project: First, how 
do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the 
immigrant? On what basis are Nigerians rejected by their Irish hosts? Why are Poles and 
Ecuadorians included? Why are Bulgarians received with indifference and suspicion? 
Second, why do immigrants belong or fail to fit in? Why do Poles and Nigerians consider 
themselves strangers in Dublin, while Ecuadorians and Bulgarians perceive themselves as 
part of Madrid? Third, how do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants’ 
perceptions affect incorporation outcomes? Why are Ecuadorians and Poles enjoying 
relatively ample political, economic, and social rights, while Nigerians, and to a lesser 
extent Bulgarians, claim few entitlements? 
The central argument is that identity and culture matter. The thesis asserts that the 
identity characteristics, both those of the newcomers and their host societies, are primary 
in determining the welcome or rejection of different ethnic communities in receiving 
cities. What is more, immigrants are considered agents who form their own perceptions 
of belonging or isolation on the basis of cultural identity. These perceptions determine the 
foreigners’ stake in the host context and what they do with the openings and closures they 
face. Political, economic, and social incorporation outcomes are ultimately conditioned 
                                                          
1 Confidential respondents, personal interviews, February – May, 2011, Madrid. 
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on the interplay between the inclusion-exclusion dynamics in the receiving context and 
the immigrants’ perceptions of welcome or rejection. 
The project does not claim to assess or downplay the explanatory power of 
material self-interest, social contact, or national policy regimes. However, it suggests that 
considerations of identity are highly significant in determining immigrant welcome or 
rejection. The dissertation thus departs from the literature by highlighting the 
understudied role of culture in comparing immigrant reception patterns. The thesis 
acknowledges the significance of citizenship laws and national institutions. However, it 
enhances existing migration scholarship by considering how these are themselves shaped 
by identity. It also looks at the ways in which immigrants as conscious actors form 
perceptions, navigate institutions, and choose whether to integrate in the receiving 
context. The project does not deny that national and supranational legislation and policy 
matter. Still, it contributes to understanding of incorporation patterns by turning to the 
local level, where policy is implemented in practice. It also focuses on new immigrant 
receiving locations, which could still avoid the mistakes of traditional immigration 
countries when dealing with their foreign populations.  
While focused on the cases of Dublin and Madrid, the dissertation aims to provide 
insight into a larger puzzle about the future of the “new” Europe.  Immigration is tearing 
at a Continent already in crisis. Refugees create fears of cultural disharmony and the 
overwhelming of public resources, but also of the loss of national autonomy with 
European dictates of burden-sharing (Fichtner, Popp, Schult, & Smoltczyk, 2015). 
Rioting in Sweden and France calls into focus the perceived deficiencies of immigrant 
integration, especially among Europe’s Muslims (Higgins, 2013; Roy, 2005). Worker 
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mobility from the developing world is interpreted as a danger to receiving societies’ 
sense of community and as a threat to Europe’s already fragile labor market with 
economic troubles in Greece, Spain, and Italy (Dimou, 2015). Post-communist migration 
with European Union enlargement is producing renewed debates on “poverty migration” 
from the East and rising resentment of the limits on national policy and identity brought 
about by EU expansion (“EU-Richter,” 2014; Pohl, 2014; Simons & Volkery, 2013). The 
specter of the Roma, seen as incompatible with host communities’ way of life yet 
empowered by the ideals of European citizenship, is reinforcing Euroscepticism and 
enlargement fatigue (“Ich kann,” 2014; Penketh, 2014). As immigrant receiving localities 
on the Continent are plagued by these multiple crises in common, albeit in their own 
particular ways, studying identity and immigrant integration in Dublin and Madrid can 
provide valuable insight into the viability of the very idea of Europe.  
This chapter introduces the framework underpinning the dissertation through: a) a 
review of the immigrant reception literature; b) a review of the literature on immigrant 
integration; c) an elaboration of the main argument and concepts; and d) a discussion of 
the research design and methodology. 
 
I.2. Immigrant Reception in the Literature 
Why do reception outcomes vary in Western European immigration spaces? The 
literature only addresses the question indirectly when explaining variations in 
immigration patterns, policy and group conflict. Nonetheless, immigrant inclusion and 




Representatives of the economic-rational approach argue that immigrant reception 
is determined by the cost-benefit calculations of the state and its actors. Migration 
patterns reflect differences in labor demand and supply in a globalized marketplace 
(Todaro, 1976; Sassen, 1998). Immigrants are accepted when they provide Western 
European countries with cheap labor in economic sectors undesirable to native workers 
(Piore, 1979) and serve the economic interests of the receiving state or its capitalist class 
(Wallerstein, 1974; Freeman, 1995).  Immigrants are excluded in times of recession or 
periods of high unemployment (Sides & Citrin, 2007). Foreign laborers are also rejected 
when they compete with nationals for scarce resources like jobs, wages, or welfare 
benefits (Fetzer, 2000; Sniderman, Hougendoorn, & Prior, 2004). Lesser educated or 
economically disadvantaged natives are particularly prone to express anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).  
According to the social network approach, migration occurs when “webs of 
connectivity” between sending and receiving countries, as well as migrant-supporting 
institutions in the receiving state, facilitate mobility (Faist, 2000; Massey, Alacron, 
Durand, & Gonzalez, 1987). Longer-established immigrant groups in possession of high 
levels of “ethnic capital” are better received by their host societies, since they have 
opportunities to engage in meaningful social contact with natives, debunk harmful 
stereotypes, and build intergroup trust (Allport, 1954; Zhou & Logan, 1989). However, if 
contact is casual and fails to establish meaningful relationships with the autochthonous 
population, large ethnic enclave generate hostility and exclusion instead (Fetzer, 2000; 
Quillian, 1995).  
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Finally, the political-institutional approach attributes exclusion and inclusion 
dynamics to the national institutional context and principal stakeholders of the receiving 
state (Ireland, 2000). Immigration policy creation, as well as immigrant rejection or 
acceptance, is contingent upon the preferences and power of national administrators 
(Guiraudon, 1998), courts (Joppke, 1999), employers (Freeman, 1995; Money, 1997, 
1999), ethnic organizations (Koopmans & Statham, 2000), and trade unions (Meyers, 
2000). Migrants are rejected with the break-up of traditional state structures and the rise 
of anti-immigrant parties (Betz, 1991; Messina, 1989; Schain, 1988; Thränhardt, 1995) 
and are generally included in states with left-wing governments (Lenski, 1966). 
Immigrant reception can also reflect the contending interests of specific state institutions 
(for ex., Calavita, 1992) or the foreign policy prerogatives of the receiving country 
(Miller, 1992; Weiner, 1985).  
All three approaches contribute to understanding of immigrant reception in 
Europe and beyond. The economic and demographic benefits of migration are often cited 
as a justification for liberalizing immigration policy or as an explanation of pro-
immigrant public opinion. Networks of family and friends attract migrants to specific 
destinations, as they reduce the risk and cost of mobility (Massey et al., 1993). Populist 
parties radicalize the reception climate in host countries.   
Despite these contributions, the literature leaves some gaps as well.  Most 
significantly, all three paradigms tend to omit non-material variables and the issues of 
cultural distance and identity politics, which define immigration discourse and politics 
today (Hainmüeller & Hiscox, 2007; Hayes & Dowds, 2006). For instance, economic-
rational theorists suggest that states would “import” immigrants to fill labor shortages 
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regardless of the workers’ ethnic origin, while in reality racial and ethnic discrimination 
influence labor migration policy (Meyers, 2000). A number of studies find that the threat 
of socio-cultural disharmony with migration is much more prominent in public opinion 
than the danger of economic competition (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Manevska & Achterberg, 
2011).  
Moreover, the preferred level of analysis for all three approaches is the national or 
the supranational level, with less attention to the local level, where exclusion and 
inclusion patterns shape up in reality (Money, 1999). The emphasis is on the creation of 
policy, rather than its actual outcomes, or on the determinants of group conflict, rather 
than its contours on the ground. Finally, while reception patterns are a significant 
predictor of immigrant incorporation, the connection is overlooked in the literature. 
This project aims to enhance existing scholarship by focusing on the understudied 
cultural aspects of inclusion and exclusion, turning to the local level of analysis, 
considering discourses along with policies, and exploring how reception influences 
integration.  
 
I.3 Immigrant Integration in the Literature 
Why do integration outcomes vary in Western European immigration spaces? 
Only recently has the migration literature begun to answer this question, due to practical 
pressures with the rise of right-wing parties across the Continent, terrorist attacks in the 
United States and Europe, and doubts about the incorporation of Europe’s Muslims 
(Givens, 2007). Nonetheless, three main perspectives have emerged to explain immigrant 
integration in Europe. The national identity approach, most famously elaborated by 
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Rogers Brubaker (1992), focuses on the identification of ideal-type integration models. 
Integration is interpreted as a set of national policies falling on the continuum between 
assimilation, or immigrants’ becoming like natives through the acquisition of distinct 
national values (Joppke & Morwaska, 2003),  and multiculturalism, or immigrants’ 
empowerment through group rights and the retention of particular ethnic identities 
(Kymlicka, 2012; Scholten, 2011). Through a comparison of France’s territorial-based 
and Germany’s blood-based nationality laws, Brubaker (1992) argues that integration 
depends on the contours of formal citizenship regimes, which are in turn conditioned by 
processes of nation-building. Koopmans and Statham (1999) build upon Brubaker’s 
argument to suggest that ethnic and civic citizenship regimes interact with distinct 
integration models to produce certain political opportunity structures for immigrant 
incorporation (Koopmans, Statham, Guigni, & Passy, 2005; Statham, 1999). Favell 
(2001) finds that differences in immigration patterns and nation-building prerogatives 
between France and Britain dictate an emphasis on assimilation and citizenship 
acquisition in the former and on race relations and multiculturalism in the latter. 
The liberal institutionalist approach, developed by Mark Miller (1981) and James 
Hollifield (1992), challenges the power of the nation-state and the primacy of national 
citizenship rules extended by the national identity paradigm. According to Miller 
(1981)’s “European Dilemma,” liberal democratic states cannot detract from the rights of 
even temporary, short-term workers. Hollifield (1992) picks up Miller’s argument to 
suggest that thickening economic interdependence forces liberal states to grant rights to 
all of their residents regardless of their nationality. Increasingly porous national borders 
and stronger liberal international regimes have led to the decline of national citizenship 
10 
 
and the rise of “postnational” personhood (Soysal, 1994). Therefore, the state’s ability to 
dictate the conditions under which immigrant communities are incorporated has been 
severely undermined (Jacobson, 1996). This is especially the case in Europe, where 
European Union integration imposes added limitations on individual member states 
(Bauböck, 2006; Guiraudon, 1998).  
Finally, the domestic politics approach looks within the nation-state to suggest 
that integration depends on the structure of key national institutions and the power of the 
state’s main political actors. Integration is defined not as a policy characterized as either 
assimilationist or multiculturalist, but as the access immigrants have to the host society’s 
distinct spheres, like education or the labor market (Boswell & Geddes, 2011; Faist, 
1994; Ireland, 2000). Some representatives of this paradigm focus on the structure of the 
welfare state (Dörr & Faist, 1997) or the educational system (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003), 
while others disaggregate the state into different institutional domains and survey 
integration in all of these areas (Etzinger, 2000). Furthermore, political parties are 
hypothesized to enhance or undermine opportunities for incorporation. For instance, 
Messina (2006) suggests that left-leaning parties encourage immigrants’ political 
mobilization. On the other hand, radical right parties impede integration through 
influencing governmental policy and citizenship legislation directly, or through shifting 
the agendas of mainstream elites to the right (Schain, 2006).  
The three approaches provide valuable insight into immigrant incorporation 
patterns in Europe and partially inform this dissertation. This project espouses the 
concern with historically-grounded values and identities reflected in the work of 
Brubaker and other representatives of the national identity paradigm. It shares in liberal 
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institutionalists’ skepticism of the nation-state’s ability to determine the contours of 
belonging or citizenship single-handedly. The thesis adopts the definition of integration 
extended by domestic politics scholars as migrants’ access to rights in the domains of 
state, market, culture, and welfare (Freeman, 2004). 
Nonetheless, this project is cognizant of the gaps left by the integration literature. 
Most significantly, all three perspectives are concerned with the power, institutions, and 
main actors of the nation-state (Castles & Miller, 2003; Hammar, 1985). Conspicuously 
missing is discussion of the characteristics, perceptions, and choices of the immigrant. 
Sociology has a lot to offer here. For instance, neo-classical assimilation theory contends 
that integration is only possible as immigrants become indistinguishable from natives in a 
process that spans generations (Alba & Nee, 2003). The segmented assimilation model 
suggests that immigrants’ language, education, or work experience determine 
occupational and socioeconomic mobility and dictate the sector of the receiving society 
to which migrants are assimilated (Portes, 2007; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Yet, even in the 
work of Alba and Nee (2003) or Portes and Zhou (1993), the emphasis falls on 
immutable characteristics rather than on the immigrant as a conscious actor (Berger, 
Galonska, & Koopmans, 2004; Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Immigrant agency is missing 
from the integration equation. 
What is more, the three paradigms focus on the creation and effects of 
incorporation rules and regimes. Formal integration policies clearly create opportunities 
for Europe’s immigrants in practice. Nonetheless, policy often does not achieve its 
intended goals and its implementation is uneven across and within countries. In this 
context, comparing actual integration outcomes sheds more light on the situation of the 
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foreign worker in Europe.  Focusing just on formal rules eclipses discussion of informal 
discourses and “cultural opportunity structures” that might explain variation in 
incorporation outcomes regardless of similar policies (Guigni & Passy, 2004). As Carmel 
and Cerami (2011) put it, surprisingly little attention is given to “emotions” and how they 
drive preference formation and circumscribe decision-making. Identity politics are 
largely absent from the discussion of immigrant integration.  
While the national identity approach does consider the role of culture and the 
liberal institutional perspective challenges the primacy of the nation-state, both pay no 
heed to the local. In the former paradigm, preoccupation with large structural processes 
occurring on the national level obscures the significance of dynamic local identities that 
might challenge the national narrative. In the latter approach, discussion of supranational 
pressures says little about sub-national variations in reception and integration patterns, 
often occurring as a direct result of European policy standardization. Moreover, in all 
three perspectives, attention is directed to traditional immigration countries that serve as 
ideal types of the ethnic, civic, or multicultural state (Brubaker, 1992; for Germany, for 
ex., see Euwals, Dagevos, & Roodenburg, 2010; Kahanec & Tosum, 2009; for France, 
consult Bleich, 2005; Weil & Crowley, 1994; for the United Kingdom, examples include 
Boswell, 2011, 2012; Favell, 1998; Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Fewer scholars focus 
on the experiences of new immigration spaces on the Continent. The elaboration of the 
main argument that follows suggests how this project seeks to extend the explanatory 





I.4. Argument, Definitions, and Contributions 
This dissertation aims to address the limitations of current migration scholarship 
by combining a political science literature concerned with the nation-state with insights 
from sociology and social psychology that emphasize perceptions, boundaries, and group 
relationships. The thesis makes four principal contributions. First, while not discounting 
the insights in the migration literature, the dissertation concentrates on its least developed 
aspects by stressing culture, identity, and “emotion” as drivers of immigrant inclusion-
exclusion and incorporation. Second, the thesis brings immigrants’ agency back into the 
discussion of integration. The immigrant is considered a conscious actor who interprets 
surroundings and forms preferences. Unlike in previous studies, the interaction between 
immigrants’ perceptions, ambitions, and strategies on the one hand, and the host 
communities’ discourses and preferences on the other constitutes a central piece of the 
argument.  Third, the dissertation turns to newer migration spaces, which have received 
less scholarly attention than traditional immigration countries, and to the local level of 
analysis, where integration actually takes place. Finally, it considers the connection 
between reception, and how we decide who to admit, and integration, or how we 
accommodate the ones admitted.  
The thesis also offers some practical implications. By identifying entrenched 
cultural identities and immigrant perceptions as obstacles to immigrant accommodation 
in Western European cities, it also hints at the ways in which to overcome these 
challenges. By highlighting the significance of local dynamics, it weighs in on the 
effectiveness of national frameworks and supranational directives.  
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Why do reception and integration outcomes vary in similar new Western 
European immigration spaces? The argument centers on identity politics, culture, and 
emotions. But what is meant by these three concepts? The dissertation turns to the work 
of theorists of symbolic boundaries to provide a definition (for ex., Durkheim, 1965; 
Jenkins, 1997; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Taifel, 1982; Weber, 1978). Culture is 
conceptualized as “the beliefs, behaviors, objects, and other characteristics common to 
the members of a particular group or society.” The focus is on non-material culture or 
symbols, rituals, “knowledge and beliefs that influence people’s behavior” (Livesey & 
Lawson, 2008). Culture is employed by groups and individuals for self-definition and for 
distinction from other groups. However, culture is dynamic and changeable, as are the 
boundaries between groups that it is often used to erect. This definition diverges 
fundamentally from essentialist paradigms that interpret the concept as an immutable 
marker of personal and group identification. Unlike Huntington’s understanding of 
culture as a rigid objective category that produces conflict between individuals, groups, 
and civilizations, this project considers culture subjective and fluid (Huntington, 2005). 
Consequently, group boundaries can be reconstructed, clashes between ethnic 
populations are not inevitable, and integration deficiencies can be remedied.  
Identity is defined as the counterpart to culture. Identity is understood as a means 
of self-definition for a person or a social group, which is relational, or possible only 
through distinction from another person or social group (Jenkins, 1997; Somers, 1994; 
Taifel, 1982). Individuals’ and groups’ identity formation, or the answering of both the 
question “who am I (are we)?” and the query “who are you (they)?”, is based on cultural 
ideas and beliefs (Livesey & Lawson, 2008). “Assumption of dissimilarity of beliefs 
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between oneself and the members of the out group”, as well as similarity of beliefs 
among the members of the in-group is one element of group identity (Tajfel, 1981, 1982: 
25; Weber, 1978). Identity is thus a feeling of communality, as well as opposition to the 
perceived identity of other racial and ethnic groups (Barth, 1969). Therefore, the 
interpretation of identity is often used by members of the in-group to “maintain and 
achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimension” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1985). As culture and identity are intimately interrelated, with culture 
constituting one element of identity and identification of both “us” and “them” based on 
cultural beliefs, the two concepts are used in conjunction throughout the dissertation.  
Emotions are found to be “socially constructed” and “interactionist.” Emotions, 
therefore, are taken to denote feelings that are “culturally patterned, experienced, 
acquired, transformed, managed in daily life, and legitimated” and in turn affect 
interactions and cultures. Emotions are the cultural meaning given to certain feelings and 
as such are experienced differently by different groups and societies. They necessarily 
stem from the interaction between the person/group and their environment (Marshall, 
1998). Emotions are intimately related with culture, since they are defined by culture and 
in turn contribute to its development. They also interact with identity, as the 
interpretation of feelings derived from identity and emotions lead to different attributions 
of identity not based on objective characteristics.  
How do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion 
of the immigrant? Both elites and publics in host societies form preferences for certain 
immigrant cohorts over others based on emotions (or feelings of social and cultural 
anxiety), culture (or beliefs and ideas held in common within the group but considered 
16 
 
fundamentally different for out-groups), and identity (or perceived characteristics which 
place a foreign population either in an insider or an outsider status) (Taifel, 1982; Weber, 
1978). Local identity variations, or the definition of “who we are”, affect how different 
migrant groups are identified, or the answer to the question “who they are” (Livesey & 
Lawson, 2008). Identity and local cultural understandings have a role to play in which 
immigrant characteristics are considered “similar” and welcomed and which ones are 
deemed “different” and undesirable (Triandafyllidou, 2001). Immigrant populations are 
included when commonalities are perceived in cultural categories like race, religion, 
shared past, language, common lifestyle and disposition, as well as “work ethic” – a non-
material, fluid characteristic that could be re-ascribed to any immigrant group (Barth, 
1969; Smith, 1991). On the other hand, groups considered fundamentally different in 
terms of the same cultural attributes are excluded, to maintain the cohesion of the host 
community. Connections are invented both to justify the welcome of a certain foreign 
cohort and to emphasize the most desirable attributes of the receiving society. 
Commonalities are also undermined or ignored in order to solidify the placement of an 
immigrant population in an outsider status.   
Immigrant reception is conceptualized as the discourses and attitudes prevalent 
among the receiving society’s elites and public rather than as the formal legal rules or 
administrative policies of the host community. Legislature and policies are of interest to 
this project, yet are interpreted as the outcome of attitudes and discourses rather than their 
cause. Particularly, the project adopts Giddens’ (2001, p. 323ff) definition of exclusion as 
“ways in which individuals may become cut off from full involvement in the wider 
society.” Inclusion and exclusion patterns are thus found to reflect the setting of symbolic 
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boundaries between natives and immigrants. Welcome or rejection dynamics are 
understood as “the fundamental construction of in-groups and out-groups in various 
public spaces, structurally and discursively, as the basis for, and with varying impact on, 
conflicts, integration, negotiation,  decision-making and the genesis of racism and anti-
Semitism” (Giddens, 2001, p. 61). 
Why do immigrants belong or fail to fit in? Identity politics are important from 
the perspective of the immigrant as well. Foreign populations’ perceptions of difference 
or similarity from receiving communities, often framed through the same cultural 
categories identified above, influence the migrants’ stakes in the host context. If 
immigrant populations consider themselves similar to their hosts and believe they belong 
in their new home, they are more likely to actively seek and exercise political, economic, 
and socio-cultural rights. Perceptions of difference and isolation on the part of the 
newcomers lead to the reverse – little engagement in the host society’s everyday life. 
How are belonging and isolation conceptualized and operationalized here? By definition 
subjective and relational, the dyad is expressed through subjective feelings of being 
different or similar and belonging to an integrated or isolated diasporic community; 
future migration plans; satisfaction and primary identification as either an “alien” or an 
insider; and comparative levels of interaction with the host society and one’s own ethnic 
group.  
Finally, how do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants’ perceptions affect 
incorporation outcomes? Identity politics have a role to play here as well. The host 
society’s identity-based reception patterns correlate with open or closed opportunities for 
integration and the endowment or denial of rights and resources. Immigrants’ identity-
18 
 
Figure I.1. Local Identity, Immigrant Perceptions, and Integration (Model) 
 











based perceptions of belonging or isolation translate into different preferences for the 
active pursuit and enjoyment of these resources. Ultimately, therefore, integration 
outcomes depend on the interaction between the immigrants’ agency and the prevailing 
discourses in the receiving society (Figure I.1).  
This dissertation is concerned not with integration models but with actual 
incorporation outcomes. Therefore, the project adopts Freeman (2004)’s definition of 
incorporation as access to rights and resources in the domains of the state, the market, 
culture, and welfare over the focus on ideal policy types preferred by national identity 
theorists. Incorporation in the “state” is divided into “passive political incorporation” 
contingent on legal status and pertinent legislature and policy, and “active political 
incorporation,” or running and voting in elections, membership in trade unions and 
political parties, voluntary activism, and naturalization. When surveying integration in 
the “market,’ the focus is on recruitment, occupational mobility, employment and 
unemployment rates, as well as conditions and relationships at work. Incorporation to 
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“welfare” is operationalized through access to disposable income, fair housing, social 
welfare benefits, education and health resources, as well as other state institutions like the 
police or the local trade unions. Finally, “culture” is studied in conjunction with social 
integration, through a discussion of experiences of discrimination. The project departs 
from traditional studies, which find that socio-economic rights depend on political 
membership, in that it considers cultural access a prerequisite for socio-economic and 
political inclusion instead (Brubaker, 1992; Howard, 2006). Further, the definition of 
incorporation considers not only whether immigrants have access to material and cultural 
resources on the ground, but also what foreign populations do with such resources.  
 


































































Based on the central argument, integration patterns can be represented in a two-
by-two matrix, with four possible outcomes (Table I.1). Incorporation is most successful 
when the immigrant group perceives itself to be similar and belong and when the 
receiving society shares in this discourse of inclusion. In what this project calls organic 
integration, immigrants both enjoy open opportunities and utilize them to fit into their 
new homes. Integration outcomes are least favorable when the immigrant group considers 
itself isolated or different and the receiving community reproduces this discourse of 
exclusion. In this instance of blocked integration, immigrant populations fail to combat 
the closures they face in the receiving context and remain strangers in their cities of 
residence. The other two outcomes are intermediary. Reluctant integration, or the second 
best outcome according to this dissertation, results when reluctant immigrant populations 
who do not consider themselves to belong are nonetheless drawn into the receiving 
context’s life by welcoming local stakeholders.  The third best outcome, or conflicted 
integration, occurs when foreign groups who perceive themselves to fit in are still forced 
to combat rejection in the host city.  
One final pair of terms needs clarification. The dissertation employs immigrant, 
immigrant worker, and foreign worker interchangeably to signify this thesis’ assumption 
that regardless of their initial route of entry, the foreign nationals discussed here are 
economic migrants who compete for jobs and other resources in the host countries’ labor 
markets. Nonetheless, the project dubs these same populations immigrant “Others,” 
ethnic groups or foreign populations. Some might disagree with this classification. The 
Polish, for instance, are not an ethnic minority in Ireland, but rather share the ethnicity of 
their hosts. However, this dissertation argues that ascribing ethnicity is often a conscious 
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instrument of closure and that “ethnicity” stands for racial, national, or cultural 
characteristics. This nomenclature also stresses the thesis’ assumption that the immigrant 
as an economic commodity cannot be separated from the immigrant as a socio-cultural 
being. As Overbeek (1995, p. 15) explains, “it is nearly impossible to distinguish between 
‘political’ and ‘economic’ migrants.” Economics and politics are intertwined as push 
factors for migration, and all foreign groups are subject to “xenophobic nationalism” 
regardless of their legal status. The immigrant worker is also an “Other” who falls on a 
continuum of ethno-cultural similarity and difference from the receiving society.  
 
I.5. Research Design, Case Selection, and Methodology 
The main argument and concepts are developed in a “small-n” comparison 
between two receiving localities each hosting two distinct immigrant populations. I 
compare Ireland and Spain, and more specifically Dublin and Madrid, where I survey 
Polish and Nigerian, and Bulgarian and Ecuadorian immigrants respectively.2 I review 
four possible integration outcomes, one roughly fitting in each cell of Table I.1.   
 Spain and Ireland provide for a fruitful comparison. Former emigration countries, 
both became immigration countries in the mid-1990s, as they moved from the European 
periphery to the forefront of economic growth with booms in the service and construction 
sectors (Brücker, 2007). Both are coming to terms with the immigrant workers in their 
                                                          
2 Throughout the dissertation, Bulgarian and Polish immigrants are described as East Europeans and 
Dublin and Madrid are dubbed Western European cities. Those are not meant to be precise geographic 
classifications. Instead, they emphasize the contrast between established members of the European Union 
and new ones aspiring to fully belong to the Continent, as well as between desirable migrant destinations 
and countries that primarily export migrant labor. The categories are necessarily fluid, yet call to the 
persistent hierarchy among European countries regardless of the myth of a unified Europe. The terminology 
also highlights the contrast with non-European immigrants, who do not share a common European past and 




midst for the first time in the context of European integration, sweeping economic 
change, and fragmented national identity. Both states are experiencing severe economic 
contraction since the late 2000s, while struggling with continued immigration and 
pressure to integrate their foreign populations. Neither, however, is subject to the overt 
racialization of politics or the influence of a right-wing political party.  Despite 
similarities, Ireland remains the only EU country where European immigrants are more 
numerous than third-country nationals and relatively large groups of Nigerians or 
Chinese migrants are nonetheless dwarfed by white Christian workers (European 
Commission [EC], 2008; CSO, 2012a). In contrast, Spain’s foreign labor force is 
multicultural, with Ecuadorians, Moroccans, Romanians and Bulgarians representing 
some of the largest groups (Instituto Nacional de Estadística [INE], 2010; Papademetriou, 
Sumpton, & Terazzas, 2010). 
 The focus is on Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Ireland and Bulgarians and 
Ecuadorians in Spain (Table I.2). For each country, a “new” European and a non-
European immigrant collective is selected. The intent is to determine if European Union 
citizenship confers added rights and protections to immigrant workers in an enlarged 
Continent or whether European membership has little effect on reception and 
incorporation patterns in practice.  
The four cohorts are among the most prominent in the receiving localities (Table 
I.2). The first non-Irish immigrants to arrive to Ireland, Nigerians grew from only 10 in 
1996 to 19,780 in 2011. They represent the largest third-country national group in the 
receiving context (CSO, 2012a; Kómoláfé, 2008). Nigerians are dwarfed by Polish 
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Table I.2. Case Selection Criteria 
Characteristics Polish Nigerian Ecuadorian Bulgarian 
EU citizen     
Third-country national     
Large group     
Economic migrant     
Low-skilled worker     
Muslim     
Historical resentment     
Recent colonial relationship     
First generation     
Urban concentration     
 
 
workers, however, who account for 8% of the Irish labor force (Barrett, 2009). Attracted 
to a rapidly growing and liberal economy and the ease of migration with EU enlargement, 
Polish nationals are the most numerous foreign group in Ireland with 122,585 persons in 
2011 (CSO, 2012a). With a booming construction and service sectors in the host state, 
Ecuadorian labor mobility to Spain rose sharply in the early 2000s, rivaling traditional 
migration from Africa (Pérez, 2003). Ecuadorians are the third largest national group in 
Spain, with 440,304 persons residing in the receiving state as of 2009 (INE, 2010). Spain 
is also the home of the largest Bulgarian diaspora in Europe. Bulgarians were among the 
fastest growing foreign groups in Spain in the late 2000s (INE, 2009, 2010).3  
While a large number of Nigerians entered Ireland as asylum seekers, all four 
groups are currently economic migrants concentrated in the same market segments of the 
host states. Apart from some medical personnel, Nigerian nationals in Ireland are 
                                                          
3 The Bulgarian population in Spain grew by 112% between 2006 and 2007, from 60,174 to 127,058 
persons. This is the largest relative migration growth for any national group excluding Romania with 185% 
(INE, 2010). It also represents a shift in European migration to Spain from retirement-based migration from 
Western European older EU member states to economic migration for low-skilled and informal 
employment from among the new Eastern European EU members (Papademetriou et al., 2010).  
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employed in lower skilled services, such as social work, security, retail, manufacturing, 
and the taxi industry (CSO, 2008). It is in these sectors that they compete with Polish 
workers who arrived to Ireland to fill labor shortages in construction, manufacturing, 
retail, hotels, and restaurants (CSO, 2006-2011; Quinn, 2010). Bulgarian and Ecuadorian 
men vie for employment in construction, low-skilled services, and manufacturing, while 
women take work primarily as domestics or in tourism (Papademetriou et al., 2010; INE, 
2007). The analysis focuses on these lower skilled occupations, including construction, 
retail, hotels, restaurants, and domestic care. These economic sectors have the highest 
concentrations of the immigrants in this study. They are home to the most severe 
competition among the relevant foreign groups facing conditions of economic recession. 
They also tend to fall within the informal economy and to offer little if any safety net.4 
The four cohorts are also selected for this dissertation, since they offer a realistic 
view into immigrant reception and integration, relatively unburdened by history, 
international relations, or excessive media attention (Table I.2).  None of the four 
immigrant populations are of predominantly Muslim faith, and therefore their 
experiences have not been scrutinized and skewed by a hyper vigilant media or heated 
public debate. While Ecuador was a Spanish colony, the relationship falls in the distant 
                                                          
4Some might suggest that Polish and Ecuadorian workers were officially “invited” into Dublin’s and 
Madrid’s labor markets through recruitment fairs and bilateral agreements respectively (Pérez, 2003). On 
the other hand, Nigerians were forced upon the Irish state as involuntary asylum seekers, and no official 
invitation was extended to Bulgarians by the Spanish authorities (Kómoláfé, 2008; Confidential interviews, 
September 2010 – May 2010, Dublin and Madrid). This distinction is exaggerated.  The four groups are 
faced with comparably conflicted “official invitations,” which do not neatly correspond to informal 
dynamics of reception on the ground.  Poles’ and Ecuadorians’ official invitations into Ireland and Spain 
were withdrawn with economic downturn in Europe in 2007-2008. That has not significantly changed 
migration or inclusion-exclusion patterns for the two populations (Arango, 2012). While a majority of 
Nigerians entered Ireland as asylum seekers in the late 1990s, some members of this group were recruited 
as medical personnel and students (Kómoláfé, 2008). A majority today are workers entering Ireland 
through employment permits (ICI, 2008). Bulgarians were recruited to Spain as fruit pickers, for instance, 
yet their invitation has also been rescinded with downturn (Confidential interviews, February – May 2010, 
Madrid). The informal discursive variations in welcome or rejection on the local level are not considered 
problematic in the case selection process, as they are in fact one of the main queries of this dissertation. 
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past, unlike in the case of Morocco, which was actively managed by Spain until the 
1950s (Flesler, 2008; Lange, Mahoney, & Von Hau, 2006). Consequently, the 
dissertation does not discuss Moroccan immigration to Spain, even though Moroccans are 
the largest third-country national group in the receiving state (INE 2010; Papademetriou 
et al., 2010). Recent colonial ties, deeply rooted resentment of the “Moor,” and fears of 
the Moroccan Muslim are powerful lenses through which Moroccan identity is inevitable 
interpreted (Calavita, 2005; Flesler, 2008; INE 2010; Mendoza, 2001; Papademetriou et 
al., 2010). Such historical resentments or prejudices are not present in the case of Poles, 
Nigerians, Ecuadorians, and Bulgarians. In fact, Bulgarians in Spain are studied instead 
of the larger Romanian group, since despite a similar legal-political status and migration 
patterns, the former are not immediately racialized through the stereotype of the “Roma.”  
The majority of the four immigrant groups represent the first generation. While 
there is ample literature on the integration patterns of the children of immigrants, less is 
known about their parents. Nonetheless, whether the first generation is able to “catch up” 
with natives is a significant issue affecting immigrants’ opportunities for generations to 
come (Barban & White, 2011; DeVoretz, 2006).  
Despite these multiple commonalities, there are significant variations in the four 
groups’ identity and ethnic characteristics, with some defined as profoundly “different” 
and others described as presumably “similar” to their hosts. Therefore, the experiences of 
Poles, Nigerians, Ecuadorians and Bulgarians provide for a fruitful comparison in a 
dissertation concerned with identity politics.  
While the four collectives migrated to multiple localities within Ireland and Spain, 
a majority concentrate in these countries’ capital cities. Therefore, the analysis moves 
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beyond the national level to focus on the urban spaces of Dublin and Madrid (Sassen, 
1998; Money, 1999). Dublin and Madrid both attract about one-fifth of all immigrants in 
their respective countries (CSO, 2008; INE, 2010). Dublin is the home of forty percent of 
all Nigerians residing in Ireland and about one third of all the Polish workers in Ireland in 
2011 (CSO, 2012a; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [MSZ], 2009). Madrid hosts the 
largest Ecuadorian community in Spain (30% of the total) and the most Bulgarians in the 
receiving state (18% of the total) (INE, 2010). The two cities are also the center of the 
economic sectors in which the immigrant groups of interest focus, or construction and 
lower-skilled services (CSO, 2006-2011; INE, 2007, 2009). Madrid and Dublin have 
been profoundly transformed by Bulgarian, Ecuadorian, Polish, and Nigerian immigrants, 
whose churches, restaurants, shops, and associations have enhanced the cities’ identities. 
On the one hand, the cities are representative of the four populations’ experiences in the 
host countries more broadly, as they contain a cross section of these communities in 
terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, they are 
unique spaces for the study of immigrant integration, as it is there that immigration and 
integration policies are implemented in reality and the immigrant groups interact among 
each other and with local labor market and socio-political actors. 
The study applies mixed methods, with emphasis on qualitative analysis. Data 
collection is based on the ethnographic approach (Geertz, 1983). During a year-long 
fieldwork in Madrid and Dublin, I engaged in participant observation of the relevant 
migrant groups in their social, economic, and organizational environments. I took 
residence in heavily immigrant localities of the cities. I visited the communities’ 
associations, and participated in the cultural, social, and political events they organized. I 
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also collected short surveys with one-hundred randomly selected native consumers of 
foreign labor in each city. 
More significantly, I conducted semi-structured interviews with three types of 
relevant actors in each location. I interviewed anywhere between ten and forty 
representatives of each of the foreign populations of interest. I supplemented the less 
numerous interviews conducted with Nigerian and Ecuadorian workers through surveys 
of these communities by other researchers and research organizations.5 Questions follow 
the same script, but are open-ended in order to elicit what the immigrants themselves 
consider most significant about their immigration and integration. I also conducted 
interviews with the immigrants’ representatives in ethnic organizations. Finally, I 
interviewed thirty local labor and political actors in each context. These include local 
elected politicians and administrators, representatives of the relevant ministries and trade 
unions, members of the police and the media, as well as employers of foreign labor. The 
questions are comparable, yet I ensured that the participants were enabled to identify the 
issues in local integration of most importance to them and to outline their organization’s 
specific role in reception and incorporation. While interviews with the immigrants are not 
representative, they are essential in understanding how perceptions and attitudes form 
among the foreign populations (Maxwell, 2008). Together with reports and secondary 
sources, they provide a crucial level of detail and richness to the findings and reinforce 
the patterns identified by community leaders and native stakeholders. 
Sampling differs across actor type. The snowball approach is employed to identify 
immigrant participants. However, the approach was modified where subsequent 
                                                          
5 For instance, the project employs surveys of Nigerian integration by the Immigrant Council of Ireland 
(ICI, 2008) and the Economic Social and Research Institute (McGinnity, Quinn, O’Connell, & Donnelly, 
2011), concerned with similar issues as this work. 
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interviewees were selected on the basis of their difference from the previous “seed” in 
terms of demographic characteristics (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2004). I also picked 
respondents at random from immigrant-heavy areas and ethnic events. Sampling for 
immigrant representatives and local labor market actors is purposive. I identified in 
advance the local organizations that take part in shaping exclusion, inclusion and 
integration policy, and I met with at least one representative from each relevant 
institution. In the case of elected councilors and the media, I approached more than one 
representative in order to take full account of the left-right political spectrum.  
Interview and survey data are the primary source of establishing variations in 
reception and belonging across immigrant groups and localities. I analyze interviews and 
observations recorded during fieldwork through discourse analysis. I interpret the survey 
data through statistical analysis. I tabulate all responses pertaining to a certain question 
and identify repeating trends. I supplement interview data by expert respondents through 
analysis of legislation and other pertinent documents in order to determine integration 
outcomes and how they relate to reception and belonging,.   
 
I.6. Dissertation Plan and Sources 
 The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides an overview of 
contemporary migration to Western Europe and serves as context for the cases of Dublin 
and Madrid. The chapter focuses on the changing patterns and logics of European 
migration since the 1950s in order to demonstrate the growing significance of identity in 
the European migration process. It also documents the transition of Spain and Ireland 
from sending to receiving countries of migration in order to answer the question whether 
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new immigration spaces in Southern Europe provide continuity or divergence from 
traditional immigrant receiving countries on the Continent.  
 Chapters Three through Seven focus on the specific case studies of this 
dissertation. By studying two receiving locations and two immigrant populations in each 
host community, I obtain four cases of immigrant reception and assimilation. The 
chapters are organized by theme, with all four immigrant populations and both cities 
discussed in each section. Chapters Three and Four present the immigration discourse 
prevalent in Spain and Ireland, from both the receiving society’s and the immigrants’ 
perspective. The two chapters address the first and second empirical questions of this 
dissertation by outlining the scope and determinants of immigrant inclusion-exclusion 
and belonging-isolation in Dublin and Madrid. Chapter Three employs expert interviews 
with local labor market actors and a survey of local consumers of the immigrants’ labor 
in order to demonstrate which foreign populations are accepted and which rejected and to 
suggest what accounts for these inclusion-exclusion patterns. Chapter Four utilizes 
interview data with the four immigrant groups and their representatives to determine 
whether these populations consider themselves to be part of their receiving communities 
or whether they still identify as outsiders in their new homes.  
 Chapters Five through Seven analyze immigrant incorporation in the political, 
economic, and socio-cultural spheres respectively. They assess the dependent variable of 
this dissertation, or integration, and answer the third research question of this dissertation. 
These three chapters are based primarily on legislation and policy documents, statistical 
data, governmental and non-governmental reports, as well as original interview data. By 
discussing a large array of issues, such as voting and running in elections, access to the 
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educational or health systems, or working conditions and relationships, the chapters 
outline how the intersection of immigrant belonging and isolation on the one hand and 
exclusion and inclusion discourses on the other produce specific incorporation outcomes 
for the four populations of interest.  






URBAN LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION: 
DUBLIN AND MADRID IN THE HISTORICAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
 
II.1. Introduction  
 
Migration is not new to Europe. People traveled from villages to cities to take 
advantage of economic opportunity with industrialization or moved across countries to 
escape religious persecution at home as early as the 1800s (Sassen, 2000, pp. 7-31). What 
is new, however, is the rising significance of identity for contemporary immigration 
patterns, policies, and discourses on the Continent.  
European migration became a qualitatively different phenomenon after the end of 
the Second World War, as labor mobility flows intensified and transformed from a 
legal/practical issue into a highly politicized item on the agendas of an increasing number 
of states. It was with the onset of the new millennium, however, that an emphasis on 
identity politics turned immigration into one of the most contentious issues before 
European elites and publics. Who are the ones admitted is a highly significant question, 
where even workers necessary to fill demographic and labor gaps are racialized and met 
with suspicion across Europe. Whether foreign populations conform to cultural values 
and narratives of national identity increasingly determines patterns of reception and 
integration, especially with the resurgence of xenophobic sentiments and actors in most 
host communities on the Continent. With European Union enlargement, identity politics 
affect not only non-European, but also Eastern European immigrants seeking their 
fortunes in the West. Identity is particularly prominent on the sub-national level, to which 
inclusion-exclusion dynamics shift with pressures of European harmonization and 
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national standardization. As all immigrant receiving communities on the Continent are 
plagued by the migration dilemma and the effects of identity politics in common, albeit in 
their own particular ways, the idea of a multicultural Europe unified in peace and 
democracy becomes highly questionable.  
The goal of this chapter is two-fold. First, an exposé of historical migration trends 
documents the rising significance of identity for migration processes and dynamics on the 
Continent. Second, a description of the migration experiences of Ireland and Spain serves 
to situate the two cases within the European context. While reflecting larger European 
trends, Ireland and Spain are still constructing their migration systems and are yet to be 
ravaged by overt xenophobic pressure or the influence of a right-wing party. The 
remainder of this dissertation surveys the effects of identity politics in the two receiving 
communities, in order to determine whether these new migration localities will be able to 
effectively accommodate their foreign populations. 
 
II.2. European Migration Patterns and the Rising Significance of Identity 
 
II.2.1. Intensification and Politicization in the Post-WWII Era  
 
Immigration has occurred to and within Europe for centuries (Soysal, 1994). 
However, the phenomenon underwent a qualitative transformation in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, when migratory flows intensified, diversified, and reached a rising 
number of European countries (Castles & Miller, 2003). Most significantly, the migration 
question transitioned from an economic issue to a political and security dilemma 
(Geddes, 2003, p. 17). A brief exposé of three historical migration waves documents the 
changing logic of migration leading to the rise of identity politics on the Continent.   
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In the immediate aftermath of WWII, elites in a select number of Western 
European states framed immigration as an practical economic issue (Messina, 2007). 
Governments and private firms actively recruited low-skilled, cheap, flexible foreign 
workers to rebuild Europe after the War and to fill economic and demographic gaps on a 
rapidly growing Continent. Migration was considered a temporary phenomenon that 
conformed to simple dynamics of supply and demand (Messina, 2002, p. 212). Therefore, 
immigration policy was constructed behind closed doors with no public debate or 
consideration of political and social implications (McLaren, 2001).  
Identity had little role to play in immigration politics, since the sources of 
migration were perceived as relatively unproblematic. Most European migrants 
originated from the stagnant high-unemployment economies of Southern Europe and 
Ireland, especially after the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 
(Castles, 1984; Garson & Loizillon, 2003, pp. 3-4). Bilateral treaties further allowed for 
the mobility of familiar Mediterranean neighbors from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia 
and former colonial subjects from Asia and Africa (Baldwin-Edwards & Schain, 1994, 
pp. 7-9; Joppke, 2005). In the rare occasions when the migration question made European 
headlines in 1950-1970, it was framed as “vital for Europe” (Sulzberger, 1950). 
Economic crisis in the mid-1970s transformed migration into a political and social 
issue, considered increasingly contentious by European elites and publics. With 
deepening economic recession and rising unemployment, Western European states 
terminated recruitment, initiated immigrant repatriation programs, and closed their doors 
to new immigrant workers (Trindafyllidou, Gropas, & Vogel 2007, p. 2). As British 
Prime Minister Edward Heath put it, “there is to be no more permanent large-scale 
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immigration into this country” (“British conservatives,” 1970). “Black” immigrants from 
outside the European Common Market were particularly marginalized (Kandell, 1978). 
However, few foreigners left, since they were worried about future employment 
opportunities and even tighter migration controls (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2003, p. 4). The closing of traditional labor 
migration routes in fact led a rising number of workers from Asia and Africa to utilize 
special colonial ties to bring along their families and settle permanently in Western 
Europe  (Lahav, 2004, pp. 29-30; Messina, 2007; Trindafyllidou et al., 2007, p. 2). 
The combination of economic stagnation and a growing number of ethnically and 
racially different immigrants on the Continent led to the politicization of the immigration 
issue and the birth of identity politics. Publics were no longer apathetic to immigration, 
but came to resent economic competition from “unfamiliar” foreigners. Feeling 
“swamped by immigrants of a different culture,” Western Europeans experienced 
xenophobia for the first time since the end of WWII (Swaine, 2009). In France, numerous 
Algerians were killed in racial conflicts in 1975-1979 and Arab immigrants were expelled 
as a “threat to public order.” The Swiss complained of the “overforeignization” of their 
country, especially as Roman Catholic workers from Latin America disrupted the 
homogeneity of Protestant cantons. Welcome to Turkish workers in Germany was 
replaced by worry about these immigrants’ refusal to leave (“Europe rejects,” 1979). 
This increasingly hostile climate became fertile ground for the advent of right-
wing parties and movements on the Continent. The 1970s marked the ascent of the 
Freedom Party in Austria, the British National Party in Britain, the Progress Party in 
Denmark, the National Front in France, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, the National 
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Socialist Front in Sweden, the People’s Party in Switzerland, and a variety of extremist 
political movements in Germany (Schain, 2006). Politicians like Enoch Powell in Britain 
rose to prominence by demanding that immigrants be sent back home (Kilborn, 1977). 
Questions of immigrant integration and ethnic conflict rose rapidly on the agendas of 
Western European states (Baldwin-Edwards & Schain, 1994, pp. 12-13; Lahav, 2004).  
Considerations of security and order came to the fore of the migration debate in 
the 1980s, as receiving and sending countries diversified and the flow of asylum seekers, 
illegal immigrants, and ethnic minorities intensified (Geddes, 2003; OECD, 2003). After 
the closure of immigration policy in the 1970s, many economic migrants entered the 
Continent without authorization (Messina, 2007).6 With the rising incidence of regional 
conflicts and the collapse of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, the number of asylum 
seekers and refugees to Western Europe increased substantially.7 As political revolution 
convulsed East Central Europe, both East-West migration and the mobility of ethnic 
minorities intensified (Salt, 2006). Civil conflicts and globalization led to higher levels of 
immigration from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia with no colonial ties to 
Western Europe (Messina, 2007).  
As an ever larger spectrum of immigrants left for Europe for a larger set of 
motivations, immigration became securitized. Refugees and asylum seekers brought 
along issues of war, ethnic difference and perceptions of rising crime rates. Non-white 
“poor, hungry, and persecuted” immigrants were blamed for all “big-city problems like 
                                                          
6 While the illegal immigrant population in the European Community was estimated to be 600,000 in the 
early 1970s, it stood between one and two million in 1976 and was put anywhere between 2.6 million and 4 
million in 1991 (Messina, 2007, pp. 39-41). 
7 The total number of asylum claims to Western Europe in 1955-1979 was estimated to be 629,185. In 
1983, Western states reported 700,000 applications. Despite a drop in applications due to constitutional 
reform in Germany in the mid-1990s, 388,000 applications were received by Western states in 2001 alone 
and a total of 3 million applications were submitted in the 1990s (OECD, 2003; Paspalanova, 2006). 
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drug addiction, crime and … AIDS” (Markham, 1987). Irregular migrants confronted 
Western societies with concerns of human trafficking and organized crime.  As 
immigrants from far away places introduced different lifestyles to European host 
societies, fears of the incompatibility of Islam with democratic values galvanized 
Western publics and politicians for the first time (Lahav, 2004; Markham, 1987).  
These new tensions were replicated in new locations, moreover, as traditional 
immigrant sending countries like Spain, Greece, or Ireland turned into receiving states 
after joining the European Economic Community. These localities had to deal with the 
migration dilemma with little experience and few political and social institutions or 
policies (Ruspini, 2008, pp. 11-28).  
Notably, identity politics influenced migration patterns, immigration control, and 
integration policies in Europe even before the advent of the new century. Common 
history and a shared colonial past led workers from the Commonwealth and Ireland to 
settle in the United Kingdom, while Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians chose France as 
their destination. Turkish and Serbian migrants went to Germany and Austria (Fassman 
& Münz, 1994). Germany, a self-defined “ethnic state,” granted citizenship rights to 
ethnic Germans “returning” from Eastern Europe after the collapse of Communism 
(Brubaker, 1992). On the other hand, Turkish immigrants residing in the receiving state 
for decades were denied economic, social and political rights, as they were not 
considered part of the German nation (Angenendt, 1999). Identification as a “civic state” 
and an emphasis on the values of secularism and equality produced a focus on 
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“assimilationist republicanism”8 in France (Brubaker, 1992). Ample integration efforts 
and high naturalization rates were paired with insistence on immigrants’ unqualified 
adoption of French democratic political values (Angenendt & Pfaffenroth, 1999; 
Schuerkens, 2007).9 Considerations of identity defined the particular ways in which 
European states experienced common migration trends on the Continent.  
European migration was fundamentally transformed in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. The immigration issue transitioned from an unproblematic economic 
consideration to a socio-political dilemma and a security concern. Ever more numerous 
European states were confronted with new ethnic and social cleavages, as the sources and 
types of migrants diversified.  Identity rose to prominence in defining European mobility, 
and influenced where people went, how they were received, and what policies were 
constructed to accommodate them. Nonetheless, it was not until the new millennium that 
identity became paramount in defining European migratory processes and dynamics. It is 
to this development that the chapter turns next.  
 
II.2.2. The Rise of Identity Politics in the New Millennium 
 
 While immigration has preoccupied European states for decades, the new 
millennium transformed migration into one of the most contentious issues before 
European elites and publics. Five interrelated developments characterize this 
transformation. First, governments on the Continent are torn between the need to fill 
                                                          
8 This term was coined by Virginie Guiraudon (2006) to reflect the expectation that foreign workers will 
become French through the institutions of the Republic (to which they had equal access), and through their 
inclusion in the labor market and other economic and social institutions. 
9 In 1996 117,500 foreigners acquired French nationality. The annual number of naturalizations averaged 
100,000 in 1992-1996 and 150,000 in the late 1990s. To compare, naturalization numbers stood at an 
average of 50,000 applications per annum in the UK and 85,000 in Germany (OECD, 2008). 
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demographic and labor gaps and the impulse to control their borders against a persistent 
flow of highly diverse immigrants, especially with economic downturn. Second, even 
mainstream politicians are swayed to the right with the entrenchment of populist forces 
deep into the European political process and with the rising discontent of publics fearful 
of the immigrant “Other.” Third, the quickening pace of European Union enlargement 
creates new migration cleavages on the Continent, as poor post-Communist workers join 
post-colonial migrants in the West. Fourth, the supranationalization of immigration 
policy with European Union integration produces resentment of external pressures on an 
issue most intimate to national sovereignty and shifts immigration policies and discourses 
to the local level.  Finally, with the diversion of immigrant flows from traditional host 
states to new immigration destinations, countries like Ireland and Spain are at the center 
of these dynamics, yet remain ill-equipped to deal with the migration pressures common 
to all of Europe. Identity politics underpin these multiple tensions, with “who are we” and 
“who are they” serving as two of the most significant questions before Europe’s 
immigrants, natives, and governments.    
A graying Continent needs immigrants. Declining fertility and increasing life 
expectancy produce a shrinking native work force, empty tax coffers, and an unraveling 
safety net for Europe’s elderly (Münz, 2011). Only substantial immigration can remedy 
these demographic gaps or the persistent labor shortages on the Continent. European 
governments responded to these challenges by reinstituting worker recruitment programs 
in the early 2000s. Northern and Western European states invited highly-skilled 
immigrants to address booms in information and technology (EC, 2008). The 2000 
German Green Card program for IT specialists and the British Highly Skilled Migrant 
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Programme (2002) are two examples (Castles, 2006, pp. 749-753). Simultaneously, 
Germany and the Southern European states implemented temporary programs to alleviate 
low-skilled labor shortages and channel illegal immigrants into legal employment in 
agriculture, construction, tourism, and catering (EC, 2008, p. 97; Garson & Loizillon, 
2003, p. 5; Kraler & Iglicka, 2002).  
However, especially with economic downturn, economic calculations are 
counteracted by the impulse to control European borders against a persistent flow of 
highly diverse immigrants. The workers recruited to the Continent in the 2000s are 
increasingly selected by Western governments on the basis of their socioeconomic, 
national, ethnic, and cultural characteristics (Castles, 2006, p. 747; Triandafyllidou et al., 
2007).10 There is an emphasis on the immigrants’ future potential for integration (Castles, 
2006).  
The focus on control and exclusion is more pronounced when it comes to “less 
desirable” migrants in Europe, like undocumented workers or refugees from the Middle 
East, Asia and Africa. To point out a few examples, the Austrian government restricted 
asylum seekers’ access to Austrian procedural guarantees,11 clamped down on illegal 
immigration,12 and introduced rigorous “integration agreements” for third country 
nationals in the early 2000s (Kraler & Sohler, 2007, pp. 20-22).13 During the same 
period, the Dutch government introduced a strict asylum regime and compulsory courses 
                                                          
10 For example, the British Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (2002) was followed by the introduction of 
the White Paper (2006), which overhauled the immigration regime by introducing a point-based system of 
migration in the UK (Castles, 2006, pp. 749-753). 
11 For example, the right to appeal was limited by excusing new evidence during appeal procedures.  
12 For instance, by giving more power to the state to investigate sham marriages, transferring resident 
permit powers to provincial authorities, or extending the maximum duration of detention pending 
deportation. 
13 Integration agreements as per the 1998 law required immigrants from third countries who immigrated to 
Austria after 1998 to enroll in mandatory language classes. Language proficiency requirements were raised 
in 2005, making it increasingly difficult for immigrants to fulfill the requirements (Kraler & Sohler, 2007). 
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of civic integration for non-European laborers (Ter Wal, 2007, pp. 250-251). With 
economic crisis, the Italian government criminalized the irregular immigrants it had 
tolerated for years. Italian police expelled hundreds of immigrants on suspicion of 
immigration violations in 2008 and authorized citizen patrols to control illegal 
immigration in 2009 (Rosenthal, 2008). In early 2009, the French government followed 
suit and expelled a number of illegal laborers to create jobs for unemployed legal workers 
(Fix et al., 2009). Issues of control, integration, and identity came to be intimately 
interrelated in Western European states’ treatment of the migration question. 
Indeed, even mainstream politicians are swayed to the right by publics threatened 
by the immigrant “Other” and populist actors entrenched in European politics. Especially 
in traditional immigration countries like France, the Netherlands, Britain, or Germany, 
elites racialize and marginalize the “different” immigrants in their midst. Labour Party 
British immigration minister Phil Woolas “pandered to the right” when he proposed to 
ease racial tensions in the UK by “stabilizing” the British population through a cap on 
non-EU foreigners (Rothschild, 2008). Ministerial candidate David Cameron omitted 
non-white Tory candidates from campaign leaflets. After becoming Prime Minister, 
Cameron quipped, “We hate immigrants more than Labour” and introduced a twenty-
million-dollar plan to assure “white enclaves” they have nothing to fear from non-white 
immigration (Gohir, 2010; “UK immigration,” 2013).  
Mainstream politicians often respond to the rising xenophobia and fear of the 
immigrant among European publics. Worker mobility from the global South is perceived 
as a danger to receiving societies’ sense of community and as a threat to Europe’s already 
fragile labor market after economic downturn (Dimou, 2015). Refugees from Syria and 
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beyond stoke fears of cultural disharmony and the overwhelming of public resources 
(Fichtner, Popp, Schult, & Smoltczyk, 2015). Terrorist attacks in the United States, 
Madrid, and London, and events like the Charlie Hebdo massacre, serve to frame 
immigrants as a threat to Western societies’ security and well-being in the minds of 
Europeans (Laurence, 2015; Triandafyllidou et al., 2007). Ethnic riots in Belgium, 
France, and Sweden bring the failure of immigrant integration and Islam’s 
incompatibility with Western culture to the forefront of public debate on the Continent 
(Guiraudon, 2006; Higgins, 2013; Riding, 1991; Roy, 2005). Since the 2005 French riots 
in particular, a “crisis of meaning and identity” marks French and European society 
(Schuerkens, 2007, p. 116).  
Such fears of the immigrant are sharpened by right-wing parties and movements, 
which are not only reinvigorated but are deeply entrenched in European politics since the 
2000s. The National Front in France, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, and the 
Italian Northern League participate in their governments’ political process and infuse 
mainstream politics with exhortations to “get rid of, deport or send home foreigners and 
‘the others’” (Azikiwe, 2010). While such urgings have been justified primarily as a 
solution to economic ills, they are increasingly cast in identity terms. For instance, the 
Swiss People’s Party, the most popular party in Switzerland in the 2007 election, 
introduced election campaign posters depicting a black sheep kicked off a Swiss flag by 
three white sheep and images of black, brown and yellow hands grabbing for Swiss 
passports (“On becoming Swiss,” 2008). The UK Independence Party or the Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA) in Germany are making 
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significant political gains by campaigning for the exclusion of Europe’s immigrants 
(Brändlin, 2013; Karnitschnig, Troianovski, & Gross, 2015).  
The quickening pace of European Union integration feeds into the racialization of 
the foreigner and the success of populist parties on the Continent. After the 
unprecedented addition of twelve new members from East Central Europe to the Union in 
2004 and 2007, Western European receiving societies increasingly question the principles 
of free movement and European citizenship (EC, 2008). They initially welcomed their 
eastern neighbors as an alternative to third-country workers, but are now rethinking 
opening their doors to the poor post-Communist immigrants (EC, 2008, pp. 111-114; 
Thränhardt, 2009).14 With the impending removal of transitional agreements to Bulgarian 
and Romanian labor, for instance, debate on welfare tourism and unsustainable “poverty 
                                                          
14 Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia joined the 
European Union in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania followed suit in 2007 (EC, 2013). As a result, the 
number of Eastern Central Europeans working in Western Europe rose by over a million between 2003 and 
2007, with Balkan immigrants contributing to the swelling of the East European migrant pool even further 
(Brücker, 2007, p. 7; EC, 2008, pp. 15-16, 114; Fix et al., 2009). In order to address Western European 
states’ concerns over labor market dislocation with these rising numbers, European states reached a 
compromise that allowed older members of the EU to temporarily abrogate European Community 
principles of free movement of people by imposing Transitional Agreements (TAs) on new member states. 
These arrangements could limit the free movement of East Central European workers (but not other Eastern 
immigrants) for as many as seven years based on a “two plus three plus two” rule (Commission of the 
European Communities [CEC], 2006). During the first two years, older member states were allowed to 
apply national measures or discretionary bilateral formulas to regulate access to their labor markets. Labor 
mobility from new member states could be further limited for three years as a sovereign decision (Brücker, 
2007). Restrictions past the first five years could only be maintained if free labor mobility would result in 
severe disturbances in hosts’ labor markets (CEC, 2006; EC, 2008, pp. 111, 113). Western European 
countries used transitional agreements very differently, resulting in uneven patterns of East-West labor 
mobility. As Sweden and Ireland decided not to impose any restrictions on the movement of the first EU 
joiners, and the United Kingdom applied no restrictions but maintained its Worker Registration Scheme, 
for instance, the Anglo-Saxon countries attracted a large numbers of Polish workers in the mid-2000s (Fix 
et al., 2009). As Southern European countries only limited the movement of workers from both Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans for two years, they welcomed a large number of Romanian, Bulgarian, and to a 
lesser extent Polish immigrants (EC, 2008; INE, 2009). Nonetheless, transitional arrangements and 
immigration patterns on the Continent do not correspond neatly. While Austria and Germany maintained 
limitations on Eastern labor for the maximum period of seven years, for instance, they continued to receive 
large number of Eastern European workers throughout the 2000s. Open Sweden welcomed few migrants 
from the East. Polish workers inundated the markets of the UK and Ireland, but were less predominant in 
Sweden, Spain or Portugal (EC, 2008, pp. 55, 117; Eurostat, 2009). Bulgarians and Romanians 
concentrated in Southern Europe, and less so in the Nordic countries (EC, 2008, pp. 117-120). 
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migration” shook German cities in 2014 (“EU-Richter,” 2014). Similar fears were 
politicized by British Prime Minister David Cameron who threatened to abandon the idea 
of Europe if he was not allowed to severely curb welfare benefits for Eastern Europeans 
and deport unemployed Eastern workers (Onyanga-Omara, 2014). Even in Spain, 
politicians from the right-leaning People’s Party emphasize the stress Balkan immigrants 
put on the welfare system and low-skilled native workers lament the fact that Spain is not 
“kicking out all their immigrants” like Italy or France (Burnett, 2008). 
The Roma, considered incompatible with host communities’ way of life yet 
empowered by European citizenship, create even more powerful cleavages in the “new” 
enlarged Europe (“Ich kann,” 2014; Penketh, 2014). French President Nicholas Sarkozy, 
for instance, ordered a Roma girl to be deported while on her way to school due to a 
belief that “only a minority” of Roma can integrate in France (Rubin, 2013). Hundreds of 
Romanian gypsies were evacuated from their homes in Belfast after Ulster youth attacked 
them on the basis of their race and their perceived abuse of Northern Ireland’s social and 
economic resources (“NI racists,” 2009). A rumor that a Gypsy girl stole a baby was used 
as a justification to evict the residents of a Roma encampment in Naples (Ghosh, 2008; 
Rosenthal, 2008). The systematic discrimination of these ethnically-different European 
nationals chips away at the very idea of a Europe “unified in peace and democracy” 
(European Economic Community [EEC], 1957). 
Tensions surrounding East-West labor mobility, often framed in economic terms, 
are nonetheless firmly embedded in larger debates about national autonomy and identity 
in the face of an ever more overreaching Europe. Especially with economic slowdown, 
individual European governments protest the harmonization of immigration policy or the 
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requirement for burden-sharing under the European umbrella. Enlargement fatigue and 
resentment of supranational limitations on national identity and policy fuel 
Euroskepticism and the success of political parties advocating departure from Europe 
(Messina, 2014). They also lead to the “shifting down” of migration politics to the local 
level, where the rights of all migrants can be restricted and where identity politics can 
thrive (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). For instance, the limitation of welfare benefits on the 
state level in Germany has led to de facto exclusion of Bulgarian and Romanian 
immigrants from some German provinces but not from others (Pohl, 2014). Uneven 
granting of benefits at the municipal level in Ireland precludes Polish migrants from 
settling in certain Irish cities and limits their freedom of movement regardless of their 
European citizenship.15 Electoral success of the National Front in some French cantons 
and town halls has led to restrictions for foreigners, by requiring foreigner registration or 
added inspection of marriage certificates between foreigners and nationals (Guiraudon & 
Lahav, 2000). Local rather than national identity variations are increasingly prominent in 
influencing these patterns of inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant.  
Finally, all of these dynamics play out in new immigration spaces on the 
Continent. Ireland and the Southern European countries not only became the leaders in 
immigration figures in the 2000s, but diverted migration flows from traditional receivers 
of foreign labor (Triandafyllidou et al., 2007). They attracted European and non-
European immigrants due to their high demand for low-skilled labor, their 
underdeveloped and relatively open migration regimes, as well as their comparatively 
tolerant attitudes to migration (Laczko, 2002). The foreign populations in Ireland and 
Spain, for instance, swelled from 1% of the total in the 1990s to more than 10% in the 
                                                          
15 Confidential respondents, personal interviews, September  – December, 2010, Dublin. 
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new millennium (Triandafyllidou et al., 2007). Increasingly important as centers of 
European migration, the new immigration localities are also uniquely unprepared to 
accommodate their foreign workers. Insufficient migration experience leaves the new 
host states ill-prepared to deal with the interrelated challenges of massive immigrant 
inflows, economic stagnation, and fragmented national identity. However, the lack of 
discursive, institutional or policy baggage allows the new host communities to avoid the 
mistake of traditional immigration countries.  
To summarize, immigration, intimately interrelated with identity politics, is one 
of the thorniest issues plaguing European states since the new millennium. Mobility is 
high on the agendas of European states both as an economic and demographic necessity 
and something to control and protect against. Migration threatens European publics and 
leads to their support for populist parties and anti-immigrant measures. The immigration 
issue feeds into doubts about the very idea of a powerful, overarching Europe that would 
limit national identity and sovereignty. With rising Euroskepticism, the tensions 
surrounding migration on the Continent come to affect both non-European and European 
foreign workers, and increasingly play themselves out on the local level. The migration 
debate is centered in new receiving destinations like Ireland and Spain that are uniquely 
unprepared to deal with the contentious issue. Nonetheless, as they had few policies in 
place before the arrival of numerous foreigners in their midst, these new migration spaces 
offer a relatively unadulterated glimpse into migration patterns and experiences on the 
Continent. The chapter turns to the cases of Ireland and Spain next in order to situate 




II.3. The Case of Ireland  
The case of Ireland reflects the general European trends described above, as this 
new host state is dealing with the same challenges that have plagued traditional 
immigration countries on the Continent for decades. As this thesis will demonstrate, 
cultural dynamics and local identity politics affect immigrant reception and integration 
and complicate the management of foreign cohorts there, much like in the rest of Europe. 
However, the project is not concerned with a comparison between Ireland and older host 
states like France or Germany. In fact, the Irish case was selected since it offers a glimpse 
into migration, reception, and incorporation patterns that is relatively unburdened by 
media hyper attention, intense public debate, or association with the polarizing Muslim or 
Roma questions. A factual exposition on the developing trajectory of migration flows to 
Ireland in this chapter is followed by a discussion of the connection between identity on 
the one hand and immigration discourse and integration on the other in subsequent 
sections of the dissertation.   
 
II.3.1. From Emigration to Immigration 
Ireland has long been an emigration country. In response to crises like the Irish 
potato famine or in simple search of a better life, the Irish immigrated in large numbers to 
countries with stronger economic development, like USA, Australia, or the United 
Kingdom. In spite of sixty years of independence from the UK and EU membership, as 
late as the 1980s massive numbers of Irish left their home country.16 
                                                          
16 As many as 70,000 left in 1989 (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 4).  
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However, as the Irish economy experienced unprecedented growth in the 1990s, 
Ireland reached its turning point and finally followed the rest of Europe by transforming 
into an immigration country. Attracted by rapid growth in a variety of economic sectors 
and significantly lower unemployment rates, returning Irish nationals were the first 
massive immigration wave to Ireland during the 1990s. They were succeeded by non-EU 
nationals, who dominated flows between 2001 and 2004 and came to constitute more 
than half of all non-Irish immigration to the country. Nigerian immigrants, mostly 
arriving in the country as asylum seekers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, are still 
among the most numerous foreign groups in Ireland (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009).  
However, it was European Union enlargement that led to a marked rise in 
migration to Ireland. As Ireland, together with Sweden and the UK, was one of three 
countries to immediately open its doors to new EU members, workers from the ten 
countries that acceded to the Union in 2004 elevated Irish migration to new heights. From 
a country with negative migration, Ireland suddenly transformed into the European 
Union’s member with the third highest immigration rate.17 Foreigners came to account 
for 10% of the Irish population in 2007 and this proportion has remained steady into 
2011, regardless of the economic downturn. The migration surge reflects rising mobility 
by citizens from the new EU member states, who constituted half of all new migration 
flows into Ireland in 2005-2009 and account for more than a quarter of immigrant stocks 
in 2011.18 The country is the only EU member state with a predominantly white and 
                                                          
17 Ireland had the highest proportion of immigrants among EU member states in 2009, following only 
Malta and Spain. There were 14.5 migrants per 1,000 native inhabitants in 2009 (Ruhs, 2009). 
18 To be precise, they accounted for 44% of all migration flows in 2005-2008 and for 54% of all non-Irish 
immigration flows for the same time period (Ruhs, 2009). The migration from new member states to 
Ireland grew from 31,000 in 2003 to 203,000 in 2007. In 2011, there were 196,896 citizens of the new EU 
member states in Ireland, compared to a total foreign population of 766,770 persons (CSO, 2008, 2012a). 
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European foreign population (CSO, 2012a).19 In spite of rapid decrease in flows in 2008-
2009 and return migration with the full onset of economic crisis, Eastern Europeans have 
renewed their migration to Ireland in 2010-2011 and continue to play an important role in 
the country’s labor market and socio-cultural life. Together with more established non-
European immigrant groups, East European workers are the primary subject of exclusion 
and inclusion dynamics, as well as integration efforts, in the country.  
 
II.3.2. Nigerian Migrants in Ireland 
 The first large group of non-Irish nationals to arrive in Ireland was that of 
Nigerian immigrants. As Kómoláfé (2008) puts it, “Ireland may well be considered a new 
haven for Nigerian migrants.” Nigerian migration to Ireland began in the 1980s and 
mostly consisted of medical students or trainees who often returned to their home country 
upon completion of their studies. Nigerians started settling in Ireland in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, taking advantage of relatively liberal immigration and asylum laws and 
the accelerating economy. The number of Nigerians officially residing in Ireland 
increased substantially from only 10 in 1996 to 19,780 in 2011.20 While the absolute 
number of Nigerian citizens in Ireland might not be large, Nigerians are the largest non-
EU national group in the country. The Africans have contributed to significant changes in 
Ireland’s and Dublin’s economic, political, and sociocultural landscape (CSO, 2012a; 
Kómoláfé, 2008).  
                                                          
19 In most European countries, the migration flows and stocks of third country nationals far exceed these of 
European Union nationals. The numbers in the Irish case are as follows: In 2007, 3.7% of the population 
consisted of non-EU migrants, 3.9% of EU-15 nationals, and 5.8% of EU10 nationals (EC, 2008). 
20 The actual figure is estimated to be much higher, as it includes a number of undocumented migrants. 
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 Kómoláfé (2008) identifies a number of motivations for Nigerian citizens to 
migrate to Ireland, including regularization of status conveyed by another Western 
European country, persecution, or professional and economic migration. The connection 
between the sending and receiving countries, with many Irish missionaries developing 
education, building churches and villages, and improving the quality of life in Nigeria, 
serves as an additional incentive for Nigerian nationals to select Ireland (ICI, 2008; Ugba, 
2009). Regardless of their true motives, many Nigerians in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
chose to apply for Irish asylum as a fast track to regularization in the country. Nigeria 
was the top country in terms of asylum applications to Ireland until 2011, providing for 
one third of all application in 2001-2005, one fourth of all applications in 2006-2008, and 
one fifth of applications in 2009-2010 (Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner 
[ORAC], 2002-2012).  
Regardless of their route of entry, however, most Nigerians in Ireland are 
economic migrants today. Apart from a number of medical professionals recruited to fill 
gaps in Ireland’s health sector, most Nigerian nationals in the country are employed in 
lower skilled occupations, such as social work, security, retail, manufacturing, or the taxi 
industry.21 These occupations rarely match the educational qualifications of Nigerians in 
Ireland, 38.3% of whom held a third-level degree in 2006 (CSO, 2008). The Africans 
often work in these occupations illegally, after their documentation expired or while they 
are still part of the asylum system. As few are returning home with economic downturn, 
                                                          
21 Between 1996 and 2001, there was an open policy that allowed Nigerian medical doctors and nurses to 
apply for employment permits to Ireland from Lagos and Abuja. These working permits were usually for a 
period of two years, renewable thirty days before expiration. After 2001, the system changed, where 
hospitals went to Nigeria to directly recruit medical doctors and nurses. Once the doctors and nurses arrived 
in Ireland, they only needed to undergo a six-week induction course to begin work (Kómoláfé, 2008; also 
confidential interviews, September-December, 2010, Dublin).  
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Nigerian workers are becoming a permanent presence in Ireland’s low-skilled economic 
sectors.22 These are the sectors where Nigerian immigrants compete for jobs and labor 
market inclusion with other foreign nationals, such as the numerous Polish workers 
inundating Ireland since the mid-2000s.  
 
II.3.3. The Polish in Ireland  
Among Eastern European nationals migrating to Ireland, Poland provided for the 
largest inflows. Attracted to the high wages, liberal economic system, and widely spoken 
English language in the host country, the proverbial “Polish plumber” arrived in every 
Irish town and city after 2004. The Polish quickly inundated the Irish labor market and 
are the largest foreign-born group in Ireland today (CSO, 2012a).23 Some estimates place 
the Polish community in Ireland at close to a quarter of a million persons at its peak 
(Krings, 2010). The proliferation of Polish services, shops, and restaurants, and the 
founding of several Polish-language newspapers in Ireland, such as Polska Gazeta or 
Polski Herald, testify to the rising significance of Polish nationals in Irish society.  
This significance is most clearly identifiable in the Irish labor market, as the 
majority of Polish migrants to Ireland are economic migrants. Most arrivals are male, 
                                                          
22 Indeed, many occupations were closed to permit holders as response to the crisis. Nigerian immigrants 
were given few new permits – in fact, the rate of refusal of permits increased substantially. Also, 
deportation efforts for Nigerians immigrants have substantially intensified since 2010, leading to even 
smaller numbers for the Nigerian group residing in Ireland. However, a large number of Nigerian migrants 
has actually naturalized and acquired citizenship in Ireland and thus cannot be forced to leave. The drive to 
citizenship is related to the referendum changing citizenship laws in Ireland in 2004. Before jus soli was 
replaced by a mixed system with jus soli and jus sanguinis as guiding principles, Nigerian nationals with 
children born in Ireland and thus Irish citizens were permitted to regularize their status and apply for 
citizenship themselves. At the time of the Supreme Court decision overturning the right to a leave to remain 
for Irish-born children, there were 11,500 applications for residence by parents with Irish citizen children 
(Mullally, 2007, p. 28). 
23 The Polish were the largest foreign group in Ireland in 2011 with 122,585 persons compared to 112,259 
UK nationals as the second largest group and 36,683 Lithuanians as the third largest group (CSO, 2012a). 
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young, and single.24 All Polish interviewees in this project are in Ireland for economic 
reasons, even if some also quoted desire for adventure, better knowledge of the English 
language, and the experience of a new country as additional motivations for migration. 
As Barrett (2009) points out, while Eastern European immigrants from the new EU 
member states accounted for 4.5% of the total population in Ireland in 2008, they 
represented 8% of the labor force, an overrepresentation attesting to Poles’ primarily 
economic motives.25 
Not only have Polish nationals come to Ireland to work, but they have come 
armed with high qualifications and educational levels. The Polish labor force in Ireland is 
considered one of the most educated foreign labor forces in the European Union. As high 
as 27.2% of the Polish community in Ireland hold a postsecondary educational degree 
and 19.2% completed postgraduate education (CSO, 2008). According to Barrett and 
Duffy (2008), Eastern European immigrants “compare favorably with the domestic 
labour force in terms of skill levels,” and have higher educational levels than the overall 
population of Poland. 
Nonetheless, the “highly skilled inflow” of Polish workers Barrett (2009) 
describes is concentrated in low-skilled industries and is absent from highly-skilled 
occupations, which are reserved for the Irish themselves and for nationals from the older 
European Union members (Quinn, 2010, xiii). They also earn much less than natives in 
                                                          
24 According to the 2006 Census, male arrivals were almost double the number of female ones. The 
numbers stood at 56,200 compared to 23,000 respectively. What is more, of the 63,000 that reported their 
marital status, 39,000 self-identified as single. Finally, over half of the Polish population in 2006 was 25 to 
40 years of age (CSO, 2008). However, as part of the natural process of family reunification, more 
numerous female Polish nationals arrived in Ireland more recently (Bushin, 2009; Krings, 2010). 
25 Barrett (2009) also points out that while the employment rate for Irish nationals was only 59% in 2008, 
EU12 nationals exhibited an employment rate of 80%. 
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comparable occupations (Barrett & McCarthy, 2007).26 The majority of Poles arriving in 
2004 concentrated in the booming construction industry, with hotels, restaurants, and 
retail attracting a large number of the East Europeans as well (CSO, 2008). 27    
With economic downturn, this sectoral distribution changed. The crash of the 
construction industry pushed many Polish nationals into alternative employment or led 
them to return to their home country and migrate to other EU member states. The number 
of Poles employed in construction shrank significantly after 2008. While at its peak in 
2007 more than one quarter were employed in construction, only 5.6% reported activity 
in the construction sector in the last quarter of 2011. This shift has led to larger numbers 
of Polish nationals to transition to manufacturing jobs (23%). An additional 21% kept 
shops or served as clerks in Irish supermarkets and the rest worked in restaurants and 
hotels as servers, dishwashers, cleaners, and security guards (CSO, 2012b).28 
Encouragingly, some Polish nationals, and especially younger English speakers, 
transitioned to higher-skilled employment in secretarial and administrative support 
positions (CSO, 2012b).29  
Polish workers did not “displace” but rather “replaced” Irish workers from jobs 
they were no longer willing to perform (Foras Áiseanna Saothair [FÁS], 2009). Migration 
                                                          
26 Barrett and Kelly (2010) argue that the income disadvantage for immigrants from new member states is 
45% compared to the earnings of Irish nationals for comparable jobs. 
27 The Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) is a document produced by the Irish Central 
Statistical Office that reflects on a number of economic indicators concerning households in Ireland. 
Unfortunately, the QNHS has only produced an annex documenting foreign workers’ economic activity 
since 2006. Furthermore, the survey deals with broad national groupings, such as Irish, UK, EU15, EU15 to 
EU27 and Other. Therefore, it is impossible to state the precise number of Polish nationals engaged in a 
particular industry in Ireland, but as the Polish group accounts for more than half of the EU15 to EU27 
group, it is safe to conclude that the data for this category reflect the experiences of Polish nationals in 
Ireland (CSO, 2006-2011). 
28 Figures are for the fourth quarter of 2011 and refer to all immigrants from the EU15 to EU27 countries 
(including Bulgaria and Romania). As Poles are by far the largest group and in fact account for 54% of the 
EU15 to EU27 group in 2011, the data are considered representative (CSO, 2012b). 
29 There is an increase even between 2010 and 2011 by as high as three percentage points (CSO, 2012b). 
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from the new member states fit neatly within Ireland’s larger migration strategy to fill all 
labor needs through nationals from the enlarged European Economic Area (Quinn, 2010). 
Government officials and large company representatives even travelled to Eastern 
European countries in the early 2000s to actively recruit labor at the low skill spectrum 
(Wickham, Moriarty, Bobek, & Salamonska, 2008).30  
The massive influx of Polish workers, however, led to the displacement of third-
country workers in Ireland. The Department of the Taoiseach mandated that labor market 
shortages be addressed almost exclusively through the pool of immigrants coming from 
within the European Union (Department of the Taoiseach, 2000). A new Work 
Visa/Work Authorization scheme came into place in 2000 to facilitate high skilled 
migration from outside the EU, while simultaneously closing a rising number of lower 
skilled occupations to non-European citizens through the introduction of market tests 
(Quinn, 2010). The displacement of third-county nationals is apparent in the receding 
number of work permits granted to non-EU citizens in the 2000s (Barrett & Duffy, 2008; 
Krings, 2010). These changes affected Nigerian immigrants most severely. All African 
interviewees in this project reported a sense of displacement by Eastern Europeans, who 
now occupy the jobs previously available to Nigerians.31  
Competition is particularly prominent with economic downturn, and occurs 
among Poles, third-country nationals, other Eastern European workers, and Irish workers 
returning to the jobs they refused to perform during economic boom. It is most fierce in 
the lower skilled occupations reserved for foreigners in Ireland.32 Therefore, the focus 
here is on Polish workers employed in construction, manufacturing, and low-skilled 
                                                          
30 Also, confidential interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin.  
31 Confidential interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin.  
32 Confidential interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin. 
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services. These occupations not only attract the majority of Poles arriving to Ireland, but 
also contain the most dynamic and problematic relationships between Polish nationals on 
the one hand and other immigrant workers, Irish employers, and public officials on the 
other.  
 
II.3.4. Dublin as an Urban Laboratory of Immigrant Exclusion and Inclusion 
The trends described above are even starker on the city level, particularly in 
Ireland’s capital – Dublin. Dublin hosts the highest percentage of non-nationals generally 
(with 21%). It is home to the majority of Poles in Ireland and to forty percent of all 
Nigerian immigrants. While Polish immigrants went to every town and city in Ireland, 
they have concentrated primarily in and around Dublin City. According to the 2006 
census, of the total of 73,033 so-called new accession countries’ nationals, almost 
twenty-two thousand could be found in Dublin compared to only 8,572 in the next largest 
center of residence (CSO, 2008). The Polish Embassy reported that as many as one 
hundred thousand Poles resided in Dublin in 2009 (MSZ, 2009). Dublin’s identity today 
has been permanently enhanced by the Polish hair salons, restaurants, and bakeries in 
Capel Street, the impressive building of the Polish Chaplaincy in the city’s center, or the 
numerous Eastern European shops in Parnell and Dorset Street. The Nigerian community, 
in its turn, has transformed the southwest of the city, where Nigerian immigrants have 
opened shops and restaurants and are an indelible part of the neighborhood (CSO, 2008). 
Therefore, this research focuses on the city of Dublin. Dublin is the urban space where 
the majority of immigrant workers of the two groups of interest are concentrated. It is 
also the setting where Poles’ and Nigerians’ inclusion and exclusion take place and where 
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integration discourses and outcomes unfold. Dublin hosts most of the lower skill 
professions where the two immigrant communities tend to focus and in which they 
compete among each other and with the native population. The city is representative of 
Poles’ and Nigerians’ experiences in Ireland more broadly, as it contains a cross-section 
of these communities in terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural backgrounds. 
Dublin is also a unique urban laboratory for the study of immigrant integration, inclusion 
and exclusion, as it is where the interaction between the two groups, their relationships 
with local labor market and socio-political actors, as well as their own experiences of 
belonging or isolation shape up. Dublin provides for a fruitful comparison with the other 
new migration space discussed in this project – Madrid. It is to the latter that the chapter 
turns next, in order to provide a background for the migration trajectories and experiences 
of Ecuadorians and Bulgarians. 
 
II.4. The Case of Spain  
The case of Spain, like that of Ireland, reflects general European migration trends 
and dilemmas. Cultural dynamics affect immigrant reception and integration in this 
second case study as well. Distinct historical and identity characteristics determine how 
Spanish publics and elites accommodate the different migrants populations in their midst, 
with local and community identity variations defining the unique inclusion, exclusion, 
and incorporation patterns facing the newcomers. These unique identity variations also 
produce a disparate immigration dynamic in Spain from that of Ireland. Migrant cohorts 
in the former are numerous and diverse, while they are largely white and European in the 
latter context (CSO, 2012a; EC, 2008; INE, 2010). A factual exposition of the developing 
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trajectory of migration flows to Spain establishes grounds for comparison with the Irish 
case and introduces the second case study of this dissertation.   
 
II.4.1. From Emigration to Transit Migration to Immigration 
Much like Ireland, Spain is a traditional emigration country. Large numbers of 
Spanish citizens left for North Africa and Latin America in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Due to high unemployment and retarded economic modernization in the 
country, temporary Spanish workers also migrated to more affluent countries in Northern 
Europe in 1950-1970.33 Despite significant development and growth since the oil shocks 
of the 1970s, numerous Spaniards reacted to pan-European economic slowdown by 
renewing their migration to countries like Mexico, Chile, or Brazil as late as 2012 
(Flannery, 2013).34  
As traditional immigrant receivers closed their doors to foreign workers in the 
1970s and Spain joined the European Community in 1986, Spain transitioned from an 
emigration to a transit country, serving as a gateway for Maghrebi migrants heading 
further north and west. Intense economic growth and substantial reduction in 
unemployment finally rendered Spain an immigration country in the late 1980s (Hazán, 
2014, p. 376). The first large wave of migrants in Spain were in fact well-to-do retirees 
from the rest of Europe, moving to Spain to enjoy the favorable climate and way of life. 
                                                          
33In 1850-1950, 3.5 million Spanish workers migrated to the Americas concentrating primarily in 
Argentina, which received almost half of the flows, but also in Uruguay, Brazil, and Cuba. In the 1930s-
1950s, 80% of all Spanish migrants chose the Americas, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s 75% left for the 
rest of Europe (Pérez, 2003). 
34 While only 3,700 Spaniards moved to Latin America in 2005, as many as 30,000 left in 2011 (“¡Ya me 
voy!,” 2012). Renewed emigration from Spain to Latin America simultaneously reasserts Spain’s active 
role in the Iberian community and produces tensions between Spain and Latin American countries. 
Mistreatment of Latin Americans migrants in Spain has led to retaliatory measures towards Spaniards in 
Latin America with Brazil, for instance, requiring “a letter of invitation” of all Spanish visitors since April 
2012 (Flannery, 2013).  
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With economic boom, the Northern Europeans were joined by non-European workers 
from Northern Africa, and especially Morocco, who were attracted to the large 
underground economy, the ample opportunities in the agricultural sector, and the 
historical, cultural, and geographic proximity of Spain (Pérez, 2003).  
It was Latin Americans immigrants, however, who led to the explosion of the 
foreign population in the receiving country in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Traditional 
migrants from Argentina, Venezuela or Chile came to be complemented by ever rising 
numbers of Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Dominican workers. Taken together, South 
Americans quickly surpassed Moroccans as the primary source of non-European 
migration to Spain (Hazán, 2014, p. 377). Drawn to ample economic opportunities in 
services, construction and agriculture, preferential and lax immigration policies, tolerant 
attitudes, as well as similar economic, social, and cultural structures in home and host 
countries, Ecuadorians became the second largest foreign group in Spain after Moroccans 
in 2001 (Arango, 2012; Pérez, 2003; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014).  
Latin American workers were joined by a steady flow of Eastern European 
laborers, especially after Spain removed all limitations to the movement and employment 
of citizens from the new EU member states in 2006 and 2009. After Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the Union in 2007, the influx of East Europeans into Spain peaked. 
Balkan migrants grew from 7% to 20% of all European foreigners in Spain between 2000 
and 2011 and continue to arrive in the host country despite high unemployment, 
economic contraction, souring public attitudes, and the renewed emigration of Spanish 
nationals (Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014, p. 3). Romanians and Bulgarians are 
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among the ten largest foreign nationalities in Spain, with Bulgarians as the fastest 
growing European immigrant group in the receiving country (OECD, 2013b). 
As a result of these numerous migration waves, Spain’s migrant stocks grew from 
1.5 million people in 2000 to 5.4 million in 2012 (OECD, 2011, 2013b). Much like 
Ireland, Spain contains some of the highest concentrations of foreigners among 
developed countries and in fact only trails the United States in terms of relative migration 
figures (Arango, 2012; OECD, 2013b). Unlike Ireland, however, Spain contains a diverse 
foreign population comprised of large numbers of Northern Europeans, Africans, Balkan 
immigrants, and Latin Americans. This intricate and varied migration landscape produces 
complex patterns of immigrant inclusion, exclusion and incorporation in the receiving 
state, especially as Spain continues to experience economic contraction and high levels of 
unemployment. The interaction among natives, Latin American workers, and Bulgarian 
laborers is particularly dynamic.  
 
II.4.2. Ecuadorian Migrants in Spain 
 The fastest growing group of non-Spanish nationals in Spain is that of Latin 
American immigrants, and since 2000, Ecuadorians in particular. While Spaniards have 
migrated to South America since the 19th century, Latin Americans started to arrive in 
steady numbers in Spain in the 1970s for the first time. Political refugees and highly-
educated workers from Chile, Venezuela or Argentina, these foreign cohorts were 
considered unproblematic in terms of integration and remained largely unnoticed by 
native publics (Peixoto, 2012). With hyperinflation and economic stagnation at home, 
tighter immigration controls in alternative destinations like the United States, and 
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preferential policy arrangements, Ecuadorians began to arrive in Spain in large numbers 
since the late 1990s. Together with Peruvians, they came to dominate South American 
migration to Spain in the 2000s. The number of Ecuadorians in Spain increased from 
76,000 in 2001 to 457,000 persons in 2006, a figure that is close to 300,000 persons in 
2013 (Bertoli, Moraga, & Ortega, 2010; INE, 2014). Ecuadorians remain the largest Latin 
American, the second largest non-European, and the fourth largest immigrant group in 
Spain despite return migration (INE, 2014; Rodriguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014). As 
they are active in the receiving country’s economic, political, and sociocultural life, 
Ecuadorians are highly significant to Spain’s and Madrid’s migration landscape and 
constitute one of the four case studies in this dissertation. 
 The motivations for Ecuadorians to migrate to Spain are largely economic, even 
though institutional and cultural openness have a large role to play a well. The Spanish 
economy entered a period of rapid growth from 1994 to 2007, corresponding almost 
exactly with massive migration of Latin Americans into the receiving country. Since the 
growth was fueled by investment in real estate and tourism, the tourism and construction 
industries expanded disproportionately and generated strong demand for low-skilled 
foreign workers. The seven million jobs created in Spain in these sectors between 1998 
and 2007 were filled mostly by Latin American workers (Hazán, 2014, pp. 378-379).  
A number of bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries 
opened ample employment opportunities for the Latin Americans and granted them 
generous rights in Spain. Bilateral arrangements in the 2000s, for instance, defined 
Ecuadorians’ access to the Spanish labor market, facilitated seasonal employment or the 
assessment of professional qualifications, and ensured labor and social rights. Quota 
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systems instituted in 1993-1995, 1997-1999 and in 2002 to respond to short- and long-
term shortages in the Spanish labor market were largely filled through South American 
workers, especially these already in the country (Pérez, 2003). Latin Americans 
accounted for one third of all work permits granted in the 2000s. Further, a 1960 bilateral 
arrangement guaranteed that Ecuadorian pension benefits were fully transferable from 
home to host country. A 1963 agreement allowed Ecuadorians to be admitted in Spain for 
a period of three months without a visa, provided they had “approximately $2,000 (‘la 
bolsa’), a credit card, tourist plan, hotel reservations, confirmed return flight, and 
justification for being in Spain” (Jokisch & Pribilsky, 2002). The stay was extendable 
beyond the initial three-month allowance. While the visa waiver was removed in 2003 so 
that Spain conforms to European directives, Ecuadorians who used the arrangement in 
prior to 2003 could remain in the receiving state without authorization. Periodic 
amnesties, occurring in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, and 2001, and 2005 and targeting Latin 
Americans in particular, channeled these irregular migrants into legal employment in the 
country (Bertoli et al., 2010).  
Cultural proximity and a shared language complemented economic and 
institutional openness and made Spain an even more attractive destination for the Latin 
American immigrants (Hall, 2008). To provide an illustration, Bertoli et al. (2010) argue 
that between 1999 and 2005, Ecuadorians were almost three times more likely to seek 
employment in Spain than in the United States, their traditional destination.  
 Ecuadorians are firmly embedded in the Spanish labor market despite crisis and 
return migration. Most arrivals are relatively young and single, with women likely to 
migrate to Spain as frequently as men.  A majority hold a high school or primary school 
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diploma only, with few college graduates (Bertoli et al., 2010; Rodríguez-Planas & 
Vegas, 2012).35 Regardless of education, Ecuadorians in Spain are likely to be employed 
in low-skilled services and construction, much like their Nigerian and Polish counterparts 
in Dublin and Bulgarian ones in Madrid (Bernardi, Garrido, & Miyar, 2011). 
Employment is most likely in domestic and elderly care for women and construction for 
men, even though both groups are transitioning to other low-skilled services with 
economic downturn (Dudley, 2013; Jokisch & Pribilsky, 2002). While Ecuadorians 
usually arrive in Spain legally, moreover, they are likely to lose authorization and fall 
into the intricate Spanish underground economy at least at one time of their stay in Spain 
(Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012). It is in this gray economy and the low-skilled sectors 
identified above that Ecuadorians compete for labor market inclusion with other foreign 
workers, such as the numerous Balkan laborers entering Spain since the mid-2000s. 
 
II.4.3. Bulgarian Workers in Spain  
Eastern and Central European nationals have migrated to Spain since the collapse 
of the Iron Curtain. However, Romanians and Bulgarians became the fastest growing 
groups after the latest European Union enlargement in 2007 and Spain’s decision to 
remove barriers to their labor after two years. The Balkan workers have also been 
attracted to the familiar and flexible market structure in the receiving country, the 
favorable climate, and their hosts’ similar disposition and culture (Slavkova, 2012). As a 
result, there are over 170,000 Bulgarians residing in Spain in 2014, making Spain the 
home of the largest Bulgarian diaspora abroad. The Bulgarian cohort in Spain grew by 
112% between 2006 and 2007, making it one of the ten largest nationalities in the host 
                                                          
35 Only 7%-12% of Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas’ (2012) Ecuadorian interviewees held a university degree. 
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state (INE, 2009, 2010, 2014).36  A number of ethnic associations and foundations and a 
Bulgarian newspaper, Nova Duma, testify to Bulgarians’ embeddedness in Spanish 
society.  
Much like Ecuadorians, Bulgarians migrate to Spain to work. As the Bulgarian 
government’s transition to a market economy resulted in high inflation and 
unemployment rates, many Bulgarians left in search of better opportunities, particularly 
to Southern Europe (Slavkova, 2008). For instance, a 2005 study of 202 Bulgarians found 
that even before entry in the European community, a substantial number of Bulgarians 
went to Spain to improve their economic situation (Markova, 2005). According to 
another survey, three quarters of Balkan immigrants in Spain were employed within a 
short period from arrival, a figure comparable to that for Ecuadorians (Rodríguez-Planas 
& Vegas, 2012). 
Bulgarians in Spain are young and single (Markova, 2005).37 They are relatively 
low-skilled and have fewer qualifications than both the Polish and Nigerian groups in 
Ireland, but are better educated than Ecuadorians.38 However, like their Ecuadorian 
counterparts, Bulgarians take low-skilled jobs in the host country (Rodríguez-Planas & 
Nollenberger, 2014). Female migrants compete with their Ecuadorian counterparts for 
jobs in the elderly and domestic services. Most serve as internas (live-in domestic 
                                                          
36 Bulgarians are selected rather than Romanians, since Bulgarians are still among the most prominent 
foreign populations in Spain and are rising in numbers during economic downturn. Bulgarians also have 
similar legal-political status and motivations for migration to those of Romanians. However, they are not 
immediately racialized through the stereotype of the “Roma” as their Romanian counterparts. Therefore, 
they provide a more realistic picture of immigrant experiences in the receiving context.  
37 For example, Markova (2005)’s respondents were mostly in the 25-34 age group (37%).  
38 Markova (2005) finds that 69% of Bulgarians in Spain completed high school education, usually with a 
technical specialization. Another 27% held a university or a postgraduate degree. Only around 10% of 
Ecuadorians held a college degree or better according to Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012). To compare, 




workers engaged in house work, baby-sitting, or elderly care). Some internas transition to 
employment in small businesses printing or distributing leaflets (careteras), cleaning 
offices and shops, or supporting the tourism sector. Bulgarian males are employed in 
low-skilled services and in unqualified construction jobs (Markova, 2005). Since 
Bulgaria only joined the European Union in 2007 and restrictions to the Balkan migrants’ 
labor were only removed in 2009, many Bulgarians residing in Spain have been in 
unauthorized status at one point of their stay and have interacted with Latin American 
workers in the Spanish underground economy. In this gray space, they are exploited by 
other foreigners, their settled or naturalized compatriots, and Spanish employers.39  
The four immigrant groups discussed in this dissertation are highly comparable. 
They offer a realistic view into immigrant reception and integration in the cities, since 
they are relatively unburdened by history, international relations, or excessive media 
attention.  None of the four immigrant populations are of predominantly Muslim faith and 
therefore their experiences have not been scrutinized and skewed by a hyper vigilant 
media. While Ecuador was a Spanish colony, the relationship falls in the distant past, and 
escapes considerations of recent colonial hierarchies, resentments, or fears (Flesler, 2008; 
Lange, Mahoney, & Von Hau, 2006; Mendoza, 2001). The specter of the Roma does not 
automatically skew perceptions of the Bulgarian in Madrid, as it would in the case of the 
Romanian.   
The four groups occupy a similar labor market position despite their 
qualifications, legal status, or point of entry. All four cohorts have been employed in the 
construction and low-skilled service sectors and have worked in the host countries 
                                                          
39 56% of Markova (2005)’s interviewees were irregular in 2005. Many entered prior to 2007 using the 
same visa waiver as Ecuadorian migrants and overstayed their authorization. Some took part of the 
amnesties organized by the Spanish governments or acquired legal status through an employment offer. 
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without authorization at some point of their migration. Interestingly, unlike Polish 
immigrants in Ireland, Bulgarians in Spain did not displace older non-European migrants 
from these occupations, even with economic crisis. The Latin Americans’ identity 
characteristics and language skills make them desirable employees preferred to 
Bulgarians regardless of the EU citizenship of the latter. All four populations concentrate 
in the receiving countries’ capital cities, where they interact with employers, politicians, 
and native populations and negotiate opportunities, status, and identities. 
 
II.4.4. Madrid as an Urban Laboratory of Immigrant Exclusion and Inclusion 
The trends described above are more pronounced on the city level, where East 
European and Latin American immigrants interact and compete with each other, get 
welcomed or excluded, and strive to integrate in practice. While foreign populations 
concentrate in a number of agricultural and urban locations in Spain, and are numerous in 
the autonomous communities of Andalucía, Valencia, and Madrid, the Bulgarian and 
Ecuadorian cohorts focus mostly in Spain’s capital – Madrid. While the foreign 
population in Spain stood at 14% of the total, it represented 16% of the total, or more 
than one million people, in Madrid in 2012. The second largest foreign group in Madrid 
in 2012 was the Ecuadorian, with almost 100,000 people or 10% of all foreign nationals 
in the autonomous community (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). One third of all 
Ecuadorian immigrants work and live in Madrid. Madrid’s identity is largely defined by 
South American shops, businesses, restaurants and neighborhoods, especially in the 
districts of Ciudad Lineal, Latina, and Carabanchel (Dirección General de Estadística, 
2007; Lucko, 2007). Madrid is also the home of a substantial Balkan community, with 
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Bulgarians among the top ten nationalities in the city with 32,000 people (Comunidad de 
Madrid, 2012a). Since one quarter of all Bulgarians in Spain cluster in the capital city, the 
Balkan newcomers have radically transformed their new home with a multitude of 
foundations and ethnic associations, hair salons, restaurants, and supermarkets. Since 
Bulgarians also tend to select the neighborhoods of Ciudad Lineal, Latina, and 
Carabanchel, it is in these localities that the East Europeans coexist and compete with 
their Latin American counterparts (Dirección General de Estadística, 2007). 
Consequently, this thesis focuses on the city of Madrid. Madrid hosts the majority 
of Ecuadorian and Bulgarian immigrants of interest to this project and places them 
together in tightly knit migration and living spaces. It is in this urban setting that the 
immigrants’ inclusion and exclusion take place and integration dynamics unfold. Madrid 
also contains most of the lower skill professions where the two immigrant communities 
focus and in which they compete among each other, with other foreign cohorts, and with 
the native population. The city provides for a fruitful comparison with the case of Dublin, 
where the experiences of Polish and Nigerian workers develop.  Madrid is representative 
of Bulgarians’ and Ecuadorians’ experiences in Spain more broadly, as it contains a cross 
section of these communities in terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural 
backgrounds. However, it is also a unique, as it is where the interaction between the two 
groups, their relationships with local stakeholders, and their own experiences of 
belonging or isolation shape up. It is to these experiences that the dissertation turns in the 
next two chapters, by first outlining the discourse of welcome and rejection the four 





BUT THEY ARE NOT “JUST THE SAME AS US”: 
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID 
 
III.1. Introduction 
 How are Polish and Nigerian workers received in Dublin? Are Ecuadorians and 
Bulgarians welcomed or rejected in Madrid? What explains the reception patterns of the 
four immigrant groups? This chapter responds to these empirical questions in order to 
address the general question: How do Western European receiving societies construct 
inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant? The main finding is that identity politics affect 
immigrant reception in Dublin, Madrid and beyond. Local stakeholders include or 
exclude foreign workers not on the basis of economic utility, but in view of how well the 
newcomers fit into the host communities’ ideal identity.40 Immigrants are welcomed if 
they are perceived as similar to natives in terms of race/ethnicity, religion, history, 
language, culture, and “work ethic.” Foreign populations are excluded if they are framed 
as different on the basis of the same characteristics. Commonalities between desirable 
immigrant populations and natives are invented while connections with undesirable 
groups are downplayed in order to reassert the receiving city’s favorable identity 
variations while discounting unfavorable traits.  
The six markers of similarity and difference are not objective, but are subjective, 
flexible, and strategic. Their interpretation and prominence vary significantly across 
                                                          
40 The chapter and the thesis are not concerned with assessing the relative explanatory power of economic 
and cultural determinants of immigrant reception and integration in Europe. The causal connection between 
economic factors and immigrant reception is beyond the scope of the project. This dissertation is only 
concerned with establishing how identity politics figure in discourses of exclusion and inclusion in new 
immigration receiving spaces on the Continent.    
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different receiving contexts. These categories are firmly embedded in the city, with 
relevant stakeholders adamantly placing their self-identification in the local level, often in 
opposition to national or supranational projects of identity-building.  
 















The experiences of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and 
Bulgarians in Madrid attest to the significance of local identity for immigrant inclusion 
and exclusion. Chapter III establishes that Polish immigrants are included in Dublin’s 
landscape, since they are constructed to be “just the same as us.” 41 Shared strong work 
ethic, white European ethnicity, Catholicism, history of emigration and independent 
spirit, as well as an accepting and friendly disposition establish strong kinship between 
the Irish and the Polish, while also reasserting these positive qualities in Dubliners’ own 
self-identification. Language skills inadequacies are overlooked in order to maintain this 
discourse of inclusion intact. Poles place in the left-hand column of Table III.1.  
                                                          
41 Chapter III and this dissertation define immigration reception patterns, or inclusion-excluion dynamics, 
as discourse constructed by elites interlocutors, as well as the general public. Reception is not understood 
as policies or laws. It is assumed that discourse underlies policy creation and implementation. However, 














































Nigerians in Dublin are narrated as “different” regardless of actual historical and 
cultural connections with the host country. Their racial and cultural dissimilarity, bogus 
asylum claims and subservient status in the British Empire, as well as poor work ethic, 
are employed to exclude them from the receiving city. Suspect religious belonging, 
different intonation, and inadequate language capabilities are further invented to relegate 
the Africans to the right-hand column of Table III.1. 
Ecuadorians’ work ethic and educational levels are questioned by Spaniards. The 
South Americans are framed as similar and are included in Madrid regardless of these 
shortcomings. Madrilenians focus on the Latin Americans’ shared religion, language, and 
history, as well as jovial and friendly disposition, in order to reassert their own Iberian-
American self-identification. Ecuadorians’ dissimilar racial characteristics are narrated as 
an advantage, and stress Madrilenians’ commitment to multiculturalism and equality.42 
The South American population locates in the left-hand column of Table III.1.    
Bulgarians in Madrid are perceived to share a European identity, proclivity to 
“work hard,” and belonging to similar political norms with the Spanish. Limited 
acceptance of the Balkan migrants reinforces Spaniards’ own identity as European, which 
was questioned in the 1980s while Spain was finding its space within the European 
Union. However, Bulgarians’ connection to the Roma ethnicity, their criminal 
proclivities, their different religion and inability or unwillingness to speak Spanish, as 
well as their dissimilar social disposition are also emphasized, in order to construct an 
image of this group that is neutral at best and negative at worst. Bulgarians fall in the 
right-hand column of Table III.1. 
                                                          
42 Race here is not an objective hard category, but a fluid characteristic that can be framed to include or 
exclude any immigrant group. 
69 
 
The local identity particularities of Dublin and Madrid shape the interpretation 
and prominence of the subjective categories through which immigrant reception is 
constructed. For instance, “language nationalism” and painful memories of a dictatorial 
past, combined with emphasis on democracy and multiculturalism, define local 
stakeholders’ understanding of what Madrid should stand for. Conflict between an 
Iberian-American and a European identity determines reception for different foreign 
cohorts in the Spanish receiving space. On the other hand, Catholicism, ethnic 
homogeneity and opposition to historical domination by a powerful British Empire 
influence the contours of immigrant inclusion and exclusion in Dublin. Ties with white, 
European, and spirited Polish newcomers are invented, while historical connections with 
Nigerian migrants within the British sphere of influence are undermined.  
These findings are grounded in analysis of semi-structured interviews with thirty 
to forty local stakeholders in each context, as these are the actors that are influenced by 
the city’s identity, (re)interpret this identity, and determine who is accepted or not in the 
city.43 These local officials define both the discourse of immigrant reception and the 
construction and implementation of immigration policy.44 A survey of one hundred 
randomly selected Spanish- and Irish-born natives introduces a quantitative element to 
                                                          
43 These include city hall and governmental administrators, mayoral officers, local political representatives 
from across the political spectrum, trade union leaders, local representatives of national, regional and 
European political institutions, journalists and researchers, as well as employers of immigrants. Their 
selection is purposive, as there are a finite number of such leaders in immigration politics and reception. 
Only immigrant employers, who are numerous in Dublin and Madrid, were selected through referrals by 
other participants and randomly, after observation of different areas in the city and walk-in requests for an 
interview. See Appendix A for details. 
44 The interviews are analyzed through simple tabulation. The sample is too small to warrant statistical 
analysis and too homogenous in terms of socio-cultural and demographic characteristics to warrant 
discourse analysis. Nonetheless, there are clear repeating trends that emerge from the responses and hold 
regardless of the participants’ identity or characteristics. 
70 
 
the analysis in Chapter III and reinforces the significance of identity for immigrant 
reception in Dublin and Madrid.45  
The chapter proceeds as follows. A summary of reception patterns for the four 
groups is followed by discussion of these patterns’ limited material bases. The bulk of the 
chapter is dedicated to the non-material sources of inclusion and inclusion, with ethnicity, 
religion, language, history, work ethic, and culture discussed in turn.  
 
III.2. The Contours of Immigrant Reception in Dublin and Madrid 
 Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin and Bulgarian and Ecuadorian laborers 
in Madrid are a permanent part of the receiving cities and have enriched the host societies 
in which they are embedded. Nonetheless, the four groups have engendered dissimilar 
sentiments in their new communities. They have also been evaluated quite differently by 
local officials, employers, and the general public, even as economic downturn produces a 
more negative attitude towards all immigrant populations in the cities.46 The outlook of 
the reception of each group is detailed below, on the basis of interview and survey data.47 
Table III.2 summarizes the main indicators underlying these reception patterns. 
                                                          
45 This author conducted a survey with one-hundred randomly selected local residents who are the 
“consumers” of the immigrant groups’ labor and interact with them in the socio-cultural spheres of Dublin 
and Madrid. Surveys in Dublin were carried on in December 2010 and in Madrid – in April-May 2011. One 
hundred valid samples were produced in Ireland and ninety in Spain. The participants were solicited in 
different neighborhoods of the two cities, both in city centers and immigrant-heavy communities, in order 
to account for variation in opinion based on social contact or economic class reflected in these geographic 
differences. Participants were approached at shopping malls, bus or train stops, or on the street. Surveys 
were analyzed through simple regression and correlation analysis, using the SPSS software. See Appendix 
B for survey instrument and descriptive statistics. 
46 Local labor market actors and the general public present a consistent narrative of Polish and Nigerian 
immigrants in Dublin and Ecuadorian and Bulgarian workers in Madrid, with all expert respondents 
highlighting similar themes regarding the four groups. However, some of the officials attribute the narrative 
to something they have heard among the public or to other local administrators and actors.  
47 Several questions in the interviews with local stakeholders are employed as indicators of general 
reception patterns. Particularly, relevant actors were asked if the immigrant groups of interest are necessary 
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III.2.1. The Reception of Polish Immigrants in Dublin  
 Polish immigrants are received into the Irish labor market and sociocultural 
landscape in almost unexpectedly positive terms by politicians, the media, and the 
general public (Table III.2). Public officials were surprised that the massive Polish 
migration into Ireland, which constituted the first large economic migration wave Ireland 
ever experienced, did not engender fears of “swamping” or “inundation” of Dublin’s 
labor market and society (D5-ADMIN). The Polish were instead received with “novelty 
and curiosity”, a sense of kinship and empathy, and consternation at stories of 
exploitation of Polish workers. Attempts by political party Fine Gael to “play the race 
card” against Polish immigrants largely backfired (D1-J). Despite “a certain amount of 
racism” in Dublin, Polish immigrants in the city are “largely accepted” (D2-TU).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
to the receiving city or are seen as too many. They were asked how other elite and rank-and-file members 
of the city have received the immigrants. Stakeholders were asked whether the consequences of the 
immigrants’ mobility are mostly positive or negative. They were also queried about the immigrants’ 
perceived efforts to fit in the cities’ life through actions like learning the language or buying property. Both 
public officials and the respondents of the survey conducted by this author were also asked to directly rate 
their experiences with the four immigrant groups of interest to this dissertation through categories ranging 




Polish Nigerian Ecuadorian Bulgarian 
Swamping/unease     
Empathy     
Accepted by others in the city     
Rejected by others in the city     
Positive consequences      
Negative consequences      
Direct evaluation  Very good N/A Very good Good 
Efforts to fit in     
No efforts to fit in     
RECEPTION  Included Excluded Included Conflicted 
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Positive public discourse is reflected in public opinion as well. In a survey this 
author conducted with one hundred randomly-selected Dubliners in December 2010, 
90.6% rated their interactions with Polish immigrants as “excellent,” “very good” or 
“good,” with a majority of persons giving the East Europeans a “very good” evaluation 
and only 3.1% rating Poles as “poor” or “very poor.”48 This highly positive evaluation 
occurred regardless of the fact that Poles were considered the most visible group in the 
city by 88.8% of survey participants. Large population size does not translate into a 
negative evaluation in the case of the Polish in Dublin.49  
This positive reception correlates with officials’ and the public’s evaluation of the 
East Europeans’ ability to “fit in” into Dublin’s landscape. Undoubtedly, Poles are 
becoming an indelible part of the city. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, 
they also tend to remain embedded in their ethnic community and communicate, work, 
and live mostly with their conationals. Yet objective indicators have little space in public 
discourse, which declares Polish immigrants’ success in “fitting in.” Officials argue that 
“without exception” the Polish in Dublin “have integrated,” “settled” and “have at least 
one Irish friend” (D8-ADMIN; D15-E). They are reported to “have integrated easier” 
than other immigrant populations in Dublin, moreover, and to “have settled, have settled 
ties here, have children here … have bought property here” (D6-TU). Assimilating into 
the city’s life is invariably associated with learning the English language, where the 
                                                          
48 The remaining 6.3% evaluated Poles as “adequate.” 
49 According to Sides and Citrin (2007), native populations that overestimate the numbers of an immigrant 
cohort also overestimate its negative consequences for the receiving society. This hypothesis does not hold 
in the case Poles in Dublin.  I argue that this is the case, since the general public construct their acceptance 
of the Polish not based on “the pocketbook,” or the immigrants’ effects on the Irish economy, but based on 
“the flag,” or similar Poles’ contribution to the city’s identity (Aksoy, 2012). As non-material factors 
matter more for inclusion and exclusion, the foreign group’s similarity to locals does not present a threat to 
socio-cultural cohesion. Political and media discourse trickles into public opinion. The general public are 
somewhat conflicted in their evaluation of the Polish, but follow closely the official narrative.  
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language barrier in the case of Polish immigrants is downplayed and even ignored. The 
proliferation of Polish shops, organizations and publications is not only a sign of Poles’ 
embeddedness in Dublin, but also an indication of the positive effects of Polish migration 
on the city’s life and culture: 
But the other sign of how the Polish have adapted is the way they have set up shops and retail 
outlets for their own products. They attend church services in quite large numbers. And they 
mix with the Irish community by and large. I think they mix quite well with the Irish 
community and they also have their own networks and their own communities in Ireland 
(D2-TU) 
  
I’d say maybe five-ten years ago we didn’t have a Polish food section in the shops.  We didn’t 
have Polish documents in the newspapers.  We have that now (D4-P) 
 
The Polish people seemed to fit in to Ireland whether it was the shared religion, that shared 
experience, I am not too sure, but certainly they seemed to fit really well in the Irish way of 
life, they seemed to be a little bit Irish in the sense that they know how to enjoy themselves, 
they are very sociable, they were very quick to settle their own communities, their own 
chaplain in the church, and their own shops, and there as a certain level of entrepreneurship 
in providing things like translation services, and groceries and stuff like that that you would 
get in those communities (D7-TU) 
 
III.2.2. The Reception of Nigerian Immigrants in Dublin  
Unlike their Polish counterparts, Nigerian immigrants are excluded from Dublin 
(Table III.2). Nigerians comprised the first migratory wave into Ireland after it became 
an immigration receiver and despite their relatively meager numbers, they were reported 
to have caused “a shock to the system” (D25-J). In a country with “no history of black 
people,” Nigerians immigrants arriving in Ireland engendered an attitude of “we have 
nothing in common here” among the native population (D1-J). As the majority arrived 
through the asylum system, Nigerians were received with fears that they will overwhelm 
and abuse social resources in Ireland. When they were dispersed into Irish communities, 
native residents expressed “concern” with their perceived illegality and criminality, as 
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well as “irrational fears” that they will “take over” and corrupt local communities (D1-J; 
D25-J). The Irish “closed their doors to the Africans” (D28-P). 
This negative reception is paralleled by a negative evaluation of Nigerians’ ability 
to integrate in Dublin, at least compared to Poles. Indeed, the Polish are reported to have 
“integrated much better than the Nigerians,” who continue to experience problems with 
incorporation (D25-J). Some expert interviewees discuss the “community energy” of 
Nigerian immigrants and their knack for founding shops, bars or restaurants as a positive 
indicator of integration (D3-P). Since many Nigerian immigrants have children, contact 
in the Irish school system is found particularly helpful in facilitating African migrants’ 
transition to Ireland and mitigating the negative reactions towards them.  
Nonetheless, it is predominantly organizations that serve the Nigerian community 
that hold these positive views. Irish political, economic, and social actors instead 
emphasize the challenges with Nigerians’ integration. Those arriving through the asylum 
system are often considered severely obstructed in their assimilation efforts. While blame 
is not directly placed on asylum seekers, but is recognized to lie in the asylum system or 
even the Irish government, Nigerian migrants are still deemed as reluctant to establish 
connections with their host country and “set down their roots here” (D13-P). Nigerians 
are perceived to “stick together” in less desirable areas of the city and live a “parallel 
life” in Ireland (D6-TU; D9-P; D11-L; D12-E; D41-NO).  
Interestingly, while the level of multiculturalism Polish immigrants bring to the 
city is portrayed as positive in official discourse, the multiculturalism that comes with the 
“Nigerialization” of Parnell street is either overlooked or admitted to “make people 
nervous” (D25-J; D42-NO). According to one participant, sharing a geographic space 
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does not create multiculturalism and the idea of the “New Irish” remains a myth (D28-
P).50 The more diverse the immigrant populations in Dublin, the more difficult it is 
considered accommodating them and the stronger the anti-immigrant sentiments of the 
local population grow. 
 
III.2.3. The Reception of Ecuadorian Immigrants in Madrid 
 Like the Polish in Dublin, Ecuadorians in Madrid are received warmly in the city 
(Table III.2). After Moroccan immigrants “did not adapt very well,” Ecuadorians who 
“have a language like ours, a culture that is similar and so on” were eagerly invited to the 
receiving context to fill positions in domestic care, construction or agriculture (M23-TU; 
Pérez, 2003).51 The economic crisis has admittedly caused some Spaniards “to be against 
migrants, because they think that they are trying to take something from them” and has 
introduced a “competitive aspect” in the otherwise tolerant city (M20-ADMIN; M28-
EU). However, the strong socio-cultural bonds between Madrilenians and the South 
Americans have resulted in continued “good feelings” for the immigrant cohort and 
efforts in including what are conceived of as “European Latinos” (M16-P; M31-R). A 
survey by the European Union’s Center for Sociological Investigation (CIS) similarly 
found that only 0.8% of Spanish respondents had no sympathy for Ecuadorians 
(compared to 15.4% in the case of Romanians), where 14.1% of participants found Latin 
Americans most acceptable or “easiest to sympathize with” in Spain, the largest 
                                                          
50 The “New Irish” was a series by the Irish Times that covered various immigrant communities residing in 
Dublin. Much like the One City, One People program by the Dublin City Hall, this series proponed the idea 
that ethnic communities residing in the city could maintain their cultural identity while adopting Irish 
culture and nationality. The series also promoted inclusion of immigrant populations in the country (D1-J). 
51 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Los marroquís no se adaptan muy bien, vamos a 
probar con los países de Sudamérica, que tienen un lenguaje como el nuestro, una cultura parecida y tal…”  
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percentage among all foreign nationalities or regional groups (Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas [CIS], 2012, pp. 11-12). In the survey with Madrilenians conducted by this 
author, a majority of respondents identified Ecuadorians as the largest group in the city, 
yet this estimation did not translate into a negative evaluation of the group. 
 Welcome for the cohort correlates with the perception that Ecuadorians “come to 
set down roots and stay” in Madrid (M13-E).52 The Latin Americans are perceived to 
“have fewer problems [fitting in] than, for example, Bulgarians” and to be able to make it 
much easier than Moroccans who are yet to belong after twenty or more years in the 
receiving context (M11-E).53 As the South Americans “present few problems”54 with 
integration and there is no perception that “they should be changing something [or] need 
to make a bigger effort to integrate, to accept our values,” Ecuadorians are deemed to 
“have the best…integration [in the city]” (M19-ADMIN; M27-L; M33-ADMIN). 
As Ecuadorians are beneficiaries of fast-track naturalization procedures, but more 
so as “they speak the language” and have similar culture, they are narrated to “want ot 
live the rest of their lives here, even if they are unemployed” (M16-P). They are reported 
to have “settled permanently” and to “bring their kids or have kids” in the host city (M16-
P; M19-ADMIN). Ecuadorians’ embeddedness in the receiving context is indicated by 
their proclivity to naturalize in large numbers, buy apartments in Madrid, place their 
children in the Spanish educational system, and exhibit “feelings of belonging, some 
degree of attachment” (M31-R). One respondent shares a telling anecdote: 
                                                          
52Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Sudamericanos por general es gente que todo lo 
contrario al gente del Este, vienen para echar raíces y quedarse.”  
53Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Yo creo que Sudamérica tiene menos problemas 
como, por ejemplo, búlgaros.” 




There was the question, “Are you planning to return, to go back?” They said, “Yes, for the 
holidays.” That is, they feel Spanish (M31-R) 
 
Some expert interviewees admit that South Americans in Madrid engage in 
segmented assimilation, where they incorporate to unfavorable niches of society in 
Madrid, “do not go to school…and are on the streets,” and engage in “Latino gangs with 
their fights and rivalries” (M18-ADMIN).55 However, even such patterns are taken to 
signify Ecuadorians’ permanence in the city and their transformation from Latin 
Americans into “European Latinos,” much like in the US (M16-P). 
 
III.2.4. The Reception of Bulgarian Immigrants in Madrid  
Finally, while Bulgarians in Madrid are not rejected like Nigerians in Dublin, they 
face a neutral treatment at best (Table III.2). As Spain itself was perceived to suffer from 
second-class citizenship in the European Union upon joining in 1986, a certain 
expectation existed among administrators that the new Balkan members of the EU will be 
met with empathy by Spaniards. However, as two expert respondents stated, while “being 
part of the European Union should [translate into] the same rights, you cannot tell [with 
Bulgarians]” (M17-P; M31-P).56   Especially as the removal of all barriers to Bulgarian 
migration to Spain coincided with economic crisis, the East Europeans are instead 
suggested to have produced “unease … discomfort. No risk, no clashes in the streets, but 
a certain uneasiness [among Madrilenians]” (M27-L).57  
                                                          
55Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Chicos que tienen que ir al colegio y no van... Y 
bueno, pues que están en la calle…Bueno, hay bandas latinas de jóvenes que tienen sus peleas y sus 
rivalidades.”  
56 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Además de ser de la Unión Europea, tener los 
mismos derechos, pero no se les nota.”  
57 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Crea cierta… nosotros decimos desazón. 
Incomodidad visual. No hay peligro, no hay choques en las calles, pero sí que se percibe cierto desazón.” 
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These sentiments are further reflected in public opinion. Only 0.1% of Spanish 
respondents in a survey by CIS (2012, p. 11) reported to have the most sympathy for 
Bulgarians in particular and 1.0% for East Europeans in general, figures that compare to 
1.4% for Ecuadorians in particular and 14.1% for Latin Americans in general. At best, the 
Balkan workers met with indifference and lack of interest. As one official put it, “I don’t 
think there is neither good nor bad perception [of Bulgarians]…I think Bulgaria is still a 
very unknown country… People don’t know anything at all about it” (M16-P). In this 
author’s survey of Madrilenians, 38.5% of respondents were unsure how to rate the 
Balkan migrants. Bulgarians were considered “very good” or “good” by 49.8% of 
participants and “adequate” to “very poor” by 12.5%. While positive, this evaluation is 
less favorable than that of Poles in Dublin or other foreign workers in Madrid.58  
 This relatively negative reception of Bulgarians in Madrid correlates with a 
conflicted but somewhat adverse evaluation of the migrants’ ability to “fit in” into 
Madrid’s life. Some respondents suggest that the simple tendency not to see Bulgarians 
physically speaks to their integration in the city. Some experts hold that a European status 
render Bulgarians “well integrated, no problem” (M-16). Two political stakeholders go as 
far as to argue that East Europeans’ integration has been the easiest among all immigrant 
cohorts, since “the population is more skilled … the culture is similar, there is a different 
level of education, the lifestyle is common” (M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN).59 
 Nonetheless, the more common opinion is that “while the South American relates 
[to Madrilenians] fast, the East European is slower to do so” and “has it more 
                                                          
58 In the survey conducted by this author, 65.9% of respondents eexpressed preference for other foreign 
workers like Ecuadorians to Bulgarians residing in Madrid. See Appendix for detailed results. 
59 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Es una población que está más formada… la cultura 




complicated” than a Latin American worker does (M11-E; M13-E).60 Bulgarians are 
reported to “stick to themselves and do not mix with the Spanish” (M15-E).61 The 
perception of Bulgarians as isolated is exemplified in the Balkan migrants’ tendency to 
concentrate in labor market niches populated by their compatriots and to work only with 
other Bulgarians. Further, Bulgarians live together in large numbers and focus in 
immigrant neighborhoods in the outer belt of Madrid. They “group up together and 
develop relationships amongst each other above all” (M27-L).62 The tendency not to 
“open themselves” is attributed to a certain feeling of superiority Bulgarians have over 
both other immigrant communities and the Spanish, which prevents them from fully 
inserting themselves into Madrid’s life (M16-P).  
 
III.3. The Limited Material Bases of Inclusion and Exclusion  
What explains these reception patterns? Why are Poles in Dublin and Ecuadorians 
in Madrid welcomed to their host cities despite economic downturn and their large 
numbers? Why are Nigerians excluded from Dublin? Why do Bulgarians meet with 
indifference and lack of interest in Madrid? Why do public officials and employers 
portray Poles in Dublin and Ecuadorians in Madrid as “embedded” and their Nigerian 
and Bulgarian counterparts as experiencing problems with integration? The material 
interests of receiving localities have something to do with it, but are not primary in the 
immigrants’ inclusion and exclusion.  
                                                          
60 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Pero así como el sudamericano se relaja rápido, el 
del Este tarda más en relajarse. Y el africano se relaja un poquito menos” (M13-E); “Ellos lo tienen más 
complicado” (M11-E). 
61 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son más con ellos, no se juntan tanto con 
españoles.” 
62 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Se agrupan entre ellos y desarrollan sus relaciones 
entre ellos sobre todo.” 
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At least initially, Polish workers were perceived to fill large gaps in undesirable 
occupations that Irish nationals no longer wanted to take. Irish employers and even the 
public were thankful for the influx of flexible, cheap Polish workers who dampened the 
rising costs of labor. Most interviewees went as far as to suggest that Polish workers were 
the drivers of the economic boom in Ireland, where they not only fueled the construction 
sector but also occupied “the apartments that were built” (D13-P). As one employer 
shared, “EU enlargement was a godsend, because we seem to have run out of local 
employees and resources and when these people came in, it was fantastic” (D10-E).  
However, material factors cannot explain the persistent welcome for the Polish 
after economic downturn. Economic considerations are largely absent from elite 
discourse of Poles’ inclusion. They are also the least significant factor in Poles’ 
evaluation by the general public. “Hard work” was the East Europeans’ most important 
characteristic according to the Dubliners surveyed by this author and served as the basis 
of the opinions of 59.6% of respondents. However, hard work signifies non-material 
qualities rather than economic utility for the city’s residents. In fact, 45.3% of Dubliners 
agreed that “The Polish take away jobs from the Irish,” almost forty percent disagreed 
with the statement “The Polish are necessary in Dublin because there are no Irish to fill 
some jobs,” and only 12.6% agreed that Poles are a source of cheap labor in the city.63 
The East Europeans’ positive public image is based on Poles’ non-material attributes. 
 In contrast to the Polish case, the arrival of Nigerian immigrants was considered 
not an economic asset but the cause of significant public cost.  Nigerian asylum seekers 
arrived in Ireland in the late 1990s when the Celtic Tiger was only beginning to roar, 
governmental subsidies were fueling the rising economy, and returning Irish nationals 
                                                          
63 Consults the Appendix for more detailed survey results.  
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provided for labor shortages in the country (Dorgan, 2006). As asylum seekers are not 
allowed to work while their claims are being processed, many Nigerians were not only 
losing valuable economic capital, but were also never considered a potential economic 
resource by the native population and public officials. In fact, in public discourse, 
admitting asylums seekers into Ireland is interpreted to be “costing a fortune” to Irish 
taxpayers and to be putting a strain on public finances and social resources (D25-J). As 
many were placed in the direct provision system and assigned housing, Nigerians were 
also not considered valuable tenants in new housing tenements, unlike the Polish.64  
Nonetheless, a majority of the original Nigerian asylum seekers are currently 
economic migrants filling the low-skilled jobs the Irish do not want. Many Nigerians 
arrive as students and employ their high educational levels to enrich the receiving 
context. Many have superior education and professional qualifications. However, such 
material considerations are not acknowledged by respondents. Discussion of Nigerians’ 
economic value is secondary to reports of the Africans’ cultural characteristics and 
difference from the Irish.  
 The connection between economic benefit and reception patterns is even less 
clear in Madrid than in Dublin. Ecuadorians were indeed recruited to Spain through a 
number of bilateral agreements in the 1990s to fill shortages in jobs left vacant by an ever 
more educated and skilled Spanish middle class (Pérez, 2003).  As Masterson-Algar 
(2011) argues, many Spanish companies invested in or relocated to the emerging markets 
of Latin America, with those enterprises that could not outsource their operations 
importing South American workers to fuel their growth locally instead. Ecuadorians’ 
                                                          
64 Direct provision signifies placing asylum seekers in state-mandated residences, where the state provides 
each adult individual with full-board accommodation, including two meals per day and a personal 
allowance of €19.10 a week (Reception and Integration Agency [RIA], 2010). 
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fitting human capital made them a particularly attractive source of a flexible cheap labor 
in the booming Spanish economy of the early 2000s (CIS, 2012, p. 6).  
However, Ecuadorians’ economic utility is not discussed by Madrilenian 
respondents in this project. While Ecuadorians are considered “good workers” by some 
employers, stereotypes suggest that Latin Americans “do not work well” but “drink and 
party a lot” (M23-TU).65 Ecuadorians are reported to be “less organized” or hard-
working than East Europeans, for instance, and to lack “seriousness, respect, and long-
term plans” in the work place (M11-E; M18-ADMIN).66 Therefore, the South Americans 
are accepted despite of, rather than due to, their material value to the receiving context.  
 Finally, most Madrilenian expert respondents consider Bulgarians educated, 
skilled, and good workers. Bulgarians’ arrival to Spain in the 2000s is seen as the result 
of “the size and vigor of the construction sector, of the tourist industry, of the domestic 
service, care industry, and to some extent, agriculture,” where the Balkan workers have 
complemented the work of Latin Americans and Moroccans (M31-R). However, as 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007 and the removal of limitations to Bulgarians’ 
employment in Spain in 2009 coincided with economic downturn, evaluation of the 
economic effects of the East Europeans’ labor are ambiguous. The advantages of 
Bulgarian work are disputed, as the Balkan workers not only compete for jobs with other 
immigrants, but also undercut employment opportunities for Spaniards returning to the 
dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs they had vacated in the 1980s-1990s. According to 
one respondent, such material costs have resulted in the “public opinion that they need to 
                                                          
65 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Los latinoamericanos no trabajan bien  beben 
mucho, fiesta y not trabajan.” 
66 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “menos organizado” (M11-E); “esa falta de seriedad, 
de respeto, de tener una proyección a largo plazo…” (M18-ADMIN). 
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leave” (M26-TU).67 Moreover, Bulgarians reinforce the growing underground economy 
in which they are embedded. While participation in the informal economy is common to 
all foreign populations in Spain, Bulgarian’s European status renders such participation 
particularly costly, since “even if they work illegally, they cannot be expelled” (M31-R).  
 The connection between economic self-interest and inclusion is even more 
tenuous in public opinion of Bulgarians in Madrid. Bulgarians receive a neutral reception 
regardless of the fact that they are considered “hard-working” in 42.9% of the responses 
given by the Madrilenians surveyed by this author. Most respondents are unsure of 
Bulgarians’ usefulness to the city, with 49.5% persons agreeing and 39.3% disagreeing 
with the statement that Bulgarians are necessary to fill the jobs natives do not want, and 
52.8% of participants considering the East Europeans a source of cheap labor, while 
47.2% finding them expensive. Interestingly, the Balkan workers ae viewed less 
positively than Poles in Dublin despite the opinion that that they make a larger 
contribution to the Spanish labor market. To illustrate, Bulgarians in Madrid are 
welcomed by less than 50% of participants and Poles in Dublin – by 90% of respondents. 
Yet, 26.1% of Madrilenians believe that Bulgarians take away Spanish jobs. The figure is 
37.9% in the Irish case.68  
In sum, immigrant inclusion and exclusion in Dublin and Madrid occur despite of, 
rather than on the basis, economic considerations.  Local elites and publics evaluate the 
newcomers in their midst in relation to “the flag” and not “the pocketbook” and are more 
concerned with the immigrants’ socio-cultural characteristics than their economic profile. 
 
                                                          
67 Author’s translation from the original quote in Spanish: “Es esa, tú le estás diciendo a la opinión pública, 
que tienen que marchar.”  
68 Consult Appendix for more detailed survey results.  
84 
 
III.4. The Non-Economic Bases of Inclusion and Exclusion  




The narrative of exclusion and inclusion in Dublin and Madrid is framed not 
through material interests but through non-economic categories. Welcome and rejection 
are understood in terms of ethnic, historical, and cultural affinities between immigrants 
and natives, rooted in Dubliners’ and Madrilenians’ own self-identification.  
Reception patterns are based on six characteristics, five of which closely follow 
Smith’s (1991) definition of national identity. However, these attributes are rooted firmly 
in the local context, and are often interpreted in opposition to a national identity-building 
project. The juxtaposition of the immigrant communities in each city renders the 
categories particularly meaningful. Public discourse places Polish and Ecuadorian 
workers in the “us” group on the basis of shared ethnicity, religion, history, language, as 
well as a common culture and disposition between the newcomers and their hosts. 
Nigerian and Bulgarian immigrants are relegated to the “them” group by reference to 
                                                          
69 A “” indicates that local stakeholders consider the respective immigrant group similar according to this 
identity characteristic, while a “” mark shows that local actors narrate the immigrant population as 
different according to the particular attribute. Parentheses “[]” indicate that while relevant local actors 
acknowledge a similarity or difference with an immigrant group according to the particular characteristic, 
they explain it out. These classifications are highly subjective and are not based on the author’s judgment. 
Instead, they present a summary of the interview data underpinning this chapter and reflect the perceptions 




Religion Language History Work ethic Culture 
Polish   []    
Nigerian   []    
Ecuadorian []    []  
Bulgarian []    [] [] 
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differences according to these same characteristics. Similarity is also established though 
the category of “work ethic,” a non-economic entity that subsumes all the rest, especially 
in the case of Dublin. “Culture” further serves as an all-encompassing attribute that 
underlies all other key traits, particularly in the case of Madrid. Table III.3 summarizes 
how the six categories frame immigrant reception in Dublin and Madrid.  
 
III.4.1. Ethnicity 
Local stakeholders justify immigrant inclusion and exclusion on the basis of the 
migrants’ perceived racial and ethnic similarities and differences with natives. Racial and 
ethnic characteristics render the Polish “just the same as us,” while they permanently 
relegate Nigerian migrants to a space of cultural marginalization in Dublin (D18-P). 
Ecuadorians’ racial distinctiveness contributes to an image of Madrid as tolerant and 
multicultural.70 Bulgarians’ European identity contribute to the foreigners’ inclusion in 
Madrid, but the East Europeans’ connection to Roma gypsies is strategically employed to 
undermine connections to the Spanish. Race and ethnicity are not hard objective 
characteristics that permanently locate an immigrant group in an outsider or insider 
status, but are reinterpreted by social and political actors to strategically include and 
exclude. Any immigrant group can be “racialized.”  
 
III.4.1.1. Ethnicity and Poles in Dublin  
Polish workers in Dublin are included on the basis of the racial and ethnic 
characteristics they share with the Irish (Table III.3). Race, ethnicity, and culture are 
                                                          
70 However, the ethnicity of less desirable foreign populations, like Moroccans or the Roma, is considered a 
problem for social cohesion in Madrid, unlike in the case of the culturally-similar Ecuadorians. 
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often used interchangeably by the respondents. White ethnicity and European origin 
mitigate racism or discrimination against the Polish in Ireland according to Irish 
interviewees. Since the Polish are “hard to distinguish” from the Irish group 
phenotypically, they rarely “invite trouble” and have an easier time assimilating into 
Dublin’s landscape (D13-P). Because “they look like us,” Polish immigrants are 
perceived to face less prejudice and more open access to socioeconomic and cultural 
resources in the city than their Nigerian counterparts (D11-L). Furthermore, being 
“white” creates a feeling of empathy towards the Polish in a “homogenous” country like 
Ireland (D25-J). Irish national identity has long been defined by a tension between its 
European origins and British ties, with a conflicted attitude towards the idea of Europe. 
The arrival of the white, European Polish at a time of acceptance of the idea of the 
unified Europe has contributed to the strengthening of Irish identity as deservedly 
European. Ethnically similar Poles are also considered best suited to “mix with” the 
native Irish group (D4-P). Especially through intermarriage, these similar migrants 
contribute to a comfortable level of multiculturalism in Dublin without undermining the 
city’s ethnic integrity. While Polish workers have introduced some racial diversity in the 
previously insular Ireland and are perceived to have enhanced Irish ethnicity and culture, 
they do not threaten to change the city fundamentally. In the words of the respondents:  
There are also a lot of young Polish people in Dublin in general and they mix very well 
with the Irish. They intermarry; they really fit in, while the Indians and Filipinos stick 
together more. The young Pole and the young Irish, these really mix well. They go out, 
they marry, and we really need that here in Ireland (D20-ADMIN)  
 
They do tend to be a better blend or a better mix, and I find lots of them even having Irish 
boyfriends, etc…and some of them even marry… I think that certainly it does wonders for 





Elite discourse is mirrored in public opinion. Similarity to the Irish is the second 
most significant characteristic that renders Poles welcome in Dublin and is cited in 28% 
of responses. The city’s residents find Poles highly likeable, as 64% consider this group 
“most similar to the Irish” in ethnic and cultural terms.71 
 
III.4.1.2. Ethnicity and Nigerians in Dublin  
 While shared racial and ethnic characteristics place the Polish in the “insider” 
group, Nigerian immigrants are relegated to the “outsider” group on the basis of their 
skin color (Table III.3). “Those who are a different color of skin” “stand out” in 
Caucasian Ireland (D13-P; D28-P). Immigrants who are racially different are the most 
apparent targets for “blatant prejudice” and the usual victims of racist attacks (Pettigrew 
& Meertens, 1995). According to respondents, visual differences present Nigerian 
immigrants with numerous barriers to integration, such as subtle prejudice and 
institutional discrimination. “Black Africans” are immediately identified as “not Irish” 
and not full citizens in the host country (D14-R; D41-NO). Deportations on the basis of 
racial identity are becoming more common in Ireland.  
Most significantly, “the racial issue” establishes a barrier between Nigerian 
immigrants and the native population. As they have different skin color, Nigerians are 
perceived to “have nothing in common” with the Irish (D1-J; D11-L; D18-P; D25-J). 
Race is conflated with culture and a number of negative stereotypes that further 
distinguish the Nigerian group from the host society. Specifically, black skin color is 
associated with asylum seeker status and abuse of social resources, inferior education, as 
well as lack of ambition or enterprise.  Race, an immutable identity characteristic, often 
                                                          
71 Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.  
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trumps other changeable identity components like religion or language, thus perpetually 
precluding Nigerians from fitting in. As Dubliners’ own self-identification is rooted in 
their white European ethnicity, there is a strong feeling of unfamiliarity between the 
receiving society and the black Nigerian community.  
 
III.4.1.3. Ethnicity and Ecuadorians in Madrid 
 Ecuadorians’ distinct racial and ethnic characteristics are either rarely discussed 
by expert respondents or are framed as a positive feature (Table III.3). Acceptance of the 
ethnically-different Ecuadorian institutionalizes Madrilenians’ commitment to 
multiculturalism and difference from isolationist Barcelona or nationalist Spain. While 
the darker Ecuadorians fit it easily despite ethnic dissimilarities and contribute to 
Spaniards’ pride in tolerance for all races, however, ethnically distinct Moroccan and 
Roma migrants are perceived as a problem for social cohesion.  
Employers in Madrid argued that nationality or race had little to do with the 
selection or treatment of their foreign workers. One respondent suggested that he 
purposefully strove to make his enterprise “a United Colors of Benetton, as racial 
intermixing enhances humanity” (M14-E).72 In a survey by CIS, “skin color” is 
significant for respondents’ treatment of the immigrant only in one tenth of the cases, 
while “cultural enrichment” is paramount in immigrant reception in Madrid (CIS, 2012).  
Similarly, public officials suggest that the services they provide or the policies 
they create “don’t distinguish, but focus on everybody” regardless of nationality, race or 
ethnicity (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Spain is characterized as “a young country of 
                                                          
72 Author‘s translation from the original quote in Spanish: “Yo siempre digo una frase que es United Color 
of Benetton, que es la mezcla racial yo creo que potencia la humanidad.” 
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immigration” “with very homogenous constituency that has not had immigrants 
traditionally”73 and especially has not had “people of color, black people” (M19-
ADMIN; M27-L; M34-TU). Respondents argue that the arrival of multiple immigrants 
from South America and Eastern Europe in the 1990s has served to transform Spain from 
a country with little tradition in the area of migration into a tolerant, receptive, de facto 
multicultural society “characterized by peaceful coexistence” among ethnicities and races 
(M26-TU).74 Ecuadorians in particular “have different ethnic characteristics, that they’re 
proud with them and, of course, they maintain,” which only contribute to Madrid’s 
identity as a multicultural city (M16-P). Precisely because of the inclusion of the 
ethnically different Latin Americans, Madrid is compared to tolerant New York City and 
contrasted with Barcelona, with its “circumscribing Catalan identity,” and with Spain, 
which continues to be tied to a “nationalist-Catholic” project (M35-P).75  
Nonetheless, such inclusion applies to the ethnically different Ecuadorians only 
because they are not considered fundamentally different from the Spanish. Only one 
respondent talks of Ecuadorians’ physical difference and their “swarthy complexion, 
dirty eyes” (M12-E).76 However, multiple interviewees speak of their families’ migration 
to South America and their personal identification with the Ibero-American community, 
which the presence of culturally similar Ecuadorians only serves to enhance. On the other 
hand, despite the fact that they have been present in Spain for more than twenty years, 
Moroccans are perceived as “not clean,” “dirty” and “problematic” based on their 
                                                          
73 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Nosotros somos un país con bastante homogénea 
como consecuencia de que no ha habido tradicionalmente inmigración” (M27-L); “En España no había 
gente de color, no había gente negra.” (M34-TU). 
74 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Nos caracteriza una convivencia.” 
75 Author‘s translation derived from orginal quote in Spanish: “Nosotros somos de una generación del 
nacional-catolicismo”; “He vivido mi identidad catalana que es más identitaria.” 
76 Author‘s translation from original quote  in Spanish: “…si ves a un moreno con los ojos medio limpios.” 
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physical appearance, which includes both their skin color and the religious symbols they 
wear (M28-EU). Similarly, “the Roma ethnicity” is considered “contaminated” and is 
admitted to face multiple “problems of xenophobia” (M28-EU; M31-R). These two 
ethnic populations are directly contrasted with Ecuadorians to relegate the latter cohort to 
insider status in the receiving context. 
 
III.4.1.4. Ethnicity and Bulgarians in Madrid  
Some Madrilenian experts acknowledge that Bulgarians’ phenotypical similarity 
to the Spanish makes their transition to life in Madrid relatively smooth (Table III.3). 
Furthermore, the Balkan migrants’ European ethnicity renders them similar to the 
Spanish, where their inclusion actually reasserts Madrilenians’ own European self-
identification. According to some participants, European ethnicity correlates with high 
educational levels, elevated rights, subscription to political and cultural values of 
democracy and human rights, and easier integration. As one respondent summarizes: 
Being Europeans and belonging to the same political and cultural space, makes things much 
easier. I mean, even ethnically, no? It still is those things… still it’s easier to integrate if you 
are European, no? And because there are still people who are racist, who are xenophobic 
(M16-P) 
 
Nonetheless, the majority of local stakeholders in Madrid focus on Bulgarians’ 
connection to the Roma to undermine the group’s ethnic similarity to the Spanish.  Expert 
interviewees assert that “there has been a certain confusion and an element of 
stigmatization where the people fix their attention on concrete ethnicities” and reject 
Bulgarians based on their perceived location within a gypsy ethnos (M35-P).77 As the 
“gypsy is always viewed to be worse than any other foreigner,” the image of the Balkan 
                                                          
77 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Ha podido haber una cierta confusión o un 
elemento de estigmatización general cuando la gente fijaba su atención en etnias concretas…”  
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workers is “contaminated” and “the scales of sympathy” swing away from Bulgarian 
immigrants in Madrid (M31-R). Identification with Roma ethnicity leads Bulgarians to be 
viewed as “dirty” and to be associated with homelessness, crime, begging on the streets 
and numerous problems for social cohesion in the receiving society (M19-ADMIN).  
“Nationality” is the most significant characteristic defining public opinion 
towards the immigrant in Spain. In a survey by CIS (2012), Romanians were the least 
liked group based on that trait, followed by “Moors” and “Arabs,” with “people from 
Eastern Europe” a close fourth. Few of the respondents to the survey conducted by this 
author in Madrid found Bulgarians to be similar to the Spanish. The receiving city’s 
residents are in fact as ambiguous about Bulgarians’ ethnic ties to Spaniards as public 
officials with 38.2% finding some similarity, 32.6% focusing on the differences between 
the two group, and four in ten respondents conflicted of Bulgarians’ ethnic belonging.78   
 
III.4.2. Religion  
Religion reinforces race and ethnicity to place Poles and Ecuadorians in the 
“insider” group and to cast Nigerians and Bulgarians as “outsiders.” Even though 
respondents in Madrid identify are less religious than Dubliners, religious belonging in 
both cities signifies cultural and social rituals and values that make some foreign groups 
less similar to natives than others.79 In both cities, fear of Islam is the backdrop against 
which the inclusion and exclusion of non-Muslim migrants are constructed.  
                                                          
78 Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.  
79 In the surveys this author conducted with Dubliners and Madrilenians, there is little difference in 
religious patterns among respondents. For instance, 62.3% of Dubliners and 63.3% of Madrilenians 
identified as Catholic. 20.4% of the Irish and 28.9% reported not being religious. While religiosity is highly 
comparable, there are few subtle differences, with Spaniards actually being more Catholic than the Irish or 
than betrayed in public discourse. Yet, Madrilenians also tended to be non-religious more frequently than 
Dubliners, who identified as Protestant or Episcopal in relatively high numbers. Religious belonging in 
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III.4.2.1. Religion and Poles in Dublin  
Religion reinforces ethnicity to explain Poles’ welcome in Dublin (Table III.3).  
The strong Catholic tradition shared by Poland and Ireland is narrated as one of the 
factors attracting Polish workers to Dublin in the first place. Ireland’s Catholic values are 
believed to have been “publicized strongly in Poland” as to convince many potential 
migrants to select this country over other destinations (D9-P). Shared religion is also 
constructed as one of the key factors that rendered the Polish “very much welcomed” in 
the host country (D9-P). Religious affinity interacts with common ethnicity to enhance 
the positive opinion of Polish immigrants in Ireland and to institutionalize “positive 
stereotypes” about them (D11-L). For instance, religious values correlate with being 
“good” or “trustworthy” according to respondents. Common religion leads Irish 
participants to argue that the Polish are a “good mix” with the Irish, as the two groups’ 
social activities can coincide around the church (D4-P). The arrival of Polish immigrants 
to Ireland serves to reassert Irish identity as devoutly Catholic in a time of declining 
church attendance among Irish youth. In fact, the Polish influx into Dublin is perceived as 
beneficial to Irish Catholicism by some, with the demand for Polish Catholic mass 
rejuvenating emptying churches and lackluster chaplaincies.  
 
III.4.2.2. Religion and Nigerians in Dublin 
While shared religious values are found to be central to the interaction between 
Polish immigrants and their Irish hosts, religious kinship is downplayed in the narrative 
about Nigerian immigrants (Table III.3). A majority of Nigerians in Dublin are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Madrid, therefore, is split between Catholicism and atheism, while cleavages between Catholicism and 
Protestantism are more prominent in Dublin. Consult Appendix for detailed survey results.  
93 
 
Christian. In 2011, more than one quarter of all Nigerians in Ireland reported to be 
Roman Catholic, 22% identified as Pentecostal, and 30% as belonging to another 
Christian denomination. Only 12% reported being Muslim and less than 1% identified as 
not religious. In comparison, while nine in ten Polish respondents identified as Roman 
Catholic, 5% reported being atheist (CSO, 2012a). Clearly, the Nigerian community in 
Ireland is highly religious, even more so than its Polish counterpart, where the majority of 
Nigerians share the Christian faith of the Irish. However, religious kinship does not figure 
into the discourse of Nigerian migrants in Ireland. Only one local labor market actor 
spoke of the religiosity of Nigerians in Dublin, of their active participation in Pentecostal 
churches in Ireland, and of their construction of support networks through church 
structures. Other public officials were in fact surprised to find out that a large proportion 
of Nigerians in Ireland were Roman Catholic or of other Christian denominations. The 
assumption was that Nigerian immigrants in Dublin are “not Christians” and therefore 
remain profoundly dissimilar from their Irish hosts (D26-ADMIN).  
 
III.4.2.3. Religion and Ecuadorians in Madrid 
 Religious commonality places Ecuadorians firmly in the “insider” group in 
Madrid (Table III.3). Expert respondents argue that Spain is hardly an ardently religious 
country and identify it is “neither Catholic not anti-Catholic” (M21-ADMIN).80 
Nonetheless, in a report conducted in Spain in 2012 by the European Union’s Center for 
Sociological Investigations (CIS, 2012), 74% of respondents identified as Catholic, 23% 
as “non-religious” or “atheist”, and only 2% as belonging to another religious 
denomination. More than six in ten of Madrilenians surveyed by this author self-
                                                          
80 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “O sea, España no es católica o anti-católica.” 
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identified as Catholic, with 28% considering themselves not religious. While there is a 
cleavage between religiosity and being non-religious, belief systems like Islam or 
Orthodoxy have lesser space in Madrilenian society.  
All expert respondents admit that “culture in its religious facet creates a common 
identity” between Madrilenians and Ecuadorians (M27-L).81 The South Americans are 
perceived to have chosen Madrid based on the Catholic values of the receiving context. 
Their religiosity places them in the common space of the church where they interact 
regularly with their Spanish hosts. Being religious also creates trust and positive 
stereotypes of the Latin Americans and reinforces historic ties between South America 
and Spain. Most significantly, belonging to a Catholic cultural community sets 
Ecuadorians apart from undesirable religious minorities in Madrid, like Muslim 
Moroccans. Religious belonging correlates with certain cultural mores and values. 
Muslim religion is interpreted to connote “deceitfulness, thievery,” mistreatment of 
women, “rebelliousness,” “disrespect of our values”, ties to global terrorism, and lack of 
integration (M21-ADMIN; M31-R; M19-ADMIN).82 In contrast, Catholic Ecuadorians 
are honest, focused on the family, and respectful of women, much like Madrilenians.  
 
III.4.2.4. Religion and Bulgarians in Madrid  
While Bulgarians’ religious belonging is rarely discussed by respondents, some 
experts admit that the East Europeans’ atheism and Orthodox faith is a barrier to their 
                                                          
81 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “El idioma y la cultura en su trasfondo religioso crea 
una identidad común.” 
82 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Los marroquíes son todos unos ladrones, 
son musulmanes, son mentirosos, y tal” (M21-ADMIN). 
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inclusion in Spain (Table III.3).83 It is not the particular belonging to Catholicism, the 
migrants’ religiosity, or their church attendance that is at stake here. Rather, the cultural 
and social values attached to religious belonging matter. As they are not perceived as 
religious, Bulgarians are considered suspect in terms of their trustworthiness, loyalty or 
goodness. Because they are Orthodox, the Balkan immigrants’ “customs are [framed as] 
different,” and so are their patterns and spaces of social interaction (M35-P).84 Religion 
stands for culture and is employed to reinforce the differences between post-Communist 
Balkan Bulgarians and European Catholic Spaniards.  
 
III.4.3. Language  
Linguistic affinity institutionalizes the other desirable characteristics of accepted 
immigrant groups while setting apart dissimilar foreign populations, especially in the 
Spanish case. Ecuadorians’ Spanish language skills allow them to procure jobs, interact 
with their hosts, and easily integrate. They also reinforce pride in a global Spanish 
cultural reach. Bulgarians’ inadequate knowledge of the language signifies their cultural 
dissimilarity from the native population. Linguistic ties are invented or undermined to 
keep intact reception narratives in the Irish case. While Poles rarely speak English upon 
arrival in Dublin, their efforts to learn the language are praised as the ultimate sign of 
their integration. Nigerians’ distinct intonation is emphasized to highlight their difference 
from the Irish. Language is not an objective category, but a fluid characteristic interpreted 
strategically by local actors to justify the differential reception of the foreign cohorts.  
 
                                                          
83 As one respondent argued, “La barrera de la religión en ciertas zonas tiene mucha importancia….” 
84 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Es de las pocas cosas en las que se nota y dices, sus 
costumbres son diferentes.” 
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III.4.3.1. Language and Poles in Dublin 
The category of language is employed by Irish labor market actors to construct 
similarity with the Polish, while setting apart Nigerian immigrants (Table III.3). As 
English is not the first language in Poland, and Russian and German used to be the 
foreign languages taught at Polish schools, many Polish workers arrived to Dublin with 
deficient language skills. One quarter of Irish labor market actors acknowledge “the 
language barrier” as the singular issue of Polish immigration into Ireland, especially 
among “middle-aged men” (D8-ADMIN; D15-E; D24-E; D31-E). Language deficiencies 
are recognized not only to affect the integration prospects of Polish workers and diminish 
the quality of interaction between the immigrants and their hosts, but also to render the 
Polish vulnerable to exploitation in the socio-economic sphere. The language barrier is 
also the most commonly cited negative attribute of Polish migrants in public opinion. Of 
the thirty respondents surveyed by this author who wrote in a negative attribute for the 
East Europeans, more than one third cited Poles’ deficient language skills. Some 
respondents were frustrated about how hard it was to communicate and understand each 
other and others proposed a language requirement for all immigrants in Ireland. 
However, even local labor market actors who admit to the language deficiencies 
of Polish immigrants in Dublin qualify their statements and construct away language as a 
marker of difference in the case of the Polish. A distinction is made between older Polish 
workers and younger Polish nationals “with good English” who easily fit into Dublin’s 
life (D22-TU). The implication is that while many belonging to the former group have 
left after economic downturn, the latter group continues arriving in Dublin. Any language 
barriers are thus erased. Furthermore, interviewees tout the the efforts of the Polish 
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community to “learn the language” (D10-E). Through English language courses and 
communication with the native population, the Polish are perceived to have “learned 
English quite quickly,” especially compared to “other people from other countries,” and 
even to have “taken on some Irish-isms” (D15-E). As a result of these efforts, one third of 
local labor market actors never found any issues with Polish workers’ language. Public 
discourse is not far removed from reality, in fact, whereas 70% of Polish participants in 
the 2011 Census report speaking English “well” or “very well” and only 5% suggest that 
they do not speak English “at all” (CSO, 2012a). Similarly, despite complaints about 
Poles’ deficient language skills, 60.7% of Dubliners surveyed by this author at least 
somewhat agreed that “Poles speak English,” in direct contradiction to their previous 
statements.85 Therefore, language differences were explained away by elites and the 
public to maintain the construction of Poles’ cultural similarity to their hosts. 
 
III.4.3.2. Language and Nigerians in Dublin  
On the other hand, language is employed by Irish respondents to assert the 
difference of Nigerian immigrants (Table III.3). More than nine in ten Nigerians 
reported speaking English “well” or “very well” in 2011 (CSO, 2012a). Nigerian 
organizations quoted knowledge of the English language as the one significant advantage 
of Nigerians over Polish workers in Dublin, and as the characteristic that facilitates 
Nigerian integration in Ireland. However, local stakeholders focus on disparities in accent 
or “intonation” instead (D28-P). For instance, one organization suggested that while 
Nigerian immigrants speak English readily, their written skills are poor (D39-PO). 
Speaking English with a Nigerian accent is considered a barrier in the work environment, 
                                                          
85 Consult Appendix for detailed survey results.  
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an obstacle to developing professionally, and the source of complaints by customers or 
colleagues. The Nigerian community’s “pronunciation” or “bad English” is a source of 
irritation among the native population and another marker of Nigerians’ difference from 
the Irish (D11-L; D13-P; D28-P; D29-ADMIN). Rather than an objective category, 
language here is a cultural and social construct employed by Dubliners to exclude the 
Nigerian group.  
 
III.4.3.3. Language and Ecuadorians in Madrid 
For self-admitted “language nationalists” like Spaniards, common language with 
their hosts is the single most important advantage Ecuadorians have over other 
immigrants populations in Madrid (M21-ADMIN) (Table III.3).86  Ecuadorians’ 
excellent command of the Spanish language permits for the Latin Americans’ smooth 
insertion into the Spanish labor market and their domination of certain economic sectors, 
according to interviewees. As “Spaniards do not learn foreign languages,” the South 
American migrants’ knowledge of Spanish creates the opportunity for a “common 
identity” and increased interactions with the native population (M27-L).87 Due to their 
language skills, Ecuadorians can be “extroverted, can integrate better … and share in 
[Spaniards’] public spaces, parks and parties” (M25-TU; M33-TU).88 Linguistic 
commonality is further perceived to reinforce a broader “cultural affinity” between 
Madrilenians and Latin Americans and reinforce historical, cultural, and ethnic ties 
                                                          
86 Author’s translation from original phrase in Spanish: “nacionalistas idiomáticos.” 
87 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Y es que los españoles no aprendemos lenguas 
extranjeras,” “identidad común.” 
88 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Son más extrovertidos , que se integran 
mejor porque hablan nuestro idioma y comen nuestra comida, y que comparten los espacios públicos, 
porque se los ven en parques, en fiestas, y tal.” 
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(M12-E; M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). “Speaking the language” nullifies any “ethnic 
difference” between Ecuadorians and Spaniards and explains the ease of the South 
Americans’ integration in the receiving context (M16-P). Ecuadorians’ command of 
Spanish, finally, reinforces Madrilenians’ “national pride that many people in the world 
speak Spanish” and institutionalizes the image of a powerful Spain with a global cultural 
reach (M27-L).89 
 
III.4.3.4. Language and Bulgarians in Madrid 
On the other hand, Bulgarians’ inability to speak Spanish is perceived as the most 
significant obstacle to the Balkan migrants’ inclusion and integration in Madrid (Table 
III.3). Some local labor market actors acknowledge the fact that the East Europeans have 
made an effort to learn the local language and have thus been successful economically 
and socially in their new environment.  However, the majority suggest that the language 
barrier severely cripples Bulgarians’ economic opportunities in a city where the service 
industry is the most prominent employer of foreign laborers.  Their “language challenge” 
contributes to Bulgarians’ “labor problems, which accompany familial problems, 
problems with housing, health” (M19-ADMIN; M25-TU).90 A survey of Madrilenians by 
the Autonomous Community of Madrid confirms this sentiment, with one quarter of 
Spanish respondents dubbing “difficulties with the language” the “largest obstacle on 
foreigners’ road to integration” (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a).91  
                                                          
89 Author’s translation from original  quote in Spanish: “Es una de las razones para sentirse orgulloso de 
que hay tanta gente en el mundo que habla español.” 
90 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son gente que además de arrastrar problemas 
laborales, le acompañan problemas familiares, desestructura familiar, de vivienda, de sanidad.” 
91 Author‘s translation from original text in Spanish: “Dificultades con el idioma,” “obstáculos que se han 
encontrado los extranjeros en su camino hacia la integración.” 
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The “language barrier” also contributes to a perception of difference and unease 
caused by the numerous Balkan migrants who “are a lot” and “tend to speak … the same 
kind of strange language” (M16-P). Interestingly, as many as 67.5% of Madrilenians 
surveyed by the author at least somewhat agreed that Bulgarians speak Spanish. 
However, the language barrier presented the most important negative aspect of Balkan 
migration to the city (among 17.4% of responses), according to the write-in answers of 
survey respondents. Correlation analysis suggested that language skills were the most 
significant predictor of a positive evaluation of the foreign cohort (Pearson’s R = .403**). 
Linguistic differences, therefore, serve to institutionalize and reinforce broader cultural, 
social, religious, ethnic, and historical dissimilarity and place Bulgarians in the outsider 
group in Madrid.  
 
III.4.4. History 
The historical and colonial bonds existing between receiving and sending societies 
are a further marker of similarity and difference and justification for the newcomers’ 
inclusion or exclusion. Historical parallels are invented between the Polish and the Irish 
in order to institutionalize Dublin’s spirit as European, independent and entrepreneurial, 
while connections with Nigerians are omitted as to forget painful memories of Irish 
subservience within the British Empire. Independent Poles are consequently constructed 
as insiders, while “bogus” Nigerian migrants are relegated to outsider status. Connections 
between Madrid and Ecuador are emphasized in order to reinforce the image of Spain as a 
leader of a forward-looking Iberian-American transnational community. Ecuadorians fit 
in the receiving city not as second-class former colonial subjects but as a cohort sharing 
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in a socio-cultural and migration space with their hosts and able to extend a similar 
sentiment of welcome to Spaniards in South America. While Bulgarians’ path within the 
European Union creates certain empathy for the Balkan migrants, Bulgarians’ historical 
trajectory brings about unwanted memories of Spain’s own authoritarian past and former 
second-class citizenship in Europe. Such parallels are undermined in the democratic 
pluralistic space of Madrid.  
Before proceeding with the four case studies, an important clarification is in order. 
While Ireland was never a colonial power, Spain constructed the first global empire in 
Europe, extending over parts of Europe, the Americas, and Africa (Lange et al., 2006). 
Spain’s colonial holdings, adeptly manipulated from the city of Madrid, could be argued 
to distinguish between the two case studies in this dissertation and render Spain closer to 
traditional immigration receivers like Franc than to new migration countries like Ireland.  
Nonetheless, the project maintains that Ireland and Spain are comparable for two 
reasons. First, unlike the colonial holdings of Northern European states, which only 
achieved independence in the mid-1900s and thus have recent and profound political, 
social, economic and cultural ties to the center, Spain’s empire in the Americas 
disintegrated in the early 1800s. Many territories achieved independence during the 
Bolivar Revolution and before nationalist movements or the birth of modern Venezuela, 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Lange et al., 2006).92 The temporal distance 
weakens the historical bonds of subservience between Spain and the South American 
countries. On the other hand, Spain participated in the management of parts of Morocco 
until 1956. Thus, a hierarchical relationship and strong historical precedent exists 
                                                          
92 For instance, Ecuador gained its independence from Spain in 1822. On the other hand, India and Pakistan 
gained independence from the British Empire in 1947 and Nigeria – not until 1960 (Lange et al., 2006). 
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between the two localities (Flesler, 2008; Mendoza, 2001). The Moroccan group is not 
studied here to steer clear of the burdens of such historical precedent. Notably, 
Moroccans’ colonial ties to Spaniards have not produced more favorable policies or 
discourses towards the North Africans (Mendoza, 2001, pp. 47-48). What is more, the 
strong cultural and historical bonds between Ecuador and Spain stem from a more recent 
relationship based on the migration of Spanish nationals to Latin America, especially 
during dictatorship and economic industrialization, and occurring within the bounds of a 
developing economic, political, social, and cultural Iberian-American community 
(Calavita, 2005; Masterson-Algar, 2011).93 Considerations of reciprocity and the welfare 
of the Spanish diaspora in South America, as well as understanding of the need for 
cooperation within the Latin American transnational space render the relationship 
between Ecuadorians and Spaniards highly significant yet fluid and untainted by notions 
of superiority or inferiority. In fact, the connection here is closer to the relationship 
between Spain and the original members of the European Union, to which Spanish 
nationals migrated for economic opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s. The connection is 
forward-looking rather than focused on the past, with Spain angling to head the Ibero-
American community in its future political and socio-economic development. On the 
other hand, South American countries aim to institutionalize the Hispanic roots of 
Madrid, a locality torn between its American origins and European aspirations, in order to 
deepen interdependence with the “motherland” (Masterson-Algar, 2011).  
                                                          
93 The Iberian-American community refers to the community of countries and people sharing a cultural and 
linguistic Hispanic heritage. Spain serves as the center, with a number of Latin American nations, including 
Ecuador, participating in this transnational entity (Masterson-Algar, 2011). The formal institution of the 
Iberian-American community is a recent venture, existing since 1991 as an alternative center of power to 
the European Union. It assumes economic, political, social, and migration commitments and agreements 
among the twenty-two participating states. Yet, the structures are based on the historical presence and 
influence of Southern European descendants in Latin American countries (Peixoto, 2012). 
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Second, while Ireland had no colonial holdings of its own, its special status within 
the British Empire made it a complicit ally of the British imperial project. Irish 
missionaries and settlers in fact employed rays of British colonial influence in order to 
transplant Catholicism, spread political, social, and educational institutions and values, 
and create a certain desirable image of the center in British holdings in Africa (Lentin & 
McVeigh, 2002). Thus, the relationships between Nigeria and Ireland and Ecuador and 
Spain could be considered quite similar in their “quasi-colonial” nature. These similar 
connections are interpreted and utilized very differently in the two receiving cities.  
 
III.4.4.1. History and Poles in Dublin  
Shared historical myths complement language in cementing Polish belonging in 
Dublin (Table III.3). Polish immigrants are welcomed, since they fought for 
independence from a larger neighbor like the Irish, and share in their hosts’ experience of 
emigration. Poland and Ireland are considered akin as both were part of “big bad 
empires,” the British Empire and the Soviet bloc respectively, where they were “overrun” 
as smaller and more vulnerable members of these structures (D9-P). Shared historical 
experiences and the fight for independence against this neighbor are also employed as to 
construct an image of the Polish worker as patriotic, brave, and principled. Through this 
historical parallel, Dublin’s stakeholders reassert their own spirit of independence. In 
reality, however, Ireland was a much more willing participant in the British Empire than 
Poland was in the Soviet bloc, as it was part of Britain’s colonization project and 
maintains strong socio-economic ties with the United Kingdom today (Lentin & 
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McVeigh, 2002). Still, Irish interviewees reinforce the myth of “having fought against a 
bigger country” through connection with independent Poles (D18-P). 
What is more, Dubliners construct kinship with Polish workers as both groups 
come from a “country of emigration” (D1-J). The experience of being an “emigrant 
nation” renders the Irish more welcoming towards all immigrant groups in the country, 
according to labor market actors. As one respondent put it, “We don’t really have the 
right … to be looking at immigrants as something negative” (D7-TU). As “there isn’t an 
Irish family that doesn’t have an emigrant in their midst,” Irish public discourse casts 
Dubliners as guided by the maxim of “treat people like you would ask your family to be 
treated in other countries” (D8-ADMIN; D11-L). Nonetheless, this feeling of empathy 
extends only to Polish immigrants, who are compared to Irish workers travelling to 
America or England. A majority of public officials recreate the myth of kinship between 
the two groups on the basis of their enterprising spirit and desire to improve their 
family’s life, as well as the common sacrifices and negative treatment the two groups 
faced abroad. As they have themselves experienced discrimination in Great Britain, Irish 
respondents empathize with the negative reception the Polish received in Germany, for 
instance.94 By constructing migration as part of the “tradition” and “psyche” of both the 
Polish and Irish, Irish labor market actors reestablish Poles’ and their own spirit of 
“entrepreneurship” (D5-ADMIN; D18-P).  
 
III.4.4.2. History and Nigerians in Dublin 
In turn, Nigerians’ national struggles are downplayed or ignored (Table III.3). 
African migration for self-development and economic improvement is considered not 
                                                          
94 Respondents referred to the slogans of “No blacks, no Irish” in 1960’s London, for instance (D25-J). 
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enterprising but “bogus” (D13-P; D25-J). Despite actual historical connections and 
shared experiences within the sphere of influence of the British Empire, none of the Irish 
respondents in this project referred to historical kinship between Nigerian migrants and 
the host society. African authors discuss Nigeria’s colonial history in terms much similar 
to those of Ireland’s history as part of the British Empire, where military, cultural and 
religious pressure were “used to cultivate British hegemony” (Fafunwa, 1974; Ihuegbu, 
2002). While Nigerian immigrants arrived in Dublin partially in view of colonial kinship, 
and their perception of Ireland as a beacon of equality, upon arrival they found that such 
historical ties are not part of the local mythology. Neither do Nigerian immigrants in 
Dublin meet with the same empathy as Polish labor migrants, even though many have 
migrated in search of a better life. This lack of affinity stems mostly from the perception 
that the Nigerian community in Dublin is comprised only of asylum seekers rather than 
enterprising economic migrants. Rather than economic ambition, Nigerians are associated 
with the burden they are placing on the Irish social state. In the words of one respondent, 
when considering Nigerian immigrants in Dublin, natives think “why do we have to pay 
them” (D35-PO). A belief that most of these refugees are in fact economic migrants does 
not establish a connection with the Irish either, as Nigerian migrants in Ireland are 
considered to have suspect motives. They are perceived as “spongers” there to defraud 
the system rather than enhance it (D1-J). Nigerians are considered “in the wrong foot 
with everybody” from the start, and “totally separate” from Polish economic migrants in 
entry route, history, and goals (D17-ADMIN; D18-P). Nigerians receive no sympathy or 




III.4.4.3. History and Ecuadorians in Madrid 
Ecuadorians’ inclusion in Madrid is cemented through their historical connections 
to their hosts (Table III.3). Much like the Polish in Ireland, the Latin Americans are 
welcomed as they share historical memory of belonging to an emigration country with 
the Spanish. A majority of expert respondents characterize Madrid as “also an immigrant 
society” “that has been sending immigrants abroad for centuries” and acknowledge that 
Spaniards are struggling to assimilate in the Americas like their Ecuadorian counterparts 
in Europe (M16-P). The fact that Spanish nationals were pushed out of their own country 
“after the Civil War and during the Second World War to Europe or Latin America” 
renders Madrid a “receptive” (receptiva), “flexible” migration space, where immigration 
is not “a risk to our culture, our entity,” but a process to be emphasized with instead  
(M16-P; M23-TU). Especially as Spaniards “went a lot to South America,” 
“remembering our history” means according Ecuadorians in Spain “certain solidarity” 
and favorable treatment (M26-TU; M32-ADMIN).95 Vague feelings of solidarity 
translate into particular benefits Latin Americans in Madrid, unlike in the case of Poles in 
Ireland, however, since recent emigration from Spain to South America creates concrete 
ethnic, cultural, and familial ties across the two countries. For instance, the influence of 
Spanish descendants in Southern Europe and considerations of reciprocity translate into 
advantageous naturalization rules for Ecuadorians in Spain. More significantly, the 
historical ties between Spanish and Ecuadorians contribute to a broader feeling of cultural 
communality and lead Madrilenians to “hardly perceive Latin Americans… as 
‘foreigners’” (Cornelius, 2004, p. 410).   
                                                          
95Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Intentamos siempre que se recuerde nuestra historia. 
Quiero decir que nosotros nos fuimos tanto a Sudamérica…” (M26-TU), “Hay una cierta solidaridad que 
está ahí latent (M32-ADMIN).  
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Notably, historical connections are not cast in colonial undertones that assume a 
hierarchical relationship between first-class Spaniards and second-class Ecuadorians. In 
the words of local stakeholders, “it is not in the Spanish character to have a superior 
status as a British person might have towards the members of their colonies. The Spanish 
immigrant used to be of lower middle class and would situate himself at a level close [to 
that of former colonial subjects]” (M18-ADMIN).96 Respondents declare themselves 
“proud of a historical past of the empire where the sun never set” (M25-TU).97 Yet, the 
more significant historical relationship is that of Spanish cultural and artistic dominance 
in the Ibero-American transnational space and the open-mindedness of Madrilenians to 
South Americans intertwined with their hosts through descent and common cultural, 
historical and linguistic self-identification. 
 
III.4.4.4. History and Bulgarians in Madrid  
While ties to Ecuador invite memories of a glorious past and a bright future, 
historical parallels with Bulgarians only bring about painful memories of domination, 
dictatorship, and second-class European citizenship among local stakeholders. Therefore, 
these parallels are discounted and Bulgarians’ difference from their hosts is 
institutionalized through the category of history (Table III.3). Some Madrilenian 
respondents talk about the connections between Bulgaria’s and Spain’s political and 
historical trajectories, as well as the two countries common participation in the European 
project. As one expert suggested, 2010 Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-
                                                          
96 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Dentro del carácter español no tenemos ese 
sentimiento quizás de estatus superior que igual puede tener el inglés frente a los miembros de sus 
colonias.” 
97 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Yo me siento muy orgullosa de ser española y he 
tenido un pasado histórico que no se ponía el sol en nuestro imperio.” 
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Gotha “is in reality Spanish and that has drawn the two countries closer together in a 
palpable manner” (M27-L).98 As another interviewee argues, “in ten or twenty years” 
Bulgaria “will follow a pattern similar to that of the Spanish in Europe” and will develop 
correspondingly within the European Union (M16-P). 
Nonetheless, local stakeholders downplay historical parallels between Spain and 
Bulgaria, since these call forth the undesirable aspects of Madrid’s own past. Experts 
argue that, “Spain has never ever had an intense [historical] relation with Eastern Europe” 
(M16-P). While Spaniards went to many European and American countries and 
intertwined their destinies with ethnicities on multiple continents, Bulgarians were 
complacently tucked behind an Iron Curtain (M16-P).  The domination of Bulgaria by the 
Turkish Empire does not invite empathy by Spaniards themselves subjugated by the 
infamous “Moor” (Flesler, 2008). Instead, “cultural and religious subjugation” drives a 
wedge between a Spain that allegedly overcame such domination and a Bulgaria that is 
still “tainted by Turkish ethnicity” (M12-E).99 Further, historical parallels of Communism 
in Bulgaria and dictatorship in Spain are painful for Spaniards who want to forget “the 
Francoist epoch” and “the disgrace of political dictatorship” (M14-E; M27-L). Historical 
connections between the two countries are undermined in order to underestimate Spain’s 
own complicity in allying with despotic Russia or imposing a repressive nationalist 
project on its citizens. “Modern, advanced, republican” and “internationalist” Madrid is 
different from authoritarian Bulgaria (M35-P).100  
                                                          
98 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Es que el rey de Bulgaria había un primer ministro 
que queda al español realmente. Y esto ha cercado los dos países de una manera muy sensible.” 
99 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Ha estado como sometida durante mucho tiempo 
tanto como por cultura, como por religión al imperio turco… tiene la lacra de la etnia turca.” 
100 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Moderno, avanzado y republican… apelamos a 
nuestro patrimonio internacionalista.” 
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Finally, Spain’s own second-class status in the European Union in the 1980s and 
its perceived inferiority to Northern developed states like Germany or the United 
Kingdom did not engender empathy for Bulgarian migrants in Madrid. Spain still 
imposed limits to Bulgarian mobility for two years, forgetting how such discriminatory 
arrangements affected its own national self-pride in 1986.  As one respondent put it, such 
political decisions speak of a “very selective memory” of Bulgaria’s and Spain’s status 
within the European community and a desire to forget the host country’s inferior position 
as “Europeans second-class.”101 Instead, there is a desire to emphasize the transformation 
of Spaniards into “new rich, new Europeans” with equal claims to the “club of rich 
countries with reserved admission rights” (Flesler, 2008, p. 31; M12-E; M19-ADMIN). 
Therefore, despite existing historical parallels, connections between Spain and Bulgaria 
are downplayed to undermine the receiving context’s own undesirable characteristics.  
 
III.4.5. Work Ethic 
 Along with relatively immutable characteristics of identity, Irish and Spanish 
officials justify immigrant inclusion and exclusion through the category of “work ethic.” 
Being “hard-working” is an attribute that is particularly significant in the case of Dublin. 
The quality of “hard work” implies the economic benefits that cheap and highly skilled 
Polish workers provide to the expanding Irish economy, at least before economic 
downturn. However, “hard work” does not refer simply to material benefit. It is a catchall 
characteristic that implies the good education, skills, reliability, honesty, and flexibility of 
Polish workers, as well as the pride they take in their work. It suggests affinity with 
Dubliners, who have also left home and “worked hard” in search of a better life. Work 
                                                          
101 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Que somos europeos de segunda” (M12-E). 
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ethic is also the category that establishes the starkest contrast between the insider Polish 
group and the outsider Nigerian group. Nigerians’ characterization as “not good workers” 
is multilayered and evokes this ethnic community’s economic and social cost to the 
receiving society. “Work ethic” asserts the fundamental difference of African migrants 
from entrepreneurial Dubliners without employing problematic categories, such as race.  
 “Working hard” is less significant in Madrid, where discourse concentrates on 
immigrant integration and multiculturalism rather than on the cost-benefit analysis of 
migrants’ entry (Arango, 2012). Culture, instead of hard work, is emphasized as an all-
encompassing, non-problematic attribute that evokes all other characteristics essential in 
local political discourse, and which can relegate specific immigrant populations to the 
“us” or “them” group. In fact, Ecuadorians are accepted in Madrilenian society regardless 
of perceptions of their lower quality of work, as Spaniards self-define as jovial people for 
whom work is not primary. In the case of Bulgarians, the category of “work ethic” is 
adeptly manipulated to justify the lack of acceptance for this ethnic population. While 
local stakeholder’s emphasize Bulgarians’ skills and education, much as in the case of the 
Polish in Dublin, they also juxtapose these characteristics with Bulgarians’ perceived 
criminality and aggressiveness, like in the case of Nigerians in Dublin. 
 
III.4.5.1. Work Ethic and Poles in Dublin 
 More than two-thirds of all the Irish officials interviewed defined Polish 
immigrants as “very hard workers” who are “willing to go the extra mile” (D12-E; D18-
P). The strong work ethic of Polish immigrants is perceived as the reason the Polish are 
preferred to workers from other national groups, including the Irish (Table III.3). 
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Because “they are more hard-working than some of the other nationalities,” Polish 
immigrants place higher on the labor market hierarchy in Dublin (D15-E). “Working 
hard” correlates with superior skills and education, efficiency and punctuality in the work 
place, and flexibility essential in a competitive labor market. However, strong work ethic 
is also interpreted in non-economic terms. It implies that the Polish Polish immigrant in 
Dublin is “reliable” and “punctual,” “honest” and “trustworthy,” as well as enthusiastic, 
“diligent”, and proud of one’s work (D3-E; D10-E; D12-E; D13-P; D15-E; D24-E). 
Work ethic and the positive stereotypes attached to this characteristic do not simply serve 
as the reason for Irish “employers [to] just love [the Polish]” and “keep recruiting them in 
the recession” (D8-ADMIN; D9-P). “Working hard” creates a strong perception of 
kinship for the Polish. Since the “Polish here are doing the same thing that the Irish did in 
America and in Britain, “Irish people recognize that similarity” (D17-ADMIN; D29-
ADMIN). Polish immigrants’ construction as hard-working, yet sociable, hard-playing, 
and “good” reasserts Irish nationals’ own ability to “make a contribution” (D10-E; D23-
E; D26-ADMIN).102  
 Similar connections are established in the survey with Dubliners conducted by 
this author. The East Europeans’ “hard work” is the reason for their overwhelmingly 
positive evaluation according to 57% of respondents, with being “hard-working” as the 
most quoted positive characteristic of the Polish in write-in responses. One participant 
even went as far as to suggest that the Polish “kept the country going.” More than 60% of 
respondents considered Poles the most skilled and highly qualified foreign cohort in 
Dublin and 67.4% dubbed them “the most reliable and hard-working.” The work ethic of 
                                                          
102 Work ethic is a flexible category that justifies the inclusion of Polish immigrants in Dublin without 
referring to immutable national identity characteristics.It allows Irish public officials to change their mind 
and relegate Polish nationals to the “out” group in the future. 
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Poles was related less to their cheap labor or ability to fill the jobs the Irish do not want, 
however, and more so to their being “reliable,” “honest,” “polite,” “genuine,” “efficient,” 
and simply “good people.”103 Therefore, a socio-cultural connection was established 
between Dubliners and the East Europeans. 
 
III.4.5.2. Work Ethic and Nigerians in Dublin 
Work ethic institutes the starkest contrast between the “in” and the “out” groups 
in Dublin. It hints at African immigrants’ complex legal status, suspect migration 
motives, and “perceived distance” from the Irish without referring to characteristics like 
race (Table III.3). Even though there is a substantial Nigerian population in Ireland, 
these African immigrants are not considered a potential labor resource by Irish 
respondents. Employers either omit Nigerians altogether or suggest that Nigerian workers 
are less prominent in the Irish labor market due to legal restrictions or the availability of 
an alternative European labor force with EU enlargement. In public discourse, the lack of 
prominence of Nigerian immigrants in Dublin’s labor market is also justified through 
their poor work ethic. In direct contrast to their Polish counterparts, Nigerians are 
perceived to be “not good workers” and “lazy because of the social and cultural system” 
in Africa (D11-L; D12-E; D28-P). Poor work ethic implies other shortcomings like 
unreliability, lack of education, and dishonesty. Even employed Nigerians are associated 
not with contributing to the system but rather with abusing it through fraudulent taxi 
licenses, for instance. Mostly, however, Nigerians are narrated to “not [be] working at 
all” and to be “getting money for nothing from the community” (D11-L).  
                                                          
103 Consult Appendix for detailed survey results. 
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While Polish workers are making an honest living in Ireland, much like the Irish, 
Nigerian immigrants are perceived as asylum seekers in the country to “defraud” the 
social welfare system (D28-P). Nigerians are narrated as “bogus” and prone to engage in 
illegal activities (D25-J). Even when recognized as economic migrants, the Africans are 
framed as “spongers” “[relying] on the state and not contributing to the economy” (D1-J; 
D25-J). Irish respondents convey unfamiliarity towards Nigerian immigrants who are in 
Ireland “for a quick buck” and out of suspect motivations (D4-P). Work ethic is thus used 
to cement a connection among race, nationality, legal status, and perceived distance from 
the Irish in the case of Nigerian workers in Dublin. 
 
III.4.5.3. Work Ethic and Ecuadorians in Madrid  
Conversely to Nigerians in Dublin, Ecuadorians in Madrid are accepted in Spain 
despite the fact that they are not considered “hard-working” (Table III.3). Having 
“economic qualifications that Spain needs” is among the most important considerations 
in including migrants in Madrid, according to a survey by CIS (2012, p. 4). Still, 
Ecuadorians are not rejected despite of their inferior economic performance or 
qualifications. Most employers surveyed here have South Americans workers. Few of 
them, however, talked about the work ethic of Ecuadorians. Among the ones who did, 
some suggested that the Latin American migrants are not as “seriously hard-working” or 
“well-organized” as other nationalities, even though they are still useful sources of cheap 
labor (M11-E; M13-E).104 Ecuadorians are also considered much less educated than 
Bulgarians, for instance. As one expert interviewee put it, even if Bulgarian workers 
                                                          
104 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Lo veo menos organizado que los países del Este” 
(ME-11), “No son tan serios trabajando como la gente del Este (M13-E). 
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“have more qualifications, they do not get the better of an Ecuadorian woman,” however 
(M26-TU).105 Historical connections and cultural proximity assure the continuous 
employment of Ecuadorian workers in Madrid. The lack of emphasis on “hard work” 
both renders “culture” the most significant category underlying the acceptance of 
immigrants in the receiving city and institutionalizes the following relationship between 
being Spanish and “work”: 
The way people get along with each other, social contact. You build up friendships and you 
have your social life…I’m more proud of the fact that work is important but not the essential 
thing. We work to earn the living and don’t live for work (M19-ADMIN) 
 
III.4.5.4. Work Ethic and Bulgarians in Madrid  
 Manipulation of the attribute of “hard work” justifies the conflicted reception of 
Bulgarians in Madrid (Table III.3). On the one hand, the group is characterized as very 
“hard-working” and “well-prepared,” much like the Polish in Dublin (M13-E).106 Indeed, 
more than two-thirds of local stakeholders talk about Bulgarians’ elevated educational 
and skills levels, efficiency, and labor market experience that renders them good 
professionals. Among Madrilenian survey respondents, hard work was cited a positive 
feature of Bulgarians in 47.3% of responses and 32.7% of write-in answers.107 
While they are responsible, “high achievers” and “good as workers,” Bulgarians 
fail to connect with Spanish employers on a socio-cultural level (M12-E; M13-E; M15-E; 
M23-TU).108 Being “too serious” precludes the Balkan laborers from “improvisation in 
                                                          
105 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish:” Tienen más cualificación, pero no es que tengan a 
lo mejor que una mujer ecuatoriana.” 
106 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son bastante trabajadores… En términos generales 
la gente del Este está bastante mejor preparada.” 
107 Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.  
108 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Lo que te he dicho, son serios, bastante 
serios. … Son bastante responsables en general. Cumplen sus compromisos, son bastante trabajadores… 
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the organization,” and isolates them from other collectives (M11-E).109 Since “culture” is 
more significant as a predictor of public opinion that economic position and Spaniards 
are most concerned that foreigners “adopt the way of life” (esté dispuesto/a a adoptar el 
modo de vida del país) in the receiving country, Bulgarians’ seriousness sets them apart 
from relaxed Madrilenians (CIS, 2012).110 Such considerations lead the same 
Madrilenian survey respondents who touted Bulgarians’ hard work to be conflicted in 
their evaluation of the Balkan migrants’ work ethic and reliability, with 56.7% providing 
a somewhat positive rating and 43.3% a somewhat negative one.111  
 Bulgarians’ hard work is counterbalanced with stereotypes of the group’s 
criminality, much like in the case of Nigerians in Dublin. The perception of Bulgarians as 
connected to crime and “violence” is as widespread as that of their high qualifications 
(M17-P; M35-P).112 The East Europeans are reported to have a “tendency to work 
underground,” a trend that undermines governmental efforts to eradicate the growing 
informal economy in Madrid (M19-ADMIN). Coming from “a more corrupt country” 
attaches security considerations to Bulgarian migration, as the East Europeans’ mobility 
is perceived to corrupt the receiving space (M23-TU).113 Connections to “organized 
mafia” and “criminal organizations” taint the image of the respectful, educated Balkan 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Por su nivel de fomación más elevada que el resto, que es clarísimo que tiene una formación más elevada 
(M13-E), “Pero como trabajadores bien” (M15-E).  
109 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “En los países del Este como Bulgaria, 
tienen…no es ser serios, sino tienen más organización, las cosas se hacen así, así y así. Hacen menos 
improvisación en la organización.” 
110 Among CIS respondents, 26.4% based their opinion about immigrants on the newcomers’ culture, and 
19.6% on their economic position. Other predictors included nationality (24.6%), skin color (10.6%), and 
other factors (6.9%). 12.6% of respondents did not provide an answer to this question (CIS, 2012, p. 6) 
(author’s translation from original text in Spanish).  
111 Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results. 
112 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Pero el principal problema con respecto a 
la delincuencia, y sobre todo búlgara, es la violencia.” 
113 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Luego también vienen de países más 
corruptos, donde hay una corrupción más generalizada, donde todo el mundo entiende que la corrupción es 
un hábito, una costumbre.” 
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worker (M16-P; M20-ADMIN; M27-L).114 The frame of the Bulgarians “who … 
dedicate themselves only to drugs and stealing” further detracts from perceptions of 
Bulgarians’ hard work and suggests that perhaps the East European migrants “don’t come 
in to work but only to steal” (M15-E).115 The stereotypes of having “a number of crimes 
higher than the median,” of being “former military, Mafioso,” and of engaging in 
“physical violence” “collide with Spanish society,” according to respondents (M17-P; 
M24-TU; M27-L).116 Bulgarians’ aggressiveness, crime, begging, dirtiness, or proneness 
to alcoholism are cited as significant negatives by Madrilenian survey respondents as 
well. Such images are particularly damaging in a host community where immigrants who 
“come to rob” are much less likely to be perceived as sympathetic than the ones who 
have different customs and way of life (CIS, 2012).117 In contrast, few Ecuadorians are 
viewed as criminal, and any issues with the Latin American group are dubbed “internal 
affairs” (M27-L).118 Bulgarians’ perceived criminality sets the collective apart from 
Spaniards and South Americans in Madrid.  
                                                          
114 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “La percepción que se tienen del delito 
organizo de los extranjeros es del este.  Mafia organizada…” (M27-L).  
115 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Yo conozco a búlgaros que tienen su plan y se 
dedican solamente a la droga y a robar … Que se vienen a trabajar y no entran a trabajar sino a robarte.” 
116 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “En ciertas ocasiones ha habido cierto 
recelo, en términos sociológicos, se registra que hay un número de delitos producidos por los ciudadanos 
bulgaros superior a la media….” (M27-L), “Los hombres del este es igual un poco a ex militar, mafioso, 
por toda la historia contemporánea, la relación de Yugoslavia de Romania de…”   (M24-TU), “Lo que 
ocurre es que cuando han participado en ciertos delitos, como que chocan mucho con la sociedad 
Española…Es decir, ya no es que entren a una casa a robar estando los habitantes dentro, sino que encima 
hay una violencia física muy exagerada” (M17-P).  
117 Indeed, in a survey by CIS (2012, p. 13), immigrants are “perceived worse” or endanger “less sympathy 
by Spaniards” (le caen peor o tiene menos simpatía por) mostly if they “come to rob” (vienen a robar ) 
(20.4%), are “bad persons” (son malas personas) (9.8%), “do not integrate, form ghettos”(no se integran, 
forman guetos) (9.6%), have different “customs, way of life, cultural difference” (sus costumbres, formas 
de vida, diferencias culturales) (8.8%), “are violent, aggressive, conflictual, problematic” (son violentos, 
agresivos, conflictivos, problemáticos) (8.4%). Other reasons like attitudes towards women (5.6%) or 
religious extremism or Islamism (4.3%) are important but less significant than criminality, violence, and 
cultural dissimilarity (author’s translation from original text in Spanish).  
118 Author‘s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Cuando se asocia la delincuencia con los 




Finally, the category of culture subsumes all the other markers of difference and 
similarity employed by local stakeholders, as to firmly place certain ethnic cohorts in the 
“us” group, while relegating others to a “them” status, especially in the case of Madrid.119 
Cultural similarity between the South Americans and their Spanish hosts produces a 
common identity and undermines any differences in educational levels, political 
development, or ethnic belonging. While Bulgarians might share European roots, higher 
qualifications, or historical trends with Madrilenians, the Balkan migrants’ cultural 
attributes, including a dissimilar disposition, linguistic differences, and a distinct way of 
life, render their reception conflicted. In the case of Dublin, “work ethic” is instead 
employed by stakeholders as a non-problematic rubric to summarize perceived ethnic, 
linguistic, historical, and social connections or differences. Nonetheless, culture is also 
highly significant. It contributes to Poles and Dubliners’ connection due to their similar 
disposition and mores. More importantly, “culture” sets apart Dubliners and Nigerians, as 
the latter are reported to have distinct traditions and social interaction patterns from 
natives. In reality, even when Irish respondents speak of Nigerians’ different intonation 
or work ethic, they highlight cultural differences of social relations and perceptions of 
what is socially appropriate or desirable. Thus, in both case studies of this dissertation, 
“culture” is paramount in including and excluding desirable and undesirable foreign 
cohorts.   
                                                          
119 For the definition of culture, refer to Chapter I of this dissertation. The project’s definition diverges 
fundamentally from essentialist paradigms that interpret the concept as an immutable marker of personal 
and group identification. Unlike Huntington’s understanding of culture as a rigid objective category that 
produces conflict between individuals, groups, states, and civilizations, this project considers culture 
subjective and fluid (Huntington, 2005). Consequently, group boundaries can be reconstructed, clashes 
between ethnic populations are not inevitable, and exclusion or integration deficiencies can be remedied.  
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III.4.6.1. Culture and Poles in Dublin 
 Polish immigrants are cast as insiders because of their culture (Table III.3). The 
“cultural connection” is reported to be one of the motives attracting Polish workers to 
Ireland in the first place (D18-P).  Cultural similarity is also perceived to render the 
Polish so well liked among the native population. Cultural kinship is understood in terms 
of a common friendly attitude and openness to others. It is further defined as the ability 
“to get on socially,” as well as an “easy-going temperament” and a penchant for 
“enjoyment” (D1-J; D13-P). Reference to cultural similarity with the Polish reconstructs 
their Irish hosts as possessing a “gregarious,” “friendly,” and accepting disposition 
themselves (D1-J; D16-ADMIN).   It also calls forth Poles’ other desirable attributes, 
such as hard work, historical connections to the Irish, or shared ethnic belonging. 
 The perceived cultural similarity between Poles and their Irish hosts is highly 
significant for public opinion in Dublin as well. Similarity to the Irish, understood both in 
ethno-national terms and as a common attitude or disposition, is the second most 
prominent positive feature of the East Europeans, according to the city’s residents. Polish 
workers’ friendliness and easy-going, open-minded, and fun attitude accounts for the 
respondents’ advantageous evaluation of the Polish in numerous write-in responses. 
Multiple participants characterize Poles as “nice” or “good” people, who are “polite,” 
“courteous,” “helpful” to others, “neat” and “attractive”, much like the Irish.120  
 
III.4.6.2. Culture and Nigerians in Dublin 
 On the other hand, Nigerians are narrated as “unfamiliar” because of their culture 
(Table III.3). Their arrival in the 1990s is cast as a threat to the relatively homogenous 
                                                          
120 Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results. 
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fabric of Irish culture. Nigerians are considered less integrated and the subject of more 
resentment than their Polish counterparts in view of how “different” they are. As one 
respondent put it, “visual and cultural differences present a barrier for Nigerians” (D41-
NO). Nigerians are described as a “different category people.” A “feeling of difference 
between us and them” is based on the Africans’ aggressiveness and “loud,” “rude” 
manner of communication (D1-J; D9-P; D28-P). The “cultural gap” with the Irish is 
considered evident even in the different ways of African and Irish nationals in celebrating 
Christmas or carrying out other social traditions (D1-J). “Because their culture is a very 
different thing to us,” Nigerian immigrants are even described through the term 
“unacceptable migrants” (D1-J; D18-P). Cultural incompatibility is what the respondents 
refer to when they reference Nigerians’ loud voices or when they describe the Africans’ 
tendency not to work hard but to take advantage of the social system. While interpreted 
as habits and disposition by Irish local actors, therefore, “culture” is a much broader 
category that underlies all other determinants of inclusion and exclusion in Dublin.   
 
III.4.6.3. Culture and Ecuadorians in Madrid 
 The category of culture, interpreted as common customs and way of life, but 
further assuming similar language, history, religion, and disposition, is the most 
significant marker of similarity and difference between the native population and 
immigrant collectives in the city of Madrid. While Madrid is constructed as a “plural 
democratic society… where there are multiple faiths that need to be respected,” cultural 
distance is not tolerated by the host population (M27-L).121 To demonstrate, respondents 
                                                          
121 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Puedan vivir en una sociedad democrática y 
plural…Es un país realmente donde hay muchas creencias y hay que respetar.” 
120 
 
in the survey by CIS (2012, p. 4) found immigrants’ willingness “to adapt to the way of 
life in the country” (que esté dispuesto/a a adoptar el modo de vida del país) by far the 
most significant factor for allowing them to remain in Spain.  “Culture” (cultura) was 
also considered the best predictor of foreigners’ treatment in the receiving context. 40% 
of respondents found “cultural enrichment” (enriquecimiento cultural) to be the most 
significant positive effect of immigration and “cultural clashes” (choques culturales) the 
most problematic aspect of mobility (CIS, 2012, pp. 6, 8). More than half of CIS’ 
participants agreed that “immigrants should be allowed to maintain only these aspects of 
their culture that do not bother the rest of the Spanish” (Los inmigrantes deberían poder 
mantener sólo aquellos aspectos de su cultura y costumbres que no molesten al resto de 
los españoles) (CIS, 2012, p. 9).122 Respondents surveyed by this author similarly argued 
that foreigners have to “function like Spaniards and change their culture” (M21-
ADMIN).123 Therefore, culturally proximate Ecuadorians are in a particularly favorable 
position to enrich the sense of multiculturalism in the receiving city without introducing 
fundamentally different or disruptive customs or patterns of interaction (Table III.3). 
 A majority of local stakeholders talk about the fact that “culture brings us closer 
to the South Americans” (M12-E).124 Workers from Ecuador “who do not have a very 
different culture” are reported to choose Madrid as a destination based on their proximity 
with their hosts and to “adapt very well” in the receiving context (M25-TU; M34-TU).125 
Respondents interpret culture as “common language,” which allows for the Latin 
                                                          
122 Author‘s translation from original text in Spanish. 
123 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Y que por tanto tienen que funcionar como 
españoles y cambian la cultura.” 
124 Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Quizás la cultura nos acerca más a los americanos, 
por el idioma, por la historia.” 
125 Author‘s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Ha sido la oleada migratoria potente en 
España ha sido la de América Latina: Perú, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, que son trabajadores que hablan 
español, que no tienen una cultura muy diferente y que han encontrado más fácil el estar en España.” 
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Americans’ easier transition to the host city (M23-TU).126 “Cultural similarities” and a 
“common language” contribute to Ecuadorians’ superior integration levels in the city 
(M16-P; M18-ADMIN; M20-ADMIN; M26-TU; M32-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). 
“Cultural closeness” in terms of shared religion and history create a “common identity” 
between Ecuadorians and Madrilenians and contribute to the immigrants’ warm welcome 
(M27-L).127 Common culture is also framed “proximity, proximity of customs, links to 
Latin America and the language” (M35-P).128 Finally, culture is interpreted as a shared 
“form of communication” between hosts and newcomers (M33-TU).129 As Ecuadorian 
workers are more “loose” and “communicative,” much like the Spanish, they perform 
better in the service industry where they compete with Bulgarians (M10-E).130 Since the 
“Latin Americans are more extroverted … speak our language and eat our food, share in 
our public spaces,” this ethnic cohort has multiple opportunities for communication with 
the native population and exists in a shared socio-cultural space with Madrilenians (M25-
TU; M34-TU).131 Common culture, interpreted as similar language, history, religion and 
an extroverted disposition, cements Ecuadorians’ acceptance and belonging in the city of 
Madrid, while confirming Spaniards’ own friendliness and favorable way of life.  
 
 
                                                          
126 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Vamos a probar con los países de 
Sudamérica, que tienen un lenguaje como el nuestro, una cultura parecida y tal…” 
127 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Hay una cercanía cultural que hace… el 
idioma y la cultura en su trasfondo religioso crea una identidad común.” 
128Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Por cercanía, por cercanía de costumbres y por 
vinculación a Latinoamérica y por idioma.” 
129 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “forma de comunicación.” 
130 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Se nota, las chicas de Europa del Este son 
más serias. Las sudamericanas son un poquito más dejadas, pero también son más alegres con respecto al 
trabajo, son más comunicativas con la gente.” 
131 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Los latinonamericanos son más extrovertidos… 
hablan nuestro idioma y comen nuestra comida, y que comparten los espacios públicos, porque se los ven 
en parques, en fiestas, y tal.” 
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III.4.6.4. Culture and Bulgarians in Madrid  
 The conception of Bulgarians’ cultural characteristics is highly conflicted (Table 
III.3). On the one hand, one third of expert respondents suggest that Bulgarians “stem 
from a culture very similar to ours” (M17-P).132 The category of culture here is 
interpreted less as partaking in common language, disposition, history, ethnie, or way of 
life, an “organic” conception participants apply to Latin Americans (Gellner, 1983). It is 
instead framed as participating in shared high educational levels, a common economic 
and political reality within Europe, and certain political mores and values like obeying 
the law. Culture here is understood as socially and politically engineered (Weber, 1976). 
Thus, while shared cultural identity with Ecuadorians refers to Spaniards’ innate Ibero-
American roots, shared culture with Bulgarians is elected and confirms Madrilenians’ 
determination to be European. The two connections highlight the desirable characteristics 
of the receiving space without necessarily being contradictory and despite two distinct 
conceptions of culture and identity.   
 On the other hand, the same expert respondents speak of Bulgarians’ cultural 
distance from Madrilenians and the Balkan migrants’ different customs. As the East 
Europeans are “introverted, in the sense of ‘I don’t interact with others’,” Madrilenians 
find it hard to establish deep connections and share in relationships with the newcomers 
(M25-TU; M34-TU).133 Bulgarians’ “different customs” set them apart from both the 
festive Madrilenian and the lively Ecuadorian, who “parties, dances” (fiestas, bailes) and 
                                                          
132 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Parten de culturas muy parecida a la nuestra.” 
133 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Un poco quizás introvertidos, en el sentido 
de ‘no me interactúo con otros’. … La gente de los países del Este son como más introvertidas, de 
relacionarse más entre ellos,.” 
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enjoys life (M23-TU).134 As Bulgarians are “people who do not speak your language… 
people who come from a different reality,” they create problems of cohesion and 
integration in the receiving context (M25-TU; M34-TU).135 Their different way of life, 
for instance their tendencies for aggression and public drunkenness, presents a barrier to 
their inclusion in Madrid and an issue for coexistence with that collective. These elite 
sentiments are reflected in public opinion as well, with 21.7% of write-in responses 
pointing to Bulgarians’ seriousness, closed mindset, and lack for trust for outsiders. 
Respondents also suggest they simply cannot understand the culturally-different Balkan 
migrants.136 Therefore, while the East Europeans might share certain civic and political 
values with Spaniards as Europeans, they are different from their hosts and the culturally 
proximate South American group in terms of fundamental characteristics like their “way 
of being” (forma de ser). Bulgarians are thus excluded in Madrid.  
 
III.5. Conclusion    
Through analysis of elite and public discourse, Chapter III finds that the four 
immigrant groups of interest to this thesis are positioned very differently in Dublin and 
Madrid. Despite a general souring of public attitudes toward all immigrant groups with 
economic downturn, Polish and Ecuadorian workers continue to be narrated as insiders 
who fit into the host contexts’ lives and integrate in the receiving societies. Both 
engender empathy and a sense of kinship from their hosts. On the other hand, Nigerian 
immigrants are excluded in public discourse despite the length of their stay and the actual 
                                                          
134 Author’s translation from original Spanish.  
135 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son gente que no habla tu idioma, son gente que 
viene de una realidad diferente.” 
136 Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results. 
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ties they share with their receiving community. They are perceived as outsiders who are 
too different from the native population to integrate. Bulgarians’ reception in Madrid is 
conflicted. While not as negative as that of Nigerians in Dublin, the evaluation of 
Bulgarians’ ability and willingness to fit in is ambiguous.  
This differential reception might have something to do with the groups’ perceived 
economic utility. The Polish are considered economic migrants contributing to Dublin’s 
labor market and Nigerians are seen as asylum seekers who only place a burden on Irish 
social resources. Ecuadorians were recruited by the Spanish state to fill labor shortages in 
low-skilled services, and Bulgarians, while highly educated and hard-working, are tied to 
organized criminal organizations and the begging Roma. 
However, in both official discourse and the public’s eye, economic utility has less 
to do with inclusion and exclusion than do perceived distance and familiarity constructed 
in cultural, non-economic terms. Shared strong work ethic, white European ethnicity, 
Catholicism, English language, history of emigration and independent spirit, as well as an 
accepting and friendly disposition, frame kinship between the Irish and the Polish, while 
also reasserting these positive qualities among Dubliners. Nigerian immigrants are in turn 
narrated as fundamentally different on the basis of the same categories, where the 
coexistence of the two immigrant groups makes these categories even more meaningful. 
Ecuadorians are admitted in Madrid in view of their common existence with Spaniards in 
an Ibero-American transnational space. They share with their hosts the Castellan 
language; historical parallels of emigration and a spirit of reciprocity between Spain and 
South America; Catholic religion; as well as social interaction patterns, an extroverted 
disposition and common culture. Despite Bulgarians’ white European ethnicity and 
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similar historical trajectories, the Balkan migrants are constructed as different from 
Madrilenians. They are farmed as serious, criminal, authoritarian, Orthodox, ethnically 
suspect, and participants in different customs and interaction patterns. Commonalities 
between desirable immigrant populations and natives are emphasized or invented while 
any connections with undesirable collectives are downplayed.  
Surprisingly, European belonging or privileged legal status does not automatically 
translate into positive reception in new immigration spaces on the Continent, with non-
European Ecuadorians faring better than EU Bulgarians in Spain. Instead, inclusion and 
inclusion are based in local stakeholders’ interpretation of the subjective identity-based 
categories of ethnicity, history, religion, language, work ethic, and culture. Two of these 
attributes stand out. “Hard work” is a non-material category that underlies and assumes 
all other desirable characteristics of insider immigrants, especially in the case of Dublin. 
“Culture,” while understood as common mores and a shared disposition, is an all-
encompassing classification that serves as the basis of other commonalities. For instance, 
Poles’ hard work implies shared cultural mores with ambitious Dubliners. Nigerians’ 
distinct intonation suggests cultural distance from the Irish. Ecuadorians’ shared language 
with Madrilenians allows for common traditions and cultural patterns. Bulgarians’ 
Orthodox faith correlates with dissimilar customs and a cultural barrier. 
Furthermore, cultural markers of similarity and difference are not essentialist or 
objective, but are mutable, fluid, and reinterpretable. They are employed strategically by 
local stakeholders to institutionalize patterns of welcome or rejection, and carry different 
meanings and weight according to context and local identity variations. For instance, 
authoritarian past engenders not empathy but suspicion for Bulgarians in Madrid, as local 
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identity is focused on modernism, republicanism, and democracy. It creates kinship 
between Poles and Dubliners who have both overcome such historical obstacles. 
Language skills are paramount in Spain, but are downplayed and explained out in Ireland. 
This chapter showed how local political and economic elites and the general 
public interpret and reinterpret flexible identity characteristics in order to include or 
exclude the immigrants in their midst.  However, public discourse is only factor in 
determining immigrant integration outcomes in Dublin and Madid. Ethnic communities’ 
own perceptions of welcome or rejection have a large role to play for incorporation 
patterns. It is to the way in which foreign cohorts utilize the same fluid identity attributes 
employed by elites and native public to construct their own belonging or isolation in 






TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY:  
BELONGING AND ISOLATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID 
 
IV.1. Introduction  
Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are 
received very differently by employers, politicians, and the general public. The four 
populations also form different perceptions of their own belonging or isolation in the two 
cities, often in opposition to the public discourses they face. Polish workers are accepted 
by Dubliners and satisfied with life in Ireland, but are still to make Dublin their home. 
Nigerians feel isolated in the hostile receiving city. Ecuadorians are at home in 
welcoming Madrid. Bulgarians build a future in the host community despite attachment 
to the motherland or Madrilenians’ lukewarm reception. What explains these patterns?  
Why do the immigrants belong or fail to fit in?  
Cultural proximity and distance play a role in all four cases. Rigid cultural self-
identification and embeddedness in national networks preclude commitment to 
integration in the case of Polish workers. Ethnoracial differences and their effects 
undermine the ability to belong among Nigerian migrants. Linguistic and historical 
commonalities render Madrid an extension of Ecuador for the South American 
immigrants. Strong national self-identification and intense nostalgia for the homeland are 
counteracted by a common European destiny with the Spanish in the case of Bulgarians. 
While these findings concern four particular foreign cohorts in two specific European 
locations, they also provide insight into the experiences of the first generation of 
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immigrants on the Continent more broadly.  Immigrant agency and rigid culturally-
grounded conceptions of welcome or rejection obstruct incorporation efforts as much as 
local discourses of exclusion.  
 
 
Table IV.1. Indicators of Immigrant Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation137 
 
 
 This chapter traces patterns of belonging and isolation for Poles and Nigerians in 
Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid through the discussion of migration 
trajectories; perceptions of group status; interactions with natives; and conceptions of 
individual satisfaction, integration, and self-identification (Table IV.1). Polish workers 
                                                          
137 Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Answers that reflect lack of belonging are 
assigned a value of 1. Answers that reflect high levels of belonging constructed in cultural terms are given a 
value of 5. Answers that fall in the middle are assigned a 3. The numbers 2 and 4 reflect intermediary levels 
of belonging falling between the three categories. The values from each row are added to produce an 
average level of belonging for each group. Values between 3 and 6 reflect low levels of belonging, values 
of 7-11 show intermediate levels of belonging, and values of 12-15 reflect high levels of belonging. 
“Migration trajectory” is a composite indicator defined in terms of motivations for migration, length of 
stay, and future migration plans. Each sub-category is given a number of 1-5, and the sum is divided by 
three.  Migration on the basis of cultural ties, long-term settlement, and no return plans warrant high values, 
while economic motives, short-term migration and plans to return home warrant a low value. “Group 
status” focuses on individuals’ perceptions of how well their national group fits in into the receiving 
context. Group welcome and perceptions of the group’s integration are assigned a value of 1-5 and the sum 
is divided by two. “Individual status” is composed of four sub-categories. The immigrants’ interactions are 
evaluated and given a high value if relationships are with natives and other nationalities and low value if 
they occur only with compatriots. Self-reported satisfaction and integration in the receiving city are the 
second and third components. Self-identification is the fourth sub-category, given a low value if the 
immigrants identify predominantly with the home country and a high one if they also identify with the host 



















































are satisfied with opportunity in Dublin and feel relatively welcomed by their Irish hosts. 
However, as their self-identification is exclusively Polish, the East European immigrants 
do not invest adequate efforts in integration. They perceive their larger ethnic community 
as isolated, confined to the Polish diaspora and lacking in meaningful interactions with 
the local society. Even individual respondents fail to establish deeper connections with 
Dubliners and define themselves exclusively through the home country. According to 
Table IV.1, Poles do not belong in Dublin.  
Nigerians’ ethnoracial differences from the Irish and the constant reminder of 
their unfamiliarity undermine their sense of belonging in the host city. Unlike Polish 
workers, Nigerian immigrants were actually attracted to Ireland due to the cultural and 
historical ties they share with this country and have come to Dublin to settle. However, 
much like their Polish counterparts, they still feel isolated and rejected. The Nigerian 
community is considered to be excluded on an everyday basis and therefore remains self-
contained and separate from the local population. While individual migrants are satisfied 
with life in Dublin and interact with the native population, they still identify as Nigerian 
and different from their Irish hosts. The Nigerian community has more at stake in Ireland 
than the Polish community, but shares in its feelings of isolation (Table IV.1).  
 On the other hand, Ecuadorians belong in Madrid as they are similar to their 
hosts. While they are economic migrants in Spain arriving with a relatively short-term 
migration plans, the intimate interrelation between home and host countries leads the 
South Americans to choose Spain as their destination, remain in the receiving city 
indefinitely, and build their future in both Ecuador and Spain. Cultural affinity, as well as 
historic and linguistic connections, underlies the Latin Americans’ perceptions of 
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welcome by the Spanish and integration of their larger ethnic community. Individual 
respondents’ “Spanish blood” explains their ease in navigating Madrid’s landscape, 
building relationships with the Spanish, and ultimately reuniting the family unit in the 
receiving space. According to Table IV.1, and as they perceive both Ecuador and Spain 
as part of a larger Ibero-American transnational community, Ecuadorians experience high 
levels of belonging in Madrid (and the highest among the four ethnic populations).  
Despite conflicted feelings about life in Madrid, Bulgarians belong in the host city 
(Table IV.1). The East Europeans identify exclusively as Bulgarian and suffer from 
intense nostalgia for the motherland. They arrived in Spain with short-term plans, 
continue to form their strongest relationships with other Bulgarians, and see their national 
community as isolated. However, as they are joined by family and friends, find the 
Spanish a warm society with a similar temperament, and want to provide the next 
generation with stability and opportunity, the immigrants extend their stay in Madrid. 
Disappointment with a corrupt homeland and a superior standard of life in the receiving 
context lead them to set roots in Spain and look for connections with the Spanish. High 
levels of satisfaction in Spain, especially with language acquisition and the consolidation 
of the family unit, lead Bulgarians to call Madrid their new home.138  
Based on their perceptions, Polish workers place in the lower left corner of Table 
IV.2. The myth of inclusion and similarity established in Irish public discourse is 
undermined by Polish immigrants’ relatively weak sense of belonging in Dublin. The 
                                                          
138Group identification and experiences are always established in opposition to those of other ethnic 
cohorts. Both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Spain, for example, cite the other collective’s dissimilarity 
with the Spanish to cement their own belonging in Madrid. Nigerians’ disagreement with the myth of 
Poles’ belonging in Dublin intensifies their own indignation with an exclusionary receiving environment 




Nigerian community falls in the lower right quadrant of Table IV.2. Nigerians’ isolation 
reinforces the discourse of difference of Irish elites and the public. Ecuadorians occupy 
the upper left quadrant of Table IV.2. Perceptions of belonging are consistent with the 
image of inclusion and affinity extended by the Spanish. Bulgarians fit into the upper 
right quadrant of Table IV.2. Their conflicted yet growing sense of identification with 
Madrid occurs in contrast with a certain perception of difference by Madrilenians.  
 
 














These findings are based on analysis of in-depth interviews with thirty to forty 
members of the Eastern European cohorts and ten members of the non-European groups, 
as well as all four groups’ representatives in ethnic organizations. In the case of Nigerians 
in Dublin, interview data are further supplemented through studies conducted by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute and the Immigrant Council of Ireland. In the case 
of Ecuadorians in Madrid, periodic surveys by the Autonomous Community of Madrid, 












































Interviews with the individual migrants are not representative, but they are not meant to 
be. Instead, they introduce a crucial level of thickness and nuance to the findings and 
bring the human experience into theoretical discussion of identity, belonging, or 
integration. They reinforce the conclusions of the groups’ elite interlocutors. Combined 
with secondary sources and reports, the interview data provide invaluable insight into 
how attitudes and perceptions form among foreign populations (Maxwell, 2008).  
This chapter turns to the narrative for each immigrant group, starting with Poles 
and Nigerians in Dublin and moving on to Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid.  
 
IV.2. “A Contented Proletariat”: Polish Perceptions of Belonging and 
Isolation in Dublin 
 
The Polish immigrants studied here are not a homogenous group. In fact, 
members of this ethnic community themselves point to the existence of several separate 
categories of Polish immigrants in Ireland. The clearest cleavage is between older, lesser-
educated migrants in Ireland for a specific purpose and thus connected exclusively to 
Poland and younger, better-educated workers ready to experience Irish culture and 
society. Some also identify a third group, composed of migrants who still feel connected 
to the home country, but are thankful for the opportunities they have found in Ireland and 
constantly reconsider the length of their stay in the receiving country. With return 
migration from the first group after the collapse of the Irish construction industry, yet an 
uninterrupted flow of people into Ireland, the third group is growing in numbers in 
Dublin. Therefore, most of the members of the Polish community in Ireland today share 
similar sentiments about their migration to Dublin. Those sentiments are highly 
conflicted, and betray a feeling of being “in between”, temporary, and not truly invested 
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in the host society. Polish immigrants’ own perceptions and inspirations diverge from the 
discourse of welcome and inclusion extended by Irish local administrators and the 
general public. As a result, Poles place in the bottom row of Table IV.2. Polish 
immigrants’ narrative of belonging is detailed below.  
 
IV.2.1. Polish Workers’ Migration Trajectories  
Poles’ migration trajectories indicate conflicted sense of belonging in Dublin. In 
contrast to the perceptions of Dubliners, Polish workers migrated to Ireland not due to 
shared identity characteristics and a perception of common future with their hosts, but 
rather for a complex set of motives combining economic opportunity, desire for 
adventure, the wish to learn English and experience a different culture, and the 
prerogatives of family life. Political openness with European Union enlargement, the 
promise of support by family and friends, the ease of travel, and the positive image of 
Ireland in the Polish media serve as additional factors for choosing Ireland.  
 
 








% of all 
respondents 
 
Economic opportunity 27.4% 29 69% 
Open borders (EU) 17.9% 19 45.2% 
Adventure/experience 15.1% 16 38.1% 
Social networks 14.1% 15 35.7% 
Family prerogatives 10.4% 11 26.2% 
Kinship and friendliness 8.5% 9 21.4% 
Ease of travel 3.8% 4 9.5% 








Of 42 persons 
  
Source: Author.  
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Regardless of the myth of kinship in Irish public discourse, few Polish immigrants 
and representatives asserted that the Polish community migrated to Ireland in view of 
cultural affinity with the Irish. Three Polish respondents cited the shared history between 
the receiving and sending societies as one of the factors behind their decision, and a 
single Polish worker provided Ireland’s Catholic tradition as his main motive for 
choosing this destination. Seven among the forty-two participants quoted Irish people’s 
“similar” and friendly disposition and the small country’s comfortable way of life as 
reasons to choose Ireland over other potential host states. Because it is “the most friendly 
place in Europe for Polish people” and “Ireland is more like at home,” 16% of all 
participants “booked a one-way ticket” to Ireland instead of Sweden, which also removed 
political and economic borders for new EU members joining in 2004 (Table IV.3).139 
 However, most chose Dublin for economic reasons. More than a quarter of all 
responses deem Dublin-bound migration the result of financial or economic factors and 
seven in ten of my Polish participants admit they are in Ireland because of the “taste of 
money” (Jennifer, 29) (Table IV.3). Lack of economic opportunity at home, even for 
college graduates, has pushed many Polish workers to seek alternative destinations of 
employment. Undesirable positions, “little money,” and high unemployment rates at 
home led many Polish immigrants to leave their country (Mary, 41). On the other hand, 
the booming and flexible economy and relatively high wages attracted Polish workers to 
Ireland in particular. The availability of work, especially in the building industry, the 
                                                          
139 Most participants gave multiple responses to the question “Why did you leave Poland and migrate to 
Ireland?” Therefore, while there are forty-two respondents who discussed this question, there are in fact 
one hundred and six recorded answers among them. The rest of the chapter takes account of the incidence 
of the responses both as percentage of all 42 respondents and all 106 responses given. While rates for each 
answer are radically different based on these two different modes of calculation, results are the same 
regardless of method. 
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“good money” and the active recruitment of Polish workers by Irish companies and 
government agencies led Polish workers to swell up Dublin’s population (Devon, 33). A 
majority of respondents arrived for the money to supplement low pensions in Poland or to 
save up for a new business, a new house, or a wedding in the home country.  
While financial troubles and lack of opportunity at home were the main 
motivations to leave Poland, economic prerogatives were often combined with desire for 
change from a routine reality, thirst for getting to know different societies, as well as 
aspirations for professional experience and sharper language skills. Almost four in ten of 
all participants referred to their migration as an “adventure” or “risky,” where in 15% of 
all responses the need for change, experience, and excitement served as the primary drive 
behind labor mobility (Amy, 28; Kevin, 27; Ted, 28) (Table IV.3). The second largest 
group of participants, therefore, left Poland to look for a better and more interesting life. 
This inevitably entailed gaining practical experience from the entrepreneurial Irish, 
meeting “a different culture,” as well as learning the English language (Rick, 45). The 
implication is that experience and skills acquired in Ireland would eventually be applied 
back in the home country.  
Finally, a large group of Polish respondents left the sending country with the 
prerogative of maintaining their family unit. Family interest was the fifth most common 
motivation for migration, in 10% of all responses. More than one fourth of the forty-two 
participants who responded to this question suggested that they migrated to Dublin to 
preserve a relationship with their Polish partner or to develop a new one after meeting 
Irish partners in Poland (Table IV.3). Other interviewees relocated to Dublin to help out 
children, improve the educational opportunities of their children or start a family  
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Several other factors led Polish respondents to choose Ireland as a migration 
destination in particular. The enlargement of the European Union played a major role in 
Polish migration to Ireland. Almost half of my interviewees suggested their migration to 
Dublin was greatly influenced by the removal of political boundaries for Polish citizens 
there (Table IV.3). According to 18%, the freedom of movement with EU widening 
allowed the Polish to take advantage of opportunities in Ireland with “no border, no 
passports, no visas” or any other obstacles (George, 58). The “open door policy after EU 
enlargement” that Ireland espoused contributed to this country looking “like paradise” for 
many Poles (Thomas, 37). As one respondent shared, “enlargement definitely helped 
most of the Eastern European countries to go to the West and try to find a better place to 
live” (Zara, 30). EU enlargement helped regularize Polish workers already in Ireland and 
therefore improved the quality of their economic and social life. As one participant put it: 
I live in Ireland for almost five years because there was big opportunity for us, Polish 
citizens, to come here in 2004 with European Union extension. So I decided to not go 
elsewhere because I couldn’t build my existence on illegal work (Rick, 45) 
 
The ease of travel with open borders and an ever proliferating number of flights 
between Poland and Ireland was also quoted as a catalyst for Polish workers’ decision to 
migrate to Dublin. While not a leading factor, almost 10% of all respondents talked about 
Aer Lingus and Ryan Air, which “connect Ireland with almost every city in Poland” and 
make commuting between the two countries “very easy” (George, 58; Hailey, 60). A 
rising number of bus connections and improved Internet communications between 
receiving and sending states further facilitated Polish migration to Dublin.  
A slew of information and a positive image of Ireland by friends, family or the 
Polish media, as well as the security of support upon arrival, also served to attract Polish 
workers to Dublin. Social and human networks made Ireland a preferred destination of 
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Polish migration, as Poles already residing and working there presented the country as 
“paradise” (Lara, 32). The image of Ireland as “green,” “nice,” and “good economically” 
led 7% of all interviewees to conclude that they will like this particular destination. A 
place where a lot of their fellow citizens were already residing appeared like a safer and 
better bet for many Polish immigrants. The promise of support on the ground, in terms of 
accommodation, information, and even a job offer upon arrival, facilitated Poles’ 
decision to migrate to Ireland among more than one third of all participants. In 14% of all 
responses, Polish workers followed relatives or responded to professional opportunities 
offered to them by friends and family (Table IV.3).  
One respondent summarizes well the complicated motives behind Polish workers’ 
decision to migrate to Ireland: “Polish people came to Ireland because they wanted a 
better life. Second, it was very easy. Economic was very high. Of course also if all your 
friends are here, you are going to come here ... Of course there was a boom and many 
people came with the EU” (Thomas, 37). Economic motivation and a booming economy 
in Ireland combined with social networks, desire for adventure, and open borders to 
attract hundreds of thousands of Poles to Ireland. While a certain coziness and familiarity 
between Poland and Ireland exists, this feeling of kinship rarely led the decision of Polish 
workers to migrate to Dublin. Therefore, this sub-component of migration trajectories is 
assigned a low value of 2 (Table IV.1). 
Not only are Polish migrants in Dublin rarely led by feelings of perceived 
familiarity, but also they are recent arrivals who do not plan to settle in Ireland. In 2002, 
there were only 2,000 Polish residents officially in Ireland, a figure that soared to more 
than 62,000 in 2006 and more than 115,000 in 2011 (CSO, 2004, 2008, 2012a).  While 
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these numbers could simply reflect the illegality of Polish immigrants in Ireland prior to 
EU enlargement, they more likely suggest that Dublin-bound Polish migration occurred 
primarily after 2002. Among this project’s respondents, only 19% arrived prior to 2004. 
The majority (62%) migrated to Dublin immediately after Poland was admitted to the 
European Union, with another 19% arriving after 2007. At the time of their interviews in 
2010, therefore, Polish participants have been in Ireland for an average of five year, 
insufficient time to set roots in the receiving city.  
Polish workers also arrived with short-terms or unclear migration plans. Most 
interviewees planned a short trip to Dublin for a specific goal like raising money to 
purchase an accommodation in Poland or finance a wedding, obtain a larger pension, or 
take advantage of a specific program in Ireland. Six in ten Polish participants arrived in 
Dublin for several months and no more than several years. Another third were unsure of 
the length of their stay in Ireland. Only one in ten relocated either with the intention to 
settle in Dublin or to remain in the host state long-term. 
However, the respondents have remained in Ireland beyond their original plans 
and have reluctantly put down roots in Dublin. Some remain in the country, because they 
have not reached their migration goals. However, other Polish workers admit they have 
stayed longer, because they are in good employment, “met nice people,” feel satisfied in 
Ireland, or have children who are now part of the Irish educational system (Michaela, 24). 
As one respondent put it, “the holiday [I initially planned] turned into six years” (Kevin, 
27). Therefore, the Polish are neither here nor there, as they participate in life in Ireland, 
yet still consider their migration short-term and deny they have in fact settled. The group 
is assigned a 2 for his sub-component of migration trajectories (Table IV.1). 
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The feeling of being in-between is reflected in respondents’ plans for the future. 
Almost half of all participants would like to return to Poland and do not foresee living in 
Ireland indefinitely. As they have “left friends and family behind” and identify as 
“foreign” in Ireland, these respondents envision “having a proper life” in Poland (Nadine, 
27; Peter, 32; Zara, 30). On the other hand, one third of all interviewees plan to remain in 
Dublin, since they “love Ireland,” made many friends, purchased property, or have a 
family in the city (Elizabeth, 36). One in five are unclear about their plans or unwilling to 
commit to specific arrangements. Among those planning to return, most remain unsure of 
the exact date and continue extending their stay in Ireland.140  
 As they remain in Ireland longer and longer, respondents begin to admit their ties 
to their receiving society and the difficulty of returning home. As one Polish migrant 
shared, “I am very nationalist, so my mind was set on coming back. But lately I am 
realizing I might stay here for much longer than I thought. I started to be involved in 
more community things here. We are trying to get more connected to the Irish society and 
get more involved in Irish life” (Steven, 34). Another Polish worker suggests how hard it 
is to return as her son grows up in Ireland. According to a final respondent, if “something 
changes and I have a good job and I am happy, maybe I will stay” (Kevin, 27). In view of 
their conflicted migration plan, Polish workers are assigned an intermediate 3 for this 
subcomponent of migration trajectories (Table IV.1). 
 In sum, Polish immigrants choose Ireland for mostly economic motives, consider 
their stay temporary, and plan to return to their home country. They feel more connected 
to Poland and continue to identify as “immigrants” in Dublin, in contrast to the 
                                                          
140 Only 8% of respondents had a specific date in mind to leave Ireland, whereas 65% reported being 
“unsure” of their future migration plans. 
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perceptions of their Irish hosts. Nonetheless, as they remain in Dublin longer, they 
inevitably settle and become part of the city, thus extending their stay indefinitely. 
However, while they reluctantly participate in Irish society, they invest less in their host 
community and continue to plan their future lives in Poland. Poles’ migration trajectories, 
therefore, indicate a relatively low level of belonging in the host city (Table IV.1).  
 
IV.2.2. Perceptions of the Polish Community’s Group Status  
 
 Conceptions of the Polish community’s position in Irish society further 
complicate Polish workers’ feelings of belonging in Dublin. The Polish community in 
Dublin is perceived as welcomed by their Irish hosts. At least in boom economic times, 
Polish workers considered Dublin “the most friendly place in Europe for Polish people” 
and found the Polish to be preferred in the work place to other immigrant groups and 
even Irish nationals (Thomas, 37). Polish workers and their representatives report that the 
Polish community in Dublin has enjoyed a “very positive image” and was well liked by 
their hosts, at least in the past (D36-PO; D37-PO). Irish people are considered “very 
friendly” in their reception of Polish immigrants and Ireland is dubbed the “the most open 
country in Europe for Polish people” (D37-PO).  
 Some respondents reiterate the myth of belonging established by their Irish hosts 
by suggesting that Polish immigrants are welcomed in Dublin due to historical and 
cultural affinity between the receiving and sending societies. Three in ten respondents 
believe that similar history and religion, shared mentality and a common race are what 
render the Polish well-liked in Ireland. Polish workers argue that they were able to fit in 
well in Dublin because “the Polish and the Irish are very, very similar. They match very 
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well. They understand each other very well” (George, 58). “Similar experience” in terms 
“history of immigration and fighting,” “shared Catholicism,” common humor and “style 
of enjoyment,” as well as “fighting spirit” are perceived to account for Polish workers’ 
elevated status in Dublin (D33-PO; D34-PO; Iris, 32; Jake, 31; Rick, 45). However, the 
majority of respondents do not ascribe the native population’s positive reception of the 
Polish to perceived familiarity. One quarter of all participants find their kinship with 
Dubliners to be only relative and suggest that “in many ways [the Polish and Irish] are 
completely different” (Ashley, 29). Almost half of all Polish interviewees actually 
emphasize the distinctions between the receiving and sending communities. 
 Indeed, most Polish respondents suggest that they felt welcomed in Ireland, at 
least upon their arrival, not due to a deep sense of belonging or similarity, but rather in 
view of their high qualifications and willingness to work. Almost nine in ten participants 
agree that their economic utility was what rendered them so well liked in Dublin, 
regardless of how their reception is framed by their hosts. As one respondent put it, “if 
somebody knows something about economics, work, or Poland, they are fine with us” 
(Jane, 30). The Irish were perceived to open their doors to Polish migration because 
“there was a need for us” to occupy the jobs that the native population found undesirable 
(Amy, 28). Polish interviewees felt welcomed because they are “doing the job well” and 
are “better educated, better experienced, better motivated” than other workers in Dublin 
(Nadine, 27; Rick, 45). Interestingly the category of “hard work” is interpreted differently 
by the Polish community than it is among the native population. For Polish immigrants, 
being a “dedicated worker” does entail high qualifications, efficiency, reliability, and 
honesty (D36-PO). However, this characteristic does not imply other positive qualities or 
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affinities with the Irish. Rather, it is an economic category, where a “good work ethic” is 
equated with “not [being] afraid of anything and [liking] to work,” and agreeing to 
exploitation and underpayment in the Dublin labor market (Richard, 34).  
 Reportedly, Polish workers’ economic utility is also the qualification that sets the 
Polish apart from other workers in Dublin. Among the interviewees, 22.5% argue that 
Polish immigrants are preferred even to local workers, since they would take any job and 
work “much harder [and better] than the Irish” for lower wages (Annie, 30). Six in ten of 
Polish participants suggest they are preferred both in the workplace and the social sphere 
to all immigrant groups.141 Comparing themselves specifically with African immigrants 
in Ireland, six in ten Polish participants believe they are better suited to life in the 
receiving country. The justification echoes Irish interviewees’ connection between race, 
immigration status, cultural difference and tendency to abuse the system. However, it is 
Nigerian immigrants’ diminished economic utility and unwillingness to work that renders 
them particularly undesirable guests, according to Polish respondents.  
 As emphasis is placed on Polish immigrants’ economic commodity, welcome and 
satisfaction with Polish workers does not translate into deeper relationships or a true 
sense of inclusion in the work place. As one respondent puts it, “the Irish people like you 
only as a colleague” or employee, but “after that, that’s it” (Ted, 28). Inadequate 
knowledge of the English language compounds the barriers that remain between Polish 
workers and their Irish hosts. Due to inadequate language skills, the connection between 
Polish and Irish in Dublin’s landscape remains strictly economic in nature. When 
economic self-interest is no longer strong, therefore, the Polish are no longer “included.” 
                                                          
141 Only 7% believe there is no preference for Polish immigrants in Dublin. The rest either did not provide 
an answer to this question (23%) or were undecided in their answer (7%). 
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 With economic downturn, the economic utility of Polish workers in Ireland has 
diminished along with their welcome. In the words of one interviewee, “We were very 
welcome in 2004-2005 when there was a need for us, when there were lots of jobs for us, 
which the Irish didn’t want. Whereas now discrimination has increased hugely and it is 
frustrating for some people that ‘the foreigners are here and they are getting our jobs’” 
(Amy, 28). Only about 12.5% Polish respondents found no change in their Irish hosts’ 
positive attitude towards them, whereas 72.5% reported a worsening climate and less than 
warm welcome in Dublin.142 Due to the perception that they are too many, abuse the 
welfare system, and “take jobs” away from Irish workers, Polish immigrants report cool 
treatment in Ireland since 2008. More than half of all Polish interviewees believe that the 
native population now considers them a drain rather than an asset to the Irish economy, 
and resents that unemployed Irish workers have to emigrate while “those immigrants are 
staying here” (D35-PO). The Polish group is assigned a relative high, but not the highest, 
value of 4 for this sub-component of group status (Table IV.1).  
On the other hand, Polish immigrants and their elite interlocutors find their 
national community far from integrated in Dublin. Seventy percent of all Polish 
respondents believe that Poles in Ireland are not integrated, twenty-four percent consider 
the picture mixed, and only six percent find Polish workers incorporated in Irish life. This 
lack of assimilation is expressed through a set of identifiable symptoms. The Polish 
community is considered prone to “stick together” within their own “homogenous” group 
and less inclined to “mix” with their Irish hosts beyond the necessities of an economic 
relationship (D33-PO). Polish immigrants are reported to live together, frequent Polish 
bars, restaurants or shops, watch Polish television, and use the Polish language in their 
                                                          
142 The remaining 15% of all respondents provided no answer to this question. 
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everyday interactions.143 Therefore, intergroup relationships rarely evolve “beyond 
[conversations about the] weather and small talk” (D35-PO). As they rely for their 
everyday lives on Polish networks, Polish workers live [in Dublin] “without knowing a 
word of English,” further obstructing the assimilation process (D33-PO).  
 Nonetheless, the Polish community is perceived as fragmented by its members, 
with certain parts isolated “in the Polish bubble,” yet others ready to make Dublin their 
home (Rick, 45). In the words of the interviewees, there are those who “mentally … are 
in Poland” (D37-PO). However, there are also “some people who are very much 
assimilated without losing their own identity and very happy to integrate with the Irish 
people and other nationalities here” (Janet, 67). Language is by far “the main problem” 
for the isolation of some parts of the Polish community (Kevin, 27). Eight in ten 
participants believe that inadequate language skills substantially affect Polish workers’ 
ability “to talk, to be here,” as well as to “meet Irish people” (D38-PO; Jane, 30). Limited 
language capabilities create a vicious cycle, as lack of English often forces Polish 
workers to “live together with Polish people, work with Polish people and [only] watch 
Polish TV”; thus further isolating them from their Irish hosts (Mary, 41).  
 Other barriers to the integration of the Polish community in Ireland are found to 
exist, however, including the lack of effort by Irish organizations to make Polish 
immigrants more welcome. The preoccupation with one’s own economic goals is 
perceived by my respondents to cause rifts even within the Polish community itself, with 
competition for jobs and “envy” precluding the solidification of this group as a 
                                                          
143 It is possible not to speak English and still leave a productive life in Ireland, as the sheer number of 
Polish immigrants has led to the creation not only of a number of Polish-based services and offices, but has 
also necessitated the employment of Polish workers who could serve as interpreters in all major Irish 
companies and institutions. 
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permanent and powerful player in Dublin’s landscape (Sarah, 33). In the words of one 
expert, “people who came just to work are not interested in integration but they are 
interested just in money” (D37-PO). Difference in mentality or culture from the Irish is 
also considered a significant barrier to Polish integration in Ireland. Because the 
“mentally is a hundred percent different” and Polish immigrants’ lifestyle is differently 
structured, Poles are found to fail to truly fit in (Thomas, 37). A demanding work life and 
emphasis on saving, as well as social interaction in the home rather than the pub leads to 
even little communication between guests and hosts. Finally, dedication to family is 
actually believed to facilitate incorporation among the Polish in Dublin. Raising a Polish 
family in Ireland necessitates “settling” as to ensure continuity and stability for children, 
where Ireland is considered “safer” than Poland and the Irish educational system “better” 
than the Polish one (D38-PO; Richard, 34; Steven, 34). In view of the barriers identified 
by Polish interviewees, the East Europeans are assigned a low value of 2 for this sub-
component of group status (Table IV.1).  
In sum, the position of the Polish collective in Dublin’s life is conflicted and 
merits an intermediary evaluation (Table IV.1). Polish immigrants feel welcome in 
Dublin and argue that they place high on the hierarchy among immigrant groups than 
Nigerians, for instance. However, Irish elites and publics’ welcome, perceived to be 
economically motivated, is seen as tenuous with economic downturn.  Group status is 
further complicated by the Polish community’s inward-looking character and 
embeddedness in strong ethnic networks. Despite local discourses, therefore, Polish 
respondents believe their group to be far from integrated in life in Dublin. Belonging and 
investment in life in the city are tenuous.  
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IV.2.3. Poles’ Perceptions of Individual Status  
 
 Perceptions of personal status further complicate the narrative of Polish 
belonging in Dublin. Individual participants are quick to disassociate themselves from the 
larger Polish community in Ireland, which they consider ridden by jealousy, preoccupied 
with material goals, and isolated. Polish interviewees’ personal experience is 
characterized by contentment with life in the receiving country, more frequent and 
meaningful interaction with the native population, and a deeper level of self-reported 
integration. Regardless of these accounts, respondents still consider themselves different 
from their hosts and continue to identify as outsiders. For most Polish interviewees 
comfort and belonging in Ireland are in tension with national pride and an exclusively 
Polish identity (Table IV.1). 
 Turner, D’Art, & Cross (2009) deem the Polish in Ireland “a contented 
proletariat,” a community that is satisfied with their economic and social conditions in the 
receiving state.144 This project’s respondents confirm the authors’ proposal. Seven in ten 
suggest that they are at least satisfied with life in Dublin, with more than a quarter of 
them stating they are “welcomed,” “like being” in Ireland, and feel “quite happy” “to live 
here” (Emily, 35; Jake, 31; Jane, 30). On the other hand, 15% of participants are not 
content with their migration to Dublin and the same percentage are conflicted about the 
host state, “sometimes [feeling] happy and sometimes feeling depressed” (Sarah, 33). 
Respondents also lend credence to the hypothesis of self-selected migration and consider 
themselves the best suited for migration from among their compatriots.145 
 
                                                          
144 The levels of satisfaction of the Polish community in Ireland are discussed in the following section, 
which explores the objective indicators of integration for the Polish in Dublin.  
145 As contrasted to the majority of Polish nationals, who have not chosen to immigrate. 
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Economic opportunity 17.5% 7 
Ease/quality of life 17.5% 7 
Love city/people 15% 6 
Connections with Irish 12.5% 5 
Better family life/schooling 10% 4 
Not satisfied 15% 6 








 Source: Author. 
 
 The economic and financial opportunities Ireland provides are the main reason for 
Polish immigrants’ personal satisfaction with their lives in Dublin (Table IV.4). The ease 
and quality of life in Ireland outstrip sacrifices like hard lowly work and separation from 
family. Love for the city of Dublin, its cultural identity, and its people renders 15% of 
respondents contented with their life abroad. The welcome provided them by the local 
population and the positive relationship with Irish friends contributes to the sense of 
satisfaction of 12.5% of Polish participants. The benefits of the Irish educational system 
and the better structured family life in Dublin are not lost on the interviewees. This sub-
component of individual status merits a high rating of 4 (Table IV.1). 
 Not only are Polish participants relatively satisfied with life in Dublin, but they 
also have some relationships with the Irish and feel somewhat integrated in the host city. 
More than one third share that they have Irish friends and another 18% report Irish 
acquaintances, mostly in a professional sphere. While interactions at work remain the 
more common, several interviewees have gained close friends and even partners from 
among the native population. Furthermore, 21% consider themselves integrated in 
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Dublin’s landscape and another 26% identify as at least somewhat assimilated to life in 
their new home. Participants even consider the receiving society their “second home” 
(Michaela, 24). In the words of one Polish immigrant: 
I do feel part of Dublin. I do feel welcomed. I am happy with what I have received here. I do 
feel Ireland as home now and Dublin as the place where I belong too (Amy, 28) 
 
 Despite relative satisfaction, some connection with the Irish and some belonging 
in Dublin, Polish workers continue to relate most closely to their compatriots, remain 
embedded in Polish networks in Dublin, and identify as Polish. While interaction with the 
native population is not absent and is generally positive, one in four participants have no 
friendships with Irish nationals and find communication with their hosts difficult.146 As 
they “do not have much to do with the Irish” in terms of temperament and interests, 
cannot communicate well in English, or “did not come to be social,” these interviewees 
consider it “very difficult to make close connections with Irish people” (Hailey, 60; Jane, 
26; Mary, 41). Even those who report having some Irish friends, consider the 
relationships limited. Indeed, even if they communicate with other immigrants and enjoy 
the higher degree of “multiculturalism” Ireland offers them, most respondents hold their 
“closest relationships … with the Polish” (Amy, 28). While 16% suggest they steer clear 
of the Polish community, as it is ridden by competition and jealousy, the remaining 84% 
report that the majority of their friends are Polish. Interaction with other Polish 
immigrants is frequent at home, at work, during religious services, and in the social 
sphere. Participants see their “friendship with [other] Polish people as fuller and complete 
because [they] share much more than with Irish people” (Ted, 28): 
                                                          
146 As discussed previously, 39% of Polish respondents have no Irish friends, 37% report having close 
relationships with the native population, and 18% have some Irish friends, but those are few and usually 
work-based. The remaining 6% did not provide an answer to this question. 
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Polish people are more close to me, it’s a different way that they are speaking or something 
but we are connecting better (Nadine, 27) 
 
 As their interactions are embedded primarily within the “Polish bubble,” a large 
percentage of Polish interviewees in Dublin remain isolated from the host society (Rick, 
45). Almost half of all respondents report not feeling integrated in the receiving city.147 
These participants rarely interact with the native population and rely on Polish networks 
for their everyday lives. Going to “the Polish shops,” attending Polish mass, and 
communicating with their compatriots at work or in the social sphere prevents them from 
truly belonging in their new environment (Lilly, 36). Due to inadequate language skills, 
different cultural and social traditions and rituals, as well as subjective feelings of 
foreignness, Polish immigrants in Dublin remain confined to the Polish diaspora. The 
group is given intermediate ratings for the second and third components of perceptions of 
individual status (Table IV.1).  
 Finally, most Polish respondents maintain a strong Polish cultural identity. Two 
thirds of the interviewees suggest that they will “always feel Polish,” irrespective of the 
ties they build in the host society (Ted, 28). Only one in ten state they feel “more Irish 
than Polish” and consider Dublin their home (George, 58).148 Because of the barrier “to 
talk, to be here,” most Polish immigrants in Dublin still consider the host city “not the 
same as home,” not their “place” (Howard, 28; Jane, 30). Even when their language skills 
are adequate, most respondents prioritize their connections to family and friends in the 
home country and identify their future as embedded in Poland. As they are “very 
                                                          
147 45% of respondents do not consider themselves integrated, 26% believe they are somewhat integrated, 
and 21% believe they are integrated in Dublin. 8% did not provide an answer to this question. 
148 Another 16% consider themselves “in between,” cannot identify their center of belonging or consider 
themselves uprooted from national boundaries or loyalties. The remaining 8% did not provide an answer to 
this question.  
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nationalist” or consider themselves fundamentally “different” from the gregarious Irish, 
participants continue to deem themselves “foreigners” who are “outside” of life in Dublin 
(Ashley, 29; Nadine, 27; Steven, 34). Indeed, even when feeling satisfied in Ireland, 
Polish workers still “feel as an immigrant,” “think in Polish, read in Polish … write in 
Polish” and identify as Polish (Peter, 32). Even when they have nothing to hold them 
connected to Poland after years of migration and have reached a reasonable level of 
integration in their new environment, 16% of Polish interviewees remain uprooted and 
still fall short of feeling truly included in Dublin. Therefore, the group is assigned a low 2 
for this sub-category and an intermediate value for the composite indicator of individual 
status (Table IV.1). 
 In contrast with the perceptions of their Irish hosts, Polish workers in Dublin do 
not truly belong in their new environment. Respondents perceive the Polish community at 
large as isolated, reliant on Polish networks and not engaged with the native population.  
As their migration plans are short-term and based in predominantly economic motives, 
Polish immigrants in Ireland are considered embedded in the Polish diaspora and lacking 
in meaningful interaction with the local society. Individual participants are more satisfied 
with their life in Dublin, more integrated in the receiving city, and better suited to 
communicate with their Irish hosts. However, they still fail to establish deeper 
connections with Dubliners, hold on to relationships in their home country, and define 
their cultural identity as exclusively Polish. The Polish community in Dublin remains at 
best “in between,” torn between a certain level of belonging in the host city and 




IV.3. “The Worst Received Among All Foreign Groups”: Nigerian 
Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation in Dublin149 
 
Much like their Polish counterparts, Nigerian immigrants do not consider 
themselves to belong in Dublin, thus reinforcing the discourse of exclusion established by 
their Irish hosts. Unlike Polish workers, Nigerians in Dublin consider their migration 
long-term and have arrived in the host city to seek asylum or a better life. Like the Polish, 
Nigerian migrants deem their larger ethic group far from integrated in Irish life and their 
interactions with the local population less than perfect. Intense exclusion from their hosts 
and irreconcilable differences in cultural and social structures are found to blame. 
Therefore, despite for different reasons than the Polish community, the Nigerian 
community is similarly “in between.” Nigerian migrants are torn between the desire to 
settle in Dublin and an acute sense of isolation from life in the city and thus they 
experience feelings of frustration and even depression rather than belonging. They place 
into the bottom row of Table IV.2. 
 
IV.3.1. Nigerians’ Migration Trajectories  
 
 Nigerians’ migration trajectories speak of relative high but nonetheless conflicted 
levels of belonging in Dublin. The Africans’ ability to fit in the receiving city is further 
complicated by perceptions of group status and individual insertion into Dublin’s life. 
Like the Polish, Nigerian immigrants have arrived in Ireland for a variety of reasons, 
including the historical and cultural connections between the sending and receiving 
                                                          
149 As there are fewer respondents of Nigerian origin than of Polish nationality, interviews conducted 
directly by this researcher are supplemented with a comprehensive survey conducted by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute with 1109 non-EU adults, of which 142 Nigerian, as well as a study conducted by 
the Immigrant Council of Ireland, which includes twenty Nigerian nationals (ICI, 2008; McGinnity, 
O’Connell, Quinn, & Williams, 2006). 
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countries. Regardless of stereotypes, persecution at home is no longer the primary 
motivation behind Nigerian migration to Ireland. In 2011, 12.8% of all asylum 
applications were filed by Nigerian nationals, where Nigeria dropped from first to third 
sending country in terms of the number of asylum applications to Ireland.  As in 2011 
only 3% of applications were approved by the Irish Office of the Refugee Applications 
Commissioner, Nigerians no longer rely on the Irish asylum system (ORAC, 2012). 
Among this dissertation’s interviewees, only twenty percent reported persecution in the 
sending country as their primary reason to leave for Dublin (Table IV.5).  
 








% of all 
respondents 
 
Better life/education 36.4% 8 88.9% 
Economic opportunity 18.2% 4 44.4% 
Cultural connection 18.2% 4 44.4% 
Positive image 9.1% 2 22.2% 
Persecution 9.1% 2 22.2% 
Adventure 4.5% 1 11.1% 








Of 9 persons 
  
Source: Author.  
 
 
 In fact, all Nigerian respondents came to Ireland in search of “greener pastures” 
(Zach, 32). Nine in ten interviewees suggest that their main motive to migrate to Dublin 
was the quest for a “better life” and self-development (Stephen, 36).150 “Better life” is 
understood as economic resources by some interviewees. Much like their Polish 
counterparts, four in ten Nigerians suggest that “job opportunities” and “money” for a 
“better life for [their] children” propelled them to leave their home country (Harry, 35; 
                                                          
150 More than one third of all responses given indicate the same reply.  
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Stephen, 36). Nonetheless, for nine in ten participants the phrase “greener pastures” 
signifies educational opportunity and the possibility for self-improvement in the receiving 
country.  The main motive for Nigerian migration to Dublin is the quest for “better 
education,” the aspiration to “perfect oneself,” as well as the desire for a stable life and 
“peace of mind” (Alexis, 21; Ethan, 46; Taylor, 30) (Table IV.5).  
 Unlike their Polish counterparts, however, Nigerian immigrants have also chosen 
Ireland as a destination due to historical and cultural affinities between the two countries 
and the positive image of Ireland proliferated by Irish missionaries in Nigeria. More than 
four in ten respondents cited the connections between home and host states as drivers of 
their mobility to Ireland, where more than two in ten spoke of the perception of Ireland as 
“paradise.” The common English language, the shared Catholic religion, the similar 
history as part of the British sphere of influence, as well as the embeddedness of Irish 
missionaries in Nigerian culture were much more significant to Nigerian than to Polish 
immigrants in Dublin.151 In the words of one interviewee:   
An Irish missionary took in my father and trained him as a priest called Patrick in Nigeria. 
And my dad went to college in an Irish-built college. So I always felt good about the Irish 
because they built a lot of things in Nigeria and Africa. When you talk about Catholicism, you 
talk about the Irish missionary. I am Catholic. And it is an English-speaking country, so that 
had really helped me (Zach, 32)  
 
 Consistent with the cultural and historical affinity they perceive between Ireland 
and Nigeria, Nigerians travel to Dublin to settle. While Polish nationals have lived in 
Dublin for an average of five years, the majority of Nigerian immigrants arrived in the 
late 1990s in view of the upturn of the Irish economy and the open migration system. 
According to the Irish Census, there were 4,867 Africans in Ireland in 1996, compared to 
                                                          
151 As they arrive in Ireland, Nigerian immigrants tend to be disappointed with the reality in the host 
country. While they imagined inclusion and a “better life” prior to migration, they often meet with 
exclusion and lack of recognition of the connections that motivated them to go to Ireland in the first place.  
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8,650 Nigerians in 2002, 16,327 in 2006, and 17,642 in 2011. These numbers indicate 
that few Nigerians have migrated to Ireland after 2006, and that most Nigerian migrants 
in Ireland have resided in the host country since the late 1990s (CSO, 1996, 2002, 2008, 
2012a). Among this project’s respondents, the average length of stay is eight years or 
more. Six in ten had resided in Ireland for ten years or more at the time of their 
interviews, one third have lived in Dublin for more than five years, and only 8% were in 
Ireland for less than five years in 2010.  
 Furthermore, Nigerian immigrants arrived to Dublin with long-term plans. The 
Africans are aware that getting through the asylum process, legalizing their status, or 
completing educational degrees in Ireland would be anything but a short-term process. As 
one Nigerian migrant suggested, Nigerian nationals require “seven to eight years” to “get 
residency … and an Irish passport” and are thus “stuck” in Ireland for a relatively long 
period (Ethan, 46). Nigerians are also more “settled” in the receiving country that Polish 
workers, since they have “their whole family here, wife and kids” (Ethan, 46). Half of all 
interviewees reported having a Nigerian partner in Dublin and, in some cases, extended 
family. Another 50% shared that they have children who were born in Ireland. Therefore, 
a large percentage of respondents considered themselves “there” in Dublin, “paying 
taxes” and looking to buy property (Stephen, 36). 
 A majority (50%) of Nigerian interviewees extended their stay in Ireland. Some 
remain stuck in the asylum system, yet others are taking advantage of the educational 
system, have satisfactory employment, are enjoying the experience of new cultures and 
people in Ireland, or are raising a family in Dublin. Children who are to a large degree 
“Irish” and are indistinguishable from the local population save for the color of their skin 
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are often the main reason to remain in Ireland. As their children are inured to the Irish 
educational system, “feel good” in Dublin, and “don’t know any country apart from 
Ireland,” life in the receiving state is considered preferable (D44-NO; Harry, 35). 
Consequently, the African group is assigned high values of 4 for the first two sub-
components of the migration trajectory indicator (Table IV.1). 
 Despite their long-term stay in the receiving country, however, Nigerian migrants 
do not plan to remain in Ireland indefinitely. In a study by McGinnity et al. (2006), 
53.3% of Nigerian respondents expressed the intention to “stay in Ireland for good,” 22% 
were planning to return home, and 24.7% remained unsure of their plans. Research by the 
ICI conducted in 2007 shows similar results, where almost half of all Nigerian 
participants intend to remain in the host country permanently, one third plan to leave, and 
the remaining one fifth are unclear about their plans (ICI, 2008). Among this project’s 
respondents, the figures are reversed where a majority share that their “intention was 
never to spend [their] life [in Dublin]” and “going back would be one of [their] long-term 
plans” (Charles, 56; Taylor, 30). Only one third want to stay in Ireland for the foreseeable 
future, as they have worked too hard to legalize their status and establish their family. 
This figure is comparable to the percentage of Polish immigrants who would like to stay 
in Ireland. On the other hand, half of the participants would like to leave Ireland, as they 
do not feel at home there and find life in Dublin “not great” (Tatiana, 27). At least in the 
long run, almost six in ten Nigerian interviewees want to return home. Some educate their 
children about their home country or have even initiated the family’s relocation back to 
Nigeria.  This discrepancy in results might be due to sampling methods, but it most 
probably reflects the changing economic and social climate in Dublin and the increasing 
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hostility against “different” Nigerian immigrants. Regardless, the sub-category of 
migration plans is assigned an intermediate rating of 3 (Table IV.1). 
In sum, Nigerian migrants arrived in Ireland in view of connections to Irish 
culture and history and consider themselves long-term migrants who would raise a family 
in Dublin. They find return migration difficult as their children are embedded in the city’s 
life. Nonetheless, most continue to plan their return to Nigeria. While return might never 
be possible due to political persecution, economic reasons, or family dynamics, the 
interviewees still talk of their “mission” in Nigeria and keep connected to their home 
country (Zach, 32). Conflicted migration trajectories detract from Nigerians’ expectations 
of belonging in Dublin (Table IV.1).  
 
IV.3.2. Perceptions of the Nigerian Community’s Group Status  
 
Belonging is undermined by perceptions of the unfavorable status of the Nigerian 
community in Dublin. Nigerians face rejection and hostility in Ireland. According to the 
Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI), only about 30% of Nigerians agree or strongly agree 
with the statement “Irish people make me feel welcome,” whereas 35% disagree or 
strongly disagree. Furthermore, around 70% disagree or strongly disagree with the 
statement “Irish people accept diverse cultures and communities as part of Irish society” 
and only one in ten feel personally “accepted by Irish society” (ICI, 2008, pp. 158-160). 
This dissertation’s interviewees agree that the Nigerian community is “the worst 
received among all foreign groups” in Dublin (Taylor, 30). Nigerian respondents consider 
their ethnic community excluded from economic and social life in Dublin. Eight in ten 
perceive Nigerian nationals not to be welcome in the receiving society, whereas 14% 
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argue that Nigerians are included in Ireland and 7% suggest that the situation is mixed.  
These numbers contrast sharply with feelings of welcome among Polish immigrants, all 
but one of whom found Dublin friendly. Everyday discrimination in all spheres of life is 
the clearest indicator of exclusion. Nigerian immigrants report racism and discriminatory 
treatment as the single black student in their educational institution, or at the hands of 
public officials and landlords. Abuse occurs at work, “on the bus stop” and on the street, 
where such experiences are considered not personal but systematic and common to all 
Nigerians in Dublin. Being “put down,” “abused” and even “spat” at are considered signs 
of deliberate isolation by the native population (Stephen, 36; Zach, 32). In the words of 
one respondent, “They don’t want you and they show it” (Zach, 32). While the Polish 
community no longer feels welcomed with economic downturn either, the difference in 
reception is considerable.  
Respondents are surprised by the negative treatment they have received in Ireland, 
famed to be one of the most friendly and receptive nations. Eight in ten expected the 
native population to be friendly, but in reality found them “mean, especially when you 
are black” (Harry, 35). They were puzzled that their compatriots would be discriminated 
against by “the people who suffered some of the greatest stereotyping and discrimination 
in the whole world” (Ethan, 46). One respondent even felt disappointed that the Irish, 
who are so “well-travelled” and should have empathy for fellow immigrants, were in 
reality so hostile to the Nigerian community (Zach, 32). 
When prompted about the reasons for this hostility and lack of welcome towards 
the Nigerian community in Dublin, interviewees are painfully aware of the discourse of 
exclusion constructed by local stakeholders in Dublin. One in four interviewees argue 
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that they are rejected in Dublin due to the “unfair” image of Nigerian migrants as asylum 
seekers who “don’t obey the laws” and abuse the system, “spongers” who do not 
contribute to the system, or simply “too many” to accommodate (Frank, 34; Stephen, 36; 
Taylor, 30) (Table IV.6). The local population is believed to “have hatred for Nigerians,” 
as these guests are “into vices,” steal, and constitute a burden on local resources (Isaac, 
36; Stephen, 36). As the perception is that “Africans are uneducated and nothing good 
can come out of them,” Nigerian migrants are considered an onus rather than an asset to 
the receiving country (Zach, 32). The incorrect perception that all Nigerians are asylum 
seekers who are “sponges on the economy,” are “lazy,” and “here to defraud you” is 
found responsible for the exclusion Nigerians face (D44-NO). Natives’ view of Africans 
is exacerbated as “half of the African population in Ireland” is Nigerian and as the 
supposedly short-term asylum seekers are staying longer than expected in Dublin (Ethan, 
46). Negative treatment, therefore, is perceived to be based in a complex set of 
stereotypes, tying legal status, economic cost, criminality, nationality, and race.  
 
 









% of all 
respondents 
Asylum seekers/abusing system 24.5% 12 85.7% 
Racial/cultural difference 22.4% 11 78.6% 
Economic crisis 18.4% 9 64.3% 
Influx of Polish 18.4% 9 41.7% 
Economic onus 10.2% 5 41.7% 
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Rejection is considered closely related to the racial and cultural differences 
between Nigerian immigrants and their Irish hosts as well. More than one in five 
interviewees suggested that simple “visual differences” create hostility among natives 
(D41-NO) (Table IV.6). Skin color sets Nigerians apart from Dubliners more so than any 
other foreign group. The color of Nigerians’ skin is also reported to the perception is that 
“every black person in Ireland is Nigerian. Every black person is an asylum seeker. Every 
asylum seeker is Nigerian. Every Nigerian is a fraudster who is cheating the system and 
is not hard-working” (D42-NO). Racial differences are compounded by differences in 
family and sociocultural structures, which are perceived to place a further wall of 
unfamiliarity and isolation between Nigerian guests and their Irish hosts. 
 Exclusion and the stereotypes surrounding the Nigerian community in Dublin as 
“too many,” criminals, or uneducated “spongers,” have intensified with economic crisis, 
as Nigerian workers now compete for jobs with the Irish and other immigrants. Two in 
ten of my respondents argue that as the Celtic Tiger is no longer roaring and the “bubble 
burst,” the Irish “feel threatened by us immigrants and their hostility is increasing … 
Things they didn’t care about before, they care about now. They care now that we are 
populating their schools, putting stress on their hospitals. It’s bothering them now, but 
they didn’t care about it when it was all good” (Ethan, 46). Nigerian workers believe that 
the economic situation had further exacerbated the negative attitudes they have 
experienced in Dublin, where the Irish “want to get all the immigrants out” and “don’t 
want them spoiling the country or taking social welfare” (D44-NO). 
 Finally, a large number of Nigerian interviewees found that their welcome has 
particularly worn after the influx of Polish workers into Dublin. Respondents believe that 
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Nigerians were tolerated in Ireland in the early 2000s, as they were the single source of 
cheap labor in the receiving country. They suggest, however, that the white Polish 
workers arriving in the mid-2000s have become a preferred pool of labor in Dublin. 
While they recognize that every immigrant community in Ireland experiences some 
discrimination, including the Polish, close to 80% of Nigerian participants argue that 
Polish workers are nonetheless preferred due to their racial and cultural similarity to the 
Irish. As one person put it, it is much harder to “fit in if you are black” (Harry, 35). It was 
recognized among Nigerian immigrants that Polish nationals have the “right to be in 
Dublin” as they are “European Union people” (Zach, 32). However, African respondents 
also realize that “the policy of European first and then others” has “disadvantaged 
Nigerian seriously” and comparison with the Polish has spurred even more “negative 
tendencies towards Africans” (Ethan, 46; Taylor, 30; Zach, 32). Due to perceptions of 
exclusion and hostility, the Nigerian group is assigned the lowest value for this 
component of the group status indicator (Table IV.1).  
As a result of the exclusion they face, but also due to unfavorable governmental 
policies and their own self-identification as different from the Irish, Nigerian respondents 
do not consider their community truly integrated in Ireland, like the Polish. Three 
quarters of Nigerian respondents argue that Nigerian immigrants are not integrated in life 
in Dublin.152 While engaging with the host society to a larger degree than when they first 
arrived, participants suggest that Nigerians are “not reaching out” and taking advantage 
of the “opportunities of integration” (Taylor, 30). As they are “oriented just toward their 
                                                          
152 75% state the community is not integrated, 12.5% find the community integrated and another 12.5% 
believe some Nigerians are integrated, while others fails to assimilate. These numbers are somewhat 
comparable to percentages among Polish respondents, where 70% find the Polish community not to be 
integrated, 24% consider the picture mixed, and only 6% find the Polish fully incorporated in Ireland. 
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own community and live a parallel life,” Nigerians become increasingly unfamiliar to the 
local population (D41-P). Many prefer to be residentially segregated from their hosts and 
to live in predominantly Nigerian neighborhoods to “protect themselves,” to secure 
support with raising children, as well as to shield their children from the stigma of being 
“different” (Ethan, 46). The “Nigerialization” of certain neighborhoods like Parnell 
Street, however, is considered to lead to retarded integration, devaluation of skills, and 
diminished multiculturalism (D42-NO).  
Both the Irish government’s limited efforts and Nigerians’ racial and “cultural 
differences” from the Irish are believed to be to blame for this lack of integration (Frank, 
34). Two thirds of Nigerian interviewees argue that the local government “makes it quite 
hard to integrate” (Isaac, 36). Nigerian asylum seekers in particular are physically 
removed from the Irish and are deprived of the opportunity to interact with the host 
society.153 Being “stuck” for years without the permission to work or study leads to 
devaluation and loss of skills, depression and isolation, as well as the creation of a 
permanent underclass with a disadvantaged second generation. Local policy of promoting 
integration without actually engaging representatives of the immigrant groups involved or 
giving them enough say in the process is also discussed as an obstacle to Nigerians’ 
assimilation. The racism and negative stereotyping of Nigerians are further obstacles.  
More importantly, six in ten Nigerian respondents find that “visual and cultural 
differences present a barrier” to the integration of their ethnic community (D41-NO).  
The color of their skin makes “Africans stand out” and marks them as “different” from 
                                                          
153 Asylum seekers are placed in direct provision while awaiting a decision. Direct provision signifies 
placing asylum seekers in state-mandated residences, where the state provides each adult individual with 
full-board accommodation, including two meals per day, as well as a personal allowance of €19.10 per 
week (Reception and Integration Agency [RIA], 2010).  
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the native population regardless of their actual level of assimilation (D42-NO). As 
“people are peeking at [them]” due to their phenotypical differences, Nigerian migrants 
consider it difficult to ever fit in, as they cannot alter their appearance (D44-NO). 
In a 2007 survey, 70% of Nigerian respondents suggested they do not share 
common values with Irish culture (ICI, 2008, p. 142).154 Two thirds of participants in this 
project agree that “culturally a lot of things are different” between the Irish and the 
Nigerians (Frank, 34). The dissimilar “social and cultural system” of Nigeria is believed 
to account for differences in work ethic and for lack of inclusion in the Irish economic 
system (D44-PO). Differences in family structure contribute to the overuse of social 
resources by Nigerian mothers and isolation from the host society while taking care of 
children in the home. Unique family and social relationships and modes of interaction are 
reported to prevent Nigerian immigrants from “mingling with the Irish” (Frank, 34). 
According to the ICI (2008), for instance, as few Nigerians frequent pubs and other social 
spaces the Irish favor, the two communities rarely intersect in sports, cultural, food-based 
and even religious activities.155 Respondents were in fact surprised at how divergent their 
sociocultural practices were from those of the local population, since they assumed that a 
shared Catholic religion and English language would guarantee easy integration. 
Command of the English language is considered to aid Nigerians in assimilating 
in Irish life by two thirds of respondents and to present an advantage for this ethnic 
group. Since “the communication barrier is not there,” in theory there are few obstacles to 
interaction with the receiving population (Frank, 34). Being able to “express yourself 
                                                          
154 Only 7% of Nigerian respondents argued that Nigerians “share many values in common with Irish 
people.” 
155 Catholic Nigerians find church activities particularly important to their lives and feel respected by the 




from day one” is believed to facilitate adaptation to “the system” in the host city (Zach, 
32). As one Nigerian immigrant puts it, “if you can’t communicate, you can’t integrate” 
(Taylor, 30). Nonetheless, Nigerians’ distinct accent is perceived as a marker of 
difference from the Irish and therefore as a barrier to incorporation. Communication 
between Nigerian workers and the receiving society remains imperfect due to a difference 
in the immigrants’ “speaking and listening pattern,” which identifies them as foreigners 
and outsiders (D42-NO). The African cohort is assigned a low value of 2 for this sub-
component of group status (Table IV.1).  
Despite the promise of Ireland as a “land of equality and opportunity,” Nigerians 
find that their community is the worst received foreign group in Dublin (Ugba, 2009). 
Welcome for the group is tenuous, since Nigerians are considered racially different, 
uneducated, criminal, “too many,” and less desirable than Polish immigrants. The 
Nigerian community is also far from integrated in Dublin’s economic and social life. 
Nigerian immigrants continue to communicate and live among their compatriots as to 
protect their families and shield their children from being deemed “different.” While 
English language skills ease Nigerians’ ability to communicate with their hosts and 
render them better suited to fit in than their Polish counterparts, their accents and way of 
speech still mark them as dissimilar from the Irish. Africans’ racial and cultural 
differences from the Irish, however, tip the scales in Polish workers’ favor when it comes 
to economic and social integration in Dublin. Nigerians’ perceptions of the rejection of 
their larger ethnic community and its inability to fir in into Dublin’s life create feelings of 




IV.3.3. Nigerians’ Perceptions of Individual Status 
 Like in the case of the Polish, individual respondents disassociate themselves 
from the larger Nigerian community in Ireland and report higher levels of integration, 
satisfaction, and communication with the Irish. However, a majority of Nigerian 
immigrants continue to identify exclusively with their home country and to rely on other 
Africans for support from the sacrifices and disappointments that fill life in Ireland. 
Perceptions of individual ability to fit in detract from Nigerians’ belonging in Dublin. 
 While a majority found the Nigerian community at large isolated in the host 
country, individual Nigerian interviewees tend to consider themselves relatively 
integrated in their new home. Indeed, 37% shared that they have assimilated to life in 
Dublin, whereas 27% stated they “still need to make this place [their] second home” 
(Zach, 32). More than one third find the receiving society to be their home, as their life 
and family are now embedded in Dublin. Taking advantage of the Irish educational 
system is considered the quickest way to learn about Irish culture, remove social and 
economic barriers, and “adapt” (Frank, 34). Connections between Ireland and Nigeria are 
once again cited as a catalyst to assimilation.  
 Interaction with the local population is deemed a significant sign of integration in 
the host country. Indeed, three quarters of the interviewees interact with the Irish and 
report having “a lot of Irish friends,” especially as they can communicate with them in 
English (Isaac, 36). A majority of Nigerian participants describe the natives as “very nice 
people”, since “they themselves know what it is to be living in a foreign land” (Frank, 34; 
Isaac, 36). These statements are confirmed in other studies with Nigerian immigrants in 
Dublin. According to McGinnity et al. (2006), 58% of Nigerian respondents considered it 
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“very easy” or “quite easy” to make Irish friends in 2005, a figure that compared to 64% 
among Eastern Europeans. The ICI reports somewhat less encouraging results, with only 
one third of respondents finding communication with the Irish easy and one quarter 
agreeing that “Irish people want to get to know me” (ICI, 2008). 
 Individual Nigerian interviewees believe that they are not given the chance to 
make Ireland their second home. While generally “friendly,” the native population is 
considered to be hostile against Nigerian immigrants in particular and 27% of all 
respondents have negative interactions with the Irish. In 2005, as high as 42.3% of Black 
African respondents found it difficult to make friends with the Irish (McGinnity et al., 
2006). In 2008, more than one third of Nigerian immigrants suggested that “Irish people 
are difficult to get to know” (ICI, 2008). Consequently, Nigerians in Dublin interact 
mostly within their ethnic community, much like their Polish counterparts. Eight in one 
of this project’s respondents have close connections within their national group and 
interact with their compatriots in the home, at church, and at social and cultural events. 
Nigerian interviewees deliberately surround themselves with other African immigrants 
for safety and cultural solidarity. The group merits an intermediate rating of 3 for the first 
two components of the individual status indicator (Table IV.1).  
 Furthermore, Nigerian immigrants in Ireland are not fully satisfied in the 
receiving country.  While three quarters of Polish immigrants are contented with life in 
Dublin, only one third of Nigerian workers feel “welcome” and “happy” in Ireland, and 
almost one half are “not happy at all” and even “depressed” (D42-NO; Stephen, 36; 
Tatiana, 27). While economic opportunity and the superior educational system make 
Dublin attractive, Nigerian immigrants continue to feel “different” and “not at home” in 
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Ireland (Ethan, 46; Harry, 35). The financial onus of providing for children and family in 
Ireland and Nigeria is discussed by the interviewees. Downward job mobility takes a 
financial and psychological toll on the highly educated Nigerian respondents. Being 
“tucked away” in the asylum system not only leads to loss of skills, but also produces 
social isolation from the Irish, psychological distress and a sense of powerlessness (Isaac, 
36). Not being given the chance to integrate and feeling uprooted due to skin color and 
prejudice is perceived as the largest sacrifice of choosing to live in Ireland. Refusal to be 
accepted even when “doing everything right” leads to resentment among African 
participants (Stephen, 36). High quality of life in terms of material benefits is matched by 
low quality of life in terms of socio-cultural interactions. Nigerians are assigned a low 
value of 2 for the satisfaction indicator of belonging (Table IV.1).  
 Nigerian workers in Dublin deal with depression and frustration by holding on to 
a strong Nigerian cultural identity. Much like their Polish counterparts, almost three 
quarters of Nigerian interviewees identify exclusively as Nigerian and none describe 
themselves as Irish. While one fifth would like to feel Irish after spending more than five 
years in Dublin, they continue to feel excluded, “different” and far from the ideal of the 
“New Irish.”156 As one person put it, while making their life in Dublin in practice, 
Nigerian immigrants in Ireland have “left [their] soul in Nigeria” (Zach, 32). The group is 
given the lowest value for the indicator of self-identification and a similarly low rating 
for their self-conception of their individual status (Table IV.1). 
While Nigerian immigrants were actually attracted to Ireland due to the cultural 
and historical ties they share with this country and have come to Dublin to settle, they 
feel isolated in Dublin. Unfavorable group status interacts with individual inability to fit 
                                                          
156 For a description of the “New Irish,” refer to Chapter III. 
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in, form meaningful relationships with the Irish, or feel happy and at home in Dublin. 
Respondents identify with Nigeria and perceive themselves as culturally different from 
their Irish hosts, thus perpetuating the discourse of rejection they face in Dublin. The 
Nigerian community has more at stake in the city than the Polish community, but shares 
in its feelings of isolation (Table IV.1).  
 
IV.4. Transnational “Hispanidad”:157 Ecuadorian Perceptions of 
Belonging and Isolation in Madrid158 
 
Unlike their counterparts in Dublin, Ecuadorians consider themselves to fit in well 
in. They confirm Spaniards’ discourse of inclusion. Ecuadorians see their migration to 
Madrid as relatively long-term and plans of return do not contradict desire to settle in 
Spain, as the home and host countries are located within a transnational Ibero-American 
community. Certain perceptions of discrimination in the receiving context are 
counteracted by feelings of welcome due to the Ecuadorians’ shared cultural and 
linguistic heritage with Madrilenians and the immigrants’ hard-working nature. Cultural 
proximity further ensures the group’s and individuals’ integration in Madrid and the ease 
of interaction with the local population. Despite deeper connections with compatriots and 
separation from family, therefore, Spain is deemed an extension of the homeland and 
satisfaction and belonging in the host city are high among the South Americans (Table 
IV.1). Ecuadorians therefore fit in the upper row of Table IV.2. 
                                                          
157Hispanidad refers to the community of countries and people sharing a cultural and linguistic Hispanic 
heritage. Spain serves as “the motherland,” with a number of Latin American nations, including Ecuador, 
participating in this Ibero-American community (Masterson-Algar, 2011). 
158 As there are fewer respondents of Ecuadorian origin than of Bulgarian nationality in the case of Madrid, 
the interviews are supplemented through periodic surveys of immigrant integration by the Comunidad de 
Madrid (2010a, 2010c, 2014) and ethnographic studies by Dudley (2013) and Masterson-Algar (2011). The 
former include anywhere between 363 and 445 face-to-face interviews with Ecuadorian respondents. The 
latter comprise twenty-four and forty interviews respectively.  
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IV.4.1. Ecuadorians’ Migration Trajectories 
 








% of all 
respondents 
 
Economic opportunity 31.5% 6 66.7% 
Social networks 26.2% 5 55.6% 
Shared language, culture 21.1% 4 44.4% 
Liberal migration regime 5.3% 1 11.1% 
Opportunity for development 5.3% 1 11.1% 
Adventure 5.3% 1 11.1% 








Of 9 persons 
  
Source: Author.  
 
 Ecuadorians’ migration trajectories contribute to the immigrants’ belonging in 
Madrid.  The Latin Americans move to the city for a complex set of motives, yet 
economic considerations are intricately intertwined with perceptions of cultural kinship. 
Undeniably, Ecuadorians in Madrid are “economic migrants” (M9-EO). Two thirds of 
my respondents cited “lots of idleness, high unemployment, meager economic means that 
weren’t enough for anything” at home combined with “good money” in Madrid as the 
reason to leave Ecuador and migrate to Spain (Dudley, 2013, p. 38; Ethan, 39; Lina, 30; 
Lincoln, 32).160 Economic motives explained one in three cases (Table IV.7). As 
Masterson-Algar (2011) explains, however, such material incentives have a cultural 
basis. Ecuador’s debt and banking crises in the 1980s-1990s resulted in the push of 
                                                          
159 Most participants gave multiple responses to the question “Why did you leave Ecuador and migrate to 
Spain?” Here the incidence of a certain response is reported as a percentage of all responses given and as a 
percentage of all respondents. Personal interviews are supplemented with works by Dudley (2013), who 
surveys female Ecuadorians’ motivation for migration Spain and thus complements this project’s mostly 
male cohort, and Masterson-Algar (2011). 
160 Author‘s translation  derived from original quote in Spanish: “No había mucho trabajo allí, mucha 
desocupación, mucho desempleo. Muy pocos los medios económicos, no nos alcanzaban para nada, 
entonces buscando a un porvenir mejor” (Ethan, 39); “Que ganaba buena pasta” (Lina, 30). 
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Ecuadorian immigrants out of the country with painful structural adjustment programs 
and tumultuous economic and political situations. There was also a pull towards Spain in 
particular, however, as the Ecuadorian government was only willing to accept offers for 
adjustment from the Spanish government. This served as an opening for Spain to reassert 
its global economic status by “recolonizing” the Latin American country through targeted 
investment and the acceptance of immigrants from Ecuador into its booming services and 
construction sectors. The exportation of Spanish industries to Ecuador and the 
simultaneous importation of Ecuadorian workers into Madrid were framed through a 
discourse of Hispanidad and Spanish responsibility for the Ibero-American community. 
Moreover, the South Americans’ decision to choose Madrid as a destination was 
officially presented as a bid for the “re-latinoamericanization” of a Spain that was drifting 
further towards the European Union (Dudley, 2013; Masterson-Algar, 2011).  
Shared Ibero-American identity, common language, and a similar cultural and social 
pattern motivate almost half of this project’s interviewees to choose Madrid. Culture and 
language are significant in more than one fifth of all responses (Table IV.7). Language 
skills render the host country easier to navigate and job opportunities quicker to 
encounter (Hall, 2008). Language also makes Spain preferable to traditional migration 
destinations like the United States. Similar cultural and social patterns ensure that the 
transition to life and work in Spain is smooth, as the newcomers already have experience 
with a similar context and way of organization. The migration of Spaniards into Latin 
American provided for connections and social networks when migration started occurring 
in the reverse direction. One participant talks about the colonization of Latin America by 
Spain, a factor that brings Ecuadorians to Madrid today in a reverse colonization process:  
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They implanted their religion in South America, they brought us the Christin religion. The 
culture they have, that the Spanish have here, we carry as well, the same culture and the 
same traditions and customs. Because they came to Latin America (Ethan, 39)161  
 
The social networks that have proliferated between Spain and Ecuador with 
mobility between the two countries going in both directions further explain the South 
Americans’ relocation to Madrid. Parents, brothers, cousins, in-laws or friends facilitated 
the arrival of half of the participants, as they offered information, housing, or jobs (Table 
IV.7). Additional factors that mattered for the interviewees were the liberal migration 
regime in Spain, with ample opportunity to migrate without papers and eventually get 
regularized and even naturalized, the reintegration of the family unit, as well as the desire 
for adventure or personal development in a foreign but familiar country. Notably, a study 
of Ecuadorians women in Madrid emphases the latter motive by suggesting that mobility 
is a “coming-of-age” ritual for young single women and an opportunity for older married 
women to escape traditional family structures and acquire a new identity as professionals 
in the host society (Dudley, 2013, pp. 46-52).  
 Consistently with the cultural and historical affinity they perceive between 
Ecuador and Spain, moreover, Ecuadorian workers consider their stay in Madrid 
relatively long-term. Their plans for the future are conflicted, however, with a majority of 
respondents viewing return to Ecuador and settlement in Spain as not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, Ecuadorian migration to Spain intensified significantly from 1999 onward, with 
384,000 individuals arriving between 1999 and 2005 (Bertoli et al., 2011, p. 7). 
According to a survey by the Madrid Autonomous Community, 46% of Ecuadorians 
                                                          
161 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Desde luego yo le veo la cultura como ellos nos 
implantaron la religión en Sudamérica, nos llevaron la religión cristiana, nos hicieron conocer el 
catolicismo, esa misma cultura que tienen, que acá tienen los españoles, nosotros también llevamos la 
misma cultura y las mismas tradiciones, costumbres. Se fueron a Latinoamérica.” 
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arrived in Spain at the start of the new millennium, and another 42%  - between 2001 and 
2005, with only a minority migrating since 2006 (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014b, p. 5). 
Only one in five of this project’s respondents spent less than five years in the country at 
the time of their interviews in 2011. One third lived in Spain for more than ten years.  
 While Ecuadorians came with unclear or short-term plans, these plans have been 
subsequently extended or modified. A majority of participants migrated to Madrid alone 
to seek work temporarily, “for three-four years” (por tres-quatro años) (Kris, 39).162  
However, they have subsequently been joined by wives and children, reared children in 
Spain, or initiated the process of naturalization in the receiving country. Thus, short-term 
employment arrangements turned into twelve years for one participant who shared how 
“time passes quickly, flies” in his new home (Lincoln, 32).163 Masterson-Algar (2011) 
confirms that the Ecuadorian population in Madrid is the “oldest,” at least in Spain, with 
the city as a space of “long-term settlement,” “obtaining Spanish citizenship, and 
completing family reunification.”  
 Despite their long-term stay in the receiving country, the Latin American migrants 
do not necessarily plan to remain in Spain. One in five of the interviewees want to return 
home, as they feel constrained in the “limited” urban space of Madrid and yearn for the 
“open grounds” of Ecuador (Ethan, 39; Lincoln, 32).164  However, one third are resolved 
to settle in Spain at all costs because they like it there. Indicative of this trend are the 
large number of Ecuadorians children born in Madrid or enrolled in the Spanish 
                                                          
162 Author’s translation from Spanish. 
163 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Aquí llevo ya 12 años. Bueno, aunque no 
parezca, pero el tiempo pasa rápido, volando. Muy rápido pasa.” 
164 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Tu chalet, al aire libre… Entonces 




educational system, the high naturalization rates for Ecuadorians in Spain, and the 
visibility of Ecuadorian youth in Spanish public spaces (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014b; 
Masterson-Algar, 2011).165 Interestingly, the majority (44%) of South American 
participants plan the future in both the host and home countries. They have acquired 
Spanish nationality or are waiting to do so, have invested in properties in both Madrid 
and Quito and plan living in both the sending and receiving spaces (Masterson-Algar, 
2012). According to a survey by the Madrid Autonomous Community Data, 23% of 
South American respondents plan to return to Ecuador, 35% aim to settle in Spain, and 
25% construct their future life in a transnational space including both the host and home 
countries (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a). In view of Ecuadorians’ multilayered 
migration motives and plans, the three sub-categories and the composite indicator of 
migration trajectory are assigned a high value of 4 (Table IV.1). 
 In sum, Ecuadorians in Madrid are economic migrants like the other three cohorts 
in this study. However, linguistic, historical, and cultural similarities have a significant 
role to play as well, with Ecuadorians engaging in a process of reverse colonization of the 
Spanish receiving space. Unsurprisingly, Ecuadorian workers are long-term immigrants 
who settle in the host city, invest in property there and establish their families and 
children in the receiving context. While some plan to return home, these arrangements do 
not exclude a future life in Madrid, as Madrid is perceived largely as an extension of the 
motherland. The Latin Americans’ past and future migration trajectories serve to a 
explain Ecuadorians’ high levels of belonging in their new home (Table IV.1).  
                                                          
165 Ecuadorians are among the foreign populations in the Madrid Autonomous Community with the most 
children in the local educational system. Two thirds of respondents in a survey by the Autonomous 
Community reporting having at least two children in Spain compared to one third of Bulgarian respondents, 
for instance. Further, among foreigners acquiring Spanish nationality in Madrid in 2001-2007, 70% were 
Latin Americans and 40% Ecuadorians (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a; Masterson-Algar, 2011).  
173 
 
IV.4.2. Perceptions of the Ecuadorian Community’s Group Status  
 
 Ecuadorians’ feelings of affinity with Madrid correlate with the South Americans’ 
conception of the position of their larger ethnic community in the receiving city. 
Ecuadorians feel welcome in Madrid. While these arriving in the late 1990s suggest that 
initially Spaniards “were not used to dealing with Latin Americans” and “doubted” their 
economic performance or legal status, all respondents concede that this changed within a 
couple short years (Patrick, 32).166 Some discrimination and negative stereotypes of the 
Ecuadorian who “likes to drink, creates disorder” are discounted by the interviewees 
(Lincoln, 32).167 Instead, the migrant workers emphasize the rarity of negative stories 
about them and the fact that “the Spanish are not racist” (Kris, 39).168 The Spanish are 
described as “cordial, inclusive,” “understanding of foreigners” and “open to others,” and 
“much less [discriminating] than in other places” (Lina, 30).169 Inclusive attitudes toward 
Ecuadorians in Madrid are also reflected in surveys by the Madrid Autonomous 
Community (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010a).170 In her study of Ecuadorian women, 
Dudley (2013) reports an image of her participants as “caring, patient, cheerful, 
respectful and very integrated” (Dudley, 2013, p. 38). 
 Not only are Ecuadorians welcome in Spain, but the hard-working Southern 
Americans are preferred to other foreigners. It is not their economic utility but rather their 
cultural similarity that is paramount according to the participants, however. One third of 
                                                          
166 Author’s translation form original quote in Spanish: “Los latinoamericanos éramos nuevos aquí hace 
diez años, once años. Los españoles no trataban con latinoamericanos y al principio dudaban. ” 
167 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Hay gente que le gusta beber, que hace el 
desorden, todo esto.” 
168 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Los españoles no son racistas.”  
169 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “En general son bastantes cordiales. Yo 
creo que inclusive, son muy comprensivos con la gente extranjero, porque no sufrimos tanta discriminación 
como en otros países.” 
170 14.8% of Spanish respondents answered that their first foreign friend was from Ecuador. The next 
largest nationality of foreign friends was Peru with 10.2% (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010a).  
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the respondents suggest that Latin Americans are included in the receiving context 
because they “work, work, work” and are “hard-working and responsible”, but economic 
utility and skill in the labor market are not found to distinguish them from the diligent 
East Europeans (Patrick, 32; Yana, 20).171 On the other hand, all participants argue that 
language skills set them apart from both the Bulgarian and Moroccan communities in 
Madrid. Two thirds of the interviewees identify speaking Castellan as an advantage in 
finding employment and establishing connections with Spanish employers and friends. 
Welcome is also based in common religion, implanted in South America by Spanish 
colonizers, a shared past, as well as Spaniards’ experience with migration to Latin 
America. Shared ethnicity and “Spanish blood” are further cited as reasons for inclusion 
(Travis, 42). 172 Mostly, common culture and common customs, as well as a connection 
“as people” (como gente) contribute to the warm welcome Ecuadorians enjoy in Madrid 
(Ethan, 39).173 This inclusion and perceived cultural proximity are established in contrast 
to other ethnic populations like Bulgarians who are “closed, not like the Spanish, the 
Latinos,” but especially like Moroccans who are “Arabs… with different mentality, 
hostile blood” (Kris, 39; Lincoln, 32).174 
 While the economic crisis is perceived to limit economic opportunities for 
Ecuadorians in Spain, it has not altered the natives’ welcome, according to my 
respondents. All report that their compatriots have returned home to seek their luck there 
and that jobs are scarce and worse paid than in boom economic times. A few participants 
                                                          
171 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Trabajadores que estamos trabajando, trabajando, 
trabajando (Patrick, 32), “Si eres trabajador y responsible” (Yana, 20). 
172 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Al final nosotros somos sangre española.” 
173 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish. 
174 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Los búlgaros, es que no son tan abiertos. Muy 
cerrados. No como el español, los latinos…” (Lincoln, 32), “Tú sabes que el árabe...Son otra mentalidad, 
una sangre guerrera…” (Kris, 39). 
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even suggest that the Spanish are more likely to take advantage of foreign workers,. 
However, as the welcome for the ethnic cohort is conditioned on immutable shared 
characteristics rather than on cost-benefit analysis, none of the interviewees report rising 
intolerance, discrimination or exclusion. Despite some competition with Spanish workers 
and “undercutting Romanians” in the labor market, relationships with Madrilenians are 
considered “normal” regardless of the economic situation of the receiving context 
(Travis, 42).175 The group merits a high rating of 5 for this component of te group status 
indicator (Table IV.1).  
 Cultural familiarity also leads Ecuadorians in Madrid to view their larger ethnic 
community as integrated. Three quarters of respondents suggest that South Americans in 
Madrid are satisfied, because people in Spain are “very friendly, very understanding” and 
“the culture… it is very similar to that of Latinos… it is easy to coexist [with the 
Spanish]” (Kris, 39; Lina, 30).176 Nine in ten argue that Ecuadorians are not only 
welcomed and contented, but also integrated into the receiving city’s life, because “the 
Spanish understand us well” (Ethan, 39).177 Surveys by the Autonomous Community of 
Madrid confirm this sentiment. In one report, the Latin Americans respondents were the 
most likely to feel Madrilenian. To illustrate, 46% of the South American participants 
suggested that they identify themselves as part of Madrid, compared to only 28% among 
East Europeans and 33% among Africans (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010a, p. 78). 
According to another study, more than half of the Spanish participants commended the 
                                                          
175 Author’s translation derived from original quote  in Spanish: “Después, el resto, normal … Bueno, la 
competencia ahora está con los rumanos. Porque ellos están cobrando demasiado bajo. Este es el 
problema.” 
176 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son bastantes cordiales … son muy comprensivos” 
(Lina, 30), “La cultura. Si casi se parece mucho a los latinos, me gusta, es muy parecida. La puede 
convivir, claro.” (Kris, 39) 
177 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Nos entienden muy bien ellos.”  
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immediate integration of Ecuadorians, while only 16.5% were impressed by Moroccans’ 
incorporation, for instance (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010c). The Spanish and South 
Americans’ shared knack for “acting as jokesters,” Ecuadorians’ residence in areas where 
“there are people from everywhere,” and the Latin Americans’ propensity to buy 
apartments, start companies, and “buy trucks” for construction in Madrid are cited as 
signs of embeddedness into the host community (Kris, 39; Patrick, 32; Travis, 42).178  
The collective’s integration is based in cultural characteristics that make life in 
Spain easier for the newcomers. Half of all participants emphasize language when they 
describe the facility of their transition into the host context. Similarly, in a survey by the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid, 94% of Latin American respondents found that their 
language skills had significantly facilitated their integration in Spain, compared to 69% 
among Eastern Europeans and 62% among Africans (Comunidad de Madrid 2010a, pp. 
77-78). The other half of respondents in this project focus on shared culture. The Spanish 
are considered “wonderful people who help you” to fit in, especially in view of “what 
happened between Spain and Latin America, the colonization and all that” (Patrick, 32; 
Travis, 42).179 Shared past and customs render daily life in home and host contexts 
similar.  
Interestingly, when asked about integration, the Ecuadorian interviewees did not 
focus on their own ethnic community and its fragmentation, like the other three foreign 
cohorts. They understood the query as intended by this author and talked about their 
relationships with the Spanish. Regardless, the South American immigrants did feel that 
                                                          
178 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “En sentido de que son bromistas, con buen 
sentido de humor, son graciosos” (Kris, 39), “En el bloque donde yo vivo, hay de todo” (Travis, 42), “He 
escuchado amigos que tenían alguna empresa, que había comprado camiones aquí…” (Patrick, 32).  
179 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Que hay buenísima gente, que te apoya” (Travis, 
42), “Por la raíz, por lo que ha pasado de España y Latinoamérica y toda la conquista y tal” (Patrick, 32). 
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Latin Americans tend to support each other and help their compatriots, at least relatively 
to other collectives. Finally, European Union enlargement was not perceived to have 
altered Ecuadorians’ position in the city by the majority of respondents, as “Southern 
American people are established here” (Lina, 30).180 The sub-category is given the high 
value (Table IV.1). 
In sum, Ecuadorians find their ethnic community to be profoundly welcomed and 
highly integrated in Madrid.  The favorable position of the immigrant group is 
constructed through linguistic and cultural similarities and reference to Ecuadorians’ 
“Spanish blood” (sangre española), much as in official discourse. Therefore, economic 
downturn or competition with Bulgarians is not seen to contribute to deteriorating 
relationships or exclusion. The experiences of the larger community contribute to 
individual Ecuadorians’ sense of belonging in Madrid (Table IV.1). 
 
IV.4.3. Ecuadorians’ Perceptions of Individual Status 
 
 Unlike other immigrant populations in this study, finally, individual Ecuadorian 
respondents are representative of the larger ethnic group and report high levels of 
satisfaction and belonging in Madrid. Ecuadorian workers suggest that there is some 
discrimination in the city, even though they have never experienced any personally, and 
miss their families back home. However, they feel happy with the similar yet more 
modern and organized way of life in Madrid and their welcoming hosts. The Latin 
Americans communicate not just with compatriots but also with the Spanish and other 
immigrant populations alike. They have acquired Spanish nationality and feel as much 
Spanish as Ecuadorian.  
                                                          
180 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Ya la gente sudamericana estaba establecida aquí.” 
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 Life in Madrid is not perfect for the South American participants but it comes 
close. All of the respondents mention that they have heard of some discrimination by the 
Spanish towards Latin Americans, similarly to Nigerians in Dublin. The Autonomous 
Community of Madrid reports that 19% of Latin Americans perceive discrimination in 
the neighborhood compared to 16% of East Europeans, and that 32.5% feel discriminated 
against at work, for instance (Comunidad de Madrid 2010b, p. 74). However, only one of 
participant in this project experienced discrimination personally. All agree that “99% [of 
the Spanish] are very good” people (Kris, 39).181 As one Ecuadorian interviewee put it, 
“They are not racists, no, no, no. The Spanish are more tolerant [than other host 
societies]” (Patrick, 32).182 Minor experiences of exclusion still combine with nostalgia 
for family left behind to mar the otherwise happy life Ecuadorians lead in Madrid.  
 Especially as they are rejoined by their spouses, children, and parents, at least 
three quarters of the Latin Americans are very content with their existence and are “in 
love with Spain” (Patrick, 32).183 The “social development level, the class of life” in 
Spain; the opportunities to study and work; and the free and modern social system 
impress the South American immigrants (Patrick, 32).184 The similarity of socio-
economic and cultural structures in the host context and multiple Latin American stores 
and goods lead the interviewees to feel like they are in Ecuador, but an Ecuador with 
“everything modern, the transport, the cleanliness, the health system” (Lina, 30).185 The 
                                                          
181 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Creo que los 99 %será muy buenos, el 
resto 1%, 2% excepciones.” 
182 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “No es que sean racistas, no, no, no. Con los 
españoles están más tolerantes, eso sí.” 
183 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Yo en España estaba enamorado.” 
184 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Me gusta el nivel social, la clase de vida que hay.” 
185 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Lo moderno que es todo, el transporte 
público, la sanidad. Que vas al hospital y que te atienden. Las cosas más bien funcionan mejor en sentido 
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“happy, open towards the world” Spaniards who “understand us well” are the final reason 
for the Latin Americans’ contentment (Lincoln, 32; Ethan, 39).186 The group is assigned 
the highest value for this subcomponent of belonging (Table IV.1).  
 As they perceive their hosts as tolerant and interested, Ecuadorians form 
relationships not just with their compatriots but also with Madrilenians and other 
immigrants. Unlike the Polish in Dublin or Bulgarians in Madrid, fewer participants talk 
of the jealousy and disunity that rids their own diaspora. They even share that their 
consulate includes them in cultural events and that they still join their conationals for 
“parties and folklore celebrations,” if more infrequently over time (Kris, 39).187 
Ecuadorians go dancing, play soccer and cook together with other Latin Americans. 
However, the South Americans also communicate with other immigrant communities, 
including Bulgarians, and prefer a mix of friends from different nationalities and cultures. 
Seven in ten respondents form deeper connections with the Spanish as well, since “we 
share a lot of things, we talk, we discuss. They [the Spanish] like to seek out friends” 
(Ethan, 39).188 Spaniards and Ecuadorians intersect and form friendships over shared love 
of food and music and since they structure their leisure similarly. Madrilenians’ 
inclusiveness leads the interviews to view at least some Spanish friends “almost like a 
family here” (Patrick, 32). 189  A high value of 4 is assigned to the group for the indicator 
of social interaction (Table IV.1).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
administrativo. Por ejemplo, si tienes que quedarte sin trabajo, tienes el paro. Cosas, que en mi país no 
funcionan así.” 
186 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son alegres, son abiertos al mundo” (Lincoln, 32);  
“Nos entienden muy bien ellos” (Ethan, 39).  
187 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Hay fiestas, cosas culturales, folclóricas.” 
188 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Compartimos con ellos muchas cosas, 
conversamos, dialogamos. A mí lo que me gusta es que ellos buscan amigos.” 
189 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son casi como mi familia aquí.” 
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 In view of high satisfaction and strong relationships with their hosts, Ecuadorians 
in Madrid “feel like a part of Spain” (Travis, 42).190 The few respondents who answer 
that question suggest that while they are Ecuadorian, they are adopting a Spanish cultural 
identity and consider themselves “almost Spanish” (Patrick, 32).191 Latin Americans were 
indeed the most likely to feel Madrilenian among all collectives in a study by the city of 
Madrid, with almost half giving that response (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). All of 
the respondents are waiting for Spanish nationality. More than half were joined by family 
or reared children in Madrid. One fourth engaged in studies in the city after their arrival.  
Some acquired property in Madrid and delved into the city’s rich civic associational 
tradition. All of these developments lead one respondent to summarize the sentiment of 
the majority, “I am integrated … [I] mix into Spanish life. I am here, in the middle of it 
all” (Travis, 42).192 The group merits the highest rating for this sub-category and for the 
indicator of individual status (Table IV.1). 
 Consistent with the perceptions of their Spanish hosts, therefore, Ecuadorians 
belong in Madrid (Table IV.1). The Latin Americans experience some discrimination in 
the city and miss family they have left behind. They are mostly economic migrants, some 
of whom plan to return home. Nonetheless, linguistic and cultural similarities with the 
Spanish, and perceptions of shared past and future, lead Ecuadorians to choose Spain as 
their destination and to invest in life in both the home and host countries. Cultural 
proximity factors into the South Americans’ feelings of welcome by the Spanish and their 
perception of the integration of the larger Ecuadorian community in Madrid. Their 
                                                          
190 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Yo me siento… come una parte de España.”  
191 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Yo soy casi español, soy español.” 
192 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Y ya soy integrado; Integrado seria estar metido a  
la vida española. Estar allí, metido en eso.” 
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“Spanish blood” (sangre española) leads individual respondents to form connections with 
the native population and feel satisfied with life in their new home, which they consider a 
modern, organized version of their motherland.  Since Ecuadorians feel “almost Spanish” 
(casi español), the South American immigrants reunite their families, acquire Spanish 
nationality, invest in property, and embed themselves in the receiving context. High 
levels of belonging do not exclude pride for the sending state, which exists within the 
same transnational Ibero-American community as the host city. 
 
 
IV.5. “An Adaptive Tribe”: Bulgarian Perceptions of Belonging and 
Isolation in Madrid 
 
Like their Polish and Nigerian counterparts in Dublin, Bulgarian immigrants in 
Madrid are not a homogenous group. The largest difference occur among the three waves 
identified by Bulgarian organizations in the receiving city, or the groups arriving in the 
early 1990s, the mid to late 1990s, and after 2007. While the first wave was meager and 
comprised mostly of adventurous types looking for opportunity and personal 
development in a new world, the second group consisted of elites from the Bulgarian 
intelligentsia but also of workers seeking economic opportunity. The third wave includes 
lesser-educated workers looking for financial gain, but also taking advantage of 
institutional openness, increased familiarity, and social networks. As this dissertation is 
concerned with lower-skilled migrant workers and focuses mostly on the period since the 
mid-1990s, it retells the experiences of the second and third cohorts.  
Bulgarians’ conceptions of belonging and isolation in Madrid are conflicted, as in 
the case of Dublin’s immigrants, and develop in opposition to a somewhat exclusionary 
public discourse in the host city. Bulgarians often continue to identify with their 
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homeland, communicate with other Bulgarians and want to return to Bulgaria. However, 
their stay in Spain gets continuously extended and their plans of return are increasingly 
unclear, especially as profound disappointment and even disgust with the motherland is 
widespread within the group. As they feel “kicked out” (изритани) and betrayed by 
Bulgaria, the Balkan migrants learn to appreciate the orderly and calm way of life, the 
higher standard of living, and the tolerant and warm people in Madrid (for ex., Dothy, 60; 
Shay, 56; Sylvester, 29). They bring in their families and friends, bear children, and set 
roots in the host community. As they consider themselves welcome and satisfied, they 
reluctantly shed the image of the receiving context as unfamiliar and begin to stress the 
similarities they share with the native population (Table IV.1).  While Bulgarians could 
be considered similar to Poles in Dublin for instance and linger between the bottom and 
top rows of Table IV.2, therefore, they are actually closer to Ecuadorians in Madrid. 
They are ultimately placed in the top row, as discourses and actions of belonging outstrip 
perceptions of isolation and apathy.   
 
IV.5.1. Bulgarians’ Migration Trajectories 
 Bulgarians’ migration trajectories point to relatively high levels of belonging in 
Madrid. Much like their Ecuadorian counterparts, Bulgarians migrate to the city for a 
complex set of motives, combining economic, social, institutional, and cultural elements. 
They are undoubtedly “economic migrants” (M6-BO).193 More than half of the 
respondents in this project cite economic reasons for their decision to leave Bulgaria 
(Table IV.8). Pull and push factors matter even though the latter are more significant. 
“Opportunity for business, export, import” or the abundance of work in Spain pulled 
                                                          
193 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Българите са икономически емигранти.” 
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many Bulgarian workers to Madrid to see “what [they] can accomplish [there] even 
without the language” (Devin, 55; Rita, 43).194 However, the lack of prospects in 
Bulgaria and the bankrupt situation in the home country are what truly contributes to 
Bulgarian migration to Madrid. A majority of respondents “saw no light in Bulgaria” 
with extended periods of joblessness, combined with debt with the purchase of property 
or increased educational or medical expenses for immediate family (Chris, 34).195 Even 
without a family crisis, salaries are reported to be so meager that they are insufficient for 
satisfying even basic needs. Many left as they perceived that “there was nothing in 
Bulgaria” for them financially, where even stable economic situations were thwarted by 
political upheaval (Redford, 36).196  Therefore, while a major motive for labor mobility, 
economic opportunity is more complex than a simple financial cost-benefit calculation. It 
is combined with acute sense of betrayal by the motherland, and desperation with the 
financial and political situation at home. As one respondent put it: 
I don't care about Bulgaria, because Bulgaria does not care about me. They kicked us out 
from Bulgaria to go abroad without any concern. Educated people, experts, the majority in 
Bulgaria, were kicked out abroad. Why should I care about Bulgaria? (Shay, 56)197 
 
Financial troubles and lack of opportunity at home reinforce family prerogatives 
in the Bulgarian case (Table IV.8). Almost half of all respondents (or one in five replies) 
cited the need to follow a loved one abroad as a motivator for their decision to go to 
Spain, as they “could not make it alone” and the family unit had to be kept intact (Nina, 
                                                          
194 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “възможности за някакъв по- сериозен бизнес, 
експорт- импорт” (Devin, 55); “Заради стандарта, за да видя какво точно мога да постигна в тази 
страна и без език” (Rita, 43).  
195 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Защото в България вече не виждах изход.” 
196 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Видях, че в България няма нищо...” 
197 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Но от гледна точка на други неща не ме 
интересува, защото и България не се интересува за мене. От България ни натириха в чужбина без да 
се интересува за нас. Подготвени хора, с образование, масата на българската нация,  специалистите 
ни изгониха в чужбина. За какво аз да се интересувам за България?” 
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57).198 Sick relatives, the need to send money to children in university or help children 
working in Spain were all reasons that led Bulgarians to go to Madrid. The theme “we 
migrated for the kids” resonates in the replies of a number of the Balkan participants 
(Pam, 39).199 Disruptions in the family are another incentive to relocate, where divorce 
left interviewees no reason to stay in the sending county and created the “need for 
change” (нужда от промяна) (Devin, 55; Redford, 36).200  
 








% of all 
respondents 
 
Economic opportunity 22% 22 56.4% 
Social networks 21% 21 53.8% 
Family prerogatives 18% 18 46.1% 
Ease of travel/settlement 14% 14 35.9% 
Opportunity for development 14% 14 35.9% 
Adventure 7% 7 17.9% 








Of 39 persons 
  
Source: Author.  
  
Desire for personal growth and development, for more opportunity, and for 
experience and adventure are the final reason for Bulgarians to leave home (Table IV.8). 
One third of all respondents purported migrating for Spain for non-material 
“development” (развитие) and “opportunity” (перспектива), such as the possibility for 
                                                          
198 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “И аз казах, че ще дойда, не мога да го оставя 
сам той да се справя тука.” 
199 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Емигрирахме заради децата.” 
200 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian.  
201 Most participants gave multiple responses to the question “Why did you leave Bulgaria and migrate to 
Spain?” Therefore, while there are thirty-nine respondents who discussed this question, there are in fact one 
hundred recorded answers among them. In the rest of this chapter, I take account of the incidence of the 
responses both as percentage of all thirty-nine respondents and all one hundred responses given. While 
rates for each answer are radically different based on these two different modes of calculation, results are 
the same regardless of method. 
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personal growth and self-realization in terms of professional development, language 
acquisition, and expanding one’s horizons (Xander, 20). Once again, the “scary” 
(страшна) situation in Bulgaria leaving little space for personal growth serves as a 
backdrop to the decision to migrate (Gina, 33). It is the self-described “curious” 
“dreamers” who discounted the risk and took the spontaneous decision to relocate and 
“get to learn another side of things” (Devin, 55; Nora, 26; Pam, 39).202  
Several other factors motivate the respondents to choose Madrid as their particular 
destination. The proliferation of social networks between home and host societies is most 
significant, as the few risk-takers going to Madrid in the early 1990s reduce the risk for 
subsequent arrivals. In what one organizational representative dubbed the “calling effect” 
(efecto llamada) immigrants on the ground are providing information, housing, and, less 
frequently, jobs to family and friends (M1-BO).203  More than half of all interviewees 
(and one in five responses) identify the personal connections they had in Madrid as the 
reason they were drawn to the city in particular (Table IV.8). As one respondent shares, 
“We had friends here who could help us start all over again” (Yana, 50).204 Therefore, 
social factors come to rival economic considerations in Bulgarians’ decision to move to 
Spain. Notably, the four cases in this thesis do not share a single motivation for 
migration, regardless of their current status as economic migrants. Social, economic, and 
cultural factors interplay, yet carry different weight for each of the four groups.  
                                                          
202 Paragraph contains author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Аз съм един 
мечтател” (Pam, 39);” И пристигнах чисто от любопитство” (Devin, 55); “Не само приключение, да 
професионално и може би да опознаеш още една страна на нещата” (Nora, 26).   
203 Author’s translation from original phrase in Spanish.  
204 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Той дойде тука, защото имахме познати, 
приятели, които да ни помогнат малко или много да започнем съвсем отначало.” 
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Two other factors point to Spain as the right choice of destination for Bulgarians – 
the liberal migration regime and the tolerant and friendly Spaniards who share a certain 
kinship or mentality with the newcomers. Immigrant respondents and their elite 
interlocutors cite the ease of traveling to Spain, the ability to “fix documents” and “get 
legal,” and the general social and integration policies in the country as important factors 
for selecting Madrid (M6-BO).205 The fear of deportation made unauthorized Bulgarians 
forego traditional migration destinations like Germany and Austria. The ease of entry 
without documents through a tourist visa attracted a large number of the East Europeans 
to Spain in particular and served as the motivator of one third of this project’s 
interviewees (Table IV.8). While considered beneficial, Bulgaria’s accession to the 
European Union did not change the situation of the majority of Bulgarians in Madrid or 
cause a massive wave of new immigrants to the country. Rather, repeated amnesties and a 
laissez-faire attitude towards the undocumented are more significant. Relatedly, the 
Spanish government’s open social policies of free medical coverage or ample local 
integration funds inspired many respondents to select Madrid as their destination.  
 Finally, perceptions of tolerance, welcome, kinship, and shared mentality lead 
some of the Balkan migrants to Madrid. Most interviewees find the Spanish to be warm 
Southern people, much like Bulgarians themselves, in contrast to the “robots in 
Germany” (Tanner, 64).206 While only one in ten interviewees (or 4% of all responses) 
cited cultural ties as the main reason for migration, many of the respondents talked about 
the Spanish as “warmer, emotional, amiable, closer to our mentality” and told stories 
where busy Spanish passersby would guide lost Bulgarians to their destinations (Rosa, 
                                                          
205 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “После Испания имаше политика да приема 
емигранти, да ги легализира, да им оправя документите.” 
206 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Германия за мене е държава- робот.” 
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44).207 Half of all ethnic representatives identified southern mentality similar to that of 
Bulgarians, warmth, and tolerance to foreigners as reasons for Bulgarians to choose 
Spain. Tolerance and opportunity, together with a perception of Spain as a better, more 
“cultured” (културно място) version of Bulgaria, leads respondents to call Spain a 
“paradise” (рай) (Idris, 30; Xander, 20).  One respondent puts it most eloquently:208 
I saw a Spain that I want Bulgaria to be like. A multinational Spain, with many cultures, 
many religions, no one bothered by that, everyone learning from each other and cohabiting 
with tolerance and empathy among ethnicities… Spaniards are used to this sea of 
nationalities and migrants… they are so polite, so tolerant. I saw a Spain that was so socially 
accepting and welcoming (Devin, 55)209 
 
The East Europeans are assigned an intermediate value of 3 for this sub-category 
of the migration trajectory indicator (Table IV.1). 
Bulgarians’ migration plans are conflicted, much like the group’s motives for 
mobility, yet indicate an increasing level of affinity and belonging in Madrid. Bulgarian 
migration to Spain intensified in the early 2000s, with a peak in 2006 (INE, 2008). There 
were only about 3,000 Bulgarians in the receiving country in 1998, a number that grew to 
around 10,000 in the early 2000s and 150,000 in 2011 (INE, 2014; Kolev, 2005). Like the 
Polish in Dublin, Bulgarians appear to be short-term immigrants in the host context with 
an average length of stay of around five years. However, a closer inspection reveals that 
Bulgarians have actually been setting roots in Spain since the late 1990s and therefore 
average at least ten in the receiving context, more like Nigerians in Ireland or 
                                                          
207 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Тези хора са много топли и сърдечни и са по- 
близки до нашия манталитет.” 
208 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian.  
209 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Видях една Испания, която е какъвто искам 
да видя света и каквато искам да видя България. Ами мултинационална Испания, много култури, 
много религии, никой нищо не го интересува, т.е. всеки може де попие от другия и една 
съвместимост и толерантност и търпимост по отношение на религии и по отношение на всичко. 
Между самите етноси. От друга страна самите испанци сякаш са привикнали от това масово море, 
масов наплив на чужденци…И самите испанци са изключително толерантни, изключително 
вежливи и не на последно място видях една социално осигурена Испания.” 
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Ecuadorians in Madrid. Bulgarians did not immigrate to Spain in reaction to European 
Union enlargement in 2007, but have already chosen the Southern European context 
before the major institutional change. Fewer than one third of respondents in this project 
have been in Madrid for less than five years, with one third residing in the receiving 
community for more than ten years. Consequently, they have been able to create social 
networks in the city, start or bring in families, and begin to assimilate into Spanish life.  
Bulgarians arrived in Spain with unclear or short-term plans, leaving partners and 
children behind, like Poles and Ecuadorians. Few had a clear goal in mind, with seven in 
ten respondents arriving with the idea to secure a job, acquire financial stability, visit 
friends, or simply “see how things are” (Tara, 50).210 However, plans have changed for a 
majority of the Balkan immigrants. Most have stayed well beyond their original plans. As 
one interview put it, “We just came to see for 5-6 months but we are here for eleven years 
now” (Anna, 36).211 One in six participants who gave a response to this question reported 
being joined by family and having children in Spain after a short period to settle and get 
legalized in the receiving society. Even if they still dream to return to Bulgaria and have 
even acquired property there, the immigrants’ prerogatives have changed. As one 
interviewee summarized, “this is the plan but you know how plans change. Our boy is 
growing here, adapting, and loses his desire to go back with each day” (Gina, 33).212 The 
cohort is assigned a value of 4 for this sub-component of belonging (Table IV.1).  
                                                          
210 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Да видим как стоят нещата.” 
211 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “По принцип дойдохме за 5- 6 месеца, колкото 
можем нещо да заработим и да се върнем. Но тези 6 месеца станаха вече 11 години.” 
212 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Това ни е планът, обаче то нали знаеш, едно 
планираш, друго става. Като се замисля детето ако расте тука и свикне с тази среда, с тези хора и 
вече то няма да има желание да се приберем.” 
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As a result, Bulgarian respondents are conflicted about their migration plans, but 
as time passes, they “have negotiated in [their] heads that [they are] staying [in Spain]” 
(Idris, 30).213 A majority of the Balkan immigrants report missing their homeland. Four 
in ten want to go back to Bulgaria one day, but have no clear arrangements or date for the 
return trip. A report by the Madrid Autonomous Community confirms Bulgarian’s desire 
to stay, with 57% Balkan respondents intending to settle in Spain and only 18% planning 
to return to Bulgaria (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a). One interviewee summarizes the 
common sentiment best, “I will go back eventually, maybe in fifteen-twenty years when 
it's better in Bulgaria” (Xavier, 20).214 Six in ten have decided to stay in the host country, 
however. Feelings of disappointment, betrayal and even disgust with the motherland are a 
major reason to decide to remain in Madrid indefinitely: 
How can you go back to Bulgaria? When I worked there the money was enough only for rent, 
cigarettes, food. You couldn’t afford anything else (Van, 30)215 
 
There is no life in Bulgaria. When I go back, I start crying from the airport. The problems 
start. Everyone is looking for money from you (Dothy, 60)216 
 
Setting roots in the host city and the well-being of the family are equally 
important. A majority of Bulgarian participants suggest that their future depends on the 
family unit. Even if they miss their home state, older Balkan migrants concede to stay in 
order to provide an organized, easy, lawful, and calm lifestyle for their children. Having 
worked to secure a bright future for their progeny, few foreign workers want to go back 
                                                          
213 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Да де, сега се преустроих, в смисъл мисловно 
да оставам тука.” 
214 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ще се прибера евентуално, след 15- 20 
години мисля, като се оправи България.” 
215 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Как да се прибираме в България, като аз като 
бях в България каквото съм работил ти стига за квартира, за цигари, за храна. Не можеш да си 
позволиш нищо да си купиш.” 
216 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “няма живот в България? Аз като си отида със 
слизането на аерогарата започвам да плача, започват ти проблемите. И всеки те гледа в ръцете и 
мисли, че идваш с много пари.” 
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and start the process anew. In the meantime, they often get used to the manageable and 
stable way of life in Spain themselves. As the second generation adapts to the receiving 
community, gets engulfed into the Spanish education system, speaks Spanish more often 
than Bulgarian, and only occasionally visits relatives in Bulgaria, family prerogatives 
make staying the only possible choice for first-generation Bulgarian migrants. The 
significance of the family unit, therefore, is paramount both in constructing initial 
migration arrangements and in changing migration plans: 
My home is where my family is. My family is here. My brother in Bulgaria is sick and doesn't 
even know me. My parents passed. So I don't want to go back (Nina, 57)217 
 
The cohort is assigned a value of 4 for this indicator of belonging (Table IV.1). 
 In sum, Bulgarians migrate to Madrid for a complex set of reasons, in which 
economic, social, political, and cultural elements are hard to separate. Desperation with 
the economic situation at home pushes Bulgarians to leave their home country. An open 
Spain offering economic and social stability, liberal migration policies and generous 
social welfare system, as well as a warm and similar society, draws the Balkan 
immigrants to Madrid. Social networks enhance perceptions of safety and familiarity for 
the newcomers. Stability and growing kinship with Madrid serve to transform short-term 
plans into long-term settlement among the East Europeans. As they are disappointed with 
a corrupt Bulgaria, want to provide a bright future for their progeny, and get used to the 
superior way of life in Spain, Bulgarians concede that Madrid is their de facto new home. 
Bulgarians’ migration trajectory indicates a rising level of affinity with the city (Table 
IV.1).  
                                                          
217 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Където ми е семейството там ми е домът, там 
ми е родината. Семейството ми е тука, в България нямам, родителие ми, сестра ми са починали. 




IV.5.2. Perceptions of the Bulgarian Community’s Group Status  
 
 The changing migration trajectories of Bulgarians correlate with the East 
Europeans’ perceptions of the relatively privileged status of their ethnic community in 
Madrid. Bulgarian workers arriving in Madrid feel welcome and consider their new home 
“paradise” (рай), regardless of the city’s economic situation (Dothy, 60). While these 
arriving in the 1990s suggest that initially Spaniards knew less about Bulgarians and even 
viewed them negatively as they equated them with the Roma ethnic community, all 
concede that this has changed. Even though Bulgarians have the “bad reputation of being 
car thieves,” Madrid’s population continues to welcome the Balkan newcomers and is 
even amazed by their superior skills in stealing cars (Kevin, 33).218 Madrilenians are 
found to be “positive,” eager to help, and “welcoming towards us” (Xander, 20).219As 
they are “charmed by [Bulgarians],” the Spanish are deemed to be “interested” and to 
“know our traditions” (Caleb, 33; Tanner, 64).220   
 The Bulgarian cohort is split in its understanding of the basis of welcome by the 
Spanish, with the same person prioritizing economic utility and cultural similarity in the 
same interview and not considering the two factors mutually exclusive. Much like their 
Polish counterparts in Dublin, Bulgarians believe that Madrilenians prefer them to other 
nationalities, since they are hard workers with good education and high qualifications.221 
More than half of all Balkan respondents and all Bulgarian representatives in ethnic 
                                                          
218 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Българите, които идват в Испания имат слава 
на крадци на коли.” 
219Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Положително отношение. Дружелюбни са. 
Приемат ни.” 
220 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Очаровани са от нас, очаровани” (Tanner, 64), 
“Ами да, знаят и за традициите, за празниците и се интересуват” (Caleb, 33). 
221 Among the Bulgarian respondents, eight in ten (thirty out of thirty-seven) suggest that they are preferred 
to other immigrant nationalities, with only two respondents unsure and one convinced that other 
immigrants groups are better liked than Bulgarians.  
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organizations who gave a response to this question hold that the Spanish like the East 
Europeans, because “they know their job” and “are not afraid of work” (Jack, 28; M2-
BO).222 Fifty-five percent of Bulgarians self-identify as the “most hard-working of all” 
(най- работните от всички), with few respondents also implying that Bulgarians are 
easier to exploit by their hosts than other foreign workers (Sasha, 33).223   
 The category of hard work is hardly a material one, however.  Hard work is 
conflated with conscientiousness, politeness, honesty, discipline, as well as high 
qualifications and good education. As one respondent put it, “We work both with our 
hands and our heads. We are educated” (Nina, 57).224 Bulgarian representatives also 
emphasize the home country’s educational system that gives an edge to the Balkan cohort 
in the Spanish labor market. In the minds of the interviewees, Bulgarians’ intelligence, 
preparedness, and cultured nature is what sets them apart from Latin Americans, who are 
“illiterate” and don’t have education or manners (Chris, 34).225 Bulgarians also claim to 
differ from South Americans, who are “two-faced” (двулични) (Pam, 39), impolite, and 
very “slow and lazy” (бавни и мързеливи) (Rita, 43).  
 Bulgarians, much like Ecuadorians, believe that they are welcomed by the 
Spanish due to their common cultural attributes, with economic and cultural factors not 
mutually exclusive.226 Perceived similarity is constructed by the Balkan cohort through 
the same categories employed in public discourse and by Latin American immigrants. 
                                                          
222Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Знаят си работата” (jack, 28), “По принцип 
мнението на испанците /може с времето да се е променило/ е, че хората от Източна Европа са 
работливи, че не ги е страх от работа” (M2-BO).  
223 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian.  
224 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “И начинът на работа, работи с главата си 
освен с ръцете си… Образовани сме.” 
225 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ами защото латиноамериканците не знаят да 
четат, не знаят да пишат, те са неграмотни.” 
226 Four in ten of the respondents, as well as three quarters of the community’s representatives emphasized 
cultural similarity when explaining Bulgarians’ warm welcome in Madrid.  
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That is, Bulgarians feel welcomed in Madrid as they are racially and ethnically similar to 
their hosts and “indistinguishable from the Spanish physically,” rendering them less 
likely to be discriminated against (M1-BO).227 As Bulgarians are “part of Europe,” there 
is a perception of shared past and future between the newcomers and the native society 
(Sylvester, 29).228 Common history and a vivid historical memory of Spanish emigration 
constitute additional reasons for Bulgarians to fit in, according to the respondents. Being 
under Turkish and Moor slavery, and sharing in religious rituals or national folklore are 
pointed out by one respondent. As another interviewee put it, “I tell Spaniards, you were 
emigrants too, you were exploited too… I feel the empathy - they understand” (Connor, 
44).229 While Bulgarians do not speak Spanish like Latin Americans, they emphasize 
their multilingual abilities and correct pronunciation of Castellan Spanish as opposed to 
the South Americans’ different jargon. Finally, Bulgarians “habits, character” (and 
“mentality… the way of fiestas” are found to be closer to those of the Spanish, even if the 
latter “are a bit louder” (Grady, 54; Kevin, 33).230 The commonalities between Spaniards 
and Bulgarians are once again emphasized through a reference to Latin Americans: 
There is a myth that Spaniards and Latin Americans share a linguistic and cultural 
similarity. In terms of language, the similarity is 80% as Latin Americans speak gypsy 
Spanish. In terms of culture, there is actually no correspondence whatsoever. A Peruvian or 
another South American comes from a much lower educational base than the average 
Spaniard creating tensions and issues with integration… Maybe it is not so bad for 
Bulgarians, as we are educated and part of Europe (Sylvester, 29)231 
                                                          
227 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ние не се отличаваме от испанците и от това 
сме облагодетелствани.” 
228 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ние сме част от Европа.” 
229 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Да, и за им казвам на испанците ‘Вие също 
сте били емигранти, използвани.’ Чувствам симпатия, знаят го това нещо. 
230 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “По- топли като характер. И много им са 
близки навиците. (Grady, 54), “Защото българският манталитет е много близък до испанския начин 
на живот, начина на фиеста … но те са по-грамогласни.” Only one respondent suggested that Spanish 
and Bulgarian cultures are incompatible and hence Bulgarians’ status in Madrid will always be inferior to 
that of South Americans (Shay, 56).  
231 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “По принцип общоприето е, че Испания има 
много сериозна връзка с латиноамериканците на базата на езика и на базата на културата. Въпросът 
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 According to the Balkan immigrants, moreover, economic crisis has not affected 
the tolerance and welcome of their Spanish hosts. While a few Bulgarians find that 
Madrilenians started prioritizing their compatriots, while before the crisis they preferred 
the cheaper, educated, and fast foreign workers, all concede that they continue to be 
“always respected anywhere [they] go” (Chris, 34).232 Only one respondent shared the 
opinion that “Spaniards started losing their jobs and blamed us, all foreigners, that we are 
taking their bread” (Pam, 39).233 The downturn was also perceived to affect the internal 
dynamics of the Bulgarian community, with many people leaving, losing their jobs or 
becoming resentful and isolated from the larger Bulgarian diaspora. However, the 
respondents did not face a deteriorating relationship with their hosts. The situation was 
considered different for South Americans, however. Several East Europeans suggested 
that the non-European workers create tensions and issues of integration by sending 
remittances outside of Europe and staying with crisis. The confident Bulgarian cohort is 
assigned the highest value for this sub-component of belonging (Table IV.1). 
Despite the welcome they perceive from their Spanish hosts, Bulgarians are 
conflicted in their conception of their community’s integration. On the one hand, elite 
interlocutors tout the ability of the Balkan workers to adapt to Madrilenian society. Six 
out of the eight ethnic representatives interviewed suggest that Bulgarians integrate well. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
е, че базата на езика е донякъде, до известна степен вярна 80 %, тъй като те говорят много по- 
цигански от испанците. В културно отношение няма никакво припокриване. Това означава, че един 
латиноамериканец, дошъл тук от базата на образованието, което е получил в Перу или която и да е 
латиноамериканска държава не кореспондира на средния испански кадър, който е живял в неговите 
среди. Това означава, че ще има някакви много сериозни базови разминавания в културно 
отношение, които ще доведат до конфликти и ще направят много трудна асимилацията на дадения 
латиноамериканец…. При българите може би е по- различно, тъй като сме образовани и сме част от 
Европа.” 
232 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Винаги ме уважават където и да ида.” 
233 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Дефакто испанцит започнаха да остават без 
работа и ни обвиняваха нас, че сме дошли да им вземем хляба.” 
195 
 
The remaining two do not deny that their compatriots can fit in, but simply see the group 
as more heterogeneous. Since they are not criminal and “do not cause trouble for Spanish 
authorities,” are Orthodox Christians rather than Muslims, and are educated and cultured, 
Bulgarians are considered among the most successful groups in their integration in the 
host country (M4-BO).234 Reports by the Madrid Autonomous Community confirm the 
ethnic representatives’ assertions by documenting the rising rates of intermarriages and 
friendships between Bulgarians and Spaniards.235 
The agency of both Bulgarian organizations and the Spanish government is 
considered decisive. The numerous associations (more numerous that these for larger 
immigrant communities in Madrid) not only aid the Balkan migrants in language 
acquisition and getting used to life in Madrid, but also create a positive image of 
Bulgarians among the Spanish and spark the hosts’ interest in Bulgarian culture. In their 
turn, the Spanish and Madrilenian governments’ integration plans and funds are deemed 
“pointed,” “holistic,” and truly beneficial to the newcomers (M6-BO).236 Association 
leaders even go as far as to suggest that the East Europeans are “an adaptive tribe” that 
blends in better with Spaniards than with their own compatriots (M1-BO).237   
 On the other hand, individual respondents find their larger community far from 
integrated, much like in the case of Poles in Dublin. Three quarters of the ones who 
discussed the issue find that Bulgarians do not easily fit into Madrid’s life. As one person 
described the trend, “They don't speak the language. Bulgarians, they live together six 
                                                          
234 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Българската емиграция е добрe интегрирана и 
не създава проблеми на испанските власти.” 
235 For instance, 11% of Bulgarians had a Spanish partner in 2013, as opposed to 6% in 2012. This 
compares with 6% among Romanians and 1% among the Chinese. The highest rate of intermarriages 
occurs between the Spanish and Dominicans, with 23% (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014b).  
236 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: И те са цялостни, целенасочени, разбира се с 
помощта на ЕС. 
237 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Суперадаптивно племе сме.” 
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people at a time and only watch Bulgarian TV. No one leaves this narrow circle of 
Bulgarian friends. They buy Bulgarian stuff, go to a Bulgarian hairdresser. Everything is 
happening in this narrow circle …I believe at least 60-70% of Bulgarians here continue to 
live in this Bulgarian commune” (Anna, 36).238 The remaining interviewees suggested 
that it is hard to settle on a group trend with younger people and families more likely to 
belong in the host city: 
There are two types of Bulgarians. One type comes to work and study. They decide to 
integrate. Others simply don't want to. They are racist towards the Spanish. They say, ‘they 
are stupid, they are unqualified.’ How can you go to another county and speak like that 
[about your hosts]? (Jasmine, 56)239 
 
 The language barrier and the reliance on Bulgarian social networks, at least in the 
initial phases of migration, are the main reasons for Bulgarians’ isolation in Madrid. 
Bulgarians’ disadvantage of arriving in the host city with no language skills is the 
primary focus of ethnic associations, who race to organize multitudes of courses to help 
their compatriots. Four out of ten respondents argue that not knowing “a word of 
Spanish” (дума испански) upon arrival limits the group’s opportunities for employment 
and interaction with natives and forces it to rely on ethnic networks exclusively (Shay, 
56). Still, it is indicative that most Balkan migrants speak of the language barrier in the 
past tense and realize that “[they] have no future in Spain without the language” (Grady, 
54). 
                                                          
238 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Друго нещо, което е много обичайно и 
срещано е, че българите, които неговрятезика, живеят по 6 човека да речем единственото, което 
гледат е българска телевизия. Никой не излиза от този кръг български приятели и ходят пазаруват 
български работи, ходят на българската фризьорка. …Обаче смятам, че поне  60-70% от хората тук 
продължават да си живеят така, в този тип комуна българска.” 
239 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Има два вида българи, има едни, които 
просто идват за работа и идват хора да учат. Зависи, има хора, които решават да се интегрират и 
хора, които просто не желаят. От страна на българите към испанците има расисъм също. Пооне от 
типа на „те нищо не разбират, те са тъпи”, нещо, което не ми е ясно защо. От каква позиция отиваш 
в някаква държава и да кажеш, че тези хора са тъпи?”  
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Additionally, the Bulgarian community is considered isolated due to the tendency 
to live together and be stuck together in immigrant neighborhoods. As one person 
explains, “everyone comes to their friends and family and the group gets bigger, they 
stick together, live together” (Hunter, 29).240 As Bulgarians have to rely on each other 
initially to find housing or secure a job, especially if they have deficient language skills, 
they might get stuck within the “Bulgarian commune” (комуна българска) and even 
exploited by settled compatriots (Anna, 36). Notably, only one respondent blamed 
cultural incompatibility for Bulgarians’ isolation in the city.  
 Interestingly, when prompted about the integration of the Bulgarian community, 
the immigrants and their representatives talk mostly about the fragmentation existing 
within the Bulgarian collective. Leaders from the community decry the inability of ethnic 
associations to cooperate on the advancement of the Balkan population, with envy and 
competition for funding as the main issues. One third of the immigrants also spoke of 
Bulgarians’ tendency not to support each other and shared that they have “suffered from 
other Bulgarians” before (Xavier, 20). The East European community is described as “not 
united,” with individual families fending for themselves (M6-BO). While this trend is 
considered a significant obstacle to ethnic mobilization and the success of the group in 
the receiving context, it unwittingly pushes Bulgarians outside of the diaspora and forces 
them to rely on the larger Madrilenian society.241 Still, the group is assigned an 
intermediate value of 3 for this component of the group status indicator (Table IV.1).   
                                                          
240 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ами те всички нови българи идват при 
техните роднини и те живеят тука и то така става. И се натрупва по малко. Всеки идва при познати. 
Той там отива и там си остава.” 
241 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Има много хора, които са 




 To conclude, Bulgarians find their larger group to be relatively well positioned in 
Madrid. Individual respondents report that deficient language skills and embeddedness in 
rigid ethnic networks preclude Bulgarians from integrating in the receiving city. 
However, elite representatives suggest that ample integration efforts and funds by a 
multitude of actors and divisiveness among Bulgarians themselves push the Eastern 
Europeans out in the larger society.  The group is further empowered by the welcome it 
receives by Spaniards, even during economic downturn. Bulgarians consider themselves 
better positioned in the city than n Latin American workers, in view of hard work and 
superior education, but also due to the ethnicity, European nationality, common history, 
and mentality they share with Madrilenians. The Bulgarian community’s favorable status 
in the receiving city correlates with relatively high levels of belonging for individual 
Balkan respondents (Table IV.1).  
 
IV.5.3. Bulgarians’ Perceptions of Individual Status  
 
 As they are stay longer, bring in or create families, and enjoy life in Madrid, 
Bulgarians are slowly coming to identify with the receiving context and “forget Bulgaria” 
(M8-BO).242 Since the Balkan immigrants consider the diaspora as a whole disunited, 
ridden by jealousy, and generally isolated, they form relationships with the friendlier and 
warmer Spaniards, as to escape envy and negativism. The Balkan immigrants miss 
Bulgaria intensely and continue to identify with the home country primarily, yet are 
starting to integrate into Madrid’s life, especially as they focus on the next generation 
(Table IV.1).   
 
                                                          
242 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Почти съм забравил България.” 
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Ease/quality/orderliness of life 32.7% 18 
Tolerant/open people 21.8% 12 
Financial stability/money/jobs 21.8% 12 
Opportunity for children 5.6% 3 
Social rights, liberal politics 3.6% 2 
Clear rights 3.6% 6 








 Source: Author. 
  
 Much like their Polish and Ecuadorian counterparts, individual participants in 
Madrid are highly satisfied with life in the receiving context. None of the Bulgarians 
interviewed for this project is unhappy in Madrid. Eight in ten immigrants are content 
with their new home, with the remainder somewhat conflicted due to either nostalgia or 
deteriorating economic circumstance.  
 While the reasons for this high level of satisfaction are complex, quality of life in 
the host society stands out as the main motive (Table IV.9). Each respondent provides 
multiple explanations for their contentment, but in one third of the cases the Bulgarian 
migrants emphasize how “calm, easier” (спокоен, по-лесен), “comfortable” (удобно), 
“better organized and settled” (по-добре организирано и уредено) their existence is in 
the receiving context (Caleb, 33; Tangra, 36; Tonya, 45). Law and order, superior 
transportation, and even street lights and pothole-free streets lead a majority of 
Bulgarians to pronounce themselves “charmed with Spain” (очарована от Испания) 
(Dothy, 60). Spanish peoples’ tolerant nature and openness toward Bulgarians counteract 
intense nostalgia for the motherland in more than one fifth of all responses. Being 
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surrounded by the “patient” (търпеливи), “intelligent” (интелигентни), “carefree” 
(освободени) natives who are always ready to help makes the respondents forget about 
the multiple sacrifices with migration and the family they have behind (Anna, 36; Dothy, 
60; Idris, 30). Ample economic opportunity, even with crisis, a stable financial situation, 
and the ability to satisfy one’s basic needs render the East Europeans better able to share 
in the “unburdened life” of Spaniards (Yana, 50).243 Liberal politics, a generous and well-
organized social system, the ability to claim one’s personal rights, and the opportunity to 
provide a better life for future generations, are additional incentives for Bulgarians to like 
their existence in the host country. The advantageous image of Madrid is constructed in 
contrast with a lawless, corrupt, poor, desperate Bulgaria, leading one respondent to quip, 
“I can be a cleaning lady in Bulgaria too, but I will be a sad cleaning lady” (Rosa, 44).244 
Satisfaction levels merit the highest rating (Table IV.1).  
 This unfavorable image of the motherland, despite the interviewees’ 
unconditional love for it, is transposed to the Bulgarian diaspora in Spain. The East 
Europeans feel most comfortable with their compatriots and form their closest 
relationships with them, yet find other Bulgarians to be jealous, backhanded and 
unsupportive of the larger national community. Thus, the Balkan immigrants begin to 
disassociate from their fellow citizens and to form relationships with the tolerant, helpful 
Spanish instead. The foreign workers are highly conflicted in their opinion about other 
Bulgarians.245 One third of the respondents report “doing everything through Bulgarians” 
                                                          
243 Paragraph contains author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian including: “Живот без 
стресови ситуации, без натоварване” (Yana, 50). 
244 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “И когато имаш стабилна работа, защото аз 
можех да бъда чистачка и в България, но да бъда нещастна чистачка.” 
245 28% of all respondents suggested their relationships in Madrid were with other Bulgarians almost 
exclusively (eleven out of thirty-nine), with the same number and percentage suggesting the diametrically 
opposed option – that they avoid communicating with Bulgarians entirely. 15% suggested that they have 
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(Tangra, 33).246 They remain within “the Bulgarian commune,” since it is “always easier 
to communicate with your own blood” (Anna, 36; Tonya, 45).247 They find it hard to 
form a connection with Madrilenians beyond that of a mere acquaintance. However, an 
equal number of participants steer clear of their compatriots. As people are 
“overburdened with problems” or are in Madrid “for the money and not for their 
dreams,” the communication within the ethnic population is breaking down (Pam, 39; 
Tonya, 45).248 The collective also includes a small percentage of Bulgarians who 
purposefully abuse newcomers by charging a commission for housing, for instance. The 
latter group leads one respondent to conclude, “A Bulgarian schemer is a Bulgarian 
schemer, no matter in what country” (Yana, 50).249   
Since mistrust rather than unity characterizes the Balkan collective, Bulgarian 
workers “have no choice” but to become “friends with the Spanish” (Jasmine, 56).250 
Indeed, while one fifth of respondents find it difficult to create and maintain friendships 
with Madrilenians, six in ten report having at least some Spanish friends and 
communicating with all people, including the native population. As Spaniards are 
interested in Bulgarians, seeking out Spanish friends quickly results in deeper 
relationships. Some respondents even have Spanish partners or go out with Spanish 
groups exclusively. Few report “getting along better with Spaniards than with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
many Bulgarian friends but that they also have friends and acquaintances from other nationalities and do 
not seek Bulgarians exclusively. Another 13% reported having mostly Bulgarians friends but keeping the 
circle tight and only communicating with immediate relatives and a few friendly families. The remaining 
15% did not provide a response to this question.  
246 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз всичко чрез българи.” 
247Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian:  “Как да ти кажа, с една кръвна група хората се 
усещат без значение от коя нация са” (Tonya, 45).  
248 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “ Всеки с проблемите си, всеки с грижите си ” 
(Tonya, 45); “Тук са за парите, а не да следват мечтите си” (Pam, 39). 
249 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз общувам с малко българи и винаги съм 
чувала от българи, от наши сънародници оплаквания, че Бай Ганьо си е Бай Ганьо, където и да го 
сложиш той си е ...” 
250 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ами то няма как- с испанци и румънци.” 
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Bulgarians” (Tamara, 43).251 This component of the individual status indicator is given a 
high value of 4 (Table IV.1).  
 Regardless of these budding relationships, the Balkan migrants maintain a strong 
Bulgarian cultural identity and categorize missing the motherland as one of the largest 
sacrifices with migration to Madrid. Eight in ten participants share that they consider 
themselves Bulgarian, even if their children were born in Spain.252 They suggest that they 
are “never going to feel Spanish,” even if the next generation makes Madrid its home 
(Tanner, 64).253 As one interviewee puts it: 
When you go back to Bulgaria, to the seaside, to the Rila Monastery, you get recharged. 
Bulgaria will always be our homeland (Tamara, 43)254 
 
This strong national identification correlates with intense nostalgia for the 
motherland. While the interviewees suggest that leaving family behind or living in 
squalid conditions in Madrid were significant obstacles in their experience abroad 
initially, most continue to suffer in Spain primarily because they “really miss Bulgaria” 
(Xavier, 20).255 As one interviewee vividly explains, “there is not a night I don’t look at 
pictures from Bulgaria. I want to scream from pain for the homeland but …” (Grady, 
                                                          
251 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз се разбирам –подобре с испанци 
отколкото с българи.” 
252 One two in ten share feeling like “citizens of the world” (жител на света) and “not [feeling] proud to 
be Bulgarians” (не се гордея, че съм българка) (Devon, 55; Jasmine, 56) (Author’s translation from 
original quote in Bulgarian).  
253 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ще се почувствам като свободен човек, но не 
и като част от Испания.” 
254 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз бих казала, че тази година той беше с мене 
в България. И просто друго си е като обиколиш на Рилския манастир, Варна, морето, София и се 
зареждаш с енергия. И аз мисля, че България винаги ще си е нашата Родина.” 
255 27.6% of the respondents identify missing Bulgaria as the biggest sacrifice they face daily with life in 
Madrid, with an additional 10.3% suggesting that Spain is not their home. 27.6% share that leaving behind 
family and friends has been the hardest part of immigrating. 24.1% point to miserable conditions of living 
and employment, life in fear without documents, and inability to communicate in Spanish as the issues that 
made their existence in Madrid difficult initially. 10.4% believe they made no sacrifices when they left 




54).256 Feelings of loss make some of the foreign workers feel like “trees without a root 
here” and believe that they “always will be immigrants” in Madrid (Connor, 44; Trini, 
31).257 It is encouraging, however, that one in ten respondents do not believe they made 
sacrifices by migrating to Madrid and a majority find that their situation has improved 
over time. Still, this sub-indicator of belonging merits the lowest value (Table IV.1). 
Despite a strong national identification and feelings of loss for the motherland, 
Balkan immigrants to consider themselves relatively integrated.  Almost half of the 
participants who provided a response to this question considered themselves “part of 
Spanish society,” with an additional 15% unsure yet leaning towards belonging in Madrid 
and another 8% having initiated the process of settlement (Sylvester, 29).258 Fewer than 
one quarter of the interviewees suggested that “even if life is good here,” they “will never 
feel at home” in Madrid (Gina, 33).259 The remainder shared how “with time things 
change and [they] almost don’t feel any difference between [the Spanish] and us” (Rita, 
43). They learned the language, acquired a house or a car, and are even being mistaken 
for natives on the street. As children are immersed into the Spanish educational system 
and family and friends relocate to Madrid, Bulgarians report that “now everything is here 
… not in Bulgaria” and they even “feel a little weird” returning to Bulgaria for a short 
visit (Chris, 34; Izzy, 40).260 This last sub-category of the individual status indicator 
receives a relatively high value of 4 (Table IV.1). 
                                                          
256 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Не минава вечер без да гледам снимки от 
България. И да плача е малко, иде ми да вия от болка за България.” 
257 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Емигранти, винаги сме си емигранти” 
(Connor, 44), “Като дърво без корен си” (Trini, 31). 
258 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз съм част от испанското общество.” 
259 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Дори животът тука да е добре … не мога да 
се почувствам като у дома си, колкото и да се опитвам, трудно ми е.” 
260 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Всичко е тука. В България- не” (Izzy, 40), 
“Като се прибера в България ми е малко странно” (Chris, 34). 
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 To conclude, despite conflicted feelings about life in Madrid and in contrast with 
the perceptions of their Spanish hosts, Bulgarians belong in the host city. The East 
Europeans identify exclusively as Bulgarian and suffer from intense nostalgia for the 
motherland. They arrived in Spain with short-term plans and continue to form their 
strongest relationships with other Bulgarians. The larger national community is viewed as 
isolated and fragmented. However, as they are joined by their family and friends, 
consider the Spanish a warm society with a similar temperament, and want to provide the 
next generation with stability and opportunity, the immigrants continuously extend their 
stay in Madrid. Disappointment with a corrupt and impoverished homeland and a 
superior standard of life in the receiving context lead them to set down roots in Spain. 
Disgust with compatriots abroad who abuse the larger ethnic community combined with 
perceptions of warm welcome by the native population forces Bulgarians to look for 
connections beyond the Bulgarian diaspora in Madrid. Perceptions of personal 
integration, relative favorable evaluations of group status evaluation, and positive 
migration trajectories lead Bulgarians to call Madrid their home (Table IV.1).  
 
IV.6. Conclusion  
Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are 
received very differently by employers, politicians, and the general public in their new 
homes. They also exhibit very different and often conflicted perceptions of belonging or 
isolation in the two receiving cities. A discussion of migration trajectories, perceptions of 
community welcome and integration, and evaluation of individual ability to fit in traces 
levels of belonging and isolation for the four populations.  
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While they consider themselves relatively welcome in the city, Polish workers in 
Dublin find themselves profoundly different from their hosts, deem their stay in Dublin 
temporary, communicate mostly with their compatriots, and plan to return to their true 
home – Poland. Nigerian immigrants came to Ireland in view of historical, linguistic, and 
cultural connections with the intention to settle. However, they do not consider their 
larger community in Dublin welcome or integrated and feel “stuck” in a hostile city in 
which they have nothing in common with the local population. Ecuadorians came to 
Madrid due to the ease of the socio-cultural transition with migration and the similar 
economic structure in Spain. As they consider Madrid an extension of the motherland, 
they plan a better future for their family in the host city. Even return migration to 
Ecuador is not permanent but often turns cyclical with individual and group investment in 
both the home and receiving contexts. Bulgarians arrived in Spain in view of social 
networks, economic opportunity, and their common temperament with Spaniards. While 
the majority of respondents desire to return to Bulgaria in the long-term, the East 
Europeans are settling in Spain in practice. As Bulgarians are disappointed in their 
homeland, they embrace the organized and happy lifestyle in the receiving city, set down 
roots and create families, and accept Madrid as their second home (Table IV.1).  
The cultural categories established in Dublin’s and Madrid’s public discourse 
underlie the immigrants’ perceptions of belonging as well. Poles’ national pride and 
embeddedness in inward-looking ethnic networks prevent the East Europeans from 
investing in life in Dublin. Racial and cultural differences detract from Nigerians’ ability 
and willingness to belong in Ireland. Socio-cultural and linguistic ties draw in 
Ecuadorians into Madrid’s landscape. Ethnic and historical affinity with Madrilenians 
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undermine strong national belonging to produce rising levels of belonging among 
Bulgarians in Madrid. Satisfaction with life in Dublin due to economic opportunity is 
secondary to the effects of racial discrimination or immutable cultural identity. Perceived 
welcome in Madrid is partly based on work ethic, yet characteristics like language, 
history, culture, or similar disposition emerge are paramount in constructing 
understanding of welcome or rejection. Significantly, group identification and 
experiences are always established in opposition to those of other ethnic cohorts in the 
two receiving spaces. Both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Spain, for example, cite the 
other collective’s dissimilarity with the Spanish to cement their own belonging in 
Madrid. Nigerians’ disagreement with the myth of Poles’ belonging in Dublin intensifies 
their own indignation with an exclusionary receiving environment.  
The immigrants’ perceptions of welcome or rejection intersect with the dynamics 
of inclusion and exclusion shaped by the host society to produce distinct political, 
economic, and socio-cultural integration outcomes. As Ecuadorians are welcomed and 
belong, they are positioned to settle and enjoy a number of rights in Madrid. They are 
hypothesized to represent what his dissertation calls organic integration and occupy the 
upper left quadrant of Table IV.10. Since they are both isolated and rejected from 
Dublin, Nigerians are least likely to be incorporated in the host context. They experience 
blocked integration in the city and fall in the lower right quadrant of Table IV.10. 
Because their own perceptions of isolation are counteracted by a discourse of inclusion in 
the receiving locality, Poles are drawn into life in the receiving context. They undergo 
reluctant integration in Dublin and place in the lower left corner of Table IV.10.  
Bulgarians represent the third best integration outcome, or conflicted integration, and fit 
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in the upper right quadrant of Table IV.10. Their affinity with Madrid undermines a 
discourse of exclusion in the host city.  
 
















This dissertation turns to an elaboration of the immigrants’ incorporation 
outcomes next. In particular, Chapter V outlines the acquisition and exercise of political 
rights for the four immigrant groups. Chapter VI traces the economic situation and 
incorporation results for the foreign collectives. Chapter VII details the social integration 
of the four populations. The aim is to survey how the intersection of discourses of 
inclusion and exclusion on the one hand and belonging-isolation on the other translate 




























































“COUNT US IN”261:  
POLITICAL INCORPORATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID 
 
V.1. Introduction 
Why do integration outcomes vary in similar new Western European immigration 
spaces? The argument is that incorporation outcomes are contingent on both political and 
discursive openness in the receiving context and foreign populations’ willingness to 
employ opportunities and combat closures. Reception and integration patterns, moreover, 
are firmly grounded in identity politics and cultural dynamics. Immigrants considered 
similar to local stakeholders in socio-cultural terms benefit from favorable policies, 
integration funds, or the attention of benevolent political actors. Foreign populations 
perceived as different from natives are targeted by harsh actors of control and see their 
political rights undermined rather than enhanced. What is more, immigrant cohorts who 
perceive themselves to belong in their host cities are more likely to fight for political 
inclusion. They naturalize in high numbers, vote and run in elections, and participate in 
native and ethnic organizations. On the other hand, foreign workers who do not fit it have 
little stake in the receiving community. They are apathetic subjects who do little to 
protest unfavorable policies or exclusion from the political process.  
Chapter V develops the argument by surveying the political incorporation of 
Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. Chapters VI 
and VII turn to the four groups’ economic and social integration patterns respectively. 
                                                          
261 Count Us In is a program instituted by the Immigrant Council of Ireland in 2011 to raise awareness 
among naturalized citizens of their right to vote in general elections (ICI, 2011; Mutwarasibo, 2011). 
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The discussion of incorporation begins with political integration, since it underlies, 
delimits, and defines the economic and social rights of immigrants in the receiving 
context. Political incorporation is conceived as a bi-furcated concept including two 
elements. On the one hand, political integration is defined as a set of legal, 
administrative, and policy principles by the receiving city. These are employed to assign 
immigrant groups and individuals to particular legal statuses, each affected by specific 
immigration, employment and social policies and carrying a set of political, economic, 
and social rights. Consequently, the political integration of the relevant populations is 
operationalized through the legal status held by members of the four cohorts, as well as 
through legal and policy developments and the direction they have taken over time.  
Political integration is also dependent on the immigrants’ active exercise of the 
entitlements outlined in legal and policy instruments. This dualistic approach of 
considering how the reception framework interacts with what immigrants do with it 
echoes the general approach of the dissertation. There are several components to 
immigrants’ active political participation. Naturalization is the quickest route to a fuller 
set of rights for the newcomers. Running for office is the activity that confers most power 
to ethnic candidates, yet also is the hardest to achieve and might not produce clear 
benefits for the candidates’ national group. Voting, especially in local elections, 
influences access to social, cultural, economic, and political resources for foreign 
communities. Participating in labor unions enhances knowledge and exercise of 
economic rights and is open to all immigrants residing in Dublin and Madrid. The 
establishment of and participation in ethnic organizations is a final aspect of active 
political participation. All of these components of political participation not only enhance 
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resources for ethnic societies but also signal these societies’ intent to settle in the host 
country. According to one report, “inclusive politics” are these that “the willingness of 
immigrants and members of ethnic minorities to actively get involved in local and 
national politics” (Fanning, Mutwarasibo, & Chadamoyo, 2003).  
 

















The four case studies of this dissertation conform to the main argument, despite 
Nigerians’ higher than predicted levels of political mobilization. Since Ecuadorians in 
Madrid are both included and perceive themselves to belong in their new home, they 
enjoy a number of local political opportunities and take advantage of them. They 
experience organic integration in Madrid’s political sphere (Table V.1). Ecuadorians are 
not disadvantaged despite their non-EU citizenship. As legal status is fluid in the Spanish 
case, even the Latin Americans who had at one time been temporary or irregular workers 

























































Moreover, the South American workers are privileged by national and local policy 
initiatives and campaigns. They are the beneficiaries of an expedited naturalization 
process, as well as bilateral agreements that assure their ability to vote in local elections, 
their access to the municipal labor market, and a fast-track path to stable legal status. 
Ecuadorians are the targets of regularization and information campaigns by the major 
trade unions, and secure the lions’ share of local and national integration funds. 
Unsurprisingly, Ecuadorians naturalize in large numbers, have some of the highest rates 
of electoral participation and trade unionism, and found the largest number of civic 
associations in Madrid (Table V.2). 
 
Table V.2. Political Incorporation Index262 
 
 
                                                          
262 Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Outcomes that reflect lack of political access are 
assigned a value of 1. High levels of incorporation are given a value of 5. Outcomes that fall in the middle 
are assigned a 3. The values from every column are added to produce an index of political incorporation 
levels for each immigrant group. Many indicators are complex or composite. “Laws and policies” reviews 
all relevant laws and policies concerning each group and the direction of policy over time. “Local electoral 
participation” includes both voting and running in local elections. “Extrapolitical activities” references 
trade unionism and instances of political mobilization outside the regular political process. “Civic activism” 
refers to participation in ethnic and local associations. The Index ranges from 6 to 30. Values between 6 
and 13 reflect low levels of incorporation, 14-22 show intermediate political access and 23-30 correspond 




















































































Poles in Dublin represent what this dissertation calls reluctant integration. They 
are drawn into Dublin’s political process by eager local stakeholders, despite their 
conflicted belonging in the host city (Table V.1). Polish political integration in Ireland is, 
therefore, imperfect but improving. Most Polish immigrants entered Ireland as EU 
citizens, or have regularized their status since 2004, thus acquiring a privileged legal 
status. Developments like the opening of the Irish labor market to new member states in 
2004, the conscious policy to fill labor shortages through migration from within the 
European Economic Area (EEA), and the focusing of integration resources on EU 
immigrants since 2008, further enhanced the legal-political position of this community. 
Polish political participation and unionization are on the rise due to direct recruitment by 
local parties and trade unions. Poles set up ethnic organizations in the receiving context, 
which hold potential for mobilization despite their inward-facing nature (Table V.2). 
Bulgarians find themselves to belong in Madrid, yet are met with indifference and 
suspicion by local stakeholders. They experience conflicted integration in the city (Table 
V.1). The legal status of EU national curiously does not translate into added protections 
or integration funds for Bulgarians in Spain. Bulgarians are allowed to vote in local 
elections, as EU directives dictate. However, Spain imposed transitional agreements on 
Bulgarians in 2007 and reinstated them with crisis in 2010. Moreover, the East Europeans 
are subject to restrictive naturalization requirements, and are rarely the targets of 
employment drives or integration campaigns.  The Balkan migrants exhibit limited active 
political participation as well, with low naturalization, voting, and trade unionism rates. 
Nonetheless, Bulgarians are civically active and engage in a disproportionately large 
213 
 
number of ethnic associations in Madrid focused on both their national community and 
its insertion into the larger society (Table V.2).  
 Finally, Nigerians experience blocked integration, since their own discourse of 
isolation reinforces exclusion by local stakeholders (Table V.1). Nigerians are highly 
disadvantaged in terms of passive political participation. Their legal status as asylum 
seekers, foreign students, or undocumented migrants warrants few rights and 
entitlements. Recent policy developments, such as the 2004 Referendum amending the 
jus soli principle of citizenship, the 2009 closure of certain professions to work permits, 
and the 2010 Immigration Bill’s summary deportation procedures, further disadvantage 
this group. Surprisingly, Nigerians are relatively politically active. They naturalize and 
vote in higher numbers than their Polish counterparts. The African migrants have set up 
some ethnic organizations and are led by a strong if small cadre of activists focused 
primarily on the specific problems of the community (Table V.2). 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section traces the constellation of legal 
categories in Ireland and Spain and places the four cohorts within it. The following 
section discusses relevant legislation and policy.  Next, the chapter summarizes active 
political participation patterns. Naturalization rates, running and voting in local elections, 
trade union membership and other political activism, as well as community mobilization 
are considered. Each section discusses Poles, Nigerians, Ecuadorians, and Bulgarians in 
turn. The findings are based on analysis of policies and laws, governmental and non-
governmental reports, statistical data, secondary studies, as well as interviews with 
relevant ethnic representatives and local stakeholders.263  
                                                          
263 To survey the active political participation of Poles and Nigerians in Ireland, the thesis focused on the 
2004 and 2009 local elections in Dublin. Data sources include Irish immigration and asylum legislation; a 
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V.2. Legal Status 
V.2.1. Legal Status in Ireland  
 Like most Western European countries, Ireland assigns foreigners to different 
legal categories. Foreign nationals can arrive as European Union citizens, foreign 
workers, or their spouses.  They can also be classified as students, asylum seekers, 
tourists, or undocumented migrants. These official labels influence the reception of each 
group within the receiving society. Legal status determines which laws and policies affect 
the immigrants and what social, economic and political resources are available to them. 
However, reception and incorporation patterns also occur in spite of the immigrants’ 
official status. As this and the following section demonstrate, local stakeholders interpret 
legal classifications creatively in order to justify foreign populations’ welcome or 
rejection. The local implementation of laws and policies follows the logic of identity 
politics to exclude even foreign cohorts holding a privileged legal status, while including 
immigrant workers disadvantaged by their legal classification. The very construction of 
legal categories includes considerations of cultural proximity and distance. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
series of reports by the Economic and Social Research Institute (McGinnity et al., 2011; O’Connell & 
Joyce, 2009; Quinn, 2010); a survey by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI, 2008); data and reports by 
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation (DETI) and the Department of Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform;  figures by the Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) and the Office of the Refugee 
Applications Commissioner (ORAC); a study of ethnic candidates by Fanning and O’Boyle (2010); 
volumes by Fanning (2011) and Lentin and Moreo (2012); reports by the Africa Centre; a 2009 editorial 
series by the ethnic newspaper Metro Eireann; data by the Irish statistical office; as well as this researcher’s 
interviews with immigrant representatives in ethnic associations and local political and administrative 
actors. In the case of Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, the focus is on the local elections of 2007 and 
2011. Data sources comprise Spanish migration legislation; a series of reports by the Ministry of Labor and 
Migration (MTIN) and the Madrid Autonomous Community; exposes on legal status in Spain by the 
European Migration Network [EMN] (2011) and Rodríguez-Ferrand (2013); scholarly reports on 
immigrant political rights by Bertoli et al. (2010), Juberías and Alonso (2008), Mateos and Durand (2012), 
Muñoz (2009), Pérez-Nievas, Vintila, Morales, and Paradés (2014), and Zapata-Barrero and Zaragoza 
(2009); studies on integration campaigns by Arango (2012), the European Commission (Bertozi, 2010), and 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX); information on immigrant unionism and civic activism by 
Meardi, Martín and Riera (2012) and Gómez and Cubillo (2010);  and as well as relevant interviews with 




Table V.3. Certificates of Registration Types, Ireland 
 
Stamp Category 
1 Non-EU nationals with employment or business permit 
1A Non-EU nationals in full time training (no other employment permitted) 
2 Non-EU national students (limitations to work permission) 
2A Non-EU national students (not permitted to work) 
3 Non-EU nationals not permitted to work 
4 People permitted to work without a permit, incl. non-EU nationals,  
spouses of Irish/EU nationals, parents to Irish-born child (ICB),  
leave to remain, refugees, non-EU intra-company transfers, temporary  
doctors, non-EU nationals with work visas 
4 EU FAM Non-EU national family member to EU citizen (no permit required to 
work) 
5 Non-EU nationals in Ireland for eight years and permitted to remain  
without time conditions (no permit required to work) 
6 Irish national with dual citizenship 
 
Source: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (amended from O’Connell & Joyce, 
2009, p. 10). 
 
 There are several migrant classifications in Ireland.264 EU immigrants benefit 
from the most entitlements and are guided by European Union directives rather than 
national or local policy. They can reside in Ireland freely if they are self-sufficient, 
employed, or self-employed. On the other hand, non-EU nationals must register with the 
Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) and receive an immigration stamp denoting 
their status (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009) (Table V.3).  
Labor migrants possess the strongest entitlements apart from EU citizens. After an 
overhaul of the system in 2007, high-skilled workers are issued a green card entitling 
them to enter Ireland without a market test, change employers and occupations, reunite 
with families immediately, and renew their permit indefinitely only after two years. This 
legal category is the closest proxy for long-term residency in Ireland (Employment 
Permit Act, 2006; ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19). On the other hand, 
low-skilled workers, given work permits or work visas, are entitled to fewer rights. They 
                                                          
264 For a detailed description of legal categories in Ireland, consult Appendix C.  
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depend on specific employers for stable legal status. Their job offer is contingent on a 
market test and the impossibility to fill the position with workers from Ireland or the EU. 
Family reunification rights are limited or delayed and permit renewals are short-term. 
With economic downturn in 2007, multiple occupations were in fact closed to work 
permits (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation [DETI], 2010) (Table V.3).  
Foreign students receive a Stamp 2 certification in Ireland and have fewer rights 
than immigrant workers (Table V.3). They must be enrolled in full-time study to 
maintain their status, have limited work permission, carry no family reunification 
privileges, and cannot apply the time spent in Ireland toward naturalization requirements. 
A two-tier system introduced in 2009 excludes students engaged in language study from 
immigration entitlements (McGinnity et al., 2011, p.10; Quinn, 2010, p. 30).  
While recognized refugees have similar rights to those of Irish and European 
citizens, asylum seekers are entitled to few protections (ICI, 2008; McGinnity et al., 
2011, p. 12; RIA, 2010). If their application is refused by the Office of the Refugee 
Applications Commissioner (ORAC) or the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT), they 
depend on the discretion of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to grant 
them subsidiary protection or Leave to Remain (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). While 
awaiting determination, asylum seekers fall outside the scope of integration policy. They 
are dispersed to lower-income or small homogenous communities. Applicants are not 
allowed to work and are housed in direct provision facilities, where they are provided 
meals and a weekly allowance of €19.10 per adult and €9.52 per child (McGinnity et al., 
2011, p. 12). Relatedly, parents of children born in Ireland prior to 2005 are given 
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discretionary permission to stay similar to the Leave to Remain and live in Ireland with 
few and unstable rights (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71) (Table V.3).  
Finally, undocumented migrants are not entitled to social or political resources 
and are subject to deportation. Still, a temporary scheme introduced in 2009 grants those 
who became undocumented through no fault of their own four months to secure an 
employment permit. Unfortunately, the scheme is not permanent, leaving undocumented 
immigrants in a precarious situation (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 
11-12).  
 














EU citizen 1 67 EU citizen 2 94 
Work permit  5 15 Work permit/visa  6 1 






2 3 Leave to remain 34 0 





72 2 Student visa 5 0 
Tourist visa 1 4 Asylum seeker 15 0 
Undocument
ed 
4 1 Undocumented 1 0 
Unanswered 8 4 Other/Unanswered 33 4 
 
Source: Table modified from Tables 2.7 and 2.8 by the ICI (2008, pp. 67-68). 
 
These legal designations are accompanied by different entitlements and are 
guided by different legal and administrative measures. Since most Polish immigrants 
arrived in Ireland as European Union citizens or work permit holders, they enjoy a 
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multitude of legal-political rights in the receiving country. In a 2008 study by the 
Immigrant Council of Ireland, two thirds of Eastern European participants arrived in 
Ireland as EU nationals, and another 15% were work permit holders. At the time of the 
report, 94% self-identified as EU citizens (Table V.4). The ICI respondents are thus 
entitled to unrestricted access to living and working in Ireland and cannot be deported 
(ICI, 2008, pp. 67-68). The situation of this project’s interviewees is similar, with only 
15% requiring authorization. Of those 15%, 5% entered Ireland on the basis of a work 
permit, 5% arrived on a tourist visa and acquired a work permit, and the remaining 5% 
came as spouses of Irish nationals or work permit holders. The remaining 85% arrived as 
EU nationals in the first place. All regularized their status after 2004. As one participant 
shares, “before 2004, there were some people here but they were illegal and were afraid 
of the Garda as they could be deported. And employers were even worse. So the EU 
helped because we could work and be legal” (Kevin, 27). Native stakeholders’ perception 
of Poles’ legality is even more significant. According to one respondent, “[the Polish] 
had the right to be here … to work, to access the Irish system, be it employment or 
education … and were able to enforce those rights” (D26-ADMIN).  
On the other hand, a majority of Nigerian immigrants entered Ireland as asylum 
seekers, students or undocumented workers, thus occupying the least privileged legal 
categories. Nigeria was the top country in terms of asylum applications to Ireland until 
2011, providing for one third of all application in 2001-2005, one fourth of all 
applications in 2006-2008, and one fifth of applications in 2009-2010 (ORAC, 2002-
2012) (Table V.5). According to the Reception and Integration Authority, there were 
6,725 persons living in direct provision in Ireland in 2004. Of those, almost 2,000 were of 
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Nigerian nationality, and so were the majority of the 1,280 Irish-born children included in 
this number (RIA, 2005). The ICI confirms these numbers, even though many of the 
ICI’s respondents have been granted leave to remain since they first came to Dublin 
(Table V.4). More than seven in ten of the ICI’s participants arrived in Ireland as asylum 
seekers. However, only 15% remain in the asylum system.  
 
Table V.5. Asylum Applications by Nigerian Nationals in Ireland, 2001-2011 
 





Applications (% of total) 
2001 10,325 3,461 33.5% 
2002 11,634 4,050 34.8% 
2003 7,900 3,110 39.4% 
2004 4,766 1,776 37.3% 
2005 4,323 1,278 29.6% 
2006 4,314 1,038 24.1% 
2007 3,985 1,028 25.8% 
2008 3,866 1,009 26.1% 
2009 2,689 569 21.2% 
2010 1,939 387 20.0% 
2011 1,290 182 14.1% 
 
Source: ORAC, 2002-2012. 
 
Fewer of the Nigerian interviewees in this dissertation passed through the Irish 
asylum system. A majority of the respondents (40%) entered the receiving country as 
students. One fifth came through the asylum system and another 20% arrived as labor 
migrants. An additional 10% came as undocumented migrants. Currently, half of the 
participants have permission to reside and work in Ireland, 10% are “stuck” in the asylum 
system, 20% are in Ireland as dependents, and 10% remain undocumented.  
To conclude, most Polish immigrants in Dublin hold a legal status that endows 
them with political entitlements similar to those of Irish citizens. As EU citizens, the 
Polish are subject to liberal European directives rather than restrictive national policy. In 
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comparison to their Polish counterparts, Nigerian immigrants appear disadvantaged, since 
at one time they occupied the migrant designations associated with the fewest rights. A 
closer inspection reveals that differences in legal status between the two groups are 
exaggerated. On the one hand, Polish nationals arriving in Ireland prior to 2004 were 
often undocumented, like their Nigerian counterparts. On the other hand, Nigerians in 
Dublin today should have rights similar to these of Polish EU citizens, since they are 
most commonly recognized refugees or long-term work permit holders.  
However, subjective interpretation of legal categories serves to widen the gap 
between Poles and Nigerians in Dublin once again. Irish political actors argue that 
Nigerians are mostly asylum seekers and thus have “the greatest difficulty” in integrating 
(D2-TU). There is a clear hierarchy among ethnic groups according to expert 
respondents, with Polish citizens placing towards the top as settled EU nationals with a 
multitude of entitlements and Nigerian citizens placing towards the bottom as 
undocumented migrants or asylum seekers who are vulnerable in all spheres of life in 
Dublin (D27-TU). While the Polish are recognized to have “the right to work,” Nigerians 
are believed to have a very different entry route (D26-ADMIN). In view of the subjective 
interpretation of legal status, Poles are assigned the highest value for this indicator of 
political incorporation, while the Nigerian group is given a lower value of 2 (Table V.2).  
The very creation of legal categories is driven by identity politics, moreover. The 
status of a parent of an Irish-born child was created specifically with Nigerians in mind 
and was endowed with limited and unstable rights. Exclusion and inclusion often occur 
regardless of legal status or through the reinterpretation of legal categories to fit 
perceived identity characteristics.  
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V.2.2. Legal Status in Spain  
Considerations of identity are written into the Spanish system of immigrant legal 
status. Spain grants entry and assigns rights to foreigners on the basis of a visa and permit 
system, like Ireland. European citizens, such as Bulgarians, should constitute the only 
category exempt from the limitations of national and local policies, according to EU 
directives. However, citizens from countries with ties to Spain, such as Ecuador, are also 
granted beneficial treatment by Spanish authorities (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). The 
complexity and fluidity of the system allow non-EU immigrants to transition among 
designations and acquire a favorable legal status. They also allow national and local 
authorities to interpret legal status and justify the inclusion of third-country nationals 
considered similar to Spaniards or the exclusion of EU migrants found to be different.  
Despite the complexity of classifying immigrants in Spain, foreigners are placed 
in an array of legal categories, associated with graduated rights, much like in Ireland.265 
EU immigrants are supposed to benefit from the most entitlements and be guided by 
European Union directives rather than national or local policy. They can live in work in 
the host country without a visa or a permit. However, unlike in Ireland, EU nationals 
need to register on the padrón, a list of all the people living in a city or town, and obtain a 
residence certificate, which requires proof of financial means and valid health insurance. 
Much like other foreigners in Spain, EU citizens are entered in the Central Register of 
Foreign Nationals and receive a Foreigner’s Identity Number (NIE) which they must 
carry at all times. EU citizens are also encouraged to register with the General Social 
Security Fund in exchange for tax benefits. These measures effectively move control of 
EU nationals from the supranational to the municipal level (EMN, 2011; Expatica, 2014).  
                                                          
265 For a detailed description of legal status in Spain, consult Appendix C.  
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One more category of persons did not require a visa to Spain, at least until 2003, 
unlike in the case of Ireland. Nationals of countries who have concluded bilateral 
agreements with Spain, such as Ecuador, did not need to obtain a visa to Spain if they 
resided and worked in the country for no longer than three months within a six-month 
period. This visa-free entry permitted Latin Americans’ unregulated admission into the 
fluid Spanish migration system (Jokisch, 2007). 
All other immigrants to Spain need to obtain a visa prior to their entry, in a bid to 
prevent irregular migration. Labor migrants, both low- and high-skilled ones, are at the 
center of the permit regime. They can enter Spain through the general worker regime or 
via the yearly contingents. Immigrants are further attracted to fill jobs for which 
Spaniards are unavailable based on a hard-to-fill occupations catalog within he general 
regime. Occupations on the catalog are mostly medium or low-skilled. They are not 
regulated by market tests on the basis of recommendation by benevolent trade unions 
assessing local economic needs (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración [MTIN], 2009).  
While most European countries afford highly skilled workers a number of 
privileges, Spanish authorities grant rights to foreign workers on the basis of length of 
residence instead (Table V.6).266 Standard work permits (Type B) limit the professions or 
geographic area available to their third-country holders. However, after renewal of the 
permit, all foreign employees are granted more flexibility, culminating in freedom of 
residence and employment in Spain. In effect, all immigrants require a job offer from a 
specific employer prior to their arrival in Spain, yet are entitled to rights similar to these 
                                                          
266 As there are perpetual shortages in the agricultural and service sectors, for instance, low- and middle-
skilled workers enjoy privileged entry and status in the country, unlike in other European migration 




of natives and EU citizens after working in the country for five years (Iabogado, 2015; 
MTIN, 2009). There are few differences between the rights of high- and low-skilled 
workers. The only special privilege is afforded to holders of the special jobseeker visa, 
who are allowed to enter Spain without a job offer and move freely about the country 
while seeking employment. Ministerial Order reserves a number of such visas for the 
sons, daughters and grandchildren of Spaniards in Latin America (EMN, 2011). 
 
 
Table V.6. Work Permit Types, Spain 
 
Type Category 
A Seasonal worker (9-month time limit) 
B Initial permit for 1 year and 2-year renewal  
(geographical, sectorial, job limitations) 
C After Type B renewal  
(valid for any job across Spain) 
D Self-employed initial permit 
 (1-year and renewal for 2 additional year) 
E Long-term (3-year) permit for self-employed, 
 after Type D renewal  
F Shuttle workers (daily return to home country)  
(for 5 years, renewable) 
Permanent Any professional activity in Spain  
(renewed every 5 years, after Type C or Type E) 
Extraordinary Non-EU nationals who have helped Spanish economic and 
cultural progress (renewed every 5 years) 
 
Source: Author from EMN, 2011 and Iabogado, 2015. 
 
 
These coming to Spain for family reunification can join their relatives after one 
year and are assigned the same status as their partners (Table V.6). They are treated as 
potential workers and are granted permanent residence after a shorter period than their 
worker spouses or parents (EMN, 2011). Family members in Spain, therefore, enjoy more 
rights that relatives arriving to other EU immigration states, including Ireland. 
Foreign students are granted fewer rights than EU citizens, labor migrants or 
foreign family members. While EU students do not need a visa for Spain, they still need 
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to register with local authorities. Third-country nationals require proof of their course of 
study and have limited work and family reunification rights (Expatica, 2014).267  
Asylum seekers occupy little space in Spanish public discourse, unlike in Ireland, 
and are guided by European directives. The asylum procedure is expedited, with the 
application decision process supposed to occur with one year. Unsuccessful applicants 
are immediately deported. These awaiting a decision are not subject to direct provision or 
dispersal, but are entitled to work after six months in Spain. Those recognized as refugees 
by the Ministry of the Interior are granted rights similar to the rights of natives and enjoy 
privileged access to Spanish nationality (Ministerio del Interior, 2010). Unlike in the Irish 
case, the category of asylum seekers is treated as a potential worker pool.     
Finally, while combatting irregular migration is an explicit aim of Spanish 
immigration policy, the fluidity of the Spanish permit system confers more privileges 
upon undocumented migrants than does the Irish system (MTIN, 2009). Even the 
undocumented have access to universal healthcare or educational resources locally 
(Hazán, 2014). They are continuously channeled into legal employment through large-
scale regularization drives. Irregular migrants who have been in the country for a two-
year period and have worked for at least six months; these who have ties to Spanish 
residents and have engaged in cultural and social integration programs; as well as the 
parents of Spanish children or children of parents who are Spanish by origin are brought 
into legality based on their integration potential and efforts (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013).  
Based on this system, Ecuadorians are afforded multiple rights and additional 
benefits than other immigrants in Spain. A majority of Ecuadorians came to Spain 
                                                          
267 While family members can visit foreign students during their academic career in Spain, they are not 




through legal channels, with an advance job offer. Even if arriving without employment, 
unlike Bulgarians for instance, the South Americans were entitled to visa-free entry in 
Spain, a period providing ample time to acquire a work contract.  In a study by 
Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012), 90.2% of male and 89.3% of Ecuadorian 
respondents were working in Spain legally in 2007. One tenth arrived in the country with 
a job offer. The remainder employed the visa-free regime for Latin American migrants, 
where 60% became legal work permit holders within a month of their migration. In 
comparison, only 60% of Romanians in the same report were in Spain legally. Among 
Latin American respondents in this study, almost seventy percent migrated to Madrid on 
the basis of a work contract, and are long-term residents or nationality applicants (Table 
V.7). Consequently, Ecuadorians have rights similar to these of the native population and 
EU citizens, where they can initiate family reunification, occupy a multitude of economic 
positions, travel freely, and even vote in local elections. Even the minority of 
Ecuadorians who were at one time irregular in Madrid have quick access to legality, as 
they can apply for residence based on cultural and social ties to the receiving context, a 
privilege fewer Eastern European possess (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). While they are not 
EU citizens, therefore, Ecuadorians in Spain are not disadvantaged by their legal status.   
 Surprisingly, Bulgarians do not occupy an especially privileged legal status in 
Madrid, despite their EU citizenship. All Bulgarians in Spain are currently categorized as 
EU nationals and enjoy rights of free movement, employment, and family reunification. 
However, these privileges are on par with the rights of other long-term residents in the 
country, like Ecuadorians.  What is more, Bulgarians coming to Spain in the 1990s held 
an irregular or temporary worker status in Madrid. According to a 2005 study with 202 
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Bulgarians, 56% of participants resided in Madrid illegally, 7% were working while on a 
tourist visa, and 37% regularized their status through a job offer or the amnesty programs 
of 2001 and 2002 (Markova, 2005). Trends are similar among the interviewees in this 
project. Only one fifth moved to Spain after the removal of all barriers to East European 
labor in 2009. Almost half came to Spain without a contract and worked in the 
underground economy until they could regularize their status. Only 17.5% came through 
formal channels, on the basis of bilateral agreements in anticipation of EU enlargement. 
One respondent arrived as a foreign student, yet subsequently acquired residency status 
as a foreign laborer. The remaining 12.5% gained entry to Spain as family members of 
established Bulgarian migrants, yet also became work permit holders (Table V.7).  
 














EU citizen 0 20 EU citizen 0 100 
Work permit 67 17.5 Work permit  0 0 





11 12.5 Family member 0 0 
Student 0 2.5 Student 0 0 
Asylum 
seeker 
0 0 Asylum seeker 0 0 
Irregular/visa 
overstayer  
22 47.5 Irregular/ 





To conclude, much like in the case of Dublin, local stakeholders in Madrid 
construct and interpret legal status on the basis of identity politics in order to include 
familiar groups and exclude unfamiliar ones. In theory, Bulgarians should occupy the 
most privileged legal category as EU citizens and should enjoy a multitude of unlimited 
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rights. Despite their EU citizenship, however, Bulgarians hold legal standing similar to 
that of third-country Ecuadorians. While they are currently entitled to freedom of work, 
residence, and travel, Bulgarians were much more likely than Ecuadorians to be working 
and residing in the country undocumented prior to 2009. European Union nationality 
does not protect against local measures of control and might actually render the Balkan 
migrants ineligible for incorporation resources. The East Europeans are thus assigned a 
lower value of 4 for this component of political incorporation (Table V.2).  
Since foreign workers are the centerpiece of the Spanish permit and residency 
system, Ecuadorians in Spain are privileged by their legal entry as laborers, and share in 
the rights of European citizens after the acquisition of long-term residence. Even irregular 
entrants have quick access to legality through claims of social and cultural ties to the host 
city. Non-EU status is not a disadvantage but might even serve as a privilege for the 
South Americans, as it entitles them to numerous integration and employment programs 
and benefits. European harmonization does not serve to undermine the Latin Americans’ 
rights in Spain, since there is a similarly strong pull for continued reciprocal privileges 
between Spain and the Iberian-American community. Ecuadorians are also assigned a 4 
for this indicator of political integration (Table V.2).  
 
V.3. Law and Policy 
V.3.1. Law and Policy in Ireland 
Legal status, but more importantly local stakeholders’ interpretation of it, 
translates into different immigration, asylum, and integration laws and policies for Poles 
and Nigerians in Ireland (Table V.8). As Ireland only recently became an immigration 
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country, until the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Aliens Act of 1935 and Aliens Order 
1946, as amended, determined the management of foreign nationals. Ireland also adopted 
European directives on the right of residence after joining the EU in 1973. With increased 
asylum and immigration flows since the 1990s, the legal framework was updated by the 
Refugee Act of 1996 and the Immigration Acts of 1999, 2003 and 2004. Most measures 
prior to EU enlargement in 2004 were aimed at asylum seekers, refugees, and 
undocumented migrants, and implicitly tied to Nigerian immigrants. Provisions since 
2003 mostly address EU nationals and the Polish group.  
 
Table V.8. Immigration, Asylum and Integration Legislature in Ireland  
 
Aliens Act, 1935  
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956, 1986, 1994, 2001 and 2004 
The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989 
Refugee Act (As Amended), 1996  
Employment Equality Act, 1998  
Equal Status Act, 2000  
Employment Permits Act, 2003, 2006 
Equality Act, 2004  
Immigration Act, 1999 
Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 
Immigration Act, 2003 
Immigration Act, 2004  
EU Accession Treaty, 2004 
Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 2008 
(Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2010) (Still under Debate)  
 
Source: Reproduced from McGinnity et al., 2011. 
 
Current laws and policies only moved the immigration framework forward in an 
ad hoc and reactive approach by responding to specific problems after they arose. The 
system is yet to be modernized and codified. Therefore, policy is administrative and 
discretionary rather than based in legislature. It is less influenced by European Union 
prerogatives than by principles of the Common Travel Area with the UK (McGinnity et 
al., 2011).  
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V.3.1.1. Laws, Policies, and the Polish Worker 
 The Polish in Dublin are guided primarily by European Commission directives. 
Those in Ireland prior to 2004 were initially subject to Irish labor laws and required work 
permits, yet currently enjoy relatively unrestricted rights of residence, work, and 
movement. As a result, policy, rather than legislature, affects Polish migrants in Ireland. 
Irish policies, including the implementation of EU enlargement, the filling of labor 
shortages, or the construction of integration programs, benefit the Polish, with only a few 
exceptions. Polish immigrants in Dublin, moreover, interact with benevolent national and 
local institutions, like the Office for the Minister of Integration, rather than the harsh 
agents of control faced by Nigerians. The focus in managing the East Europeans is placed 
on language acquisition, social rights, and integration. 
 There are several turning points concerning Polish immigrants in Dublin (Figure 
V.1). Ireland, together only with the UK and Sweden, opened its doors to citizens of the 
EU acceding member states in 2004 (Fanning, 2011, p. 16). It codified into national law 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act in 2003 to allow for the arrival of Eastern 
European immigrants (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 16). Consequently, nationals of the 
EU10 countries are admitted “without restriction” to reside and work in Ireland (Quinn, 
2010, p. 12). Polish workers are regulated by the EU’s Statement on Principles of 
Integration and Equality Principles, much like British citizens in Ireland (D29-ADMIN). 
They are no longer constrained by harsh domestic regulations and are guaranteed strong 
political, economic, and social rights. Irish politicians, Polish individuals, and ethnic 
organizations consider the removal of all boundaries, which was not replicated in the case 
of Bulgarian and Romanian workers, a major advantage (D26-ADMIN; D29-ADMIN; 
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D34-PO; D35-P; D38-PO).268 Irish stakeholders interpret the open access as a “conscious 
policy” to welcome a highly-qualified pool of European labor to fill low- and high-skilled 
labor shortages in the country. The policy choice is also deemed a political calculation. 
By supporting the widening of the European Union, the Irish could act as “good 
Europeans” and overcome the “embarrassment” of rejecting the Nice Treaty (D16-
ADMIN; D26-ADMIN; D29-ADMIN). Welcoming the Polish is therefore a step to 
reassert Ireland’s European identity.  
 

























                                                          
268 After unprecedented levels of immigration, as well as with economic contraction, Ireland chose to 
impose a work permit on citizens from Bulgaria and Romania after 2007, and thus maintain agreement with 
UK policy and the coherence of the Common Travel Area (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 9; Quinn, 2010, p. 
14). 
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A second major turning point, and one intimately related to the implementation of 
EU enlargement in Ireland, is to frame Ireland as a country of controlled labor migration 
(Figure V.1). This framing is interpreted to warrant “reducing asylum and refugee 
claims,” while encouraging economic migration from the new European member states 
(D26-ADMIN). Dublin’s administrative actors admit refusing asylum claims at a higher 
rate than in the past, while diverting immigration and integration resources to labor 
migrants (D29-ADMIN). Certain professions have been closed to third-country nationals 
and employers “[have been] mandated by the government through the employment test to 
select Irish first, EU next, Romanian and Bulgarian workers next, and only after third-
country nationals” (D21-ADMIN). Thus, Polish and other EU10 nationals are 
consciously chosen to provide for labor shortages in Ireland and are actively recruited 
through job fairs in their home countries. 
 Several legislative and policy developments underlie the emphasis on controllable 
labor mobility from within the enlarged Europe. The Employment Permits Act 2003 
placed work permits on a statutory basis for the first time, and introduced penalties for 
non-compliance for employers and employees. The Act ensured that labor shortages are 
filled through migrants from the new member states who no longer require authorization 
by increasing the opportunity costs of hiring third-country nationals (O’Connell & Joyce, 
2009, p. 45; Quinn, 2010, p.17). What is more, Ireland did not institute any measures of 
cooperation on labor migration with third countries or guidelines for the recognition of 
the qualifications of third-country nationals. However, the International Employment 
Unit of the Irish Training and Employment Agency (Foras Áiseanna Saothair or FÁS), 
together with large private employers like Intel, organized a number of job fairs for 
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lower-skilled services in Eastern Europe (D29-ADMIN; Quinn, 2010, pp. 61-62). 
Agencies and employers looked for workers for the construction, hospitality, and IT 
industries in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania in particular (D17-ADMIN). Government-led 
initiatives trickled down to local employers who conducted their own recruitment fairs 
fashioned after the national ones (D27-TU).  
Policy reports by the Irish National and Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
and the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (EGFSN) to the Department of Trade, 
Enterprise, and Innovation underpin Ireland’s labor strategy. In Managing Migration in 
Ireland: A Social and Economic Perspective (2006), the NESC argued that with foreign 
investment, a better domestic situation and expansion of the labor force, managed 
immigration was necessary to sustain economic growth and boost the competitiveness of 
the Irish economy. Single East European laborers would increase flexibility in service 
sectors like hotels or catering and reduce prices for Irish consumers (Fanning, 2011, pp. 
25-26; National Economic and Social Council [NESC], 2006). However, the 
complementary report Skills Needs in the Irish Economy: The Role of Migration (2005) 
posited that the focus should be on educating the native population and attracting Irish 
returnees. Filling labor shortages through third-country nationals was rejected as it would 
lead to a spiral of mobility. The 2007 National Skills Strategy suggested that migration 
had a limited role in rendering Ireland a modern, knowledge-based economy. However, 
the report identified managed mobility from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, and the UK as a source of educated labor to fill high- and low-skilled 
shortages. On the other hand, third-country nationals would account only for highly 
qualified positions still unfilled by European migrants. Their migration would be curbed 
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through the limiting of work permits to specific economic sectors and professions (Expert 
Group on Future Skills Needs [EGFSN], 2005, 2007). These recommendations were 
codified in the Employment Permits Act 2006 and the National Reform Program 2008-
2010 (Department of the Taoiseach, 2009). 
A third turning point is the development of integration efforts to address the mass 
migration of Eastern Europeans to Ireland (Figure V.1). There were few integration 
initiatives in Ireland prior to European Union enlargement in 2004. After the arrival of a 
large number of Eastern European citizens with expansion, however, the Office of the 
Minister for Integration (OMI) was established in 2007 to develop integration policy for 
all legally-resident immigrants in Ireland. Irish administrators and Office representatives 
recognize the OMI as a direct response to the large-scale influx of Polish workers. As the 
Ministry transformed from a unit under the Department of Justice to its own institution in 
2008, Irish representatives suggest a conscious move from control towards inclusion. The 
current Ministry is considered much “kinder” than its predecessor (D29-ADMIN). 
The OMI’s activities focus largely on the Polish community and overlook other 
immigrant groups in Dublin. In fact, protection applicants fall outside the scope of 
integration policy. The OMI’s first report Migration Nation (2008) calls for partnership 
between government and non-government organizations; linkage between integration 
policy and social inclusion; public policy to avoid the ghettoization of immigrant 
communities; as well as local delivery (Fanning, 2011, p. 38; Office of Minister for 
Integration [OMI], 2008). The document argues for cooperation among all actors, 
including immigrant communities and the receiving society (D29-ADMIN; McGinnity et 
al., 2011, pp. 13-14; Quinn, 2010, p. 37). The OMI also encouraged different 
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governmental departments to develop their own integration strategies, resulting for 
instance in the Intercultural Education Strategy (Department of Education and Skills, 
2010) and the National Intercultural Health Strategy 2007-2012 (Health Services 
Executive [HSE], 2007). The Ministry focuses on combating work exploitation among 
immigrants, and thus targets economic migrants from within the enlarged EU in 
particular (D29-ADMIN; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 13-14). The Office also stresses 
intercultural education, and especially English language provision. Polish immigrants 
take advantage of vocational and language training most frequently (D29-ADMIN; 
Quinn, 2010, pp. 37-38).  
In 2010, the Office set up a Ministerial Council on Integration to establish a direct 
connection between the Minister and immigrant communities, as well as a consultative 
process of policy-making. The Council meets in four regional fora, each including fifteen 
to twenty members from key immigrant populations. It provides for local involvement in 
debating and building integration policy (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 14). The Office 
argues that the Councils were “conceived with the specific immigration make-up of 
Ireland in mind”, namely the predominance of Polish nationals in the country. Therefore, 
meetings focus on English language instruction rather than citizenship or legal status, 
issues significant to the Nigerian community (D29-ADMIN). The large number of Polish 
members at the Dublin regional board gives voice to the Polish community (D33-PO). 
Despite these favorable developments, there have been reversals in Poles’ rights 
in Dublin. Most notably, while Ireland opened its borders to nationals from the new EU 
members, it did introduce some restrictions to their migration in fear of labor market 
inundation. Particularly, the Social Welfare Act 2004 created the Habitual Residency 
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Condition (HRC) that restricts EU and non-EU migrants’ access to social assistance and 
child benefits (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 45). Benefits are withheld for the first two 
years of residence in Ireland or if the applicant has no significant ties to the receiving 
country (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 9). Polish organizations deemed the law a legal way 
of circumventing European “soft law” and the rights inherent in European citizenship 
(D35-PO). Since assessing eligibility for social assistance is discretionary, changing 
attitudes and economic climate can impair social welfare decisions and undermine Poles’ 
social inclusion in Dublin. Still, redress mechanisms exist, where organizations like 
Crosscare are recognized as legitimate actors to appeal negative decisions on behalf of 
their Polish clients (D36-PO).   
In sum, political, legislative, and administrative changes have enhanced the 
political rights of the Polish community in Dublin, even after economic downturn. Ireland 
was one of only three countries to open its doors to citizens from the new EU member 
states. National and local policy directives designated Polish economic migrants as the 
main source of filling skilled and unskilled labor shortages in Ireland, provided for the 
active recruitment of Polish workers to Dublin, and created institutions to solidify their 
employment rights. Polish immigrants in Dublin are the primary beneficiaries of the 
recent emphasis on integration in Dublin, as they avail of the OMI’s language and 
educational resources and dominate the Ministerial Councils. The Polish community 
interacts mostly with actors dedicated to their incorporation in Irish society, namely the 
OMI, FÁS, and a slew of Polish advocacy and service organizations, rather than the harsh 
agents of control in charge of the Nigerian community. Therefore, Polish workers are 
assigned a high value for this indicator of political integration (Table V.2).  
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V.3.1.2. Laws, Policies, and the Nigerian Immigrant  
On the other hand, Nigerians’ rights are undermined by legislative and policy 
changes in Ireland, often to the benefit of Polish immigrants. Asylum law in Ireland is 
arbitrary and discretionary, putting many Nigerian immigrants in a precarious position. 
The change in citizenship laws in 2004 not only deprived Irish-born Nigerian children of 
Irish nationality but also undermined the rights of their parents. Reforms in immigration 
law restrict the entry and entitlements of the African group. Changes in Ireland’s labor 
policy closed multiple professions to third-country nationals, in order to encourage 
migration only from within the European Union. Integration policy fails to address the 
specific needs of Nigerian immigrants in Ireland. The Africans fall under the jurisdiction 
of harsh Irish institutions focused on undermining their rights (D42-NO; Taylor, 30).  
Several legal and policy developments circumscribe the political rights of 
Nigerians in Dublin (Figure V.1). The very construction of asylum legislature and policy 
aims at restricting Nigerians’ entitlements. As unfamiliar asylum seekers were the first 
immigrant population to enter homogenous Ireland in the 1990s, they engendered public, 
media and political discourses emphasizing the “bogus refugee” coming to swindle the 
Irish welfare system.269 The 1996 Refugee Act consequently codified asylum application 
procedures with a focus on exclusion and placed relevant asylum institutions like the 
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) under the aegis of the 
control-oriented Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform (Fanning, 2011, p. 44; 
Lentin & Moreo, 2010; O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 19, 44). The Act’s implementation 
                                                          
269 To quote one example, Ivor Callely, Member of Parliament for Fianna Fail, reflected the general 
sentiment when he publicly asserted in 1997 that “rogue” asylum seekers were “carrying on a culture that is 
not akin to Irish culture” and “should be kicked out.” Such widespread populist media and political 
discourse created moral panic in the receiving society with emphasis on “refugee crises,” “swamping,” or 
“flooding” by “a new army of poor” “sponger refugees” (Loyal, 2011, p. 84). 
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in 1997 was particularly heavy-handed, with immigration officers granted expansive 
powers to deny entry and deport asylum-seeking “aliens.” Treatment of asylum seekers 
deteriorated even further in 1999, when prominent politicians declared the asylum issue 
an “administrative crisis” regardless of the low absolute numbers of refugees in 
Ireland.270 The Department of Justice instituted a system of dispersal, where asylum 
seekers were settled away from Dublin into small, homogenous, and unwelcoming 
communities. Such dispersal caused intense racist reactions among the hosts, such as the 
arson of a refugee hostel in Clogheen, County Tipperary, the blocking off of a hotel in 
County Wexford to prevent the relocation of asylum seekers there, or calls to institute 
mandatory AIDS screening for the new arrivals (D1-J; Fanning, 2002, p.105). Direct 
provision complements dispersal, where asylum seekers are provided with full room and 
“a residual income maintenance payment to cover personal requisites” of €19.10 per 
adult and €9.60 per child per week (Moreo, 2012a, pp. 162-163). Direct provision does 
not have a statutory basis and falls beyond the purview of equality legislation (Loyal, 
2011, p. 102).  
The Irish asylum system is even more restrictive since the new millennium. The 
1999 Immigration Act, Illegal Immigrant Trafficking Bill 1999, and the Immigration Act 
2003, for instance, normalized the deportation of unsuccessful asylum seekers, co-opted 
transportation companies in surveilling Irish asylum seekers, and instituted sending 
applicants back to “safe countries of origin” despite persistent danger (Loyal, 2011, p. 83; 
O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 19, 44-45). The government signed bilateral readmission 
agreements with Nigeria, and imposed much narrower definitions of what actually 
                                                          
270 Ireland received the lowest absolute number of asylum applications within the European Union in 2000, 
with only 2.4% of the total (Loyal, 2011, pp. 84-85).  
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constitutes “refugee status” (Loyal, 2011, p. 83). There are regular “deportation flights” 
where unsuccessful Nigerian asylum seekers are transported back to the home country 
without deliberation (D25-J). The acceptance rate for African asylum applicants is 
considered “practically zero” and a “systematic way of rejecting people” by the 
interviewees (D2-NO; D44-NO). While in 1995 the recognition rate for asylum 
applications was as high as 57%, it fell to only 1% in 2010 (the lowest rate within the 
EU). The acceptance rate is particularly low for Nigerian immigrants, with only 0.6% 
granted status in 2004, compared to a 7.3% average cited by the UNHCR (Loyal, 2011, 
pp. 87-88). Since all attempts to codify the asylum system have so far failed, finally, the 
asylum system is arbitrary, particularly in the case of African immigrants (D42-NO; D44-
NO). With administrative discretion, processing times are lengthy, leading to deskilling 
and psychological distress for applicants stuck in the system (D42-NO; Isaac, 36). While 
applications should take no longer than six months to process, many asylum seekers have 
awaited a decision for at least eighteen months with one interviewee awaiting decision 
for seven years (Isaac, 36; Lentin & Moreo, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2011; Smyth, 2010). 
Being placed in direct provision for such extended periods is recognized to lead to loss of 
human capital, growing dependence on social welfare, and deteriorating community 
relations between Nigerians and natives (D1-J; Isaac, 36).  
Second, changing citizenship rules in Ireland impaired the political rights of 
Nigerians in Dublin (Figure V.1). Article 2 of the 1937 Irish Constitution guaranteed a 
jus soli principle of citizenship where any person born on Irish soil was conferred 
citizenship automatically, as were persons born to Irish parents (Loyal, 2011, p. 143). The 
1987 court decision of Fajujonu v. Minister of Justice, moreover, established the 
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entitlement of Irish-born children to live in Ireland with the companionship of their non-
citizen parents (Fanning, 2009, p. 82).  However, in 2003, the Department of Justice, 
Equality, and Law Reform announced that the immigrant parents of Irish-born children 
could no longer obtain residency based on their children’s citizenship. The argument was 
that non-EU asylum seekers traveled to Ireland in large numbers to give birth and obtain 
citizenship for their children and residency for themselves. This policy decision, aimed 
directly at Nigerians, resulted in a series of High Court decisions. Ultimately, the Irish 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of executive discretion in deporting the parents of Irish-
born children denied asylum and even the Irish national children (Fanning, 2011, p. 44).  
The loss of entitlements was consolidated after a Referendum held in 2004 
amended the Constitution to eliminate automatic Irish citizenship by virtue of birth. The 
referendum passed by a staggering 80% to amend citizenship rules to jus sanguinis, 
where children receive Irish citizenship on the basis of their parents’ nationality. The 
referendum was accompanied by a surge of populist politics and an emphasis on the 
distinction between “nationals” and “non-nationals” in public discourse. Most 
commentators suggest that the Amendment was particularly aimed at preventing African 
asylum seekers from acquiring citizenship in Ireland (Fanning, 2011, p. 16). The 
Referendum culminated in the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 which legally 
changed citizenship rules to grant Irish nationality only to Irish-born children whose 
parents are Irish citizens or who have been lawfully present in the country for three of the 
four years preceding the child’s birth (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 20).271 The 
Department of Justice instituted a special administrative scheme (IBC/05) for the parents 
of Irish-born children who have applied for residency prior to the constitutional change, a 
                                                          
271 Temporary residence statuses like student or asylum-seeker status are excluded from that provision.  
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majority of whom Nigerian. While granted a leave to remain in the country, holders of 
the special IBC status were under review in 2010 and had to prove self-sufficiency to 
remain in Ireland (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 20-21). The 2004 Act and Referendum 
further eliminated the expansive definition of social membership contained in Article 
45.1 of the Irish Constitution by placing emphasis on formal citizenship rather than 
denizenship when conferring protection. The Act enabled wider discretion in granting 
citizenship, where a large number of naturalization applications today are refused for 
minor offenses (D42-NO).  
The above changes in asylum and citizenship policy are accompanied by 
administrative and legal immigration proposals that have restricted the rights of third-
country nationals in Ireland through both what they mandated and what they failed to 
accomplish (Figure V.1). Specifically, the 1999 Immigration Act institutionalized the 
practice of deporting undocumented immigrants, most of whom African citizens. The 
2003 and 2004 Immigration Acts created liability for carriers of undocumented migrants 
and granted wider powers to immigration officers to deny entry to all third-country 
nationals (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 19, 44-45). With steady immigration flows to 
Ireland from both within the EU and from the rest of the world, the Irish Government 
conceived of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2007 to codify 
administrative practices into a coherent legislative system. The Bill, and its 2008 and 
2010 successors, has still not passed. Regardless, it undermines Nigerians’ and other non-
EU citizens’ rights. On the one hand, the 2010 Act creates the category of “non-national” 
for the first time in Irish legislature, thus de-normalizing a number of Nigerian 
immigrants in public discourse. As one activist put it, “Before I used to be regarded as a 
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non-immigrant. Now because of this Act I can go into this situation of being 
undocumented” (D44-NO; O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 1, 47-48; McGinnity et al., 
2011, p. 9; Quinn, 2010). On the other hand, failure in passing the Bill perpetuates an 
arbitrary administrative migration system, processing delays, and the absence of a secure 
long-term residency status for Nigerians in Dublin (D21-ADMIN; Isaac, 36).  
The rights of Nigerian and other third-country workers were also undermined as a 
direct consequence of EU enlargement and the strengthening of the rights of Polish 
workers in Ireland (Figure V.1). Specifically, the Employment Permits Act 2006 carried 
some positive consequences for third-country nationals, including Nigerian immigrants, 
by creating a green card category, allowing both employers and employees to apply for 
employment permits, or granting visas directly to employees. However, the Act restricted 
the list of occupations eligible for work permits earning less than €30,000 and therefore 
effectively closed a number of occupations to non-EU nationals. As the employment 
scheme laid in the 2006 Permits Act was introduced as an administrative measure, 
significant discretion mars the system, where the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Innovation can set arbitrary limits to the number of permits within a certain sector 
(O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 45-46; Quinn, 2010, pp. 18, 28-30). Policy instruments 
reinforce the Act, with the report Migration in Ireland: a Social and Economic 
Perspective, for instance, suggesting that with economic downturn, the immigration of 
third-country nationals, including Nigerians, will be controlled through the further 
restriction of visa and permit numbers (Fanning, 2011, p. 25). This is what happened 
when more lower-skilled occupations were closed to work permits in 2009, market tests 
for new permits were extended, processing fees soared and spouses of work permit 
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holders were made ineligible for work permits. Occupations earning between €30,000 
and €59,999, including in healthcare where Nigerians predominate, were also restricted 
for green cards (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 10, 19-20; Quinn, 2010). As a result, new 
work permits issued to third-country nationals declined by 60% between 2007 and 2009, 
and green cards declined by 77% for the same period (DETI, 2010; EGFSN, 2010).  
A final issue with the legal-political rights of Nigerians in Ireland concerns 
integration and anti-discrimination policy (Figure V.1). Ireland is touted as a model 
country in terms of its anti-discrimination legislation. The government codified strong 
anti-discrimination directives in the Employment Equality Acts 1998, 2008 and the Equal 
Status Acts 2000, 2008. It reports periodically to the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination and instituted the National Plan against Racism 2005-2008 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 14-15). However, anti-racism institutions deteriorated with 
economic downturn. The National Action Plan lapsed without replacement in 2009 (D41-
NO). Economic constraints led to the demise of the National Consultative Committee for 
Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), where reporting on racism today is fragmented 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 14-15). Local anti-discrimination initiatives are in danger of 
collapse as well, with non-profit organizations “cut out of the picture” through the 
termination of governmental funds (D41-NO; D43-NO).  
Integration programs also do not fully address the needs of the Nigerian 
community in Dublin, and target European immigrants instead. While the creation of the 
Office of the Minister of Integration was considered a positive step by this project’s 
interviewees, it is also seen as a “work in development” (D42-NO). One NGO 
representatives even called the office “useless” as it does not engage key immigrant 
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groups (D41-NO). The Office of Integration is found to be unsuited to combat racism and 
xenophobic sentiments in Ireland and even fraudulent in its overly optimistic reporting on 
racism. A top-down organization, regardless of the Ministerial Councils, this institution 
did not engage immigrant communities in its initial stages and subsequently only gave 
ethnic representatives limited say in creating integration policy (Taylor, 30). The power 
of the OMI is viewed as particularly limited and its accomplishments “in name only” 
with economic downturn (Isaac, 36). Unfortunately, other integration funds like the 
European Refugee Fund and the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country 
Nationals have also contracted by 15% since 2010 (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 14-15). 
As the Ministerial Councils focus largely on language acquisition and economic 
incorporation, they often overlook issues of political and legal entitlements and racism 
that are most significant to Nigerians in Dublin. Therefore, both integration and anti-
discrimination efforts remain insufficient when it comes to African immigrants in Ireland. 
In all fairness, there have been some positive developments for the political-legal 
rights of the Nigerian community in Ireland. According to representatives of the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation, the Employment Permits Act of 2006 
was “meant to help [all] immigrants” in Dublin (D21-ADMIN). For instance, the Act 
grants permits directly to employees in order to protect them from exploitative employers 
(D21-ADMIN; Quinn, 2010, p. 16). However, non-EU immigrant workers remain limited 
as changing employment is costly and can only occur within specific economic sectors 
(D14-R; D21-ADMIN; D27-TU). Moreover, the Third Level Graduate Scheme (2007) 
allows non-EU third-level students, including Nigerians, to remain in Ireland for six 
months after graduation and find employment. Other changes lead in the opposite 
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direction, however. For instance, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
announced that the children of non-EU students will not be permitted to access state-
funded education. Non-EU nationals entering third-level education in Ireland are denied 
immigration clearance unless they confirm they are not accompanied by their children 
“nor do they intend to have their children join them later” (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 
45-46; Quinn, 2010, pp. 15, 29). The Nigerians in the Irish educational system are 
particularly disadvantaged. 
To conclude, unlike in the case of Poles, policy changes have resulted mostly in 
limitations for Nigerians in Dublin. The asylum system is arbitrary and ever more 
restrictive since the late 1990s. New citizenship laws undermine the rights of Nigerian 
parents of Irish-born children and preclude even those with a simple traffic offense from 
acquiring citizenship. Changes in immigration law restrict the entitlements of Nigerians 
by toughening visa and entry requirements and providing for deportation and summary 
removal of irregular migrants. New labor policy significantly limits the professions 
available to African workers in Dublin. Integration efforts and anti-discrimination 
legislation fall short of addressing the specific needs of Nigerian immigrants in Ireland. 
Third-country students, mostly Africans, are effectively denied family reunification. 
Finally, while Polish workers in Dublin are mostly addressed by benevolent state 
agencies like the Office of the Minister of Integration, the Nigerian community interacts 
with institutions like the Garda or the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. 
Therefore, there is a harsh and even xenophobic security approach to Nigerians’ 
migration to Dublin (D21-ADMIN; Fanning, 2011, p. 38). The African group is assigned 
the lowest value for this indicator of political integration (Table V.2). 
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V.3.2. Law and Policy in Spain 
 Unlike in the Irish case, migration policy varies according to time period rather 
than foreign collective in Spain (Table V.9). Much like its Irish counterpart, Spain 
became an immigration country only in the 1980s. Since it was under dictatorial rule until 
1975, its first legal migration framework was the 1985 Foreigner’s Law (Ley de 
Extranjería) enacted predominantly to satisfy EU accession requirements.272 The law was 
unduly restrictive having in mind the relatively low number of migrants in Spain. It 
plunged many newcomers into irregular status and deprived the local labor market of 
much needed human capital, thus necessitating a number of corrective administrative 
measures and regularization programs. As Spain turned into a multicultural country, the 
direction of policy shifted to incorporation and recognition of migration as a structural 
phenomenon in the host context that is necessary to address labor and demographic 
challenges (Hazán, 2014). The legal framework was updated by the 1996 Amendment to 
the Foreigner’s Law, the 2000 Organic Law (Ley Organica 4/2000) and its 8/2000 
Amendment, as well as the 2000 Plan GRECO. With increasing migration due to EU 
enlargement, considerations of security and public safety with terrorist threats and 
criminal activity, as well as with economic slowdown, legal developments shifted back to 
the rhetoric of control. Several royal decrees were instituted to reflect that shift, including 
the restrictive Real Decreto 557/2011 (M28-E).  
Most of these legal instruments pertain to Ecuadorian immigrants, as Bulgarians 
are subject to EU directives since 2007. Still, the Balkan immigrants were guided by the 
                                                          
272 Spain joined the EU in 1986 and passed the 1985 Law to conform to European standards. The law was 
therefore unduly restrictive and focused on control regardless of the relatively low number of immigrants in 
the host country and the continued predominance of Spanish emigration to the rest of Europe and Latin 
America (Pérez, 2003).  
246 
 
same policies as Ecuadorians prior to 2007. They are constrained by Spanish policy 
today, as Real Decreto 2010 reversed the freedom of circulation for the newest EU 
joiners in Spain temporarily or as integration and public safety rules apply to all 
foreigners. Regardless of the proliferation of legal instruments in Spain and the 
compliance with EU-wide directives, moreover, local initiatives, administrative decrees, 
and sub-national integration programs fragment the Spanish migration system, much like 
in the Irish case, and detract from supranational prerogatives by focusing on local tools of 
migration management.  
 
Table V.9. Immigration, Asylum and Integration Legislature in Spain 
 
Foreigner’s Law, 1985 and 1996 Amendment  
Law on the Rights of Asylum and Refugee Status, 1984, modified by 1994 
Law, Royal Decrees 1995, 2001, 2003 and 2004, and Law 12/2009  
Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their 
Integration (Organic Law 4/2000), amended by Organic Law 8/2000, 
Organic Law 11/2003, 14/2003, Organic Law 2/2009, and Organic Law 
10/2011 
Organic Law 1/1992 on the Protecting of Public Safety, amended in 1997, 
1999, 2006  
Royal Decree 2007 on the Free Circulation of EU Citizens in Spain, 
amended 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012  
Royal Decree 557/2011 on the implementation of Organic Law 4/2000 on 
the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and Their Integration  
Spanish Civil Code, 1889, as Amended 
 
Source: Derived from Hazán, 2014; Ministerio del Interior, 2015. 
 
 
V.3.2.1. Laws, Policies, and the Ecuadorian Worker 
 As workers travelling to Spain mostly through legal channels and possessing 
cultural, social and familial ties to the host context, Ecuadorians in Madrid are privileged 
by legal, policy, and administrative measures. Despite some negative developments, 
policies and law grant the Latin Americans preferential access to entry and employment 
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opportunities, naturalization and local political participation, as well as integration 
resources. Even when irregular, Ecuadorians enjoy an easier access into stable legal 
status, on the basis of economic, social and cultural ties to the receiving context. The 
focus with this group is on incorporation through provision of economic and social 
resources, as well as access to active political participation. Despite European 
harmonization and severe economic contraction, changes in the legal framework have not 
severely undermined the rights of the South Americans, rendering Spain “exceptional in 
Europe” (Arango, 2012). In fact, since 2008 the cohort interacts with more benevolent 
national and local political actors focused on integration, such as the Ministry of Labor 
and Immigrants, as opposed to the control- and crime-focused Ministry of the Interior or 
Ministry of Justice (MTIN, 2009). 
There are several key policies that advance the legal-political incorporation of 
Ecuadorian workers in Madrid (Figure V.2). The Latin Americans enjoy relatively 
unrestricted and even preferential entry into Spain’s labor market and society, much like 
their Polish counterparts in Ireland.  As this open access is based in bilateral agreements 
rather than legal instruments, it persists despite economic downturn and the pressures of 
European supranationalization. A 1963 agreement between Spain and Ecuador allowed 
the South American workers to arrive in the host country without a visa as tourists for an 
easily extendable three-month period, provided they had proof of financial means and a 
tourist plan. Effectively, the visa waiver enabled Ecuadorians, but not African or East 
European workers for example, to gain entry into Spain and then regularize their status 
through an employment offer or one of the frequent amnesties occurring in the host 
context (Bertoli et al., 2010).  
248 
 
Figure V.2. Spanish Migration Policies Concerning Ecuadorians  
 































While the agreement expired in 2003, as the European Union added Ecuador to its 
common visa list, the host government creatively made up for the closure (EC 453/2003). 
For instance, a 2001 bilateral agreement between Spain and Ecuador channeled 25,000 
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agreement with Ecuador in 2000 to actively recruit Latin American workers for low- and 
medium- skilled jobs and to expedite the transfer of their professional qualifications 
(MTIN, 2009). In 2004, the Socialist government reformed the 2000 Organic Law to 
introduce the catalog of hard-to-fill occupations in the general labor regime, which 
enables employers to contract non-EU workers without a market test or considerations of 
the availability of native or EU workers (M19-ADMIN).273 Latin Americans are the main 
beneficiaries of the reform (Arango, 2012). Ecuadorians are also the primary participants 
in the labor quotas of 1993-1995, 1997-1999 and 2002 and the yearly contingents that 
succeeded the quota system to fill persistent labor gaps through seasonal employment 
(Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores i Cooperación [MAEC], 2008; MTIN, 2009). While 
seasonal contracts are conceived as temporary, in practice they provide an avenue to 
long-term residency, if the terms of the agreement are observed (MTIN, 2009). Finally, 
while all legal workers entering Spain require an established job offer and permits are 
granted to employers, Organic Law 14/2003 grants Ecuadorians among others the benefit 
of a three-month visa to search for employment in the host country, if they have familial 
ties to Spanish natives (Ley Orgánica 14/2003, 2003).  
Ecuadorians in Spain are also advantaged by citizenship and political participation 
legislation and policy (Figure V.2). Unlike third-country nationals in Ireland, Latin 
Americans in Spain benefit from privileged access to Spanish nationality. Spanish 
citizenship, regulated by the Civil Code since 1889, advances a pronouncedly ethnic 
                                                          
273 The catalog of hard-to-fill occupations is a list of occupations for which few native or EU workers are 
available. It is published by the government every three months based on information from local 
employment offices and the major trade unions. It allows employers to hire workers for the occupations 
listed without having to prove that there are no native or EU workers available for the job (Ley Orgánica 
4/2000, 2000; MTIN, 2009; Real Decreto 2393/2004, 2004). It moves policy away from national agencies 
to local authorities that take into account sub-national economic trends.  
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conception of the nation (Brubaker, 1992; Mateos & Durand, 2012). It is awarded by 
origin (on the basis of familial and ethnic ties or the jus sanguinis principle) and through 
naturalization. The children or grandchildren of these fleeing political repression during 
the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1956, mostly to Latin America, can “recover” their 
Spanish nationality “by origin” after the passage of the Law of Historical Memory in 
2007. Naturalization requires a ten-year legal continuous residency for all other 
applicants, including EU citizens, but is granted only after a two-year period to Hispano-
Americans, including Ecuadorians (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012; Mateos & 
Durand, 2012). Naturalization requirements include “good character” and “integration 
into Spanish society”, interpreted as knowledge of the Spanish language and culture 
(Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). Granting citizenship status to Ecuadorians through 
naturalization is consequently a particularly unproblematic process, as “Spaniards always 
remember their history” (M26-TU).274 Finally, dual nationality is only extended through 
reciprocity to countries that recognize the citizenship of Spaniards abroad, and 
particularly Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Ibero-American nations like 
Ecuador (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012). These provisions lead Zapata-Barrero 
and Zaragoza (2009) to deem Spanish citizenship “selection by origin” and an instance of 
positive institutional discrimination towards South Americans.  
EU migration policy harmonization did not result in a move away from the ethnic 
conception of citizenship in Spain. In fact, migrants with cultural, social and familial ties 
to the receiving context were granted additional political rights to match these of EU 
citizens residing in Spain. Thus, while foreign collectives are generally excluded from 
                                                          




municipal voting rights in Spain, local political participation was allowed for European 
Union nationals in the 1990s and for Ibero-Americans in anticipation of the 2011 
elections (Arango, 2012; Zapata-Barerro & Zaragoza, 2009). 
Legal and policy instruments further grant Ecuadorians in Spain multiple social 
rights and privileged access to integration funds and programs (Figure V.2).  The 
integration of third-country nationals has been the cornerstone of Spanish migration 
legislation, political institutions, and local programs since the 1990s. The Foreigner’s 
Law of 1985 focused on controlling temporary migrants rather than on granting rights to 
the newcomers, and pushed many foreigners into illegality through strict visa and permit 
limits. Since the Law’s 1996 amendment, however, Spanish migration legislation has 
stressed the social integration of third-country nationals, regardless of the political make-
up of government. In the words of local administrators, “Now we have a completely 
different scenario. Now what we have to implement are policies regarding equality of 
treatment, integration and the reception phase” (M19-ADMIN). For instance, the 1996 
Law recognized immigrants’ rights to education, equality, legal counsel, family 
reunification, and long-term residency (Pérez, 2003). Organic Law 4/2000 and Law 
8/2000, which served as the basis for the extensive Plan GRECO, granted access to 
education, public health and social assistance to all third-country nationals, including 
irregular migrants (Bertozzi, 2010). Since 2000, being registered on the municipal 
population register (padrón) entitles unauthorized migrants to full access to healthcare 
and local educational rights. While the conservative Partido Popular government 
amended the law in 2012 to predicate healthcare access on legal status, individual 
municipalities and local providers have not obeyed the decree and leftist political parties 
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aim to reverse the policy (Arango, 2012; OECD, 2013). Even after renewed emphasis on 
control since the late 2000s, the incorporation of third-country nationals in Spain remains 
a foundation of immigration policy (Hazán, 2014; Real Decreto 557/2011, 2011).   
The emphasis on incorporation in legal and policy frameworks resulted in the 
shifting of responsibility for migration from harsh ministries to benevolent agencies 
focused on rights (M31-R). For instance, Ecuadorians in Spain initially dealt with the 
Ministry of the Interior, also tasked with combatting crime and illegal migration, thus 
setting public debate in negative terms of control (MTIN, 2009). In 2008, third-country 
migration policy shifted to the Ministry of Labor and Immigration to signal the explicit 
link between migration and the needs of the Spanish national and local labor market 
(M19-ADMIN; M20-ADMIN; M26-TU; M33-ADMIN). The post of the Secretary of 
State for Emigration and Immigration was created in 2000 to coordinate migration and 
integration policy and the cooperation among national, regional, and local authorities in 
ensuring immigrant rights (Bertozzi, 2010; Pérez, 2003). The Spanish Observatory on 
Racism and Xenophobia (OBERAXE), tasked with reporting on migrant rights, human 
rights plan development, and coordination with local authorities, was born in the same 
year (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). After the adoption of a national integration plan by 
the government in 1994, the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants was set up to 
bring together migrants’ associations, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, and 
central, regional and local administrators (Hazán, 2014; M22-ADMIN). The Forum gives 
migrants voice in crafting policy, cements the commitment of the host context to 
incorporation and rights, and transfers responsibility for immigrant welfare to city halls 
(Bertozzi, 2010). In both 2006-2010 and 2010-2013, Ecuadorian immigrant organizations 
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held two of the nine seats dedicated to ethnic associations in the Forum, with Latin 
American organizations representing the majority (M22-ADMIN). Further, the 
Immigration Fund was created in 2005 to ground the incorporation initiatives of 
autonomous communities and municipalities (M19-ADMIN).  
 These institutional developments resulted in multiple incorporation plans and 
initiatives, serving to benefit non-EU migrants in particular. The 2007-2010 Strategic 
Plan for Citizenship and Integration, accompanied by the Madrid City Council Plan on 
Social and Intercultural Coexistence, aimed at “establishing a social context conducive to 
greater inclusion and closer integration,” expanding access to public and private services, 
instituting respect for cultural diversity, combatting xenophobia, and amending 
educational or health institutions to fit immigrants’ particular needs (Bertozzi, 2010; 
M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN). Its successor, the 2011-2014 Strategic Plan of Citizenship 
and Integration, aims to produce “feeling of common belonging among all the citizens” 
and participation for immigrants stakeholders (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). The focus is on 
ever more rights and transfer of powers to the local level (M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN). 
As European Union citizens, Eastern European nationals are rarely the center of these 
initiatives (M20-ADMIN; M33-AMDIN). Concerns with local access to employment, 
social services, education and legal status trump concerns with language training in 
integration organizations and campaigns (M18-ADMIN; M20-ADMIN; M22-ADMIN; 
M32-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Despite severe economic contraction, moreover, the 
budget for non-EU immigrant integration persists, if at a reduced level (Arango, 2012; 
M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Accordingly, MIPEX maintains its top ranking of Spain in 
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terms of equality, integration, and rights for third-country workers (Huddleston & 
Niessen, 2011).   
Finally, Ecuadorians are unlikely to be affected by the recent focus on combatting 
irregular migration, as they enjoy privileged access into stable legal status (Figure V.2). 
Even if the Latin American workers found themselves in a precarious legal position after 
the harsh 1985 Foreigner’s Law or with the removal of the tourist visa waiver in 2003, a 
number of ad hoc regularization programs were instituted to correct the situation. 
Amnesties in in 1986, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2001, and 2005 served to regularize a large 
number of South American migrants who might have lost their legal status or entered the 
country surreptitiously in the first place.  The 2001 program focused on Ecuadorians in 
particular (Finotelli & Arango, 2011). The massive 2005 drive not only granted irregular 
Ecuadorians access to health care and education by introducing the padrón, but conferred 
legal status on as many as 200,000 Ecuadorians, more than one third of the 578,375 
successful applications (Finotelli & Arango, 2011; M16-P). Normalization of status for is 
achieved on the basis of economic ties to Spain (arráigo laboral), and thus through proof 
of employment in the country, a scheme that benefits all foreign workers in the host 
context. However, other grounds for regularization include social and cultural ties 
(arráigo social), particularly salient in the case of Ecuadorian and other Southern 
American migrants with Spanish language skills, and historical and cultural ties to the 
receiving locality. In fact, despite tightening of migration policies and limiting labor 
recruitment from non-EU countries with economic downturn, the Zapatero government 
introduced the possibility to regularize one’s status by discretion through family ties 
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(arráigo familial) in 2010, effectively granting stable status to Latin American and other 
third-country parents of Spanish-born children (Hazán, 2014). 
 To conclude, political, legal, and administrative changes have enhanced the 
political rights of the Ecuadorian community in Madrid, even after economic downturn or 
EU enlargement. Ecuadorians are granted relatively open entry into the Spanish 
“motherland,” as well as preferential access to the Spanish labor market, on the basis of 
bilateral agreements, special familial ties, and bargaining by local actors. The South 
Americans are the prime beneficiaries of an ethnic conception of membership. They 
receive nationality automatically on the basis of direct descent or summarily through 
socio-cultural ties, and are granted preferential local political participation rights as to 
maintain intact the Iberian-American community. Ecuadorians are the key participants in 
local integration forums, regularization programs, and other incorporation campaigns, 
due to their knowledge of the Spanish language and connections to the host society. 
Negative changes, like the removal of the 2003 visa waiver, have not severely 
undermined the South Americans’ rights. Neither has competition from Bulgarians with 
EU enlargement, with the latter surprisingly facing restrictive or at least neutral legal and 
administrative provisions despite their European membership. The Latin Americans are 
assigned a high value of 4 for this component of political incorporation (Table V.2). 
 
V.3.2.2. Laws, Policies, and the Bulgarian Worker 
Even though Bulgarians in Madrid are European Union citizens, policy and law 
have not served to amplify their political rights, as in the case of Poles in Ireland. While 
the legal framework does not directly disadvantage this foreign cohort, the attainment of 
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“communitarian” status obstructs the group indirectly, by depriving it of integration funds 
or the attention of benevolent local authorities. Bulgarians continue to be subject to 
stricter naturalization rules and there are no campaigns for their political inclusion. 
Bulgarians’ free circulation was limited for only two years, yet limitations were 
reinstituted in a rare reversal of free movement principles. Being able to travel to Spain 
freely, yet not take up employment, created distinct problems with social integration for 
the East Europeans. The Balkan migrants were much more likely to be irregular than 
their Ecuadorian counterparts prior to their home country’s accession to the EU. Even 
though they are currently residing in Spain legally, they still tend to take unauthorized 
employment, creating avenues for exploitation and de facto loss of rights. While 
European directives grant rights to Bulgarians on the national level in Spain, the transfer 
of authority to the local level leads to disregard for the concerns and rights of the East 
Europeans. A final unanticipated consequence of European Union status is that 
Bulgarians workers in Spain, no longer considered “foreigners,” deal not with the 
pronouncedly pro-immigrant Ministry of Labor and Immigration, but with local 
authorities without a standard approach to the management of distinct ethnic collectives.  
Several policy and legislative issues affect the political incorporation of 
Bulgarians in Spain, often in direct opposition to the situation of Ecuadorians (Figure 
V.3). While Ireland opened its doors to Polish migration in 2004, for example, Spain 
imposed barriers to the movement of the 2007 EU joiners. The receiving country did not 
place transitional agreements on the newcomers, but it limited their access to the national 
and local labor market in practice, as the government “didn’t know if they wanted the 
[Bulgarian] people to be coming here” (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Bulgarians were 
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free to enter the host country, yet Royal Decree 240/2007 predicated their ability to work 
on proof of two years of residence in Spain. Effectively, Bulgarians were subjected to the 
same requirements as non-EU nationals, including a visa, valid passport, no criminal 
record, private health insurance, justification of their trip, financial means, and a return 
ticket (Real Decreto 240/2007, 2007; Rodríguez-Planas & Farré, 2014).  
 




























A study by Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012) finds that while Ecuadorians tend 
to come to Spain legally or quickly regularize their status in view of a clear migration 
regime, Balkan migrants are in fact much more likely to hold irregular status in the host 
































context, regardless of their EU membership. Some local actors argue that “members of 
the European Union [not having] free circulation” “was completely discriminatory… and 
make it very difficult to tell what the situation of Bulgarians and Romanians was” (M17-
P; M35-P).275 Other stakeholders suggest that this legal limbo “on the one hand, has 
augmented the difficulties of these persons in Spain, and on the other hand, is an issue the 
local population is preoccupied with, because [the East Europeans] don’t work… they are 
in the streets. If they are in the streets, they are visible” (M27-L).276 Even though barriers 
to the work of the Balkan migrants were officially removed in 2009, they were reinstated 
in 2010 in view of severe unemployment (Castle & Dempsey, 2011). The additional 
restrictions renewed the requirement for visas for citizens of the 2007 EU joiners until 
2013, rendering the legal situation of Bulgarians in Spain more unstable than that of 
third-country nationals (OECD, 2013; Rodríguez-Planas & Farré, 2014).  
 Not only is Bulgarians’ free circulation into Spain limited despite their 
European Union membership, but legal recognition of the Balkan migrants as 
“communitarians” actually deprives them of rights, protections, integration funds, and 
attention by benevolent local actors (Figure V.3). As one trade union representative put 
it, “in many cases, free movement entails certain loss of rights” (M23-TU).277 Since 
third-country nationals are guided by clear migration rules, their labor rights are 
publicized and any breaches of these rights by employers are easy to identify and correct. 
                                                          
275 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “La única diferencia que ha habido es el tema de 
que durante dos años, siendo ya miembros de la Unión Europea, no tenían libre circulación. Era 
completamente discriminatorio… Entonces, a partir de la ampliación, hoy es muy difícil poder decir cuál es 
la situación de los búlgaros o rumanos.” 
276 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Por un lado, eso ha aumentado las dificultades de 
estas personas en España, y por otro lado es un tema de preocupación por la población de aquí. Porque la 
gente no trabaja, y eso siempre presenta una incomodidad porque si no trabajan, están en las calles. Si están 
en las calles, son visibles.” 




On the other hand, EU workers free to move about the Continent are harder to control or 
track by national authorities, thus opening opportunities for Spanish employers to exploit 
these workers and deny them accommodation, health provisions, or travel expenses. In 
the words of one Spanish stakeholder, “while free movement facilitated bureaucracy, red 
tape, in some cases it undermines rights’ guarantees [in the form of] the contract granted 
to these workers” (M23-TU).278 This is particularly true for Bulgarians, who continue to 
suffer from unstable work permission despite free entry.  
 The conception of Bulgarians as EU nationals, and thus no longer foreigners, 
places the Balkan workers outside the scope of many incorporation campaigns. A 
majority of Spanish local actors suggest that “the issue with Eastern European 
immigrants is that for all those who are members of the European Union or are European 
Union citizens, the legal process has been different” (M16-P; M19-AMIDN; M20-
ADMIN; M36-ADMIN). While trade unions uphold the rights of all workers resident in 
Spain, their representatives admit that integration funds or regularization programs focus 
almost exclusively on “non-communitarians” and particularly Latin American workers 
like Ecuadorians, since Europeans are perceived to enjoy multiple rights and stable legal 
status (M23-TU; M24-TU; M26-TU; M33-TU). However, the opposite is true as freedom 
of entry is undermined by lack of predictable contract or employment rights for the 
Balkan workers. Since Bulgarians “are not foreigners,” they are not covered by anti-
discrimination laws designed to protect immigrants in Madrid or regular reporting by 
bodies like OBERAXE (M19-ADMIN). As “now the Eastern Europeans don’t fit very 
nicely into any of this …. they are not eligible for” certain national and local integration 
                                                          
278 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish:” Entonces que la libre circulación ha facilitado los 
trámites burocráticos, los trámites administrativos, pero en algunos casos ha mermado las garantías, o el 
contrato que había sobre estos trabajadores.” 
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funds (M20-ADMIN; M36-ADMIN). Bulgarians do participate in the Forum for the 
Social Integration of Immigrants, yet issues like language training are rarely the focus of 
the organization (M22-ADMIN).  
 Relatedly, Bulgarians in Madrid are mostly managed by local agencies and 
administrators that might further chip away at the supposedly privileged status of the 
Europeans (Figure V.3). With migration policy supranationalization, and as national 
actors are obliged to implement EU directives into law, Spain witnessed a transfer of 
authority to the local and regional levels, to counteract external pressures. “The State” 
maintains its power in “making the laws,” yet city halls and regional governments are the 
focal points of “physical resources, centers of participation, programs of employment, of 
reception” (M17-P; M35-P).  Since EU citizens are encouraged to register with the local 
Social Security Administration and are obliged to enter the padrón, there is a measure of 
local control over their movement, employment, and incorporation (EMN, 2011). As 
municipal administrators and politicians admit, “in the Madrid Autonomous Community, 
integration is very easy provided that [the immigrants] share a culture similar to ours” 
(M17-P; M35-P). Is the case with Bulgarians, problems might occur on the local level, 
where “fights derived from immigration take place” (M16-P). Since education and 
healthcare should be granted universally in Spanish cities, large migrant communities, 
especially these with unclear entitlements and rights, often produce institutional and 
personal discrimination and unease (M16-P). Even though they are EU nationals, 
Bulgarians who do not speak Spanish “produce a shock, a barrier for the immigrant” and 
possibly exclusion (M17-P; M35-P).279 Devolution of authority to the local level in the 
                                                          
279 Paragaph contains author’s translation from same original quote in Spanish: “El Estado hace las leyes y 
tiene todas las competencias en Interior y en Seguridad. Los planes corresponden a los gobiernos 
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2000s led to obstacles in the incorporation of immigrants granted multiple legal rights on 
the national and supranational level, like European Bulgarians.  
 Finally, unlike Ecuadorians, Bulgarians are subject to strict naturalization rules. 
There are few campaigns for their political inclusion (Figure V.3). Bulgarians do not 
share ethnic ties or descent with Spaniards and therefore never have to option to 
naturalize “by origin,” like Ecuadorians in Madrid. More significantly, these who aspire 
to Spanish citizenship by acquisition are subject to a ten-year waiting period as opposed 
to the two-year waiting period for Latin Americans. Dual nationality is not permitted, as 
it is only based in bilateral agreements, reciprocity, and historical affinity. Debates on 
citizenship reform exclude the East Europeans, since they are already the holders of EU 
membership (Zapata-Barerro & Zaragoza, 2009). Bulgarians are eligible to vote in 
municipal and EU parliamentary elections in Spain, as are other Europeans in Spain 
(Muñoz, 2009). However, EU status correlates with the assumption that actual 
participation merits little encouragement. Despite the relatively high number of 
Bulgarians in Spain, for instance, there were only two polling stations for Bulgarians in 
the country that would allow the East Europeans to participate in the 2009 elections in 
their home country. As a comparison, there were more than fifty polling stations located 
in Turkey (Dobreva, 2013). There were also few drives for the active political 
engagement of the Balkan workers by political parties or trade unions (Muñoz, 2009).  
In sum, while Bulgarians in Spain are European Union citizens and should enjoy a 
multitude of rights, they might have even lost privileges and entitlements after 2007. Visa 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regionales, y los ayuntamientos son los que en primer término tienen que tener los servicios. Por ejemplo, 
en Madrid hay recursos físicos, regionales, centros de participación, programas de empleo de acogida de no 
sé qué, en el nivel regional, y luego lo hay en el nivel municipal… Es decir, en la Comunidad de Madrid la 
integración es muy sencilla en la medida en que parten de culturas muy parecida a la nuestra. Producen un 
choque, una barrera por la integración…” (M17-P; M35-P). 
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requirements remained for the East Europeans despite Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, 
and limitations to free movement were reinstituted in 2010. Free entry yet limited work 
permission placed Bulgarians into legal limbo and forced a large number of the East 
Europeans into irregular employment. Bulgarians have in fact lost labor rights, attention 
by benevolent trade unions, anti-discrimination monitoring, or integration help with EU 
membership. Yet, they are ever more in need of language training, economic assistance, 
or social incorporation funding. With the transfer of authority away from the national and 
supranational levels, local administrators undermine the immigrants’ freedoms or 
resources. Finally, limited access to Spanish citizenship and political participation leaves 
Bulgarians few avenues to correct other rights deficiencies. Therefore, while few policy 
changes have undermined the Balkan workers’ rights directly, institutional neglect have 
indirectly deprived them of clear rules, stable status, and political, economic and social 
privileges. The East Europeans are assigned an intermediate value for this indicator of 
political incorporation (Table V.2). 
 
V.4. Active Political Integration 
 After the above exposé on legal status and relevant changes in laws and policies, 
the chapter turns to the four cohorts’ exercise of political rights. In particular, the thesis 
discusses naturalization, voting and running in local elections, trade unionism rates, and 
tendencies to engage in civic activism. For each indicator, a survey of the situation in 
Ireland, and the political participation of Poles and Nigerians, is followed by a discussion 




V.4.1. Naturalization and Long-Term Residency 
V.4.1.1. Naturalization and Long-Term Residency in Ireland 
Naturalization numbers are rising in Ireland. Between January 2005 and 
December 2009, 20,000 non-EU individuals acquired Irish citizenship. The figures 
exclude EU citizens, who according to McGinnity et al. (2011) rarely naturalize, due to 
high levels of mobility and lack of incentives to acquire Irish nationality.  
In fact, there are multiple obstacles to naturalization for both EU and third-
country nationals in Ireland. Naturalization data are misleading, since there is a 
significant lag in the system. Current immigrants are unlikely to be eligible for 
naturalization, with applications effective only after several years. According to the ICI, 
while most naturalization applications were processed in six months in the UK, ninety 
days in Australia, and eleven months in Canada, it took twenty-three months on average 
to process applications in Ireland (ICI, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011). Therefore, Eastern 
European nationals are unable to naturalize regardless of their intent, as they only arrived 
in large numbers in 2004. Nigerians’ access to Irish citizenship is severely undermined 
after constitutional changes in the mid-2000s.280  
Especially with a worsening economic climate, Ireland maintains a high 
naturalization application refusal, with 47% refusal in 2009, compared to 9% in the UK 
or Australia, and less than 3% in Canada (Fanning, 2011, pp. 166-167). From the 25,500 
naturalization applications processed in 2009, 12,242 were rejected on technicalities, 
6,011 were deemed ineligible, and 1,461 were refused, and only 5,868 were granted (23% 
of the original number filed). The cost of application at €950.00 is found prohibitive by 
some migrants (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 36-37). 
                                                          
280 See Figure V.1 and previous section of this chapter. 
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According to the 1956 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act as amended, the 
Minister for Justice and Law Reform has ‘absolute discretion’ in granting nationality, 
where citizenship through naturalization is considered a privilege rather than an 
entitlement (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 36). Therefore, subjective and vague criteria like 
“good character” might be employed to exclude deserving foreign candidates. “Good 
character” is not maintained, for instance, if the applicant has come to the “adverse 
attention” of the Garda Síochána even in a minor traffic offense or through the use of 
social welfare.281 There is no mechanism to appeal refusal of citizenship or legal 
obligation to reveal the reasons for refusal, where the Minister of Justice might even 
revoke a certificate of naturalization if the grantee fails in their loyalty to Ireland 
(Fanning, 2011, pp. 166-168; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 36). There are no active 
programs to promote naturalization in Ireland (Fanning, 2011, p. 168).  
Naturalization is also precluded by a narrow definition of “reckonable residence,” 
or the period of time a migrant must live in Ireland prior to applying for citizenship 
(Fanning, 2011, p. 167). The 2004 Citizenship Act specifies a necessary one year of 
continuous “reckonable residence” in the state immediately before applying for 
nationality, as well as another four years during the previous eight years (McGinnity et 
al., 2011, p. 36). Student, undocumented and asylum statuses do not apply when 
calculating “reckonable residence.” These exclusions particularly and unduly 
disadvantage the children of foreign residents, who are enrolled in education since their 
arrival in Ireland and set roots in the receiving state. These obstacles lead Fanning (2011) 
                                                          
281 For instance, in 2009 the Irish Times featured a story about a 23-old Zimbabwe national who had 
resided in Ireland for eight years. He entered the country as an asylum seeker, yet was granted refugee 
status within several months. He was stopped for drunk driving, but was never charged or convicted in a 
court of law. Still, the Minister of Justice, Equality and Law reform refused his naturalization application 
on a discretionary basis based in his lack of “good character” (“Zimbabwean challenges,” 2009).  
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to characterize the system as an “anti-integrationist security-governance perspective,” 
especially when it comes to African nationals.  
Structural and personal discrimination play a role in diminishing naturalization 
opportunities as well, especially in the case of Nigerian immigrants. In one recent 
example, thousands of Nigerian nationals who participated in the latest naturalization 
ceremony and were granted naturalization certificates by Minister of Justice Alan Shatter 
were refused Irish passports by the Passport Office. A representative of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggested that documents submitted with the applications, 
such as marriage certificates, did not appear genuine and had to be further investigated 
even though they were accepted by the Ministry of Justice. The incident also prompted 
widespread xenophobic commentary, with Irish nationals suggesting that Nigerians who 
have Nigerian passports should not be entitled to Irish ones and that “80% of Nigerians in 
Ireland are not who they claim to be” (“Thousands of Nigerians,” 2012).  
An alternative to naturalization for third-country nationals is long-term residence. 
Such legal status does not yet exist in Ireland, as the Immigration, Residence and 
Protection Bills 2007, 2008 and 2010 that proposed it never passed into law.  Legal long-
term residence would entitle non-EU residents to travel, work, welfare and healthcare. In 
the absence of a legal framework, Ireland grants administrative long-term residence to 
employment permit holders and their spouses. However, even fewer such grants were 
made between 2005 and 2009 than naturalization grants. Like naturalization, long-term 
residence is discretionary and grounded in subjective and unclear criteria. For instance, 
travel outside of Ireland might undermine claims on long-term residence. Other criteria 
are good character; knowledge of English or Irish; as well as adequate efforts to integrate, 
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all of which are highly subjective. Significantly, together with the UK and Denmark, 
Ireland opted out of the EC Directive 2009/103, which provides rights to education or 
employment for third-country long-term residents equal to those of citizens. The Irish 
long-term residency status does not include the EC’s automatic renewal after five years, 
includes broad provisions for revocation of the status, and makes residence security 
dependent on job security. These limitations lead MIPEX to rate Irish long-term 
residency provision as 28th of 31 countries (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011).  
To conclude, Nigerian nationals in Dublin are naturalizing in higher numbers than 
their Polish counterparts, even if data disaggregated by nationality are unavailable. Polish 
workers do not see a need to naturalize as they are European Union citizens with a slew 
of rights. However, low naturalization rates among East Europeans are also the result of 
these immigrants’ recent arrival in Ireland and the significant backlog of the Irish 
citizenship application system. Further, Nigerian nationals face an increasing number of 
obstacles to naturalizing in Ireland, such as high costs, a slow and discretionary process, 
and structural and individual racism. Therefore, their naturalization rates are likely to 
drop or plateau in the future, equalizing this component of political participation for the 
two immigrant cohorts.  Both groups are assigned an intermediary value of 3 for this 
indicator (Table V.2). 
 
V.4.1.2. Naturalization and Long-Term Residency in Spain 
Naturalization and long-term residency rules in Ireland disadvantage all 
immigrants but are particularly harsh for African foreign workers. On the other hand, 
naturalization provisions are extremely generous for Latin Americans in Spain yet 
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severely restrict entry into the national community for Bulgarians, despite their EU 
citizenship. Because of its discriminatory citizenship legislation, MIPEX III grants Spain 
only 39% for its naturalization rules (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011) 
Having an expedited access into Spanish citizenship has led multiple Ecuadorian 
migrants to acquire the nationality of the host country. To demonstrate, 81% of the 
523,106 individuals who naturalized in Spain between 1980 and 2008 came from Latin 
America (Mateos & Durand, 2012). In 2010, 103,971 of the 123,721 naturalized citizens 
were from Latin America and 43,091 from Ecuador – the largest national group to 
acquire Spanish nationality that year (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012). 
Naturalization rates are particularly high for the South Americans in the Autonomous 
Community of Madrid. According to a 2012 report, all but one of the top nationalities of 
these naturalizing in the city belonged to Latin America (with Morocco as the only 
exception). Ecuadorians were the most numerous recipients of Spanish nationality, with 
11,398 persons in the Madrid Autonomous Community (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). 
Latin Americans take advantage of favorable naturalization procedures. 
According to a comparative study by Huddleston and Tjaden (2012), immigrants in 
Madrid had to wait for an average of 9.8 years to apply for citizenship, compared to 11.7 
years in Paris or 13 years in Lyon. Yet, South Americans only waited for six years. After 
residing in the city for twenty years, 91% of migrants with historical ties to the receiving 
locality were Spanish citizens compared to 63% of these without cultural ties, 56% of 
foreigners in France, and only 29% of immigrants in Italy. Only 12% of Latin Americans 
reported problems with their application for citizenship in Madrid, compared to 25% of 
other migrants and 53% of foreigners in Paris, for instance.  
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What is more, these Latin Americans who have not naturalized in Spain hold 
long-term residency permits, which entitle them to multiple rights. Indeed, 80% of 
foreigners in Madrid aspire for long-term residence or citizenship according to 
Huddleston and Tjaden (2012), compared to 70% of immigrants in France and less than 
30% in Germany and Belgium. After residing and working in Spain for only five years, 
Ecuadorians have freedom of movement, opportunities to change employers, and 
entitlements to reunite with their families similar to these of EU citizens and Spanish 
nationals. The application process is deemed “short and simple” and the status – secure. 
Consequently, MIPEX III assigns Spain the second best ranking in terms of long-term 
residency with a rating of 78% and the third-best grade for access to family reunification 
for third-country nationals among all thirty-one MIPEX countries. Ireland is last in terms 
of the latter, with only 34% (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011).   
On the other hand, few Bulgarians naturalize in the receiving context. Only 2,086 
of the 114,599 naturalized citizens in Spain in 2011 came from the EU (Martín-Pérez & 
Moreno-Fuentes, 2012). In 2001-2009, 850 Bulgarians naturalized in Spain (or 0.2% of 
the total) (Pérez-Nievas, Vintila, Morales, & Paradés, 2014). While national law does not 
mandate cultural tests for citizenship acquisition, municipal civil registries ask 
increasingly difficult language, geographical, and historical questions of the applicants, 
which serve as an additional barrier for non-Hispanic East Europeans, compared to the 
Latino Ecuadorians (García, 2014). Bulgarians are also not eligible for long-term 
residency in Spain, as they are EU nationals who should enjoy rights to free movement, 
employment, and family reunifications similar to these of Spaniards. However, as the 
receiving state’s government continues to limit labor market access for the East 
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Europeans through Royal Decrees, EU membership privileges are incomplete. 
Counterintuitively, the status of Bulgarians is less stable than that of long-term 
Ecuadorian residents in Madrid.  
In sum, EU Bulgarians are less likely to enjoy access to Spanish nationality than 
non-EU Ecuadorians, who naturalize in large numbers, especially in Madrid, or hold 
secure long-term residency permits. The Balkan migrants, occupying a complicated legal 
status, are only beneficiaries of EU membership rights in name, but might be denied 
some of the entitlements of long-term residents in reality. Strict naturalization rules based 
in an ethnic conception of citizenship denies them access to Spanish citizenship as well. 
Ecuadorians thus merit the highest value for this indicator of political incorporation, 
while Bulgarians are assigned a low value of 2 (Table V.2).  
 
V.4.2. Local Electoral Participation  
V.4.2.1.Running for Office and Voting in Dublin 
A second component of active political integration is the ability to stand and vote 
in local elections. Only Irish nationals can vote for the Dail Eireann (or the House of 
Representatives), in presidential elections, or participate in referendums. Third-country 
nationals are also barred from European elections, unlike their EU counterparts. 
However, all residents of Ireland can participate in local elections (Huseini & Yao, 2010; 
McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 38-39; Mutwarasibo, 2011). The Irish Electorate Act (1992) 
is a particularly permissive document that allows non-nationals over 18 years of age to 
vote and stand in local elections after residing in the country for six months (Electoral 
Act, 1992; O’Boyle, 2012). This legal framework prompted Dobbs (2009, p. 5) to 
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describe Ireland as “a critical case for understanding immigrant political integration,” as 
“it has one of the most open electoral systems in the world for non-citizens.”  
Regardless of political opportunity and a growing foreign population, there were 
few ethnic candidates in Irish elections in the early 2000s. A 2003 report by the Africa 
Centre found that party platforms and candidacies did not reflect the increasing diversity 
of Irish society and thus exemplified institutional racism. None of the major political 
parties had specific policies to encourage the membership of immigrant candidates or 
canvassed immigrant communities (Fanning et al., 2003).  As Ugba (2005) argues, Irish 
authorities did not create a “legal and institutional” foundation for immigrant political 
participation, as they were unwilling to “promote [Ireland] as a migration destination.”  
Since most immigrants are non-citizens, and therefore ineligible to vote in general 
elections, they were met with “pragmatic indifference” by politicians (Fanning 2011, 
p.156; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38). Therefore, the lack of participation of both the 
Nigerian and Polish communities prior to 2004 is easily attributable to the exclusive 
character of the political process.282  
None of the major political parties advanced immigrant candidates in the 2004 
local elections either. However, six candidates ran as independents and two Africans 
were elected city councilors (Fanning & O’Boyle, 2010; Mutwarasibo, 2011; O’Boyle, 
2012).  Dr. Taiwo Matthews and Rotimi Adebari were both former asylum seekers, 
whose inability to secure employment despite high qualifications led them to political 
activism (Fanning, 2011, p. 156; Fanning & O’Boyle, 2010). A more striking example of 
desire for political participation came when asylum seekers in the Mosney reception 
                                                          
282 In the case of Polish immigrants, there was not yet a critical mass that would ensure the interest of 
political parties in this national group in 2004. Such a critical mass existed prior to the 2009 local elections, 
however, which included Polish candidates and voter registration efforts aimed at this ethnic group.  
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center organized to set up a local branch of Fianna Fail. After one sixth of the camp’s 
residents met with Fianna Fail members of parliament, their petition was rejected on a 
national level, further precluding political participation (Fanning, 2011, pp. 156-157). 
Such political activity remained the exception rather than the rule, however, with all 
ethnic communities practically excluded from the political process until the late 2000s. 
With dramatic increases in migration rates and diversity in the country, all 
political parties committed to including foreign candidates on their ballots and to 
reaching to ethnic communities during electoral campaigning in the mid-2000s (Mac 
Cormaic, 2009). After Adebari was elected as the first black mayor in Ireland in 2007, 
Speaker of the House John O’Donoghue emphasized the political significance of the 
“New Irish” in all future elections. Minister of State for Integration Policy Conor Lenihan 
stressed the role of political parties in the integration of immigrant communities and 
several voter registration programs were placed under way by the Dublin City Council 
and the Office for the Minister for Integration (Fanning, 2011, p. 157). Fianna Fail and 
Fine Gael recruited integration officers from among the Polish community in 2007-2008 
and participated in efforts by Forum Polonia to aid Polish candidates in the election 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38). Especially in Fine Gael, Polish candidates were clearly 
favored over other ethnic politicians. Poles’ Catholicism contributed to an 
institutionalization of the party as religious in character and a connection was drawn 
between Fine Gael and Poland’s Civic Forum. However, Fine Gael recruited only two 
Polish and four Nigerian candidates. Fianna Fail practiced “racialized politics,” as it 
selected seven European and only two African candidates (Fanning, 2011, p. 159). 
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Forty-four non-national candidates ran for all the major parties in contest for 114 
County, City, Borough and Town Councils in 2009 (Huseini & Yao, 2010; O’Boyle, 
2012).283 Irish stakeholders and African and Eastern European communities consider the 
effort “quite positive and much better than previous elections” (D14-R; Ethan, 46). The 
rising participation rates are particularly significant, as they are motivated by desire to 
improve the local community, as well as the integration of the candidates’ ethnic group 
(Fanning & O’Boyle, 2010; O’Boyle, 2012). For instance, one Nigerian candidate 
interviewed by this researcher chose to run for Fine Gael due to the party’s underlying 
message of racial equality and its commitment to the idea of the “New Irish,” or 
immigrants’ adopting Irish cultural norms while maintaining their own (D44-NO). 
A stronger ethnic candidacy in 2009 did not translate into electoral successes, 
however. Only four foreign candidates were elected out of the forty-four and none in 
Dublin or from the two groups of interest here (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38).284 Narrow 
campaigns relying only on the immigrant vote based in identity hurt ethnic politicians, 
having in mind the limited numbers of voting non-nationals in 2009, as well as the 
unwillingness of foreign voters to be associated with a particular ethnicity. Voting along 
                                                          
283 Fianna Fail had ten foreign candidates, Fine Gael and the Green Party listed eight each, the Labour Party 
ran four non-nationals, and fourteen others ran as independents. Those candidates came from Nigeria 
(sixteen), Poland (nine), India and Pakistan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia, as well as Moldova, the 
Netherlands, USA, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Congo DRC, and South Africa. Immigrant candidates stood in 
60% of city councils’ elections, 38% of county councils’ elections, and one fifth of town and borough 
elections (Huseini & Yao, 2010). Polish candidates ran in Limerick, Kilkenny, Mullingar, Shannon, 
Tullamore, Templemore, with Mr. Bartlomiej Bruzewick running for Fine Gael in the Dublin North Inner 
City and Lech Szczecinski running for in the South West Inner City (Mutwarasibo, 2011). 
284 Mr. Adebari was elected to the Laois County Council and the Portlaoise Town Council. Dutch former 
aid worker Jan Rotte won a seat for the Labour Party in Lismore, Co Waterford. There were two successes 
in Co. Monaghan, where Lithuanian school teacher Kristina Jankaitiene took a seat for the Green Party and 
Russian-born Anna Rooney was elected to Clones’ town council under the auspices of Fianna Fail. Several 
candidates, like Fine Gael’s Adeola Ogunsina in Mulhuddart, Anna Michalska of Fianna Fáil in Kilkenny, 
the Green Party’s Tendai Madondo in Tallaght, and Labour’s Elena Secas, performed well without taking a 




identity lines pitted ethnic candidates against one another. This was the case for Fine 
Gael’s Adeola Ogunsuna, Fianna Fáil’s Idowu Olafimihan, and Independent Ignatius 
Okafor who ran in Mulhuddart, where voting occurred along tribal and class lines. Lack 
of financial resources or knowledge of the Irish political system, as well as low voting 
rates in the immigrant-heavy communities also disadvantaged the newcomers (D43-NO; 
“The failure of Mulhuddart’s,” 2009; O’Boyle, 2012; Reilly, 2009). Racial discrimination 
played a large role with African candidates. Visual differences detracted from the much 
needed Irish vote in the process of door-to-door canvassing (Okorie, 2009). For instance, 
South African Patrick Maphoso was verbally abused while canvassing in Dublin City and 
there were rumors that Tendai Madondo had AIDS in Tallaght. Institutional 
discrimination and the lack of support for ethnic candidates by the party with which they 
were running exacerbated the situation further (Mac Cormaic, 2009; Reilly, 2009). As 
one African candidate suggested, parties like Fianna Fail were “merely shopping for 
immigrant faces,” and their enthusiastic courting of ethnic candidates did not translate 
into granting them the necessary resources to win (Fanning, 2011, p. 154). Rather, 
running as part of established political parties exposed ethnic candidates to rigid party 
agendas and limited their creativity and reliance on ethnic networks (D43-NO).  
The 2009 local election saw not only a higher count of ethnic candidates, but also 
a drive to involve immigrant voters in the political process. The Africa Centre engaged in 
the creation and development of migrant networks as to enhance civil and political rights. 
Together with the New Communities Partnership (NCP), the Centre engaged in voter 
mobilization across immigrant communities and registered 10,000 immigrants to vote in 
2009 (Huseini & Yao, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38). The NCP also worked with 
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the Dublin City Council, which launched its own voter registration campaign among non-
nationals. Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, in their turn, engaged in active recruitment of Polish 
organizers, or “integration officers,” and translated election materials into various 
languages. Integration officers encouraged Polish immigrants to run and vote in local 
elections. Finally, the Immigrant Council of Ireland launched the Count Us In program in 
2011 that raised awareness among naturalized citizens of their right to vote in general 
elections (ICI, 2011; Mutwarasibo, 2011). Political party efforts focused mostly on the 
untapped pool of culturally and ethnically similar Polish immigrants (Fanning, 2011).  
 Despite these efforts, voting rates among immigrant communities are low. The 
ICI conducted a study with Nigerian and Eastern European voters prior to the 2009 
election. It reported that the Nigerian community registered in large numbers, with about 
half of the Nigerians interviewed registered to vote in the local 2009 elections. On the 
other hand, only 15% of all East European respondents reported being registered to vote. 
The lack of information on the eligibility to vote and the complexities of the process 
precluded 35% of East Europeans from actually registering, but six in ten did not plan to 
engage in the Irish political process due to sheer disinterest. On the other hand, one third 
of Nigerian potential voters were disinterested and 45% were unaware of the political 
process or their political rights (ICI, 2008, pp. 79-80).  
The stronger intent to participate in the Irish political process and the lower levels 
of political apathy among Nigerian immigrants should be interpreted with caution. The 
more recent arrival of the Eastern European population might account for its lower 
participation rates. Short residence might correlate with lack of time to develop political 
power and stake in Dublin. What is more, despite voter registration figures, actual voting 
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numbers for both groups are relatively low, with East Europeans showing the more 
significant gains. According to the Dublin City Council, in 2009 there were only 15,150 
people on the register who did not have the right to vote in general elections, and were 
thus assumed to be non-nationals (Mac Cormaic, 2009). This number is placed at 15,681 
by the New Communities Partnership and is considered a success as it marks a 44% 
increase in immigrant voting from 2004. There were an extra 542 votes for Dublin City 
Council, or a 6% increase, and 1,184 for South Dublin County Council, or a 24% 
increase. Increases were more prominent among EU citizens, who registered a 30% 
overall increase in votes in Dublin County, and as high as a 50% increase in votes for 
Dublin City Council. On the other hand, voting rates among third country nationals 
plateaued (Huseini & Yao, 2010). Thus, European Union citizens in Dublin reflect a 
bigger promise of political involvement in future elections.  
According to a 2006 report with 41 African immigrants by the Africa Centre, 
while Africans participate in religious and ethnic communal activities, they are not 
interested in Dublin’s local political life (Ejohr, 2006). One third of the African 
respondents surveyed could not even define “civic participation” and two thirds were not 
involved in the receiving city‘s life. Only 12% reported being involved in political 
activity in Dublin. When discussing particular political activities, only 2% were involved 
in Irish political parties or associations and less than one third voted in the 2004 local 
elections. While racism and exclusion by local political parties had a lot to do with it, 
lack of information, time, and interest was also to blame (Ejohr, 2006, pp. 22-23). The 
apathy of Africans residing in Dublin and their preoccupation with their own economic 
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and immigration problems are considered the persistent causes of diminished political 
rights and power through the 2009 election (Okorie, 2009). 
In sum, both Polish and Nigerian immigrants have low levels of political 
participation in Dublin. More Nigerian candidates than Polish candidates participated in 
local elections in the early 2000s, partly because there were few Polish workers in Ireland 
at the time. However, Polish candidates are growing in number and had a strong showing 
in the 2009 elections, as a direct result of active recruitment by Irish political parties. 
Both ethnic groups reaped few political successes, however, with limited resources or a 
split ethnic vote. More significantly, Nigerian candidates experienced both institutional 
and individual racism. Consequently, “similar” Polish workers are much more likely to 
succeed as foreign candidates in the future than their Nigerian counterparts. This 
conclusion is also evident in the increasing rates of voting by Polish citizens in Dublin. 
While both Nigerians and Poles rarely vote in local elections due to apathy or lack of 
information, the East Europeans are registering larger increases at the voting booth since 
the late 2000s. They are more likely than their Nigerian counterparts to exercise their 
political rights, as they settle in Dublin’s local life. Both groups assigned an intermediate 
value of 3 for this component of political incorporation (Table V.2).   
 
V.4.2.2. Running for Office and Voting in Madrid  
Local participatory rights are more restrictive in the case of Madrid than in the 
case of Dublin. Much like in Ireland, only Spanish citizens can vote and run in national 
and regional elections. Spain’s implementation of the Maastricht Treaty led to the 
permission for EU nationals to run and vote in local elections in 1999. Bulgarians and 
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Romanians acquired suffrage rights after 2007, rendering them legitimate participants in 
the 2011 municipal vote (Zapata-Barrero & Zaragoza, 2009). Other foreign nationals 
were originally excluded from the local political process, yet a Constitutional amendment 
in 1992 permitted foreigners to become both voters and candidates in municipal 
elections. The amendment maintained the condition of reciprocal rights for Spanish 
citizens abroad, however, thus barring most immigrants from participating in practice. In 
2008, the Socialist government used bilateral agreements to extend voting rights to the 
citizens of Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia, similar to these of EU nationals and 
Spaniards (Juberías & Alonso, 2011). Latin American long-term residents cannot serve as 
candidates in city elections, however, unless they have acquired Spanish nationality 
(Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014). As the naturalization process is expedited for numerous 
South American migrants in Madrid, despite restrictions, Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in 
Madrid are awarded similar rights of political participation.  
Ecuadorians are not entitled to stand in local elections, unless they are Spanish 
nationals. Bulgarians’ long naturalization requirement and permission to participate in the 
municipal political process only since 2007 has precluded the Balkan collective from 
running in city elections. Another reason for the scarcity of immigrant candidates in local 
elections is the very nature of the electoral system in Spain, which emphasizes not 
individual candidates and their ability to capture the ethnic vote, but rather affinities with 
the ideologies of national political parties (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014).285 Due to the local 
                                                          
285 In Dublin, all candidates run in a first-past-the-post system, where individual candidates, be they 
affiliated with a political parry or running as independents, are elected if they receive the most votes in a 
particular electoral district (Fanning et al., 2003). On the other hand, in Madrid the emphasis is on closed 
and blocked party lists. That is, each political party presents voters with a list of candidates equal to the 
number of open seats, ordered according to the party machinery’s preferences. Voters can elect a list in its 
entirety and cannot reorder candidates. Therefore, competition is among national political parties with 
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political context, parties in Spain have little incentive to include immigrant-origin 
candidates in their lists, where immigrant candidates cannot run as independents, as is the 
case in Dublin. Institutional barriers lead to the underrepresentation of all foreign 
populations as candidates in local elections or their low-priority ordering on party lists, 
which precludes them from winning a seat in practice. According to Pérez-Nievas et al. 
(2014), while most party lists for Spanish electoral districts should include at least three 
immigrants candidates, a majority included none in 2011. The gap is found to be largest 
in the capital of Madrid, where only one party included one immigrant candidate, yet 
twelve foreign-born candidates should have been nominated on the basis of the size of the 
immigrant population. Across the various electoral districts in the Madrid Autonomous 
Community, only 106 nominees for the 2011 election (or 2.9% of the 3650 total 
nominees) were of immigrant origin despite an average immigrant population of 15% in 
each district. Furthermore, even fewer ethnic candidates get elected, with an average of 
0.9% of councilors holding non-Spanish nationality.  
Still, Latin Americans are better represented politically than Bulgarians. In a 
small sample of Spanish electoral districts selected by Pérez-Nievas et al. (2014), despite 
the growing size of the Bulgarian population, no Bulgarian candidates were nominated on 
the municipal level in 2003, 2007 or 2011. That compares to one Moroccan candidate, as 
well as fifteen Romanian, twenty-two Latin American, and forty-nine other immigrant 
nominees for the 2011 elections. What is more, even when included in party lists, East 
European migrants are unlikely to reap electoral successes. In fact, none of the Balkan 
migrants in the authors’ sample of 709 candidates obtained a councilor seat in 2011. On 
                                                                                                                                                                             
differing ideologies and positions on the right-left continuum, rather than among particular personalities or 
ethnic collectives.   
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the other hand, three Latin American candidates secured a post, together with two “other” 
immigrant nominees. While all foreign-born candidates are severely disadvantaged by the 
local electoral process, therefore, Bulgarians, along with Moroccans, are particularly 
deprived of electoral successes, with Latin Americans the only, if very moderately, 
successful immigrant political candidates. This contrast leads Pérez-Nievas et al. (2014, 
p. 43) to conclude that an “ethnic penalty” is clearly in operation for the Bulgarian and 
Moroccan collectives, yet is less damning for South Americans in view of their “greater 
cultural and linguistic proximity.”286 
Not only are Bulgarians much less likely to stand as candidates in local elections 
than are Ecuadorians, but they are also less likely to vote. Foreign workers have an 
increasingly large voting potential in Spain as the migrants eligible to vote have grown 
from 2.9% in 1999 to 7% of all potential voters in 2011. Notably, Ecuadorians take a 
small part of this potential (with Latin Americans accounting for 14% of eligible voters), 
due to the requirement for long-term residency in Spain prior to voting. Bulgarians and 
Romanians account for almost four in ten potential voters (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014).  
However, all foreign collectives register and vote in much lower numbers than in a 
perfect world. In 2007, only 16.9% of eligible foreign voters actually entered in the 
Electoral Census for Foreign Residents (CERE). The numbers were particularly low for 
East Central Europeans whose registration rates were close to 1% in some cases (Juberías 
& Alonso, 2011). According to Muňoz (2009), only 10% of Bulgarians registered for the 
                                                          
286 Author’s translation from the following quote in Spanish, “En concreto, la sanción étnica parece operar 
en mayor medida entre los inmigrantes procedentes de Europa del Este (especialmente los búlgaros y, por 
lo que se refiere a la probabilidad de resultar electos, también los rumanos) y entre los inmigrantes de 
origen marroquí. En sentido contrario, y como quizás cabría esperar dada su mayor proximidad cultural y 




2007 local elections, a rate lower than the 17% average and Ecuadorians’ 30% 
registration rate. In 2001, 20% of foreigners registered to vote in Spain’s local elections, 
with 14% of all new member state citizens and 15% of all third-country nationals 
expressing desire to participate (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014). While the gap between the 
two groups has been closing according to some researchers, Ecuadorians are still more 
likely to participate locally. According to Bulgarian representatives, 2011 participation 
rates for the Balkan migrants stood only at 8%, with 34,000 Bulgarians eligible to vote in 
Madrid, yet only 2,810 registered. Only ten persons attended the information campaigns 
by the NGO. The lack of inclusion campaigns by the local, regional, and national 
governments in Spain, combined with Bulgarian’s disenchantment with the political 
process in general are found to blame (M2-BO).  
What is more, Ecuadorians are granted multiple accommodations for political 
participation in the home country, through the so-called “external vote.” However, as 
they settle into the receiving context, they are losing interest in the politics of the sending 
state. To demonstrate, in both 2006 and 2009 a majority of Ecuadorian residents in Spain 
were entitled to vote in elections back home. However, while the participation rate stood 
at 61% among registered voters and 16% among all potential voters in 2006, participation 
rates dropped to 40% among registered voters and only 11% among all potential 
Ecuadorian voters in 2009 (Echeverria, 2015). Simultaneously, three quarters of 
Ecuadorians expressed interest in voting in Spanish elections if entitled to do so (Morales 
& San Martín, 2011). The South Americans are also the beneficiaries of activist trade 
unions and other social actors, who engage in multiple political campaigns to extend the 
right to vote to third-country nationals in Spain without conditions of reciprocity or long-
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term residency (Zapata-Barerro & Zaragoza, 2009). On the other hand, Bulgarians’ right 
to the external vote is far from accommodated by Spanish national and local authorities. 
To provide one example, despite the relatively high number of Bulgarians residing in 
Spain, there were only two polling stations Bulgarians could use to vote in the 2009 
elections in the home country, compared to over fifty in Turkey (Dobreva, 2013).  
In sum, much like their counterparts in Dublin, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians 
rarely participate in Madrid’s political process. The Spanish political system is mostly to 
blame, as electoral rules in Madrid exclude a number of immigrants from voting and 
standing in municipal elections and make the inclusion of ethnic candidates on party lists 
unattractive to political parties. Nonetheless, non-EU Ecuadorians are more involved than 
European Bulgarians. While European harmonization dictates that Bulgarians be granted 
local political participation, few of the East Europeans are nominated by the major parties 
and rarely win if they are, due to an “ethnic penalty.” The Balkan workers also register to 
vote in relatively low numbers and are precluded from participating politically in the 
home country. On the other hand, policy changes enable Ecuadorians to vote in 
municipal contests, where naturalization rules effectively open an avenue for the South 
Americans’ running in Madrid’s electoral contests as well. While also severely 
underrepresented in party lists, Ecuadorian candidates tend to win seats on the basis of 
their cultural and linguistic proximity to Spanish voters. Voting rates are relatively low 
yet higher than these of East Europeans. While the Latin Americans are accommodated to 
participate in politics at home, their interest in the external vote is decreasing, signaling a 
shift to belonging in the host context. Ecuadorians are assigned a 3 and Bulgarians a 2 for 
this component of political integration (Table V.2). 
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V.4.3. Extrapolitical Participation 
V.4.3.1. Extrapolitical Participation in Dublin 
Extrapolitical activities among the four cohorts, like participation in trade unions 
or independent political mobilization, signal trends similar to these in local political 
engagement. Trade unionization and political activism rates are relatively low for all 
immigrants in Dublin, but are rising among Polish workers. According to the ICI, 
political activism is extremely low for Nigerian, Chinese, Indian, and East European 
immigrants. While the Council’s East European participants were somewhat more likely 
to engage in such activities, with 2.5% of all of the ICI’s interviewees, only 1% of 
Nigerians engaged in political activism. Trade unionization was higher for both groups. 
One quarter of all Nigerian participants were unionized compared to one tenth of East 
Europeans (CSO, 2006-2011; ICI, 2008, pp. 80-81).  
These low unionization rates reflect the sectors in which the immigrants of 
interest are employed, their length of stay in Ireland, as well as structural factors from 
their home countries. Trade union density among immigrants varies across economic 
sectors. For instance, Nigerian women in the health industry have much higher trade 
unionization rates, while the cleaning industry where Polish women are employed 
exhibits one of the lower union density rates in the country (D27-TU). There are 
differences even within economic sectors, with 45% of cleaners in public transportation 
unionized and only 3% of cleaners in private offices belonging to a union (D2-TU; D27-
TU). Long working hours and high membership fees account for the low unionization 
rates of both Nigerians and Poles. Union organizing is also low among Polish workers 
due to distrust in the labor movement at home (D27-TU). On the other hand, precarious 
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legal status precludes Nigerian immigrants from union activity (ICI, 2008, p. 80). Since 
Nigerian immigrants have been in Ireland longer, they have come to need the unions’ 
help in resolving labor disputes, while Polish workers are only now discovering the 
power of the Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU). As SIPTU 
and other trade unions engage in active recruitment of Polish workers, differences in 
unionization rates are disappearing (D27-TU; ICI, 2008, p. 80; Mutwarasibo, 2011). 
Despite “issues of perception” with the labor movement, union density is on the 
rise amidst Polish workers due to the active efforts of SIPTU. Union representatives 
report a conscious policy to welcome workers from new EU member states “one hundred 
percent”, both to secure non-Irish workers’ rights and entitlements and “to prevent 
employers from undermining labor laws and standards” for specific economic sectors 
(D2-TU; D27-TU). For instance, in 2009 the Joint Labor Committee of SIPTU made a 
decision to target the contract cleaning industry for a strategic organizing campaign. An 
administrative group interacts with industrial organizers within the Union to bring on 
board immigrants in cleaning, most of whom Polish. SIPTU also works with the Migrants 
Rights Centre of Ireland to inform on worker rights and promote economic integration for 
immigrant workers in Dublin (D27-TU). These developments led one union 
representative to suggest that the “Polish actually were the strongest group” in SIPTU, 
where there was even a Polish section of the Union’s website (D2-TU).  
Political activity is also increasing for both groups, yet differs in target and 
mechanism. African immigrants engage in political activity as part of their everyday life 
as asylum seekers in Ireland and aim to change the system. On the other hand, Polish 
immigrants involve themselves in Irish governmental initiatives, as to avail themselves of 
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the system. To illustrate, in 2010 residents of the family-friendly Mosney asylum camp 
were told to relocate to ghettoized urban hostels in Dublin. The decision came without 
consultation with the immigrants. It would effectively separate family and friendship 
networks developed in Mosney and crowd Nigerians with other asylum seekers of 
fundamentally different cultures (D43-NO; Isaac, 36; Moreo, 2012a, p. 165). As one 
asylum seeker shared, after fathering a child to a fellow Nigerian in Mosney, he would be 
deprived of the chance to see his son by moving to Dublin city (Isaac, 36). The relocation 
produced months of demonstrations, meetings with members of Parliament and Dublin 
City Hall, and the coming together of existing immigrant support organizations. It also 
spawned new immigrant organizations like the Anti-Racism Network Ireland. While the 
protests did not prevent removal from Mosney, they are a prime example of political 
mobilization by asylum seekers (D43-NO; Isaac, 36). 
On the other hand, Polish community leaders rarely engage in protests. Instead, 
they are involved in initiatives like the Ministerial Council by the Office for the Minister 
of Integration. As one Polish immigrant in the Council shared, ethnic representatives 
meet with the Minister and other key institutions, such as the Garda, to discuss key issues 
for the ethnic groups involved like schooling, problematic interactions with the police, or 
political participation (Kevin, 27).  
In sum, rates of political and trade activism are low for both Nigerian and Polish 
workers, yet are rising for the latter. This is the case due to the costs of engagement in 
terms of wages lost or membership fees, as well as disenchantment with the labor 
movement in one’s home country among Polish workers. Once again, the Polish are 
overtaking their Nigerian counterparts in terms of unionization, however, as they learn of 
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the power of SIPTU and as they are actively recruited by the Union. The Polish are also 
more likely to avail themselves of the Irish political machine than to protest against it 
than are Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. The East Europeans are assigned an 
intermediary 3 for this indicator of political integration, while Nigerians are given a 
higher value of 4 (Table V.2). 
 
V.4.3.2. Extrapolitical Participation in Madrid 
Trade unionizing and political mobilization are also relatively low among 
Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, yet are significantly higher for the Latin 
Americans. The latter unionize in rates higher than these for Spaniards and are the 
primary beneficiaries of Spanish trade unions’ political and legal campaigns and 
activities. Ecuadorians also tend to engage in political mobilization, mostly using the 
Spanish system and resources to target the home state. The Balkan migrants, much like 
their Polish counterparts, are wary of political activism or union activity in view of a 
repressive Communist past and disenchantment with the labor movement or the political 
process. However, unlike in the Irish case, Spanish actors rarely seek to engage the East 
Europeans, who are supposed to enjoy sufficient rights as EU citizens and whose level of 
civic distrust is hard to overcome. 
Much like in the case of Ireland, trade unions in Spain do not collect information 
on unionization disaggregated by nationality, with one representative placing the 
unionization of all foreign-born workers in Spain at a modest 15% (M23-TU). 
Nonetheless, a study by Meardi, Martín and Riera (2012) of the construction sector, a 
space where Bulgarians and Ecuadorians interact, finds that unionization rates differ 
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significantly between the two groups. Unionization in construction is generally low, with 
8.7% for Spaniards and 3.6% for immigrants. However, campaigns by the UGT (Unión 
General de Trabajadores) and CCOO (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras) 
resulted in success only among Latin Americans, who might even exhibit unionization 
rates higher than these of natives, but achieved no results among East European or 
Moroccan workers. The authors attribute union success to Ecuadorians’ and other South 
Americans’ language and cultural proximity, as well as general potential for political 
mobilization. On the other hand, the scholars blame Bulgarians’ and other East European 
workers’ lack of union involvement on their individualism and temporary outlook, 
distrust in organized labor activity, and “sense of distance” from Spanish unions.   
Notably, Spanish trade unionism is less about participation than about unions’ 
political activism and active protection of workers’ rights (Meardi, Martín & Riera, 
2012).  Unions are the primary force behind regularization campaigns of undocumented 
workers (M23-TU; M25-TU; M26-TU; M34-TU). They set up e Information Centers for 
Migrant Workers to inform regular and irregular foreign laborers of their rights, promote 
“dignified work” (trabajo digno), and help with permit renewals, regularization, family 
reunification, or health care access (M23-TU; M25-TU; M34-TU).287 The UGT reports 
being active in social dialogue with employers and the government in order to render 
migration and labor legislation more beneficial to foreign workers, shape the catalog of 
hard-to-find occupations and open more avenues of entry for third-county workers in 
Spain (M23-TU; M25-TU; M26-TU; M34-TU). The Union’s migration secretariats work 
together with the Ministry of Labor and Immigration to set up incorporation programs, 
put forward “diversity programs,” open centers that aid with foreign laborers’ socio-
                                                          
287 Author’s translation from original phrase in Spanish.  
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economic integration, and provide education on interviewing or looking for work in 
Madrid (M23-TU; M25-TU; M34-TU). Finally, immigrants are included as syndicate 
delegates and officials more often than as political party candidates (M23-TU). 
Ecuadorian and other third-country nationals, who require permits to enter the Spanish 
labor market, might find themselves in an irregular situation, and are eager to participate 
politically, are the primary beneficiaries of all these efforts (M23-TU; M25-TU; M34-
TU). On the other hand, EU Bulgarians who are hostile towards institutionalized trade 
unions tend not to avail themselves of the organizations’ political clout (M26-TU).  
Bulgarians also rarely engage in political mobilization in Spain due to political 
socialization, cynicism, and low levels of involvement with politically active social actors 
in Spain, such as UGT and CCOO (M2-BO). On the other hand, transnationally-oriented 
Ecuadorians often employ the resources of the host context to influence politics in the 
home country. In one instance, Ecuadorians associations and their members in Madrid 
mobilized to prevent Ecuadorians national banks from recovering mortgage debt acquired 
in Spain in 2011 (De Sandoval, 2011).  
In sum, distrustful Bulgarians are unlikely to be drawn in by eager trade unions in 
Spain. Unions also rarely target the East Europeans, since they are uninterested in 
political and social activities, or are perceived to enjoy sufficient rights and resources as 
EU citizens. On the other hand, Ecuadorians are the primary beneficiaries of trade union 
activities in Madrid. They unionize in relatively high rates, partake in UGT and CCOO 
regularization drives, employ the services of Information Centers for Migrant Workers, 
and are interested in the unions’ legal sway, integration programs and educational 
services. Ecuadorians also engage in political mobilization, mostly to change the home 
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country. Ecuadorians’ cultural and linguistic proximity and conception of Ecuador and 
Spain as existing in one transnational space underpins higher extra-political participation 
rates. Bulgarians are thus given a low 2 for their Extrapolitical activity in Madrid, while 
Ecuadorians merit a higher value of 4 (Table V.2).  
 
V.4.4. Civic Activism 
V.4.4.1. Civic Activism in Dublin 
 Finally, both Nigerian and Polish immigrants engage in community activism in 
Dublin, as do Bulgarians and Ecuadorians in Madrid.  Migrants in Dublin have 
established organizations to serve their national populations, larger ethnic groups, or the 
local community in the receiving city. Migrant activism falls in two types, however, with 
differences between European and non-European immigrants. Third country nationals 
established organizations and engaged in immigrant activism mostly between 2000 and 
2004, as a direct continuation of the political activities of individuals in their countries of 
origin. On the other hand, EU migrants engage in organizational activity since the EU 
enlargement in 2004, concentrating their efforts on practical issues like employment, 
social welfare, language acquisition, and cultural socialization (Lentin, 2012).  
Africans are well involved in community activity due to previous activism in their 
country of origin, the length of their stay in Ireland, and their urgent legal and migration 
situation in Dublin. A strong yet small cadre of Nigerian activists works across networks 
to advance the interests of the ethnic group. Nigerians participate in the Africa Centre, an 
umbrella organization concerned with the advancement of all Africans in Ireland, but also 
have their own national voluntary and civic organizations like the Nigerian Association 
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of Ireland and the Igbo Association of Ireland (ICI, 2008, p. 84). These associations tend 
to emphasize political and social empowerment rather than the economic and cultural 
integration stressed by Polish organizations (Fanning, Shaw, & Boyle, 2009).288 They 
focus almost exclusively on remedying the asylum process and securing the political and 
legal rights of the Africans.  
Religious activities are a popular venue of empowerment for the community. 
African immigrants are particularly engaged in Pentecostal churches, which provide them 
with “spiritual guidance and comfort, practical advice and help, and an interpretive frame 
to make sense of migration trajectories.” Pentecostal churches also serve as a forum for 
African immigrants to devise and engage in activities for socio-economic and political 
empowerment (Moreo, 2012b, pp. 86-87). Churches spawn other migrant organizations 
dedicated to community support and service provision. While promoting integration, 
churches represent a unique space where members of the ethnic group can preserve and 
reenact their home culture and social rituals (Passarelli, 2012, pp. 143, 149-150).  
The media is another mechanism for Nigerian activists to advance the interests of 
their community and to secure its political integration. For example, one activist started a 
radio program at Dublin Community Radio to discuss issues pertinent to African 
immigrants, “their social concerns, political concerns, policies that are unfavorable to 
them” (Taylor, 30). Another established the most prominent ethnic newspaper in Dublin 
in 2000 – Metro Eireann – a publication with predominantly Nigerian contributors. The 
                                                          
288 A few established Nigerian immigrants do focus on building the economic and social capital of their 
community. For instance, Nigerians participate in Emerge, where ethnic entrepreneurs are trained to 
conduct business according to the Irish standard and are thus provided with skills to ensure their economic 
integration in Ireland (D42-NO). One Nigerian organized a fashion show with ethnic models as to empower 




newspaper looks at “issues in the community, it could be immigration issues, political 
issues or policies” (Charles, 56). 
The civic activities of Nigerian immigrants in Dublin are rich and empowering. 
However, while asylum seekers are particularly active, once they emerge from the 
asylum process and receive more secure status or gainful employment, they focus on their 
own well-being rather than on their community’s. A desire to disassociate with the 
asylum experience, as well as one’s race or particular nationality, becomes significant. 
Consequently, communal interests lose priority (ICI, 2008, p. 84). There is also high 
turnover and cessation of activities by non-paid volunteers whose time and resources are 
limited (D43-NO). Few Nigerians beyond the core of Nigerian “career activists,” 
therefore, are involved in civic and political activities in Dublin. 
Polish workers are much better integrated in the labor market than their Nigerian 
counterparts. Further, they are rarely the subject of racism in Dublin. Therefore, socio-
cultural marginalization is not a predictor of Poles’ political and civic activity. 
Discrimination in employment did create some political aspirations, and many Polish 
organizations in Dublin focus on issues of economic and social service provision. 
Nonetheless, Polish community energy is concentrated mostly on the Polish diaspora in 
Ireland rather than on Irish institutions. For instance, the drive to create Polish schools in 
Dublin was directed at the Polish consulate and not the Irish government (Fanning & 
O’Boyle, 2010, p. 422). Still, the Polish Social and Cultural Association (POSK Dublin), 
the Irish-Polish Business Society, or Forum Polonia have provided for cross-cultural 
events in Dublin, business networking and entrepreneurship opportunities between the 
two countries, service provision and information, as well as ethnic and cultural solidarity. 
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Polish weekend schools educate Polish children in language skills and Polish history and 
geography and serve to promote “resistance against …linguistic and cultural 
assimilation,” but also to establish a new cultural identity for a community whose life 
occurs in the home and host country (Moreo, 2012b, pp. 88-90).  
There are two types of Polish organizations, both run by a loyal cadre of Polish 
activists engaged across networks to strengthen the ethnic group while promoting 
interaction with the host society. The first type of organization focuses on serving the 
practical needs of Polish immigrants in Dublin. The Social and Legal Advice Centre, for 
instance, provides legal services and information about employment and social welfare 
entitlements (D38-PO; D39-PO). Polish employees at Irish service providers like 
Crosscare, CARE, or My Mind, give specialized information to their Polish clients on 
housing, healthcare, and psychological issues respectively (D35-PO; D36-PO; D40-PO). 
Organizations like Cultur or the Polish Chaplaincy are venues for the professional 
development of well-educated Poles (Kevin, 27; Lilly, 36; Michael, 56). 
The second type of Polish organization in Dublin aims to enhance the cultural 
integrity of the ethnic group, while also presenting Polish culture to the Irish. The Polish-
speaking Polish Social and Cultural Association and the English-speaking Irish-Polish 
Society are the overarching umbrellas in setting up a wealth of cultural events in the host 
city (D35-PO). The Polish Social and Cultural Association has a “concentration on Polish 
culture” and organizes activities like meet-and-greets with visiting Polish politicians, thus 
increasing cultural density within the Polish diaspora in Ireland (George, 58). The Irish-
Polish society, on the other hand, is focused on establishing connections with the host 
society and setting up intercultural interactions. Recently, the focus is placed on 
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“[getting] more connected to the Irish society and [getting] more involved in Irish life” 
(Steven, 34). The Irish-Polish society works with the Irish Peace Corps Localise, where a 
group of Polish volunteers not only teach English to their compatriots but also aid the 
native communities in which they are based, with Irish nationals as the primary 
beneficiaries (Kevin, 27). The Polish House is the physical seat of the cultural 
associations. It serves as a forum for the strengthening of the Polish diaspora in Dublin, a 
platform for artistic expression and exchange, and formerly a seat of the Polish (George, 
58; Janet, 67; Richard, 34). The wealth of Polish bars, restaurants and shops in Dublin are 
considered another venue for interaction within the community and between the 
community and its Irish hosts (D41-NO).  
The religious and media activities of the Polish group combine the two aspects of 
community involvement described above, as they both serve to enhance the spiritual and 
cultural identity of Polish immigrants in Dublin and provide them with practical 
information and services. The Polish Chaplaincy provides a number of religious activities 
that serve as a glue and expression platform to the Polish community in Dublin, but also a 
forum for this community to interact with Irish citizens (D35-PO; D37-PO). The Church 
is recognized as a seat of political power for the Polish community in Ireland (George, 
58; Hailey, 60). The Chaplaincy’s activities reach beyond spiritual services.  For instance, 
the Polish Chaplaincy works with the Social and Legal Advice Center to address 
economic concerns, such as welfare benefits, and organizes Polish Sunday school for 
immigrant children (D39-PO; Janet, 67). It also collaborates with the Polish 
Commissioner for People’s Rights and the Ombudsman for Human Rights to ensure 
equal rights for Polish citizens in Ireland (D35-PO; D37-PO).  
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Ethnic publications like the newspapers Gazeta, Polska Gazeta, and the Polish 
Sunday Herald are invaluable sources of information for the Polish community, but also a 
way to announce the community’s identity to the host society. Even information portals 
like www.nadjemy.ie are helpful to thickening Polish ethnic networks and enhancing the 
community’s potential for civic activism (D41-NO). Most media outlets for the Polish 
community thrive under the umbrella of Forum Polonia, a diasporic network of Polish 
immigrants around the world, active in Ireland since the mid-2000s (Kevin, 27). 
In sum, both Nigerian and Polish immigrants in Dublin participle in civic and 
voluntary associations on a daily basis. Nigerian immigrants focus their efforts on aiding 
the political and social integration of their ethnic group. Polish immigrants are instead 
concerned with economic and service provision, as well as the cultural enhancement and 
entrenchment of their cohort in the host city. Both populations are active in religious and 
media organizations. Unfortunately, only a small number of “career activists” from both 
nationalities are civically engaged in Ireland. The number is limited in the case of 
Nigerian immigrants to only those with previous political experience from the home 
country. On the other hand, as a number of “ordinary” Poles participate in activities to 
strengthen their cultural community in Dublin, the East Europeans are more likely to 
interact with their Irish hosts. Regardless, both populations are assigned a high 4 for this 
indicator of political integration (Table V.2). 
 
V.4.4.2. Civic Activism in Madrid 
Civic engagement as an expression of belonging in the host context is strong 
among Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid as well. Despite the scarcity of research on 
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the subject, Ecuadorians’ associational activity in Madrid is significant (Morales & Pilati, 
2014). Of the 488 immigrant associations in Spain, 150 pertain to Latin Americans, and 
58 to Eastern Europeans. Ecuadorians have the largest number of organizations in Spain 
among all nationalities (89) compared to 49 for Romanians, for instance. While 
organizational density is intermediate (with 26.5 organizations per 100,000 persons), it is 
still higher than that for Eastern Europeans.289 As Morales and Pilati (2014) argue, many 
of these organizations are focused on the home country. Of the thirteen organizations 
surveyed by Gómez and Cubillo (2010), for instance, ten reported cooperating with the 
country of origin and working to maintain the immigrants’ own culture. Nonetheless, as 
ten of the thirteen were dedicated to political activities, Ecuadorians’ civic activism in 
Madrid is a significant predictor of Ecuadorians’ tendency for political mobilization and 
of the immigrants’ capacity to engage politically in Spain (Gómez & Cubillo, 2010).  
Bulgarians exhibit disproportionately high rates of civic participation in Madrid as 
an alternative rather than a supplement to political engagement. In 2006, for instance, five 
of the fifty-two ethnic associations in Madrid were Bulgarian (Gómez & Cubillo, 2010). 
This researcher met with the representatives of seven ethnic organizations in the city of 
Madrid, all founded since 2003. Much like the activities of Polish organizations in 
Dublin, Bulgarian associations can be divided into two types, one focused on service 
provision and the other – on cultural enhancement and integration. On the one hand, 
associations like Balcan, the CEPI Hispano-Bulgaro, ABE Cirilo y Metodio, and even the 
Office for Labor and Social Affairs to the Bulgarian Embassy in Madrid address the labor 
and legal needs of the Bulgarian community in Madrid (M1-BO; M2-BO; M4-BO; M5-
                                                          
289 For example, organizational density among Romanians is 15 organizations per 100,000 people. That 
number compares to 63 organizations for Dominicans (Góomez & Cubillo, 2010). 
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BO).  Prior to 2007, they dealt with permit acquisition and renewal, family reunification 
or access to social services (M2-BO). With entry into the EU, yet imposition of 
transitional arrangements, the organizations dedicated their energies to disseminating 
information on Bulgarians’ legal status in Spain and setting up self-employment and 
other contracts as to ensure entry in Madrid (M2-BO; M5-BO). The latest activities of 
these associations involve services like resume writing courses, voter registration drives, 
social security and pension consultations, and language classes (M1-BO; M2-BO; M4-
BO; M5-BO).  Unlike their Polish counterparts, however, the ethnic associations are 
intricately involved with the local government (M1-BO). They do not serve the Bulgarian 
community exclusively. While 60% of clients are Bulgarian, Spaniards form another 20% 
and other migrants like Ecuadorians are the third type of beneficiary (M2-BO; M5-BO). 
A second set of East European associations in Madrid promote the cultural 
integrity and expression of the Bulgarian diaspora, yet also aim to incorporate Bulgarians 
into the cultural outlook of the receiving context. For instance, Balcan organizes an 
increasingly popular Bulgarian Sunday school teaching children Bulgarian language and 
history (M1-BO; M7-BO). Associations like TANGRA, Kubrat, ABE Ciril I Metodio, 
and Asociación Hispano-Bulgara para la Integración y el Desarrollo develop the artistic 
expression of the Bulgarian community in Spain by organizing Bulgarian folk music or 
dance troupes or inviting performers from the home country (M5-BO; M6-BO; M7-BO).  
However, they also publicize Bulgarian cultural expression to Spaniards by organizing 
events for the general public in Madrid (M6-BO). They are engaged in Bulgarians’ socio-
cultural incorporation in the host city through language courses or campaigns of 
sensitization of Spaniards to the cultural diversity brought about by Bulgarians (M6-BO).  
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Media and religious expression are other venues for Bulgarian civic engagement 
in Madrid (M3-BO; M8-BO).  The Bulgarian newspaper Nova Duma, based in the capital 
yet disseminated throughout Spain, was started in 2003 as a communication forum for the 
Bulgarian diaspora. It incorporates news about Bulgaria, information about inspiring 
Bulgarians in Spain, news on Spanish developments concerning Bulgarians, as well as a 
practical question-and-answer section (M2-BO; M3-BO). The magazine “BgStyl” is a 
cultural platform for Bulgarians in Madrid, yet also contains useful information 
concerning the Balkan migrants (M6-BO). The Orthodox church “Sveto Bogojavlenie” 
provides the community with spiritual guidance and social expression.  
In sum, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians are engaged civically in Madrid. 
Ecuadorians hold the largest number of associations in the city among all immigrant 
collectives and employ these platforms to connect to the home country and to change the 
receiving context. Civic membership is a good predictor of political activity for the 
cohort, which is assigned a high 4 for this indicator of political integration (Table V.2). 
Bulgarians, engage in ethnic associations as an alternative to political involvement. 
Bulgarian associations in Madrid are dedicated to service provision, but also to cultural 
development and immersion in the host city.  Bulgarians’ civic activism is the easiest 
way for the community to signal its desire to incorporate in the socio-political life of 
Madrid and merits the highest value of 5 (Table V.2). 
 
V.5. Conclusion 
Political participation patterns support the broader argument of this dissertation. 
While the incorporation of all four groups of interest here is somewhat imperfect, there 
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are significant differences among the collectives based on the exclusion-inclusion they 
face in the receiving context and their own conception of belonging or isolation. These 
dynamics concern both passive political incorporation, and the entitlements conferred 
upon the newcomers through policy, legislation, or differing legal status classifications, 
and active participation, or the foreign workers’ use of these rights.  
Ecuadorians, who are both included and perceive themselves to belong in Madrid, 
experience organic integration (Table V.1). They are privileged by national and local 
policies and laws and take ample advantage of their entitlements. Their arrival in Spain as 
workers puts them at the center of a migration system dedicated to serving the receiving 
country’s economic and demographic needs. The South Americans are the beneficiaries 
of relatively open entry and labor market access in Spain based in bilateral agreements, 
the hard-to-fill occupations catalog, the labor contingents, and the jobseekers visa. They 
are granted fast-track admission to Spanish citizenship, local political rights close to these 
of natives and EU nationals, and ample incorporation resources. Even if irregular, 
Ecuadorians can easily avail themselves of targeted regularizations made easier by their 
socio-cultural connections to the host context. Unsurprisingly, the Latin American 
immigrants naturalize in the largest numbers among any foreign group in Spain, vote in 
local elections and might even be elected into office despite obstacles, participate in trade 
unions, and set the most civic associations in the receiving city. Even when continuing to 
focus on the motherland through their political activism, Ecuadorians signal their 
belonging in host and home contexts, which exist in one transnational space (Table V.2).  
Polish workers, who are welcomed in the receiving context, yet do not consider 
themselves to fit into Ireland’s life, represent reluctant integration (Table V.1). Most 
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Polish immigrants entered Ireland as EU citizens, or have regularized their status since 
2004. Developments like the opening of the Irish labor market to new member states in 
2004, the conscious policy to fill labor shortages through migration from within the EEA, 
and the focusing of integration resources on EU immigrants since 2008, further enhance 
the legal-political position of this community in Dublin. Regardless, Poles, who conceive 
of themselves as different from their Irish hosts, are reluctant to utilize the plethora of 
rights they are granted. They naturalize, unionize, and vote in relatively low numbers. 
However, Polish political participation is on the rise with efforts by local parties and 
trade unions. The Polish also tend to avail of the Irish political system more efficiently 
than their Nigerian counterparts as to advance their political and social integration in the 
host country. As they settle in Ireland, they overcome Nigerian immigrants in terms of 
political integration in Dublin (Table V.2). 
Bulgarians belong in their new home in Madrid, yet are met with disinterest if not 
hostility by local stakeholders. They represent the conflicted integration outcome (Table 
V.1) and intermediary levels of political incorporation (Table V.2). There are few legal 
or policy provisions that privilege the East Europeans. Legal status as EU nationals 
combined with barriers to working in Spain actually deprive them of clarity, labor 
protections, or incorporation funds. Naturalization rules or local political 
accommodations disadvantage the Balkan newcomers. As a consequence of these 
barriers, Bulgarians rarely naturalize or participate in Madrid’s elections. Prior political 
socialization and distrust precludes them from unionization or political mobilization. As 
they aspire to signal belonging in the host context, however, Bulgarians set a 
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disproportionately large number of ethnic associations in the host city, which serve to 
both preserve the community and immerse it into the receiving context’s life. 
Nigerian immigrants experience blocked integration (Table V.1). They are 
disadvantaged in terms of passive political integration. Their legal status as asylum 
seekers, foreign students, or undocumented migrants holds few rights and entitlements. 
Recent policy and legal developments concerning third-country nationals, such as the 
2004 Referendum amending the jus soli principle of citizenship, the 2009 closure of 
certain professions to work permits, or the 2010 Immigration Bill’s summary deportation 
procedures, further disadvantage this group. While Nigerian immigrants exhibit relatively 
high rates of active political participation, moreover, participation rates are still low and 
have plateaued over time. It cannot be denied that Nigerian immigrants naturalize and 
participate in local elections and Irish trade unions in larger numbers than Polish 
nationals in Dublin. However, Nigerian political participation is precluded by immutable 
barriers of structural and personal discrimination and a precarious legal status. Therefore, 
political integration levels are intermediate at best (Table V.2).  
Discussion of political integration also brings to light the differences between the 
two receiving contexts. With a focus on homogeneity and European-ness, Dublin’s 
stakeholders privilege Eastern European migrants. However, political participation rules 
are generally open to all foreigners in the city providing some opportunity even for 
different Nigerians. On the other hand, Madrid’s political landscape is conservative and 
closed regardless of a discourse of tolerance and democracy. An exclusively ethnic 
conception of the political community corresponds to entitlements for culturally and 
linguistically proximate Latin Americans at the expense of EU immigrants. EU 
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membership does not guarantee local rights and inclusion despite national commitment to 
EU harmonization. Contextual identity variations affect integration patterns.  
While context matters, what the newcomers do with it is important too. Poles’ 
cynicism and lack of belonging in Dublin render the East Europeans unwilling to avail 
themselves of the multiple entitlements and political access points they are granted. 
Interestingly, despite exclusion and lack of belonging, Nigerians in Ireland still exhibit 
relatively high active political participation levels, making the group the only outlier in 
this discussion. In this case, exclusion and racial discrimination do not connect with 
passivity but with the mobilization of ethnic group consciousness and resources. 
Unfortunately, incorporation outcomes are severely impaired in the economic and social 







“PH.D.’s DRIVING BUSES”: 
ECONOMIC INCORPORATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID 
 
VI.1. Introduction 
Why do Poles have access to the Dublin labor market, while highly-educated 
Nigerians are not considered a valuable worker pool by the Irish? Why do Bulgarians 
experience downward occupational mobility in Madrid, while Ecuadorians enjoy 
improved economic circumstances? Identity and perceptions of cultural proximity affect 
these patterns.  Not the migrants who carry the largest economic benefit, but rather the 
foreign cohorts that are considered “similar” in socio-cultural terms inspire the highest 
levels of trust and empathy among local labor market actors. They benefit from better 
access to jobs, less exploitation and more favorable relationships in the work place. 
Furthermore, immigrant collectives that consider themselves to “belong,” in subjective 
identity terms, are more likely to invest in economic access in the host city. They transfer 
qualifications and engage in jobs fitting their education, seek their economic rights and 
are satisfied with their economic situation in the receiving context.  
This chapter traces the economic integration of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and 
Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid through the discussion of access to employment; 
occupational mobility; working conditions; treatment at work; and satisfaction.290 A 
                                                          
290 Access is determined through the ability of a qualified immigrant candidate to receive an interview or a 
job offer regardless of nationality or race, as well as employment and unemployment rates. The indicator 
“occupational mobility” compares type and sector of current employment to education and work history at 
home and over time. Discussion of “working conditions” includes considerations of contract type, wages, 
work schedule, harsh working environment, or undue termination. Treatment at work is defined as 
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detailed discussion of these indicators suggests that Ecuadorians experience organic 
integration in Madrid. These similar migrants continue to have relatively open access to 
the Spanish labor market despite economic downturn and restrictive policy changes. 
Their socio-cultural proximity inspires trust in Spanish employers and results in little 
discrimination in recruitment, as well as higher participation rates and lower rates of 
inactivity than other immigrant groups like Moroccans or Eastern Europeans. 
Ecuadorians consider Madrid an extension of their homeland and their work life abroad a 
logical continuation of employment trajectories at home. They experience smaller 
penalties than Bulgarians, for instance, in terms of occupational mobility or working 
conditions upon migration. Identification with natives leads to less discrimination at work 
and higher levels of self-reported satisfaction (Table VI.1).  
 Polish workers undergo reluctant integration in Dublin. Local labor market actors 
perceive Poles as similar to the hard-working, white, European Irish. The East Europeans 
rarely experience discrimination in recruitment, even with economic downturn, and have 
high employment rates and relatively low unemployment ones. Polish workers can be 
mistreated at work by managers or colleagues, yet bullying is much less frequent among 
the Polish than among Nigerian workers, for instance. Polish immigrants are satisfied 
with their employment in Dublin. Poles’ own lack of belonging and identification with 
their hosts, however, leads to certain deficiencies in incorporation. Access is paired with 
downward occupational mobility and subpar conditions at work. As economic 
opportunities are ample, however, even if working below their educational level, Polish 
workers in Dublin are in full control of their economic destiny (Table VI.1).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
relationships with native managers, native and immigrant coworkers, as well as local clients and customers. 
Satisfaction is self-defined. 
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Table VI.1. Economic Incorporation Index291 
 
 
Bulgarians face conflicted integration in Madrid. Despite their European Union 
citizenship and high qualifications, the Balkan migrants are perceived as different and 
suspect by their Spanish hosts. Access to employment is impaired, employment status 
does not correspond to qualifications and exploitation at work is common. Regardless, as 
Bulgarian workers perceive themselves as similar to Spaniards in terms of history, 
temperament, and common European roots, the foreign workers seek their rights and are 
somewhat satisfied with the receiving city’s labor market (Table VI.1).  
Finally, Nigerians experience blocked integration in Dublin. The African 
immigrants face intense discrimination in the Irish workplace. The recruitment process is 
                                                          
291 Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Outcomes that reflect lack of economic access or 
incorporation are assigned a value of 1. High levels of incorporation and economic rights are given a value 
of 5. Outcomes that fall in the middle are assigned a 3. The values from every column are added to produce 
an index of economic incorporation levels for each immigrant group. Indicators are composite. 
“Access/(un)employment” includes the sub-categories of discrimination in recruitment/initial access to the 
labor market, current employment levels, as well as current unemployment levels for the group as a whole. 
Each of the three is given a value between 1 and 5 and the total is divided by three to come up with an 
average. Similarly, “conditions” comprise contract type, wages, hours, hard/menial work, as well as undue 
termination, with each sub-category assigned value from 1-5 and “conditions” as the average. 
“Relationships” includes treatment by native employers/managers, treatment by native and other 
coworkers, as well as treatment by native clients/customers, with each category assigned a value from 1 to 
5 and an average calculated. The Index ranges from 5 to 25. Values between 5 and 11 reflect low levels of 











































































highly disadvantaging for this physically different foreign population. There is a large 
gap between education and skills and actual employment opportunities, with medical 
doctors working as street cleaners. Occupational mobility is slow or nonexistent, 
unemployment rates are high, and activity levels are the lowest for any immigrant group 
in Ireland. Conditions and treatment at work are substandard, with bullying and 
xenophobia as an everyday experience (Table VI.1).  
The remainder of this chapter discusses each indicator of economic integration for 
Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid in turn. The 
findings are based on analysis of governmental and non-governmental reports, statistical 
information, secondary sources, and interviews with all relevant stakeholders. Interviews 
with the immigrants and their elite interlocutors add nuance to the discussion and 
complete the sources.292  
 
VI.2. Labor Market Access 
VI.2.1. Labor Market Access in Dublin  
Polish workers, considered similar to the white, European, Catholic, hard-working 
Irish, have relatively open access to Dublin’s local labor market. On the other hand, 
                                                          
292 In Dublin, additional sources include the study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland of the integration 
levels of Nigerians and Eastern Europeans in Ireland (ICI, 2008); two Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI) studies on immigrant integration in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2006, 2011); an ESRI piece 
on discrimination in recruitment among immigrants in Ireland (McGinnity, Nelson, Lunn, & Quinn, 2009); 
a report by O’Connell and McGinnity (2008) on foreign workers in the Irish labor market; as well as data 
from the Irish census (CSO, 2008, 2012a) and Quarterly National Household Survey (CSO, 2006-2011). In 
the case of Madrid, primary and secondary data are derived from the National Immigrant Survey (ENI) and 
its regional counterpart, the Regional Immigrant Survey (ERI); a report on immigrant integration in select 
European cities by the Migration Policy Institute (Huddleston & Tjaden, 2012); as well as several studies 
on the distinct aspects of immigranteconomic incorporation (Bernardi et al. 2010; Fernandez & Ortega, 
2008; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014; Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012; Sanromá, Ramos, & 




Nigerians’ entry and continued access to Dublin’s workplace is severely impaired. The 
Polish rarely experience discrimination in recruitment, despite deficient language skills, 
as opposed to their English-speaking yet racially different African counterparts.293  Even 
with the collapse of the construction industry, the East Europeans’ activity rates remain 
high, while labor market participation is particularly low for Nigerians in Dublin.   
 





Desirable Polish workers easily secure employment in Dublin and are actively 
recruited by eager Irish local labor market actors. For instance, a 2006 study by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute found that Eastern Europeans were the least 
likely immigrant group to have limited access to employment in Ireland, with 85.6% 
never experiencing problems in recruitment compared to 65.5% among Black Africans 
(McGinnity et al., 2006). Polish interviewees in this project attest to the ease of finding a 
job in Ireland, especially before the economic crisis. All those looking for a job before 
2008 talk of the availability of work, be it in lower-skilled occupations than their 
qualifications. Four in ten of the respondents came to Ireland with a job offer. Similarly, 
almost half of the Eastern Europeans in the study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland 
                                                          
293 Indicative is the fact that no representative of Polish organizations spoke of impaired access to jobs for 





Arrival with job offer < 1 
week 











Number 4 7 3 7 10 3 34 
% 12% 20.5% 9% 20.5% 29% 9% 100% 
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arrived in Ireland with secure employment compared to one sixth of Nigerian respondents 
(ICI, 2008, p. 88). Few of the East European participants in this dissertation required 
longer than one month to secure a job in Dublin (Table VI.2). Polish workers’ open 
access to work in Dublin is the result of active recruitment by Irish companies and 
governmental agencies, Polish agencies which provided for job placement and language 
courses in Dublin, and family and friends already in Ireland (D16-ADMIN; D41-NO). 
 

















Source: Author.  
 
The Polish interviewees employed different strategies when looking for work and 
sometimes changed course to ensure success. Apart from those recruited by Irish actors, a 
minority worked with an employment agency while in the home country and 16% 
enlisted the help of agencies in Ireland. Upon arrival in Dublin, a small number searched 
for jobs through newspaper ads, with little success. A more successful strategy was the 
use of the Internet, where 16% posted resumes to websites like the native irishjobs.ie or 
the Polish gazeta.ie. One quarter relied on recommendations by friends or family, or 









Recruited in Poland 2 4.5% 
Agency in Poland 2 4.5% 
Agency/FÁS in Dublin 7 16% 
News ad in Dublin 3 7% 
Internet 7 16% 
Family/friends 11 26% 










simply walked into businesses like restaurants, factories, casinos, shops, or hotels and 
handed out their resumes to potential employers. This final strategy is considered the 
most effective, where personal contact increased the chance of “similar” Polish workers 
to secure a job in Dublin (Table VI.3). Phenotypical characteristics affect access to 
employment in the receiving city. 
Few Polish workers were rejected from jobs outright. Most commonly, they were 
told they would be contacted later and were never called back. The participants who did 
receive a negative response were either told that there is a high volume of applications by 
better qualified candidates or that they were overqualified for the job (Howard, 28; Jane, 
26; Sarah, 33). Only two respondents felt discriminated against on the basis of their 
nationality. Both were looking for positions in high-skilled fields like photography and 
law. When prompted to elaborate, both conceded that lack of trust in their English 
language abilities cost them the job (Gillian, 25; Thomas, 37).  
Indeed, language deficiencies are the largest barrier to Poles’ recruitment in 
Dublin. Poor English is a justification for both not looking for qualified jobs and for not 
securing a specific desirable position. Economic downturn further affects the chances of 
Polish respondents in securing employment. Interviewees suggested that while “work 
was lying on the streets” prior to 2008, finding a job is difficult today (Jane, 27; Michael, 
56; Richard, 34). With the onset of crisis, governmental and local policy goals shifted 
from the up-skilling of the Irish population to the provision of jobs for the Irish (EGFSN, 
2010; Quinn, 2010). Employers followed suit and came to be concerned with a “quest for 
authenticity” in the service jobs previously occupied by the Polish (D16-ADMIN). 
Nonetheless, interviewees still believe that eagerness and desire to work will help them 
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secure a position regardless of economic circumstances (for instance, Kevin, 27; Ted, 
28). Irish employers agree and continue to employ the East Europeans both in view of 
their hard-working nature and their ability to “fit in.”   
While similarity accounts for non-English speaking Poles’ relatively open entry 
into the Dublin labor market, phenotypical and socio-cultural differences severely impair 
Nigerians’ access to jobs in Ireland. In a study with 480 job applicants in Ireland, the 
Economic and Social Research Institute found that discrimination in recruitment is 
particularly severe among Africans in Dublin. Job candidates with identifiable non-Irish 
names were over two times less likely to be invited for an interview than candidates with 
Irish names, despite comparable qualifications. African candidates were three times less 
likely to be invited for an interview as compared to applicants with European names. This 
is especially the case in lower-skilled positions (McGinnity et al., 2009). African 
organizations in Dublin agree that “it [is] hard for a black person to get a job in Ireland,” 
where a Nigerian person would apply to a multitude of jobs, and even if they were invited 
for an interview, “for one reason or another [they] will [still] be rejected” (D44-NO). 
Discrimination in accessing employment is the most severe area of work discrimination 
for Black immigrants in Ireland (Russell, Quinn, O’Riain, & McGinnity, 2008).  
Nigerian participants in this project confirm the difficulty of finding a job in 
Dublin and speak of the many rejections they faced in the recruitment process. They 
believe that “in-group favoritism” is strong with economic crisis, where employers “think 
about their people first” and “give preference to Irish people” (Isaac, 36; Zach, 32). 
Employing “Irish first” and “looking after their own kind” is a common theme that 
resounds with all of the interviewees (Harry, 35; Isaac, 36; Tatiana, 27; Zach, 32). In-
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group favoritism often occurs in the subtle forms described by the ESRI experiment. 
Most employers would take the Nigerian candidates’ resume and suggest they would 
contact them later with a decision, but they would never call back (Stephen, 36). The 
need for “Irish experience” serves as the most common justification to not hire African 
candidates (Taylor, 30). Bias is not always subtle, however. One Nigerian interviewee 
was turned away from a KFC restaurant and was directly told they are “looking for Irish 
people only” (Tatiana, 27). Another witnessed his resume being thrown “in the bin” 
immediately after he submitted it (Stephen, 36).  
 Skin color affects discrimination in recruitment among Nigerians. African 
organization members suggest that African immigrants are rarely employed in public 
positions or service jobs, even low-skilled. Instead, white immigrants like the Polish take 
the jobs where “the face of labor” is important (D42-NO; D44-NO). According to the ICI 
(2008), while personal contact resulted in building trust and securing a job for Eastern 
European migrants in Ireland, it severely disadvantaged Nigerian workers. Race and 
phenotypical characteristics, or as one respondent put it, “the sight of me”, affect 
Nigerians’ ability to find a job, where all suggest they need to be more qualified than 
white candidates in order to be hired (Tatiana, 27). In occupations where skills are not 
necessary, ethnicity and national origin significantly disadvantage African candidates. 
Therefore, securing a job is only possible through friend networks and recommendations 
to avoid racialization (Ethan, 46; Tatiana, 27; Taylor, 30).  
 “Similar” Poles in Dublin not only secure jobs in the first place but are also able 
to retain them, despite economic downturn or the collapse of the construction industry. 
The East Europeans’ employment rates remain high in bust economic times, even if 
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unemployment levels are on the rise. On the other hand, Nigerians’ activity rates are the 
lowest in Dublin and among the four cohorts in this dissertation. At the height of the 
economic boom in 2006, 84% of Polish workers in Ireland were employed and fewer 
than one in ten were unemployed. For the same period, fewer than four in ten Nigerians 
were employed and one third were unemployed (CSO, 2008). These activity rates are 
stable over time. In 2010, for instance, 65.6% of Polish workers in Ireland were in 
employment compared to 60.1% among the Irish and 52.8% among third-country 
nationals. Activity rates stood at 80% for EU12 citizens, 68.8% for Irish nationals and 
62.4% for non-EU immigrants (Table VI.4). Low activity rates among third-country 
migrants speak to the limited access they have to the Irish labor market (CSO, 2010; 
McGinnity et al., 2011). 
 
Table VI.4. Employment, Unemployment, and Activity Rates in Dublin (in %) 
 
 
* These numbers pertain to all third-country nationals rather than only to Nigerian immigrants. 
Sources: CSO, 2008, 2010. 
 
 
It is undeniable that Eastern European nationals are severely affected by the 
economic crisis, since they concentrated in the economic sectors that experienced the 
largest downturn (D5-ADMIN; D16-ADMIN; Mühlau, 2010). In 2010, the group was 
plagued by high unemployment of 18%, compared to 12.7% among the Irish and 15.4% 
among non-EU workers (CSO, 2010). Still, when one adjusts for the persons who are in 
education or care for the home, is it in fact 21% of all Poles who are in the job market but 
do not have a job compared to 22.5% among non-EU citizens. The high unemployment 
Population 2006 2010 
Employment Unemployment Employment Unemployment Activity 
Polish 84 9 65.6 18 80 
Nigerians 38 31 52.8* 15.4* 62.4* 
Irish 60 - 60.1 12.7 68.8 
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rate for Polish nationals, moreover, reflects the continuous inflow of Polish migrants into 
Ireland even after economic downturn. New arrivals have greater difficulty in securing a 
job in Ireland, while these arriving prior to 2008 enjoy a secure economic status. In fact, 
Russell et al. (2008) found that Black Africans were most severely affected by 
unemployment in Ireland. They were more than nine times more likely to be unemployed 
than Irish nationals when age, sex, and education were controlled for. Similarly, the ICI 
(2008) reports that only about half of the Nigerian workers they interviewed were 
employed. 13% of Nigerian men and 16% of Nigerian women were looking for work, 
percentages much higher than these for Chinese, Indian and Eastern European 
participants (ICI, 2008).  
This dissertation’s interviewees confirm these trends. Only 6% of Polish 
respondents were not working at the time of their interview compared to 60% of 
Nigerians. One third of Polish participants had been unemployed at one time, most often 
with the onset of recession, but had managed to find another job within five months. Only 
one in ten had been unemployed for longer than one year, but during that time they 
partook in government-sponsored education and volunteered in ethnic organizations to 
significantly augment their economic capital. Almost two thirds of Poles had never been 
unemployed during their stay in Ireland and a large number had never sought social 
welfare in Dublin. On the other hand, all Nigerian participants reported being 
unemployed at least at one time during their migration in Ireland. As one African 
representative suggested, since the employment opportunities available to Nigerians are 
so unsatisfactory, many to either become self-employed or rely on the generous Irish 
social security system (D44-NO).  
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To conclude, Polish immigrants have relatively open access to the Dublin labor 
market, and merit a rating of 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (Table VI.1). 
The culturally and physically proximate East Europeans rarely experience discrimination 
when seeking employment in Ireland, despite poor English language skills. Even with 
economic downturn, they believe that lesser qualified jobs are available to the eager to 
work. While plagued by high unemployment rates in Dublin since 2008, Polish workers 
continue to exhibit very high activity rates, and enjoy better access to employment than 
African immigrants and even Irish workers. On the other hand, Nigerians are blocked 
from the Dublin labor market and are assigned a composite value of 1 for this indicator of 
economic incorporation (Table VI.1). Third-country legal status disadvantages the 
Africans in looking for work. However, it is Nigerians’ phenotypical difference from the 
Irish that truly precludes them from securing occupations in which “the face of labor” is 
important. Activity rates for the excluded migrants who not consider themselves to 
belong in hostile Dublin are among the lowest for any group in Ireland. Discrimination in 
the economic sphere explains Africans’ limited access to work in Dublin.  
 
VI.2.2. Labor Market Access in Madrid 
 Like their Polish counterparts, culturally and linguistically similar Ecuadorians 
rarely experience discrimination in recruitment in Madrid. Despite severe economic 
contraction, the Latin Americans are still as likely or even more likely than native or East 
European workers to be employed and less likely to be unemployed. On the other hand, 
despite higher qualifications and more flexibility than South Americans, dissimilar 
Bulgarians do not enjoy open access to Madrid’s labor market. The Europeans’ activity 
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rates are not low like these of racially different Nigerians in Dublin. Yet, unemployment 
is higher among the Balkan workers than among the Spanish-speaking Ecuadorians.  
 While all of the Spanish employers interviewed by this author argue that they do 
not consider national origin when hiring, the labor market recruitment of Latin 
Americans is relatively unproblematic as compared to that of Bulgarians. In a study with 
3,636 Moroccans, Ecuadorians, and East Europeans in Madrid,294 Rodríguez-Planas and 
Vegas (2012) find that 61% of female Ecuadorian workers and 54% of male Ecuadorian 
migrants are working in the receiving context within thirty days of their arrival. This is 
true for only 46% of Moroccans and 51% of Eastern European laborers. Among this 
project’s interviewees, almost six in ten Ecuadorian respondents arrived in Spain with a 
contract and an additional one third were able to secure employment within one month. 
Only one in ten had difficulty in finding work, due to their irregular legal status. Nine in 
ten were never rejected during the application process, a percentage that compares to 
57% of all immigrant respondents in a study by the Migration Policy Group (Huddleston 
& Tjaden, 2012). Like the Polish in Dublin, Ecuadorians are even recruited by Spanish 
private employers, in view of their favorable linguistic, socio-cultural, and economic 
characteristics (M23-TU).  
 









                                                          
294 1,125 of the respondents in the study are Ecuadorian.  
Length of 
job search 
Contract <1 week 1 wk – 1 month >1 month Total 
Number 2 8 9 9 28 
% 7% 29% 32% 32% 100% 
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While not as disadvantaged as Nigerians in Dublin, Bulgarians have more 
difficulty entering employment in Madrid than Ecuadorians or Poles. Only 7% of this 
project’s interviewees arrived in the receiving context with a contract obtained through 
the Bulgarian National Employment Agency rather than through direct contact with 
Spanish employers. While 61% secured a job within a month, one third had difficulty 
finding employment in the long-term, compared to only 10% of both Ecuadorian and 
Polish respondents (Table VI.5).  
 
















Job search strategies further reflect the differences in access to employment 
between the Latin American and the Balkan workers. Ecuadorians are either recruited by 
Spanish companies from the home country or employ personal contact with potential 
employers to secure a job. On the other hand, Bulgarians rely almost exclusively on 
family and friend networks (60%) or the help of Bulgarian officials in Madrid (8%) 
(Table VI.6). The East Europeans share that they are usually hired only upon 
recommendation by a previous employer or by a worker leaving their post and 









Labor office Bulgaria 2 5.4% 
Labor office Madrid 2 5.4% 
BG assn/officials in Madrid 3 8.1% 
Spanish newspaper in Madrid 5 13.5% 
Internet 1 2.7% 
Family/friends 22 59.5% 














Few Bulgarian workers were rejected from positions outright, but a majority 
identified the language barrier as a significant obstacle. Much like in the case of the 
Polish in Ireland, poor language skills serve both as a justification to confine oneself to 
lower-skilled positions and as a reason for rejection from specific posts. Age, lack of 
papers or disagreement on work conditions are other hurdles to Bulgarians’ employment 
in Madrid. However, lack of trust or connection between Balkan Bulgarians and Iberian 
Spaniards, as well as preference for culturally proximate Latin Americans, is the second 
most significant barrier to employment quoted by the participants (Table VI.7). 
Interviewees share that after responding to newspaper ads about employment in domestic 
care, they were told that the job is only available to South American women (Rosa, 44, 
for instance). As the Bulgarian workers themselves put it, “No one trusts you enough to 
let you in their house,” since Spaniards “are used to their Latinos” (Pam, 39; Tonya, 
45).295 The European workers get better access to jobs over time, as they build trust and 
language skills. 
Culturally similar Latin Americans, seen largely as an extension of the Spanish 
labor force, are able to retain relatively high levels of employment despite economic 
collapse in Spain. While Bulgarians are not severely disadvantaged in terms of 
                                                          
295 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Те са си свикнали с техните латинци” (Pam, 
39), “Никой не може да ти има доверие да те пусне в къщата си” (Yana, 50).  
Obstacles Language Mistrust/preference 
for Latin Americans 




Number of responses 11 6 4 4 25 
% 44% 24% 16% 16% 100% 
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employment and unemployment rates, like Nigerians in Dublin, they exhibit larger gaps 
from the native population than their South American counterparts. The Balkan laborers’ 
conflicted access into the Spanish labor market reflects equally conflicted self-
conceptions of belonging and perceptions of Bulgarians’ identity among local 
stakeholders. 
Both Latin Americans and East Europeans came to Spain to work and thus have 
higher activity rates than other immigrant cohorts, such as Africans, and even the native 
labor force. Still, Ecuadorians are employed in higher numbers than Bulgarians. To 
illustrate, during boom times, almost nine in ten Latin Americans were employed 
compared to eight in ten East Europeans and seven in ten Spaniards (Fernandez & 
Ortega, 2008). At the height of economic growth in Spain, 82.7% of Ecuadorian 
participants in Bernardi et al. (2010)’s study were employed, compared to 75.3% of East 
Europeans, 70% of Spaniards and only 54% of Moroccans (Table VI.8). While 
immigrant cohorts have been severely disadvantaged with economic downturn in Spain 
in comparison to natives, the two groups of interest here fared better than other ethnic 
communities. While 59.8% of natives were employed in 2012, 53% of Ecuadorians were 
in employment compared to 52% of Bulgarians and only 34% of Moroccans, for instance 
(INE, 2012). Among this project’s interviewees, 89% of the Latin Americans were 
employed at the time of their interview and in the height of crisis, compared to 77% of 
the Bulgarian participants. While differences between the two ethnic communities are 





















*Numbers concern broad nationality groups. 
**Numbers concern Ecuadorians, East Europeans other than Romanians (many of whom 
Bulgarian), and Moroccans in particular. 
Sources: Bernardi et al., 2010; Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; Rodríguez-Planas & Nolleberger, 2014.   
 
As both the Balkan workers and their South American counterparts are employed 
in the economic sectors that experienced the largest downturn after 2008, the immigrants’ 
unemployment rates rose substantially. A regional study found that 39.5% of Ecuadorians 
in Madrid were unemployed in 2012 compared to 40.6% of Bulgarians and 27% of 
Spaniards (INE, 2012). A report by Rodríguez-Planas and Nolleberger (2014), however, 
suggests that Latin Americans are not nearly as disadvantaged and are similar to natives 
in terms of their economic inactivity rates. In the authors’ sample, while 39% of natives 
were out of work in 2010-2011, 37% of South Americans were unemployed when time of 
arrival was not considered, a number that compared to 44% of all East Europeans and 
66% of African migrants in Spain. When accounting for arrival time, half of the newest 
entrants from the East European cohorts are out of work – a number much higher than 
that for Latin Americans (Table VI.8).  
The interviewees in this project confirm these trends. Only 11% of Ecuadorians 















Active (1996-2006)* 88.32 86.5 73.43 77.22 
Unemployed (1996-2006)* 10.26 9.17 14.58 11.29 
Inactive (2006-2007)** 9.2 14.6 34 24.5 
Unemployed (2006-
2007)** 
8.1 10.1 12 5.5 
Employed (2006-2007)** 82.7 75.3 54 70 
Out of work (2010-2011)* 37 44 66 39 
Out of work if arrived 
2008-2011 (2010-2011)* 
41 50 76 - 
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ten of the South Americans had been unemployed at one time, yet had managed to find 
another job within three months. Only one in ten had been unemployed for longer than 
one year, like the Polish respondents in Dublin.  On the other hand, half of the Bulgarian 
participants reported being unemployed at least at one time in Spain. A majority failed to 
secure employment for longer than six months, with more than one quarter unemployed 
for longer than one year.  
To conclude, Ecuadorians have relatively open access to Madrid’s labor market 
and merit a high value of 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (Table VI.1). 
The culturally proximate Ibero-Americans do not face discrimination in securing 
employment in Spain and rely on their language skills and socio-cultural similarities 
when looking for jobs in the receiving context. While activity rates have collapsed and 
unemployment is high among the South Americans since 2009, differences with natives 
are not unsurmountable. Bulgarians’ access to work in Madrid is not as impaired as that 
of Nigerians in Dublin, but is less favorable than that of Ecuadorians. The Balkan 
collective is given an intermediate value of 3 for this indicator of economic incorporation 
(Table VI.1). While European Bulgarians break into Madrid’s labor market over time, 
their entry into employment is hindered by deficient language skills, mistrust, perceptions 
of difference, and preference for familiar Latin Americans. Activity rates approximate 
these of Ecuadorians, yet Bulgarians experience a larger penalty in terms of employment 
and unemployment than South Americans. The conflicted reception Bulgarians receive is 





VI.3. Occupational Mobility 
VI.3.1. Occupational Mobility in Dublin 
The correlation between open labor market access on the one hand and downward 
occupational mobility on the other hand is well-documented by the literature (for 
instance, Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; Venturini & Villosio, 2008). The Polish in Dublin 
are no exception, and are often employed below their educational level and skills. 
However, gaps between qualifications and employment are less glaring than these for the 
Nigerian population in Ireland. Polish workers are in control of their economic status and 
often choose to perform jobs below their qualifications. A majority experienced job 
shortages or downward occupational mobility prior to migration and thus do not suffer 
from severe deskilling upon migration, like their African counterparts. On the other hand, 
Nigerians completed tertiary education and occupied managerial and government 
positions at home, but are forced into undesirable, dead-end jobs in Ireland. They suffer 
from frustration and psychological distress due to their economic failure.  
 











Source: Author.  
 
Polish immigrants in Ireland are highly educated. In 2006, 27% of the Polish 
population in Ireland held a university degree and 19% – a post-graduate degree in 
 
Highest educational level 
 
Number of responses 
 
% 
High school or lower 5 12% 
College 14 32% 
Master’s or Ph.D. 18 42% 
Vocational 2 5% 










engineering, manufacturing, construction, social sciences, business, or law (Barrett, 2009; 
CSO, 2008). Researchers at the Trinity College Dublin Migrant Initiative found that 
while the Polish have migrated to all of Europe, the Irish cohort holds higher educational 
qualifications compared to the group residing in the South of Europe (Krings et al., 
2010). In fact, more recent arrivals are even better qualified than their predecessors. In 
2009, 41% of Eastern European migrants in Ireland aged 23-34 completed tertiary 
education compared to 47% of the Irish and 59% among non-European immigrants 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 22). Among this project’s participants, only 12% did not 
complete some form of higher education and almost half held a Master’s degree in fields 
as diverse as psychology, philology, geography, biology, geology, computer science, 
engineering, economics, marketing, chemistry, and theology (Table VI.9).  
Despite substantial educational achievements, Polish workers had few job 
opportunities at home and experienced severe downward occupational mobility prior to 
migration. According to the ICI (2008), while only 4% of Nigerians migrating to Dublin 
were not employed at home, 10% of East Europeans were unemployed prior to their 
arrival in Ireland. The same survey reports that Polish workers held a variety of 
occupations in the sending country, including lower-skilled jobs in construction or sales 
(ICI, 2008, pp. 87-88). Among this dissertation’s interviewees, 40% were never 
employed in the home country and the rest participated in sectors as diverse as 
government, education, and sales. Elite representatives characterize the Polish group in 
Dublin as diverse in terms of work experiences and skills, yet divided between young, 




The Polish in Ireland work below their qualifications. Male migrants concentrate 
in construction (22%) or manufacturing (22%), while female workers find work primarily 
in retail (17%) or hotels and restaurants (16%). The most common occupations are sales 
assistants (7%), building laborers (6%), cleaners and domestics (5%), as well carpenters 
and joiners (4%). Only 9% work as managers or professionals (CSO, 2008). While there 
has been some change with the collapse of the construction sector in Ireland, Polish 
workers continue to be focused in low-skilled occupations like shop keepers, clerks, 
servers, dishwashers, cleaners, security guards, or taxi drivers (CSO, 2006-2011).   
Nonetheless, the occupational gap is not nearly as severe for the Polish as it is for 
Nigerian workers in Dublin. 64% of Eastern European migrants in Ireland are 
overqualified for their position compared to a staggering 73% among African immigrants 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 49). It is not uncommon to find “Polish ex surgeons working 
in a production line in a meat factory” and feeling powerless with their economic 
situation (D22-TU). However, Polish workers are generally “in control” and consider 
economic sacrifices an inevitable step towards a better life (D14-R; ICI, 2008, pp. 91-93). 
They also move up the employment ladder. Most of this project’s interviewees took low-
skilled service jobs upon their arrival in Ireland. However, Bachelor’s and Master’s 
degree holders eventually came to be employed in banking, office administration, 
management, or the non-governmental sector. Polish service centers and organizations 
provide a particularly attractive venue for professional advancement. 
Not only are the occupational gap and downward occupational mobility less 
pronounced in the case of the Polish than in the case of Nigerians in Dublin, but they also 
have different causes. Unlike in the case of Nigerian migrants, the recognition of 
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education or experience abroad does not affect Polish workers. Unless the field is 
country-specific, such as law, medicine, or academia, qualifications are recognized and a 
Master’s degree or other tertiary education is considered in the job recruitment process 
(D1-J; D27-TU). Discrimination is much less pronounced. While with economic crisis 
Irish employers are “looking after their own” and promoting only Irish employees, 
“similar” Polish workers at least retain their positions. This is not the case for Nigerian 
workers (D40-PO). 
The mismatch between skills and occupation is the result of objective factors. The 
structure of the Dublin labor market and local labor policies limit the range of professions 
available to any foreign worker. As labor shortages in lower-end occupations like 
construction or personal services coincided with EU enlargement, such lower-skilled 
professions tended to attract Polish workers migrating to Ireland in the first place (D5-
PO; D33-PO). It was also deliberate governmental policy to employ nationals from the 
acceding European states as “labor at the lower end of the skills continuum” (D26-
ADMIN; D34-PO; EGFSN, 2005; Quinn, 2010). Polish immigrants are also welcomed to 
fill technical positions in engineering or IT, however (D26-ADMIN). 
More importantly, the language barrier prevents the Polish from working 
according to qualifications (D8-ADMIN; D34-PO; D36-PO; D39-PO). Confidence issues 
rather than actual lack of language skills often affect the jobs Polish immigrants 
themselves choose (D22-TU; D27-TU; D37-PO). However, as they acquire language 
skills, Polish workers advance professionally in Ireland. One third of the respondents 
received a raise or promotion after arriving in Ireland, especially as they honed their 
language skills. As on expert interviewee put it, “These people don’t want to stay in the 
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same job for ten years. They want to improve their language, they want to go to an Irish 
college or university, and acquire some more skills to find a different job” (D34-PO). 
What is more, newer arrivals hold a better command of the English language and more 
confidence (D32-PO). Professional organizations like the Polish Business Club in Dublin 
further diminish the occupational gap by training Polish professionals in language, 
organizational and business skills (ICI, 2008). 
Polish immigrants remain in control of their occupational status. They choose to 
work in low-skilled professions in order to accumulate country-specific capital or earn 
enough to return home (D14-R; D17-ADMIN; D26-ADMIN). Downward or insufficient 
occupational mobility is not the result of factors beyond Polish immigrants’ control, like 
lack of recognition of educational attainment, legal status, or racism.  
On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants experience severe deskilling upon their 
migration to Ireland. Nigerians are better educated than Polish immigrants in Dublin. 
According to the 2006 Census, 38% of Nigerians in Ireland hold a tertiary degree, a 
number an ESRI study from the same year puts at 47.7% (CSO, 2008; McGinnity et al., 
2006, p. 24). Furthermore, unlike the disparate Polish group, most Nigerian immigrants 
were gainfully employed according to their qualifications before their migration to 
Ireland. Among the ICI’s respondents, a majority worked as managers and executives, in 
business and commerce, in the local and central government, or as medical doctors in 
their country of origin (ICI, 2008). 
Once they arrive in Ireland, Nigerian workers can rarely use their education or 
previous professional experience. In 2006, only six percent were employed as doctors. 
The majority are employed in unskilled occupations, such as health care attendants, 
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security guards, sales assistants, taxi drivers, waiters, or cleaners (CSO, 2008; ICI, 2008). 
The Immigrant Council of Ireland suggests that among the four nationalities they study, 
Nigerians experience the most dramatic mismatch between skills and employment. Most 
of their Nigerian subjects express negative feelings at the occupational gaps they suffer in 
Ireland and the extreme length of their road to job security. Most are extremely frustrated 
at the menial jobs they are forced to accept in spite of high educational achievement (ICI, 
2008). In 2010, 73% of African employees in Ireland were overqualified for their jobs 
compared to 55% of Irish employees and 64% of Eastern European immigrants 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 49). 
As one NGO representative aptly put it, “many [Nigerians] have Master’s or PhDs 
and they are driving buses” (D42-PO). All of the interviewees in this thesis are severely 
overqualified for their occupations in Dublin. One African writer and labor organizer 
only worked as a waiter, a cleaner, a security guard, and a supermarket clerk in Dublin 
(Zach, 32). Another respondent pursuing degrees in web technology and fashion was 
employed as a waitress and a housekeeper (Tatiana, 27). A teacher, business owner, and 
law student was unable to find any steady job in Ireland (Isaac, 36). A Nigerian engineer 
drives a taxi in Ireland (Harry, 35).  
While the structure of the Irish economy and Dublin’s labor market influences this 
mismatch, as in the case of Polish immigrants, other factors severely limit the 
professional opportunities of African workers in Ireland. Unlike their Polish counterparts, 
Nigerians workers in Ireland are disadvantaged due to the lack of recognition of their 
education achievements and the racism they face daily. According to immigrant 
organization representatives in Dublin, unless they were recruited directly from Nigeria, 
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Nigerian job seekers experienced difficulties in getting their qualifications recognized.296 
Only 40% of Nigerian men in the ICI study had their qualifications recognized upon 
arrival in Dublin (ICI, 2008). The difficulty often lies in the complexity of the process, 
with no single department responsible for qualification recognition. Decisions are 
discretionary and lack transparency, allowing for personal and institutional discrimination 
against the immigrants (D13-P; Frank, 34). Furthermore, most Irish employers believe 
that degrees from Ireland and Nigeria are simply not equivalent (Ethan, 46). Therefore, 
Nigerian workers have to pursue education in Ireland if they want to advance 
professionally in Dublin. The prohibitive cost and the frustration with having to start 
“from square one” stunt third-country nationals’ economic development (D42-NO).  
The stigma and restrictions of asylum status further affect Nigerians’ occupational 
mobility and exacerbate the loss of human capital among African workers. Immigrants 
and their representatives in Dublin lament the inept treatment of the asylum issue by the 
Irish government and the Dublin-based Office of Integration. Most asylum seekers are 
highly educated, yet are not allowed to work until their case is decided, a process that 
could take years. Asylum seekers experience severe deskilling and loss of human capital, 
while the government foregoes “a readily accessible supply of multilingual and 
multicultural employees” (D41-NO; Isaac, 36).  
 Downward occupational mobility and gaps between education and jobs are mostly 
the result of discrimination against the racially different Nigerians.  Stereotyping in the 
private sector, where asylum status, African nationality, and low educational achievement 
are linked together, prevents Nigerian workers from securing better jobs and forces them 
                                                          
296 As was the practice in the 1990s, when Ireland experienced a severe shortage of medical personnel and 
the government recruited a number of Nigerian medical doctors and nurses (Kómoláfé, 2008).  
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into low-skilled employment (D41-NO). Even once employed, Nigerians find the upward 
mobility of “an ethnic person” much slower than that of an Irish or a European national. 
As one respondent put it, “you got the job, but there was no promotion or projection 
curve for you. You were just moving from one hospital to the other. … Most people 
found themselves just stuck into jobs” (D44-NO).  
 In sum, both Polish and African immigrants take jobs below their educational and 
professional attainment and are slow or unable to progress up the economic ladder in 
Dublin. Majorities of both foreign populations completed higher secondary or tertiary 
education and were employed in higher-skilled occupations in management, government, 
education, or health at home. Both cluster in lower-skilled jobs in Ireland and rarely 
move up to white-collar employment. However, deskilling is severe among Nigerian 
workers. Numerous Polish immigrants were unemployed or confined to lower-skilled 
services even before they came to Ireland. They choose to remain in such occupations in 
Dublin as they find the acquisition of professional and language skills undesirable having 
in mind their temporary sojourn in Ireland. The cohort is assigned a 3 for this component 
of economic integration (Table VI.1). On the other hand, Nigerians experience extreme 
psychological distress as they are stuck in jobs that do not correspond to their skills. 
While they would like to advance professionally, they are obstructed by structural factors 
like non-recognition of qualifications, precarious and stigmatizing legal status, and 
everyday discrimination. Since immutable ethnic characteristics are likely to remain an 
obstacle to Nigerians in Dublin, the African migrants are assigned the lowest value for 




VI.3.2. Occupational Mobility in Madrid  
Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain are employed in the lower-skilled occupations 
abundant in the receiving context. However, most work according to qualifications and 
even improve their economic circumstances upon migration. Mobility to the familiar 
Iberian labor market in fact serves as a prerequisite to professional development for a 
number of female Ecuadorian migrants whose familial and social roles had excluded 
them from labor participation in the home country altogether. While Bulgarians are not 
experiencing a severe mismatch between qualifications and employment in Madrid, they 
are regarded as an educated worker pool nonetheless employed in unskilled occupations 
in Spain, much like their Polish counterparts. The mismatch causes some psychological 
distress and loss of confidence among the proud East Europeans. 
 
Table VI.10. Educational Attainment among Ecuadorians in Madrid (in %) 
 
Sources: Author; Bernardi et al., 2010; Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012.  
 
Ecuadorians in Spain are not as highly educated as the other three groups of 
interest here. Among Latin American participants in the 2007 National Immigration 
Survey, only one in ten held a tertiary degree, while more than one third only completed 
primary education. Four in ten had high school diplomas (Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 
2012).297 Using the Spanish Labor Force Survey for 2006-2007, Bernardi et al. (2010) 
come up with similar numbers. About one third of Ecuadorians recorded in the survey 
                                                          








High school  
(upper 
secondary) 
Vocational Tertiary Total 
2007 ENI 35 14.4 40.1 - 10.5 100 
2006-2007 LFS 29.9 23.3 36.6 4.5 5.7 100 
2011 (Author) - 11 78 - 11 100 
328 
 
only completed primary education and only 6% held college degrees or higher. Among 
this project’s interviewees, the majority arrived in Spain with secondary education, 
completing upper secondary or high school degrees (Table VI.10). 
Consequently, the gap between qualifications and previous professional 
experiences on the one hand and current employment on the other is smaller for the Latin 
Americans than for the other three cohorts. Ecuadorians in Spain work below their 
qualifications and do not necessarily catch up with comparable natives over time 
(Bernardi et al., 2010). Like their counterparts, male Latin American migrants in Madrid 
concentrate in construction and manufacturing, while female laborers find work mostly as 
domestic workers, in restaurants, or in retail (M16-P; M17-P; M18-ADMIN; M19-
ADMIN; M25-TU; M32-ADMIN; M34-TU; M35-P). About two-thirds of Ecuadorians in 
Spain worked in unskilled positions, and one third were employed in skilled manual labor 
in 2006-2007. Only a negligible proportion held high-skilled white-collar jobs (Bernardi 
et al., 2010).  
The lower-skilled positions Ecuadorians occupy in the receiving context are not 
so dissimilar from employment at home, however. Among the project’s participants, only 
one in ten experienced significant downward mobility with migration to Madrid, with a 
university professor serving as a bike messenger, for instance (Ethan, 39). The remaining 
participants transitioned to construction or domestic care from relatively comparable jobs 
in retail, restaurants, construction, and other low-skilled services. Several respondents 
were never employed in Ecuador and instead embarked on a professional career in Spain 
for the first time. In the case of female migrants in particular, migration to Spain served 
as a rite of passage into professionalization and an impetus for the transformation of 
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gender, familial, and social roles. Women confined to the domestic sphere in Ecuador are 
able to employ their skills in the domestic care economic sector in Spain and gain human 
capital and an entrance into the labor market in the process (Dudley, 2013, pp. 51-53). 
Consequently, Bernardi et al. (2010) deem Latin American women’s economic 
incorporation in Spain the most unproblematic among different nationality and gender 
cohorts. In 2007, the number of Latin Americans who were overqualified for their 
position in Spain stood at 39.1%, the lowest value among all four immigrant groups of 
interest here (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008).298 In 2007, 34% of South Americans in Spain 
worked in the same occupation as in the home country and 27% – in the same economic 
sector – proportions higher than these for East Europeans (INE, 2009, p. 38). 
Ecuadorians concentrate in lesser qualified occupations in Madrid because of the 
structure of the local labor market. The “most valuable jobs” in Spain are reported to be 
low-skilled due to the “size and vigor of the construction sector, of the tourist industry, of 
the domestic service, the care industry” (M31-R). The South American workers are 
contracted from the home country precisely due to their relatively suited qualifications 
and experiences in filling vacancies in Spain’s unskilled labor market. In the words of 
one trade union representative, “There is no need for qualified workers in the fields” 
(M23-TU).299 Therefore, fewer Ecuadorian workers, than for instance Bulgarian ones, 
have moved down the occupation ladder upon their migration to Spain. Linguistic and 
socio-cultural proximity ensure quick entry into comparable employment, the transfer of 
educational certificates, and the portability of work experience from home. Latin 
                                                          
298 This compares to 17.2% for Spanish natives, 51.2% for Eastern Europeans in Spain, 65.5% for East 
Europeans in Ireland, and 73% among Africans in Dublin. The mismatch is likely to be even smaller for 
Ecuadorians in particular, since the Latin American group in Spain includes highly-educated and qualified 
nationalities like Argentinians for instance (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011).  
299 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “El campo no demanda trabajador cualificado.” 
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Americans are the only foreign cohort in Spain where higher educational attainment and 
relevant professional experience from the origin country actually produce improved 
economic circumstances in Madrid. Similarity also undermines discrimination as a 
barrier to occupational mobility (Sanromá et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, Bulgarians have limited access to favorable or comparable 
employment in Madrid. While the Balkan workers are not as highly educated as the 
immigrant cohorts in Dublin, they still experience a larger penalty in terms of 
occupational attainment than Ecuadorians. Dissimilarity and lack of language skills 
impair prospects of transferring qualifications, applying home country human capital 
effectively, or quickly progressing up the career ladder in the host city.  
 
Table VI.11. Educational Attainment among Bulgarians in Madrid  
 
*Numbers as per interviews conducted by author. 
Sources: Author; Bernardi et al, 2010. 
 
Bulgarians’ qualifications are relatively similar to yet somewhat lower than these 
of Poles in Dublin. However, Eastern Europeans in Spain are better educated than Latin 
Americans and Spaniards alike. More than one quarter of the East Europeans in Spain in 
2006-2007 completed a university degree, as compared to one third of the participants in 
this thesis (Bernardi et al., 2010). Less than one fifth of natives held a tertiary degree in 












Vocational Tertiary Other Total 
2006-2007 
LFS 
13.2% 12.3% 23.8% 23.2% 26.9% 0.6% 100% 
Number of 
responses* 
1 1 12 12 13 - 39 
%* 2.6% 2.6% 30.75% 30.75% 33.3% - 100% 
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education.300 Curiously, Bulgarians are more likely to engage in technical professional 
training than other immigrant groups of interest here, with anywhere between 23% and 
31% of Bernardi et al. (2010)’s and this project’s participants completing vocational 
education (Table VI.11) Among the interviewees here, two thirds completed vocational 
or higher educational degrees in fields as diverse as transportation, electro technology, 
mechanical engineering, welding, education, economics, or theater.  
A large number of Bulgarian immigrants were actually employed in construction 
or transportation in the origin country, an occupation that they retain in Madrid. 
However, the majority worked according to qualifications at home. Therefore, deskilling 
upon migration is relatively larger for Bulgarians in Spain than for Poles in Dublin, with 
the latter sacrificing skills for secure employment in their home country. Among the 
interviewees, one quarter were never employed in Bulgaria and were students or served 
in the army. Limited economic prospects upon graduation pushed them to try their luck in 
Spain. The remainder were employed as accountants, teachers, construction workers, 
engineers, and business owners, among other professions. Expert respondents confirm 
that Bulgarians in Madrid are a relatively homogenous group, bringing with them 
intermediate educational and professional achievements (M23-TU). 
 Nonetheless, Spanish and Bulgarian stakeholders agree that “in 90% of the cases” 
Bulgarians work below their qualifications in Madrid (M5-BO).301 Especially before 
2000 and after economic downturn, Bulgarians could not “expect to work in anything 
                                                          
300 13.2% of Bernardi et al. (2010)’s participants only completed primary education compared to 24.9% for 
Spaniards and 24.6% for all relevant cohorts.  
301 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “В 90% от случаите.” 
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related to their skills” with migration (M1-BO).302 Regardless of education, the Balkan 
workers are employed in domestic service, elderly care and cleaning among women, 
construction, agriculture or transportation among men, and hotels and restaurants for both 
sexes.303 Like Ecuadorians, two-thirds were in unskilled and one-third in skilled manual 
occupations in Spain in 2006-2007, with the proportion of East Europeans working in the 
lowest-qualified positions in the receiving context in 2010-2011 even higher than that of 
Latin Americans (Bernardi et al, 2010; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014). In 
2007, 32% of East Europeans in Spain worked in the same occupation as in the home 
country and less than one quarter – in the same economic sector – proportions lower than 
these for Latin Americans (INE, 2009, p. 38). According to Rodríguez-Planas and Farré 
(2014), East Europeans migrants are overqualified for their jobs more often than natives 
or other migrants in Spain.  
According to one trade union representative, deskilling can be severe, with 
“lawyers or people with a degree who serve coffees at a bar or clean the street” (M24-
TU; M33-TU).304 The mismatch between skills and employment is usually not as 
pronounced, but is endemic among the East Europeans. According to one ethnic 
representative, “I personally don’t know anyone who came here from Bulgaria to work 
according to qualifications” (M8-BO).305 Even if they have completed related vocational 
training at home and are employed in construction in Spain, the Balkan laborers work as 
                                                          
302 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Идвайки тук не можеше да претендираш да 
работиш нещо, свързано с ценза ти, на практика идваш с нагласа, че ще падне статусът ти като 
дойдеш.” 
303 All relevant actors enumerate the same sectors of employment (for example, M1-BO; M2-BO; M3-BO; 
M4-BO; M5-BO; M16-P; M17-P; M18-ADMIN; M19-ADMIN; M26-TU; M32-ADMIN; M35-P). 
304 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Aquí también hay abogados y gente con titulo que 
están sirviendo cafes en un bar o limpiando la calle.” 
305 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: Поне аз лично нямам информация, но не знам 
някой да е дошъл от България и да работи по специалността си. Няма, не познавам такъв. 
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peones, the lowest unskilled category in the sector, rather than according to specialized 
skills (M25-TU; M34-TU). Unsurprisingly, Fernandez and Ortega (2008) find that 51.2% 
of Eastern Europeans in Spain were overeducated for their current position, a gap higher 
than that for any other immigrant cohort in the receiving country. It is encouraging, 
however, that just like the Polish in Dublin, Bulgarians in Madrid “use low-skilled 
services as a trampoline to move forward” (M1-BO).306 Some Bulgarians engage in 
higher-qualified positions in Madrid as lab technicians, dentists or nurses (M3-BO; M5-
BO). Therefore, the occupational gap is relatively smaller than that for Nigerians in 
Dublin and comparable to that of the Polish in Ireland, if larger than the mismatch 
experienced by Ecuadorians.  
 While Bulgarian organizational leaders are hopeful that with time Bulgarians will 
acquire language skills and confidence and move up the professional ladder in Spain, a 
deeper look into the causes of deskilling might suggest otherwise (M1-BO; M4-BO). 
Labor market structure produces a persistent demand for low- and medium-skilled labor 
in Madrid, where higher educational achievement or the accumulation of human capital, 
including language skills, are not rewarded (M23-TU; M31-R; Rodríguez-Planas & 
Nollenberger, 2014; Sanromá et al., 2009). Unfamiliarity between Balkan Bulgarians and 
Iberian Spaniards, despite a common European framework, is the paramount obstacle to 
the occupational mobility of the East Europeans, however. On the one hand, the lack of 
parallels between Bulgarians and their Spanish hosts produces institutional barriers for 
the former, such as the non-transferability of educational qualifications. Bulgarian 
representatives talk of the difficulties in translating diplomas from the home to the host 
                                                          
306 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: го наричат феномен на страните от Източна 




country, especially in the medical or other higher-skilled economic sectors (M1-BO; M2-
BO; M7-BO; M8-BO). Non-transferability of education and professional experience 
carries an element of nationalism as well, with Spanish officials argued to insist on 
immigrants’ adopting “their education, their information” (M7-BO).307 There are no such 
difficulties for familiar Ecuadorians coming from a similar socio-economic and cultural 
reality. On the other hand, while language deficiencies as human capital might not lead to 
lower occupational status among immigrants, the lack of language skills creates mistrust 
among Spanish employers and officials (M7-BO; Sanromá et al., 2009). Individual 
perceptions of difference disadvantage Bulgarians in Madrid.  
Nonetheless, as they aspire to belong in the host context, the East Europeans 
attempt to learn Spanish and progress with their. Ethnic representatives are amazed at the 
ambition of “45-year old women, who read, study, go to courses, so they can requalify 
themselves and go forward” (M2-BO).308 Some of the in this dissertation interviewees 
managed to transition from unskilled construction positions or domestic servants to 
medium-skilled occupations like loading dock clerks, electricians, or dental assistants. 
When structural factors preclude upward mobility despite personal aspirations, however, 
the proud East Europeans experience psychological distress (M1-BO; M5-BO).   
 In sum, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians work below their qualifications in 
Madrid, much Poles and Nigerians in Dublin. However, the gap is much smaller for the 
Latin Americans than for any of the other cohorts. Ecuadorians have lower educational 
achievement than the other three groups and tend to work in lesser-skilled occupations in 
                                                          
307 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Испанците държат да имаш тяхното 
образование, тяхната информация.” 
308 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз винаги се изненадвам на капацитета, на 
желанието на жени от 45, почти към 50 годишни, които четат, учат, ходат на курсове, явяват се на 
изпити, за да могат да се преквалифицират и да продължат.” 
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the origin country. Therefore, migration to Spain serves as a continuation of professional 
trajectories rather than a step back on the career ladder. Socio-cultural familiarity 
between the migrants and their Spanish hosts leads to the transferability of qualifications 
and human capital and better access to professional growth in Madrid. Consequently, the 
South Americans are assigned a 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (Table 
VI.1). On the other hand, Bulgarians experience the largest human capital and 
educational penalty among any immigrant group in Spain.309 Despite personal ambition 
and some professional success after migration, the unfamiliar Balkan workers are 
obstructed by a labor market that does not reward skills or education, non-transferability 
of qualifications, linguistic deficiencies, and perceptions of difference by natives. The 
East Europeans merit a rating of 2 for this indicator of incorporation (Table VI.1). 
 
VI.4. Employment Conditions 
VI.4.1. Employment Conditions in Dublin 
The occupational gap translates into unfavorable conditions of employment for 
both Poles and Nigerians in Dublin. These include a lack of contract, lesser pay than 
natives, unsocial or long hours, menial work, and unlawful termination (ICI, 2008, pp. 
95-97). However, the East Europeans are treated better at the job than their African 
counterparts, especially during economic boom (D14-R; McGinnity et al., 2006). Among 
ICI participants, for instance, less than half reported issues at work, compared to more 
than three quarters of Nigerian respondents (ICI, 2008, pp. 95-97). Only one of the 
Nigerian participants here found their working conditions favorable, compared to one 
                                                          
309 If similar to that of Poles in Dublin and lesser than the mismatch experienced by Nigerians in Ireland.  
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third of Polish interviewees. African immigrants are particularly vulnerable to job 
exploitation due to legal status and perceived difference from the Irish.  
Polish workers in Dublin experience worse working conditions than natives.  
With economic downturn, the most significant issue for this population is unlawful 
termination or placement on the lay-off position. The Social and Legal Advice Center 
(SLAC) in Dublin, which processes one thousand service requests annually, reports that 
one fourth of these complaints concern “disputes with employers.” Among such disputes, 
“employers denying the entitlement to redundancy payment,” “extended periods of lay-
off” and “unfair dismissal” constitute the major complaints (Social and Legal Advice 
Center [SLAC], 2010). “Lay-off” is a forced unpaid leave that could be used by 
employers for no longer than four weeks at a time to reduce costs during unfavorable 
economic times. However, Irish employers habitually place Polish workers in this 
position for longer periods to avoid paying redundancy, which could be as high as €6,000 
for an employee in service for more than two years (Citizens Information, 2013a; D36-
PO; D38-PO). Further, employers purposefully dismiss Polish and other foreign workers 
for gross misconduct, in order to avoid paying redundancy (D36-PO). Still, only two of 
the respondents here were terminated from their jobs. Only one was placed on the lay-off 
position in a particularly severe case.310 A majority actually quit their jobs voluntarily in 
search of better opportunities.  
Being unlawfully terminated correlates with a lack of a contract or a short-term 
contract. According to SLAC, “not being provided with written terms of employment” 
                                                          
310 This person was placed on lay-off for three years for 3-6 months at a time. Lay-off was used as a 
“punishment” for pointing out safety concerns and failure to pay the lawful rates for normal and overtime 
wages. The employee was never fired to avoid redundancy payments or legal recourse against the 




ranks high on Polish workers’ list of concerns (SLAC, 2010). This condition is especially 
problematic when the lack of legal employment is unknown to the Polish employee until 
they are terminated (D7-TU). Obtaining social welfare benefits in this situation is 
extremely difficult, as that requires proof of employment (D39-PO). As one trade union 
representative shared, “it’s much more difficult to vindicate people’s rights ‘if it’s all 
verbal’” (D27-TU). Among Polish interviewees in this project, one third did not have a 
contract at one time of their employment in Ireland. Half of these employees, however, 
received pay slips and were thus entitled to social welfare benefits. All moved to contract 
employment eventually. In 2010, only 18% of East Europeans were employed on a 
temporary or casual contract compared to 13% of natives (Table VI.12). 
The issue is not nearly as pronounced among Polish workers as it is among other 
immigrant groups in Dublin who are not part of the European Union. All Nigerian 
respondents n this dissertation worked without a contract at least at one time of their 
employment in Ireland. They were paid “under the table,” allowing employers to change 
job conditions, reduce or withhold pay, and terminate employment without justification 
(Ethan, 46; Isaac, 36; Stephen, 35; Tatiana, 27; Taylor, 30; Zach, 32). Almost one third of 
African workers in Dublin did not have a long-term or any contract in 2010 (McGinnity 
et al., 2011). Working without a contract or on a casual contract is the only possibility 
among asylum seekers, not legally allowed to work in Ireland (for ex., Ethan, 46, Isaac, 
36). The lack of contract is the norm in low-skilled occupations or in the “black market” 
where Nigerians concentrate. Therefore, African immigrants have no claim to 












*These numbers refer to all non-EU workers rather than just African workers and therefore have 
to be considered with reservation. Still, as they are significantly different than percentages for 
EU12 and Irish workers, it is safe to deduce that Nigerian workers are more likely to be employed 
during weekends, nights or in shifts than the other populations of interest. 
Source: Adapted from McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 18, 44-45. 
 
Even if granted a contract, both Polish and Nigerian workers have to agree to 
temporary and unstable employment. Almost half of East European interviewees with 
contractual employment were employed on a short-term contract of one year or less at 
one time of their migration to Ireland. Nonetheless, more than one-third of Polish 
respondents began their employment in Dublin on a long-term or full-time contract, a 
figure much higher than that among Nigerian workers. Nigerian immigrants are more 
likely to be employed temporarily. In 2010, almost one third had a temporary contract 
compared to two in ten East Europeans and one in ten natives (Table VI.12).  
In view of their temporary employment in the grey economy, all foreign workers 
in Ireland are paid less than native employees. Expert respondents identified 
underpayment as the main issue for Polish workers in Ireland, even during the economic 
boom (D7-TU; D32-PO; D33-PO; D34-PO; D36-PO). Barrett, McGuinness and O’Brien 
(2008), for instance, found an earning disadvantage of 18% for East European workers 
compared to the native labor force. More than a fifth of the interviewees in this 
 








Work week of >45 hrs 18 14 14 
Work week of 30-44 hrs 68 57 60 
Work week of <30 hrs 14 29 25 
Temporary/casual contract 18 31 13 
Shift work 17 26* 12 
Part-time work 14 33 29 
Night/evening work 25 36* 20 
Weekend work 35 54* 27 
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dissertation believe that they receive lower wages than their Irish colleagues regardless of 
similar qualifications or job title. In fact, Irish companies habitually hire cheaper Polish 
workers to undercut payment rates in direct violation of industry-specific wage 
regulations (D1-J; D6-TU; D7-TU; D36-PO; D39-PO). The Irish Ferries Dispute of 2005 
was one gross example of underpayment. The construction industry is another locus of 
multiple violations of wage regulations (D2-TU; D7-TU; “Irish ferries dispute,” 2005). 
The lack of payment for holiday or medical leave, as well as illegal wage deductions, 
compounds the payment gap between Polish and Irish workers (D1-J; D33-PO; D39-PO).  
Regardless of underpayment, Polish workers in Dublin are satisfied with their 
wages as they still provide for a better lifestyle than the one in the home country (D5-
ADMIN; D6-TU; D36-PO). A study by Turner et al. (2009) with 136 Polish workers in 
Ireland in a range of professions found that Polish workers earned at the low end of the 
spectrum with 27% earning at or below the national minimum wage, 43% earning in the 
next wage bracket, and 30% earning at twice the national minimum wage. As 97% of 
respondents were paid at least the national Irish minimum wage, however, they were 
earning double the average industrial wage in Poland.311 Therefore, a majority  of Polish 
workers reported being “very definitely” or “definitely” satisfied with their pay, and only 
6% were “not at all” satisfied (Turner et al., 2009). Two-thirds of interviewees here are 
satisfied with their wages and expressly called their pay “fair.”  
On the other hand, Nigerian workers are profoundly unhappy with the minimum 
or below wages they receive in Dublin. Salary and benefit reductions are endemic among 
African workers, especially with the economic crisis. Like the participants in the ICI 
                                                          
311 In 2006-2007, when the study was completed, the national minimum wage in Ireland was €7.65 
compared to an average industrial wage in Poland of €4 (Turner et al., 2009). 
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study (2008), most interviewees here share being paid “very low, lower than other 
people” (Stephen, 36). Benefits are withheld or reduced. A negotiation to receive a raise 
or promotion might result in termination (Taylor, 30). Irregular or immigrant status, lack 
of a formal agreement with the employer, the unfavorable judicial system if higher pay 
was sought, and discrimination are found to blame for underpayment (Ethan, 46; Isaac, 
36; Stephen, 36). As one respondent shares, “They take advantage of you. A job that is 
supposed to be minimum wage, 8.65 euro, they would give you four euro an hour for. 
You have no choice but to take it” (Isaac, 36).  
Both Nigerian and Polish workers in Dublin work long or unsocial hours in larger 
proportion than Irish nationals. Polish representatives in Dublin identified the length of 
the work day as problematic for Polish workers in Ireland, where lengthening working 
hours was used by employers to reduce fixed daily rates among foreign workers (D22-
TU; D32-PO; D34-PO; D38-PO). Four in ten of this project’s respondents work for sixty, 
eighty or even hundred hours a week, and are primarily employed during night shifts or 
on the weekend. Still, only a fifth of respondents in Turner et al.’s study reported working 
longer hours upon migration, with one third actually working less in Ireland than in their 
home country (Turner et al., 2009, p. 119).  
Eastern Europeans are better off than African immigrants. Nigerian workers in 
Dublin often work fewer hours than their Polish and Irish counterparts but those are part-
time, shift-based, and during unsocial times. Specifically, 18% of East Europeans in 2010 
reported working longer than forty-five hours each week compared to 14% among Irish 
and African workers. However, Polish workers were also much more likely to have a 
normal work week of thirty to forty-four hours of length, while Africans were more likely 
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to work less than thirty hours each week. While 17% of East European workers 
performed shift work, as high as 26% of third-country nationals worked shifts. Africans 
are also employed part-time, during evenings or nights, or on the weekend in higher 
proportions than Polish and Irish nationals (Table VI.12). 
Finally, both foreign populations are more likely than natives to perform jobs 
which are menial, physically demanding, and sometimes hazardous. Almost four in ten of 
Polish respondents reported that at least one of their jobs in Ireland has been “hard”, 
“heavy” or “physical.” 14% complained about the menial, “boring” and “not challenging 
enough” nature of their jobs. Only two, however, considered their jobs unsafe, as they 
were working in a bad area or were performing tasks without training or the proper 
equipment. In fact, according to Turner et al. (2009), almost half of Polish workers do not 
experience any change in how hard they after migrating to Ireland.  
All African respondents consider their job in Dublin “lowly” or “hard.” Being 
asked to travel far and then being sent away or being asked to work during Christmas 
without heat are just two examples of unfavorable working conditions. According to one 
respondent, due to the harsh conditions at their job, all Irish employees quit and “only the 
immigrants were left” (Taylor, 30). As a result, some Nigerian workers resort to self-
employment. However, they suggest that finding business is increasingly hard with 
economic downturn, especially for different African nationals (Harry, 35; Taylor, 30).  
In sum, Polish and Nigerian workers in Ireland experience worse working 
conditions than the native labor force. They are exposed to less secure jobs, unwarranted 
termination, lower pay, and lengthier and more physically demanding work. The situation 
is easier to remedy in the case of Polish workers, however. Inferior working conditions 
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for this ethnic group are attributable to unawareness of labor regulations and entitlements 
(D32-PO; D36-PO; D39-PO). The language barrier prevents the Polish in Dublin from 
enforcing their labor rights, especially as few documents or regulations are translated 
from English (D22-TU). As Polish immigrants settle in Dublin, learn English and join 
trade unions, they are more likely to seek fair labor conditions for their work. Since 
structural or individual discrimination does not play a role in the inferior labor conditions 
Poles face, Poles are assigned a composite value of 3 for this component of economic 
incorporation (Table VI.1). African workers not only experience much worse working 
conditions but have fewer avenues for redress than their Polish counterparts. They are 
employed in the economic sectors with the worst levels of union density or regulation 
compliance and face daily discrimination in terms of contract, hours, or termination. This 
ethnic group is less likely to witness substantive improvement in job conditions over 
time. Nigerians receive the lowest value a for this indicator of economic integration 
(Table VI.1). 
 
VI.4.2. Employment Conditions in Madrid  
Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are disadvantaged in terms of their 
conditions of employment compared to Spaniards, much like their counterparts in Dublin. 
As all four cohorts are employed in low-skilled precarious occupations, it is inevitable 
that they experience some degree of “exploitation” and “abuse of labor rights” by cost-
calculating employers (M25-TU; M34-TU).312 However, there are at least subtle 
differences between the two groups that attest to the importance of culture in affecting 
                                                          
312 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “El caso típico de un trabajador extranjero que se 
aproxima al sindicato es un trabajador que ha visto vulnerados sus derechos… un trabajador explotado.”  
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economic outcomes. Similar Ecuadorians enjoy comparable or somewhat more favorable 
conditions of employment than different, if European, Bulgarians in Madrid. The 
Spanish-speaking South Americans, who are familiar with local socio-economic 
structures and often arrive in Madrid with a labor contract, are closer in employment 
conditions to natives than the Balkan workers.  
 














* Values here refer to the New Member States joining the EU in the 2000s.  
** Values for the last three columns refer to Bulgarian and Ecuadorian immigrants surveyed by 
this author specifically. The remainder of the figures refers to the broader national categories in 
the table. 
Sources: Author; Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; INE, 2009; Rodríguez-Planas & Farré, 2014; 
Sanromá et al., 2009.  
  
Immigrants, their ethnic representatives and Spanish trade unionists agree that the 
most significant issue for all foreign laborers in Madrid is being employed on a 
temporary, rather than a permanent or indefinite, contract or not having a contract 
altogether (M17-P; M24-TU; M26-TU; M33-TU; M35-P). Without a contract stating the 
precise conditions of employment, native companies can easily exploit their foreign 
workers by not paying social security contributions, mandating longer hours, granting 
lesser than agreed-upon pay, or terminating employment unlawfully. The promise of a 
contract or extending temporary employment into permanent one can keep vulnerable 
 












Permanent contract (2000-2011)* 35 31 23 40.5 
Indefinite contract (2007) 52.9 51.3 45.1 - 
Temporary contract (2007) 47.1 48.7 54.9 - 
Temporary contract (2008) 55.75 60.74 70.34 33.58 
Monthly wage (in Euro) 963.3 957.9 954.5 1017.4 
Normal work week ** 62.5 31 - - 
Work week of >45 or <30 hours** 37.5 69 - - 
Manual job ** 42.9 85.7 - - 
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immigrants working in “despicable labor conditions” (M26-TU).313 Peculiarly, both 
before and after Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, Bulgarian migrants have 
been more likely than their Ecuadorian counterparts to work without a contract in the 
underground economy or to only have part-time or temporary employment. Even with 
EU enlargement, Iberian Ecuadorians, contracted from the home country under specific 
conditions, are less likely to be abused by employers than Balkan Bulgarians who are at 
the mercy of native labor market actors for their subsistence (M23-TU).  
South American workers are in temporary employment more often than 
comparable natives but hold permanent employment more regularly than Bulgarian 
laborers. For instance, Fernandez and Ortega (2008) find that among their sample 
population, extracted from the Spanish Labor Force Survey, one third of native workers 
had a temporary contract compared to a little more than half of all Latin American 
employees. The latter were better off than Eastern European workers, however, six in ten 
of whom were employed on a temporary contract, and African workers, seven in ten of 
whom only had a short-term contract. Results from the National Immigrant Survey are 
different in value but indicate the same trends, with 47% of South Americans in Spain on 
a temporary contract and 53% on an indefinite one, compared to 49% of East Europeans 
in temporary employment and 51% - in indefinite one (INE, 2009). Rodríguez-Planas and 
Farre (2014) sample the Spanish Labor Force Survey for 2000-2011 to find that four in 
ten Spaniards had a permanent contract for that time period compared to 3.5 in ten Latin 
Americans, three in ten Eastern Europeans and only two in ten African workers (Table 
VI.13) 
                                                          
313 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Los regulares que están sometidos a unas 
condiciones laborales indignas.” 
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Most of the Ecuadorian respondents in this project arrived in Madrid with a 
contract or were legalized shortly on the basis of their social ties to the receiving context. 
They transitioned from a temporary contract to an indefinite one.314 On the other hand, 
Bulgarian respondents are more likely to be stuck in a precarious job without contract, 
guarantees, or social security payments. Nine in ten have worked in Spain without a 
written agreement at some point of their migration, but even more significantly, almost 
half are still employed “under the table” (под масата) regardless of their EU status 
(Kevin, 33).315 Lack of contract and having to work “by project” (на парче) or “by the 
hour” (на час) results in unstable employment and living conditions, the separation of 
families, and the ineligibility for social security during periods of unemployment (for 
instance, Connor, 44; Jasmine, 53; Shay, 56; Tonya, 45). As one Bulgarian migrant put it, 
“when you get sick, they don't pay you. No contract - no social security payments” (Idris, 
30).316 In fact, Bulgarians find that Spanish employers purposefully delay the process of 
granting a contract or extending temporary employment into permanent one, and even 
deliberately make mistakes when filing the necessary documents, in order to avoid social 
security contributions on the East European workers’ behalf. Employers also refuse 
permanent employment, since they lack trust for the different Balkan migrants, 
prompting one Bulgarian domestic worker to conclude, “We don't have humane 
conditions, from an economic standpoint, we don't have contracts” (Trini, 31).317 
                                                          
314 Refer to Chapter V and Appendix C for a classification of permit types, durations, and conditions.  
315 28 persons arrived in Madrid with no contract and only 3 had one upon arrivals. Currently, 14 still have 
no contract, 13 have secured contract, and 4 are self-employed. Author’s translation from Bulgarian.  
316 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: Специално при 
мен- не, защото аз тогава съм бил без договори. И като се разболееш не ти плащат просто. но без 
осигуровки, без нищо (Idris, 30). 
317 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Нямаме човешки условия, откъм 
икономическата страна, нямаме договори, нямаме осигуровки.” 
346 
 
The lack of stable contract often translates into unlawful termination, especially 
for Bulgarians in Madrid. One third of Ecuadorian participants were let go from their 
positions in Madrid in the past. However, only in two in ten cases termination had 
something to do with personal disagreement or individual discrimination. One third of 
Bulgarian interviewees were released from jobs in Madrid as well. However, only few 
lost their jobs legitimately or quit themselves to take care of family and look for better 
opportunities. Two-thirds report being terminated when they brought up the legalization 
of their employment, after complaining about unsafe working conditions, or before a 
contract had officially ended. As one respondent recounts, his Spanish employer would 
habitually hire him for one year and then place his employment “on pause” (на пауза) for 
six months so that he was not mandated to grant the Balkan worker permanent 
employment and a hefty severance payment (Sylvester, 29).318   
Due to their temporary employment in the grey economy, all foreign workers in 
Spain are underpaid compared to natives. Underpayment is even more widespread in 
Spain than it is in Ireland, as employers prefer cutting wages and hours or placing 
workers “on pause” instead of letting them go, to retain a flexible and plentiful labor pool 
(M23-TU). South Americans, who arrive in Spain with a contract, knowledge of the local 
language and labor market conditions, and readiness to access trade union representatives 
when undercut in their wages, are better off than Eastern Europeans. The latter are 
disadvantaged by their freedom of circulation in Spain and therefore tendency to work 
without contract or specific conditions of employment, their deficient language skills, and 
their unfamiliarity with the Spanish labor market (M23-TU). While differences in wages 
might seem negligible, they are still significant, with all immigrants receiving €50 less 
                                                          
318 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian. 
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than Spaniards for similar employment and East Europeans earning €6 less than South 
Americans for the same job (Sanromá et al., 2009) (Table VI.13). Employers’ charging 
their workers high rent, not paying overtime or all the hours immigrants worked, or 
illegally deducting from wages “for a series of things no one explained beforehand” 
compounds the gap between natives’ and immigrants’ wages (M23-TU).319 
Among this project’s interviewees, two in ten Ecuadorians complained of being 
underpaid or earning little with economic crisis. Half were paid overtime when working 
weekends or evenings. On the other hand, seven in ten Bulgarians reported being 
underpaid in Madrid, some severely. For instance, one domestic worker was paid only 
€300/month and wages were deducted if she did not stay in the employer’s house 
overnight (Tangra, 36). Another worker received only €20/hour for a job in construction, 
while the normal rate is €50-60 (Redford, 36). Even if not severe, underpayment is 
endemic, where the East Europeans are aware that they receive less than both lesser 
qualified Spanish workers and other immigrants laborers. In one example, a Bulgarian 
barkeep received €600/month, while her South American predecessor earned €800 
because of “the language” (заради езика) (Tonya, 45). Another skilled Bulgarian 
construction worker was paid €36/hour, while his unskilled Ecuadorians colleagues were 
granted €50/hour (Tanner, 64). A majority are not paid overtime wages. The attitude that 
“there is worse” makes Bulgarian unwilling to seek redress (Yana, 50).320 Severe and 
widespread underpayment is pushing many of the Balkan workers into self-employment 
(M8-BO). 
                                                          
319 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Si a eso le sumas que yo te cobro un alquiler 
abusivo, y que te descuento una serie de cosas que nadie las ha explicado en su país.” 
320 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Има и по-зле” (Yana, 50). 
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Finally, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid work long, unsocial, or 
insufficient hours and perform jobs that are physically-demanding, hard and even 
dangerous in larger proportion than Spanish nationals. Nonetheless, South Americans 
experience less exploitation than Bulgarians. While a little over one third of Latin 
American participants suggest that they work long hours during the night or on the 
weekend, almost two thirds report a “normal work week,” and rest on Sunday. The 
figures are reversed in the case of Bulgarians, with less than one third enjoying a normal 
work week and the rest either working long shifts with few breaks or not being able to 
secure enough hours of employment (Table VI.13). In one example, a Bulgarian working 
as a dishwasher in a restaurant worked for fifteen hours each day and was given no break 
to recuperate (Tonya, 45). In another, a Balkan flyer distributor worked only nights, 
standing for hours on end in the freezing cold (Idris, 30). In a particularly severe case, a 
Bulgarian restaurants employee worked every day from 11 am to 4 am and was forced to 
walk five kilometers to get home after his shift (Sylvester, 29). Looking at the other 
extreme, many Bulgarian domestic workers are only able to secure ten hours of 
employment each week, since they are mistrusted by Spanish homemakers (for example, 
Izzy, 40; Pam, 31). The unfavorable hours of employment lead one Bulgarian ethnic 
representative to conclude that the mandated European work day of eight regular hours 
and one overtime hour is a myth in Spain (M8-BO).  
Both foreign populations are more likely to perform jobs which are manual and 
sometimes hazardous than natives. Four in ten of Ecuadorian respondents found that at 
least one of their jobs in Spain was hard or unsafe, numbers comparable to these for Poles 
in Dublin. Much like Nigerians in Ireland, almost all Bulgarian participants found their 
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employment in Madrid “heavy” (тежка), “hard” (трудна), or “isolating” (изолираща) 
(Table VI.13). One Bulgarian domestic worker spoke of the “killer conditions” 
(убийствени условия) to which Balkan immigrants are exposed in Spain (Tonya, 45). 
Being cooped up in a home with unfriendly native elderly employers when serving as an 
interna, taking care of numerous “wild” (луди) children without command of the Spanish 
language, living away from the city in remote areas, lifting heavy luggage despite muscle 
trauma, or being asked to clean external window panes in a high-rise are some of the 
examples of the “thankless jobs” (неблагодарни работи) Bulgarian women perform in 
Spain (Trini, 31).321 Bulgarian men are also prone to work in menial or dangerous 
positions, with one employee getting electrocuted on the job, another receiving a hernia 
from lifting heavy trays at a restaurant, and a third asked to serve tables with a broken 
arm (Hunter, 29; Redford, 36; Sylvester, 29). One respondent summarizes the 
unfavorable working conditions all Bulgarians face in Madrid well, “you can be king in 
Bulgaria, but here you start from absolute zero” (Caleb, 33).322  
In sum, like their counterparts in Dublin, Ecuadorian and Bulgarian immigrants 
experience worse working conditions than the Spanish labor force. They rarely have 
formal or long-term contracts, are terminated unlawfully, receive lower pay and work 
longer hours, and perform more physically-demanding jobs than natives. However, South 
Americans are somewhat closer in their working conditions to native laborers regardless 
of their third-country legal status. Language skills, contract from the home country, use 
of local trade unions, and familiarity with socio-economic conditions and work culture 
                                                          
321 An interna is a live-in domestic worker who receives a low salary and resides in the house where she 
works. 
322 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “В България 
можеш да си цар, тука като дойдеш почваш от начало, за първи път почваш” (Caleb, 33). 
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renders the Latin Americans better able to secure decent employment and stick to 
previously agreed-upon terms. Ecuadorians are assigned a value of 3 for this component 
of economic incorporation (Table VI.1). Dissimilar Bulgarians, arriving in Spain without 
a contract, command of the Spanish language, knowledge of the local labor market, or 
trust by Spanish employers, experience worse exploitation than their South American 
counterparts. Regardless of their EU citizenship, a majority of the Balkan workers put up 
with informal employment and dismal working conditions, since “there is worse” (има и 
по-зле) (Yana, 50). Thus, Bulgarians compare better to African workers in Dublin than to 
European Polish immigrants. The ethnic group merits a value of 2 for this indicator of 
economic integration (Table VI.1). 
 
VI.5. Work Relationships  
VI.5.1. Work Relationships in Dublin  
Polish workers in Dublin are less likely to be discriminated against at work than 
Nigerian immigrants. The Immigrant Council of Ireland reports that more than half of 
their East European participants never experienced discrimination at work, compared to 
only 14% of Nigerian interviewees. East Europeans were also the least likely to be 
bullied by managers and coworkers, while Nigerians were the most likely (Table VI.14) 
(ICI, 2008, p. 95). In fact, Polish workers in Turner et al. (2009, p. 120)’s study were 
extremely positive about their workplace relationships. A majority reported being treated 
well by Irish employers (68%), supervisors (73%), and colleagues (69%), leading 64% to 




















*The number refers to white non-English speaking immigrants, a majority of whom Polish. 
** These numbers refer to Black immigrants, a majority of whom Nigerian workers.  
Sources: CSO, 2005; ICI, 2008; O’Connell & McGinnity, 2008. 
  
On the other hand, Africans are harassed at work not only by Irish supervisors or 
coworkers, but also by immigrant colleagues (ICI, 2008, p. 95). In a 2008 study, for 
instance, Black immigrants (most of whom Nigerians) were the most likely to experience 
discrimination at work, in percentages significantly higher than those for white non-
English speaking immigrants and native workers. The Equality Module of the Quarterly 
National Household Survey points to similar results where 12.7% of non-Irish nationals 
and 15.4% of non-white persons experienced discrimination at work compared to 4.5% of 
Irish nationals and 4.9% of white persons. Almost one fifth experienced discrimination at 
work on the basis of their nationality or race (CSO, 2005) (Table VI.14).  
Interview evidence points to similar results. Polish workers are sometimes bullied 
by Irish and Polish supervisors, yet are rarely discriminated against on an everyday basis. 
Expert respondents note a sense of entitlement among Irish supervisors and workers in 
relation to their Polish colleagues, where the mentality of “let the Polish guy do it” is 
common (D7-TU; D41-NO). As one trade union representative put it, “respect and 












No problems at work 55 14 31 - 
Bullying by managers 6 34 28 - 
Bullying by coworkers 4 29 9 - 
Discrimination at work 
(O’Connell & McGinnity, 2008) 
11* 12.4** - 4.6 
Discrimination at work  
(CSO, 2005) 
- 15.4** - 4.9 
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bullying, especially in the hospitality industry, most often occurs at the hands of Polish 
supervisors (D2-TU; D6-TU; D27-TU). Threats to let a Polish worker go and prevent 
them from finding another job in the industry, as well as the mentality that Polish workers 
should be thankful to have any job in Ireland and “shut up,” persist through economic 
boom and bust (D22-TU).  
The creation of employment agencies that act as intermediaries between 
employers and Polish employees facilitates discrimination against immigrant by reducing 
accountability for the perpetrator of harassment (D22-TU). Nonetheless, there have been 
few major incidents of bullying against the Polish recorded by officials (D26-ADMIN; 
D33-PO; D34-PO). Discrimination is more prevalent with economic downturn, yet as one 
Polish service provider put it, “it’s not that I get such complaints every week. It is every 
few months” (D36-PO; D38-PO).  
Less than one third of Polish participants felt discriminated against by their Irish 
employers or managers (Table VI.15). Discrimination is interpreted as being treated with 
less respect by their manager or the feeling of being pushed to work harder than Irish 
workers. Being told not to speak in Polish also occurred. In only one incident was 
harassment severe and the employee was threatened that he would never be able to find a 
job in the industry, as Ireland is a “small country.” After bringing legitimate safety 
concerns to his manager, the immigrant was told to “shut up” and be thankful to have a 
job. However, he shared that labor rights violations also applied to Irish workers at the 
same company (Steven, 34). In only two instances did Polish employees believe that they 
experienced racism. Most interviewees either have little interaction with their Irish 
managers or have a very good relationship with them. Two-thirds suggest that they work 
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in a good atmosphere and feel that their hard work is appreciated. Some even share how 
their “amazing” Irish employer personally helped them set up a bank account and even 
buy groceries upon their arrival in Ireland, for instance.  
 
 






Source: Author.  
 
 
Polish workers, unlike their Nigerian counterparts, rarely experience bullying by 
their coworkers. There is some resentment among Irish coworkers directed at Polish 
immigrants who are “taking Irish jobs” (D7-TU; D32-PO). However, only 10% of Polish 
participants reported a problem with their coworkers (Table VI.15). In one instance, an 
Irish employee undermined her Polish coworker in front of the manager, and in another a 
Polish immigrant was snubbed by a Pakistani colleague who didn’t like her “because of 
[her] religion” (Kathryn, 27). In fact, more than half of respondents work with a large 
number of nationalities and enjoy the experience. They report no problems in labor 
relationships and believe the Irish to be “nice people” and “very kind” (Lilly, 36; 
Matthew, 32). Polish immigrants get along well with native workers and even socialize 
with them beyond the job. What is troubling is the large number of Polish nationals who 
work mostly with other Polish people, speaking to them in Polish (14%), and keeping 
closer relationship only within their national group (15%). Even more disheartening is the 
fact that Polish workers in Dublin dislike their African colleagues, because they were 
“lazy,” “didn’t work” or had a “different culture” (George, 58; Howard, 28; Kathryn, 27).  
Population By Irish 
manager 






Polish 27 5 5 40 
Nigerian 100 - 33 50 
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Finally, almost half of Polish interviewees report some discrimination by their 
Irish customers or clients (Table VI.15). Complaints focused on Polish workers’ accent 
or limited command of English. Verbal abuse was most common and occurred among 
third of Polish respondents. They were addressed with a slur or told to “go home” and 
stop taking Irish jobs. However, such abuse was an isolated incident considered to be the 
exception rather than the rule. In fact, 55% of Polish subjects report having a very good 
relationship with their customer base. Several share that the Irish are genuinely interested 
in Poland and are quite patient with foreign accents and deficient language skills. A few 
Polish workers even consider their regular Irish customers “close friends” (Jennifer, 29; 
Michaela, 24; Nadine, 27; Rick, 45). 
On the other hand, Nigerian employees in Dublin experience systematic 
discrimination at the hands of Irish managers or supervisors, native customers, as well as 
Irish and immigrant colleagues. According to expert interviewees, most Nigerian workers 
in Ireland believe that they were not being treated as equal employees by their managers 
and coworkers (D11-L; D44-NO). Referrals to the Equality Tribunal, a body that deals 
with cases of discrimination in the workplace, mostly concern this ethnic group (D41-
NO). One official discussed the special case of the taxi industry, where race leads to 
severe hostility by Irish colleagues and clients (D25-J).  
Bullying or harassment at work is widely reported by this project’s African 
respondents. Discrimination is not only much more prevalent against Nigerian 
immigrants than it is among Polish workers, but also takes more severe forms. All 
Nigerian participants shared that their Irish managers were quick to accuse Nigerian 
workers of mistakes at work. They report hostile or inappropriate behavior, such as 
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objectifying female Nigerian employees, being made to feel as “a second-class citizen,” 
as well as verbal abuse (D44-NO; Tatiana, 27). One third of Nigerian workers also felt 
discrimination against by their foreign colleagues. Unfavorable treatment came in 
different forms ranging from undercutting the efforts of Nigerian workers or blaming 
them for mistakes to isolating them during work. Finally, half of respondents experienced 
discrimination by the customers at their job (Table VI.15). Most would complain about 
Nigerian workers’ accent and the inability to understand their English or would assume 
Nigerians hold the lowest position at the office. Some Irish clients would withhold their 
business on the basis of nationality and skin color. Many customers would cause trouble 
or steal during the shift of Nigerian clerks or security guards. Finally, aggressive 
customers verbally and even physically abused Nigerian immigrants at work and told 
them to “go back” (Harry, 35; Stephen, 36; Zach, 32).  
Interestingly, Nigerian workers attributed their inadequate economic opportunities 
and status not just to discrimination from the Irish, but also to the influx of Polish 
workers into Ireland. As Polish workers are willing to work harder and for less, are white 
and similar to their Irish hosts, are already familiar with the work etiquette in Ireland as 
Europeans, and do not require work permits, they are perceived to take away the jobs that 
would otherwise be given to African immigrants.  
In sum, Polish and Nigerian immigrants experience less than perfect relationships 
in the workplace. Polish workers often work with their compatriots and build rapport and 
friendships only within their national group. They face some resentment from Irish 
managers or colleagues, especially as they are perceived to “take Irish jobs” with 
economic downturn. Irish customers or clients are likely to verbally abuse Polish 
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employees or complain about their limited language skills. Nonetheless, it is Polish 
managers that are the worst perpetrators of bullying against Polish workers. A majority of 
Polish immigrants are in fact quite satisfied with their work environment and deem labor 
relations with the Irish “really good.” Therefore, the Europeans are assigned a high value 
of 4 for this component of economic incorporation (Table VI.1). On the other hand, 
Nigerian employees in Dublin experience everyday work discrimination at the hands of 
Irish and immigrant supervisors, customers, and coworkers. They face not only verbal 
abuse, but also physical abuse at work. Bullying and racism are particularly pronounced 
with the arrival of a large number of Polish workers who provide for a contrast with 
“different” Nigerian immigrants. The Africans merit a rating of 1 for this indicator of 
economic integration (Table VI.1). 
 
VI.5.2. Work Relationships in Madrid  
Regardless of their subpar working conditions, few Ecuadorians experience 
discrimination or bullying by employers, managers, colleagues or customers in Madrid. 
While the workplace in Madrid is more tolerant than the place of employment in Dublin, 
Bulgarians are still likelier than their Southern American counterparts to be harassed by 
Spanish and Bulgarian bosses or native and immigrant coworkers and clients. The 
Spanish workplace is different from the Irish one. It is characterized by the blurring of 
public and private functions, the mixing between professional and personal relationships, 
and the framing of the exchanges between supervisor and employee as exchanges of 
personal favors rather than contractual interactions (Fiala, 2012; Martínez, 2009). Levels 
of tolerance for all foreign workers are relatively high. Eight in ten immigrants in the 
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Madrid Autonomous Community work with the native population, yet only 12% 
experience discrimination on the job (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a). Eight in ten 
Spaniards openly accept their immigrant employees or colleagues, and only 2.5% reject 
them, even when immigrants hold superior positions at work (CIS, 2012).   
In this informal, tolerant context, Ecuadorian workers are particularly well 
positioned for favorable treatment. As Fiala (2012) explains, the Catholic work ethic 
shared by Spaniards and Ecuadorians differs from the formality of the Protestant or 
Orthodox work ethic of Bulgarians. Since both the sending and receiving spaces have a 
tradition of intermixing personal and professional relationships in the workplace, it is 
easy for the Latin Americans to fit in the Spanish labor sphere. Ecuadorians are fast to 
integrate into what Fiala (2012) dubs patron-client relationships in Spain and accept 
special gifts and help in exchange for loyalty and gratitude for employers. The 
immigrants develop a personal bond towards employers and managers and even consider 
the latter “family.”  
Unsurprisingly, only one in ten of Ecuadorian workers in this project felt 
discriminated against or treated unfairly by Spanish employers. It is true that some 
reported being too busy to form a bond with their superiors in the first place and some 
suggested that Spanish managers exerted constant pressure on them “to produce” or “to 
hurry” (Ethan, 39; Kris, 39).323 Some mistrust and “doubt” at the beginning of the work 
relationship was reported as well (Patrick, 32).324 However, the vast majority concede 
both their Spanish and ethnic superiors to be “friendly,” “very nice, very understanding,” 
                                                          
323 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Nos meten mucha prisa, ya y entonces 
tenemos que cumplir” (Ethan, 39), “Que tú le produzcas, productividad, producción” (Kris, 39). 
324 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Los españoles no trataban con 
latinoamericanos y al principio dudaban.” 
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and to “treat [them] very well” and appreciate their “development and hard work” (Kris, 
39; Lina, 30; Patrick, 32; Travis, 42).325 Relationships are considered “extremely cordial” 
(muy cordial) with Spanish customers (Lina, 30) (Table VI.16).  
 







*The higher number reflects the valid percentage when respondents who did not give an answer to 
the questions were excluded from the calculations.  
Source: Author.  
 
Good relations are the rule with immigrant colleagues as well, even though 
Ecuadorians prefer working with their co-ethnics. As one person put it, “it is easier to 
work with the same nationality. We understand each other a bit more” (Ethan, 39).326 
Another South American worker captured well the high level of informality and personal 
loyalty present in relationships with Ecuadorian and Spanish coworkers alike, “I have 
been working with them for four years. I am working for four years and the people stay 
with me. We are paisanos (countrymen). It is normal. We are together, whatever you 
need, be it food or … I’d give you one thing, you’d give me another” (Travis, 42).327 
Despite preference for their paisanos and a belief that other immigrants like Bulgarians 
are “very closed” (muy cerrados) and hard to communicate with, Ecuadorians report 
                                                          
325Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Mi jefe español sí. Yo lo he tenido amable 
al hombre” (Kris, 39), “Los jefes son muy buenas, muy atentas y muy comprensivas” (Lina, 30), “Pero 
luego él vio el desenvolvimiento mío, cómo trabajo y que soy una persona responsable y trabajadora y 
tal”(Patrick, 32), “Me trataba muy bien”(Travis, 42).  
326Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Es muy fácil trabajar con la misma 
nacionalidad. Nos entendemos un poco más.” 
327 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Les conozco por estar trabajando conmigo 
estos cuatro años. Tres años está trabajando la gente y siguen conmigo. Todos somos paisanos...Eso es lo 









Ecuadorians 11 33 11 11 
Bulgarians 38.5/60* 15.4/66.7* 12.8/62.5* 10.3/66.7* 
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getting along with all foreign coworkers in Spain “very well” (muy bien) (Lina, 30; 
Lincoln, 32). The only unfavorable work relationship is that with Spanish coworkers. 
None of the South American participants talk of direct confrontation or discrimination 
from native coworkers, unlike Nigerians in Dublin, for instance. However, much like in 
the case of the Polish in Ireland, one third sense “some vindictiveness, some pessimism, 
because you have a job and I don’t.” “Taking Spanish jobs” is at the root of worsening 
relationships between Spanish and Latin Americans coworkers, but only in bust 
economic times (Ethan, 39) (Table VI.16). 328 
On the other hand, Bulgarians are conflicted about their workplace relationships 
but fare worse than similar Iberian Ecuadorians in Madrid or white, European Poles in 
Dublin. Especially when it comes to Spanish employers, stern, proud, different 
Bulgarians do not know how to navigate the patron-client relationship Fiala (2012) 
describes, unlike their South American counterparts. Consequently, more than one third 
of the interviewees here experienced some problems in their relationships with their 
Spanish employers or managers. The proportion is much higher when only valid answers 
are taken into account (Table VI.16). Anecdotes of employers treating Bulgarian women 
in domestic services “like slaves” (като роби) abound (Izzy, 40; Tangra, 36). Some 
examples are extreme. One female cleaner was hung from the eleventh floor by her 
Spanish employer to clean the outside windows panes as a test of her work ethic (Gina, 
33). Another refused to work during “disgusting” (отвратителни) parties her employer 
threw late at night and was threatened with police and deportation (Pam, 39). A third 
Balkan worker was made to eat at a separate table where her employers left trash, “like a 
                                                          
328 Paragraph contains author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish, including: Hay un poco 
de revanchismo, de pesimismo, por qué tú tienes trabajo y yo no lo tengo. Porque quitas el trabajo de los 
españoles (Ethan, 39). 
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dog” (като куче) (Dothy, 60). Other examples are not as severe but reflect mistrust, 
unfamiliarity and the conception of Bulgarians as second-class citizens to be exploited. 
Pressure to work faster than other laborers despite lesser pay, being forbidden to speak 
Bulgarian, or having to “work seven days a week for two weeks” or “non-stop without a 
break” are common occurrences (Sylvester, 29; Tangra, 36).329 Accusations of stealing 
and even throwing jewelry around a house to see if the Bulgarian domestic worker would 
take it occurred as well. Questioning an administrative worker’s literacy or not inviting a 
Bulgarian cleaner to a hacienda-wide party are other indications of the East European’s 
exclusion by their employers.  
Still, Bulgarian workers concede that their experiences are not always been 
negative and “in some houses they treat you like a slave, but in the other, family people 
are more intelligent and there is no such treatment” (Yana, 50).330 A large number call 
their Spanish bosses “good employers,” (добри работодатели) and describe the “great 
relationship” (прекрасни взаимоотношения) they have in the Madrid workplace 
(Grady, 54; Shay, 56; Tara, 50). Spanish employers are “patient with language” 
(търпеливи с езика) and sometimes treat their foreign workers “as family” (като 
семейство) (Annа, 36; Trini, 31). As one interviewee recalls, her Spanish boss found her 
other places to clean, so she doesn’t “lose her papers,” legalized her documents, secured a 
job for her husband, and even found housing for her children (Nina, 57).331 
                                                          
329 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “И ме държа 
ужасно много време без почивка, 7 дена в седмицата работя, събраха ми се 2 седмици и аз казах „аз 
не мога повече” (Sylvester, 29), “Не много добро, защото се работи нон- стоп, няма почивка” 
(Tangra, 36).  
330Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Едното семейство те третират едва ли не като 
слугиня, обаче в другото семейство пък хората са по- интелигентнии няма такова отношение.” 
331 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Ще изгуби 
правото си, ще изгуби тархетата” (Nina, 57).  
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Few Balkan workers have colleagues, since they are the sole caretakers of private 
households. Still, treatment by colleagues and customers is conflicted. On the one hand, a 
majority sense mistrust, condescension, and resentment. Between 10% and 15% of the 
participants faced problematic relationships with their coworkers or customers, 
proportions that grew exponentially to two-third of participants when only valid 
responses were considered (Table VI.16). Spanish coworkers are reported to look at 
Bulgarians “with contempt, with distrust, after all you don’t speak well” (Dylan, 45).332 
They minimize Bulgarians’ work efforts or lodge complains against them in front of 
managers. Both Spanish and Latin American colleagues, “envious” (pевност) of the East 
Europeans’ work ethic or achievements, act with entitlement and boss the Balkan 
workers around regardless of their actual stature in the company, “create drama” to 
undermine the Bulgarians’ efforts, or make comments about the foreigners’ “taking jobs” 
that are not rightfully theirs (Chris, 34; Grady, 54).333 Resentment is considered 
particularly strong when the Balkan laborers are in a position superior to that of native or 
South American workers. Disturbingly, like in the case of the Polish in Dublin, 
Bulgarians are prejudiced themselves and report that they simply “cannot deal with 
Moroccans,” who are too different in religious and cultural terms (Sasha, 33).334 On the 
other hand, language skill acquisition and acculturation “after years in Spain” (след 
години в Испания) are reported to result in more communication and “good 
                                                          
332 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “И ходех, но хората ме гледаха малко с 
пренебрежение, с недоверие, все пак не им вдъхваш доверие, не говориш добре.” 
333 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Създават драма,” 
“Взимаме им работата” (Grady, 54).  
334 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Въпрос на разбиране, аз примерно не че са 
мароканци, но това, че са мюсюлмани това ме бърка и не ми е приятно.” 
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relationships” (добри взаимоотношения) in the workplace, as well as “respect” 
(уважение) by native clients (Redford, 36). 
To conclude, familiar Ecuadorians can navigate well the informal Spanish 
workplace. Despite pressure by Spanish employers, some resentment by Spanish 
coworkers who believe they are losing their jobs to the South Americans and preference 
for working among paisanos, extroverted Catholic Ecuadorians boast “very good” 
relationships on the job in Madrid. They form personal bonds with employers and 
colleagues and score high on this component of economic incorporation (Table VI.1) 
(Fiala, 2012). On the other hand, while not as disadvantaged as Nigerians in Dublin, 
Bulgarians experience worse treatment that their Latin American or Polish counterparts. 
The different Balkan workers are viewed with suspicion and contempt by managers, 
colleagues and clients and are regarded as second-class persons regardless of actual 
position in the workplace. Still, with time work relationships improve and some of the 
East European employees come to feel part of their manager’s “family,” much like 
Ecuadorians. Despite improvements with acculturation, Bulgarians rate relatively low on 
this facet of economic integration and receive a value of 2 (Table VI.1).  
 
VI.6. Job Satisfaction 
VI.6.1. Job Satisfaction in Dublin 
As a result of their occupational status and working conditions and relationships, 
Polish workers are satisfied with their economic position in Dublin, while Nigerian 
immigrants are not. In fact, Polish immigrants downplay any instances of exploitation 
and describe their professional situation as their deliberate choice. On the other hand, 
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Nigerians emphasize their lack of control and extreme dissatisfaction with their economic 
status in Ireland.  
The Polish Embassy’s economic section reports that there are few gross instances 
of exploitation of Polish workers in Ireland and “Poles are treated more and more as part 
of Irish society” (D33-PO).  Other Polish organizations suggest that “people are braver” 
and know their rights better and thus utilize institutions like the Equality Tribunal more 
frequently to dispute unfavorable conditions (D39-PO). Unsurprisingly, labor market 
satisfaction among the Polish is high leading Turner et al. (2009) to dub Polish workers in 
Ireland “contented proletariat.” Only 2% of Turner et al.’s respondents were “not at all 
satisfied with their job conditions,” while 59% were “very definitely” or “definitely” 
satisfied (Turner et al., 2009, p. 118). According to McGinnity et al. (2011), Eastern 
Europeans experience the lowest work pressure among all nationality groups in Dublin, 
including the Irish, and feel most secure at their jobs. More than half of Polish 
respondents here are at least somewhat satisfied with their experience in Ireland. The 
cohort merits a rating of 4 for this component of economic incorporation (Table VI.1). 
On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants in Ireland report low levels of job 
security and job satisfaction. According to McGinnity et al. (2011), while 29% of Irish 
and Eastern European workers thought that their job was not secure, 34% of African 
employees did not feel stable at their job. Africans workers also report higher levels of 
work pressure than Eastern Europeans with a mean score of 2.62 compared to 2.52 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 46-47). Among this project’s interviewees, less than one third 
is satisfied with their work in Ireland. This collective is assigned the lowest rating for this 
indicator of economic integration (Table VI.1).  
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VI.6.2. Job Satisfaction in Madrid 
Like the Polish in Dublin, Ecuadorians are somewhat satisfied with their 
occupational position in Madrid. Surprisingly, so are Bulgarians, who consider the 
receiving context preferable to dismal conditions at home. 
Foreign workers in Spain are less satisfied with their labor experiences than 
natives but the gap is not glaring. For instance, while 50.9% of natives are “very 
satisfied” or “satisfied” with “work in general,” 42% of immigrants express high levels of 
satisfaction. Salary levels are the least favorable aspect for both groups, while the 
“physical workplace” and “health/safety” ae found more than adequate by a majority of 
all cohorts (Corral & Isusi, 2007; Ministerio de Trabajo e Asuntos Sociales [MTAS], 
2004). Similar Ecuadorians whose workplace transition is relatively smooth, and who 
experience better access, conditions, and relationships in the Spanish labor market than 
other ethnic groups, are happy with their employment in Madrid. Two-thirds of Latin 
American respondents in this dissertation suggest they are at least somewhat satisfied 
with their economic situation in the receiving city. The better organization of labor and 
clearer rules, the higher remuneration, the access to professional activities for first-time 
South American female labor market entrants, and even the personal attachment and 
gratitude to individual employers contribute to feelings of security and happiness 
(Dudley, 2013; Fiala, 2012). Despite the fewer opportunities with economic crisis and the 
tendency of employers to “take advantage” of all foreign workers, one respondent sums 
up the general attitude that “clearly, it is a little bit better here than in my country” 
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(Patrick, 32; Travis, 42)335. As a result, Ecuadorians receive a value of 4 for this indicator 
of economic incorporation (Table VI.1).  
Surprisingly, Bulgarians are also satisfied with their employment in Spain. A little 
more than half of this project’s interviewees suggest that their migration produced better 
working circumstances for them. Better opportunities and “better money” (по-добри 
пари), especially in comparison to “horrible” (ужасни) conditions in the origin country, 
make up for sacrifices, deskilling, and humiliation (Tonya, 45). Bulgarian workers, who 
perceive themselves as similar to their European Spanish hosts, believe that as time 
passes and they acquire Spanish language and habits, their economic situation will 
improve further. Therefore, the Balkan migrants are starting to come forward with 
grievances against employers and to seek their economic rights. They also place more 
value on the work they do in Spain, and can reconcile being employed well below 
qualifications and still being satisfied. As one participants summarizes, “I can be a 
cleaning lady in Bulgaria too, but a sad cleaning lady” (Rosa, 44).336 The East Europeans 
are assigned a 4 for this component of economic integration (Table VI.1).  
 
VI.7. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the economic incorporation of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and 
Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid is imperfect, much like the four cohorts’ access to 
political rights. However, there are significant differences among the four groups, which 
cannot be explained by legal status, human capital, or niche of employment. Culturally-
                                                          
335 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “ Se approvechan” (Patrick, 32),  “Claro que aca es 
un poquito mejor que en mi país” (Travis, 42). 
336 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “И когато имаш стабилна 
работа, защото аз можех да бъда чистачка и в България, но да бъда нещастна чистачка” (Rosa, 44). 
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grounded exclusion and inclusion amid local labor market actors, and identity-based 
perceptions of belonging or isolation among the immigrants playa fundamental role. 
Ecuadorians experience organic integration into the Madrid labor market and 
rank relatively high on the economic index constructed by this author (Table VI.1). Even 
though they are exploited by cost-calculating employers during economic crunch and 
face worse working conditions and higher unemployment rates than natives, the South 
Americans still fare better than other immigrants in Spain. The Spanish-speaking 
foreigners have easy access to jobs and higher activity rates than East European workers. 
Ecuadorians, who come to Spain from a similar socio-economic reality, do not 
experience severe deskilling upon migration. In fact, female migrants often enter the 
professional sphere for the first time with mobility and educational attainment for both 
male and female cohorts translates into higher achievement in the host city. In view of the 
immigrants’ Catholic work ethic and shared understanding of the informal relations of the 
Spanish labor market, working conditions for the Latin Americans are adequate and 
relationships in the workplace are favorable. Perceptions of welcome and improved 
economic circumstances lead to high levels of satisfaction among the South Americans. 
Poles in Dublin, who are welcomed, yet hardly believe themselves to belong, 
undergo reluctant integration and merit a high/intermediate rating on the economic 
incorporation index constructed by this author (Table VI.1). In spite of the language 
barrier and the economic crisis, Polish immigrants are able to find employment in Ireland 
and face little discrimination in recruitment. While many lost jobs with economic 
downturn, their activity and employment rates remain among the highest in Ireland. 
There is a steady stream of new arrivals. Many Polish workers in Dublin are highly 
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qualified, yet are employed in lower-skilled professions. However, as they were under- or 
unemployed in Poland and worked below qualifications in the home country, Polish 
workers are not experiencing steep downward mobility upon migration. Poles can close 
the occupational gap with language acquisition. Like Ecuadorians in Madrid, the East 
European workers experience worse working conditions that Irish nationals. However, 
exploitation diminishes with increased knowledge of labor rights or the help of friendly 
Irish institutions. Working conditions are still better than these of Nigerians in Dublin, for 
instance, who are at the mercy of their employers. Working relationships are generally 
favorable, even during hard economic times. Unsurprisingly, the Polish are satisfied with 
their economic situation in Dublin, earning the moniker “contented proletariat.” 
Bulgarians, who view themselves to belong in Spain, yet face negative reception 
by their hosts, undergo conflicted integration in Madrid and merit an intermediate 
economic incorporation rating (Table VI.1). While not fully excluded from the labor 
market in the receiving context, the different Balkan workers have impaired access to 
employment in Spain and have to rely on ethnic networks for securing a job. 
Employment rates are lower and unemployment levels are higher than these of natives or 
South American migrants. While some members of the intermediately qualified 
Bulgarian labor pool might be employed according to qualifications, downward 
occupational mobility is endemic for the culturally-different cohort. Inadequate labor 
conditions and bullying by Spanish employers is much more common among the proud, 
stern East Europeans, who do not know how to navigate the Spanish labor market than 
among their Latin American counterparts. Surprisingly, satisfaction is relatively high 
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among Bulgarians, whose belief of their similarity to European Spaniards leads them to 
fight for their labor rights and hope for improved economic conditions over time.  
Finally, Nigerian workers experience blocked integration in Dublin and rank low 
on the economic incorporation index constructed by this author (Table VI.1). The 
racially and culturally distinct Africans are often unable to even secure a job in view of 
preference for Polish workers and discrimination by Irish employers. Their activity rates 
are much lower than those of Polish immigrants. When they are employed, Nigerians 
experience greater occupational gaps than their Polish counterparts and transition from 
jobs in medicine, for instance, to employment in lower-skilled occupations. Relatedly, 
African immigrants in Dublin face substandard working conditions. Pay is low, contracts 
are casual and hours of employment are unsocial. Bullying and harassment by managers, 
colleagues, and customers are pervasive and repeated. Consequently, Africans are not 
satisfied with their employment in Ireland. Since Nigerians are thwarted by structural 
factors like prejudice, their economic exclusion is hard to overcome and severe gaps in 
economic integration are replicated in other areas, like the social sphere. It is to the social 





“THE LOWEST RUNG IN SOCIETY”: 
SOCIAL INCORPORATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID 
 
VII.1. Introduction 
Non-European and European immigrants in Dublin and Madrid are highly 
disadvantaged in their access to social resources. However, there are important 
differences among collectives and contexts that cannot be easily explained by the 
newcomers’ legal status, socio-economic class and labor market position, or human 
capital. It is puzzling that English-speaking Nigerians perform worse in Irish schools than 
East European Poles. It is surprising that non-EU Ecuadorians have better access to 
Madrid’s housing market, healthcare system, or social welfare administration than 
European Bulgarians. Why tolerant Madrid is often less adept at accommodating its 
foreign population than homogenous Dublin remains unanswered. The argument is that 
identity politics are an integral part of an explanation. Regardless of a relatively 
disadvantaged economic position, culturally-familiar foreign collectives benefit from 
better opportunities in the social sphere, as they inspire empathy among natives and 
engender little discrimination. They can navigate local educational or health institutions 
with ease and are rarely the victims of racism. Immigrant collectives that consider 
themselves to belong in their new home, moreover, are likely to seek their rights and 
combat obstacles to social incorporation. They enroll in local schools, attend regular 
medical check-ups, intermix with the autochthonous population in housing tenements and 
invest in their new environment.  
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This chapter traces the social integration of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and 
Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid through the discussion of disposable income; 
access to housing, education, healthcare, and social welfare; relationships with other key 
governmental institutions; as well as incidents of racism and discrimination. While all 
four groups are hardly integrated in the social domain of the receiving communities, 
Ecuadorians in Madrid have better access than the other three collectives. The similar 
                                                          
337 Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Outcomes that reflect lack of social access are 
assigned a value of 1. High levels of incorporation are given a value of 5. Outcomes that fall in the middle 
are assigned a 3. The values from every column are added to produce an index of social incorporation 
levels for each immigrant group. Many indicators are composite. “Disposable income” is surveyed through 
average wages and poverty rates. “Housing” includes homeownership, access to the rental market, 
segregation from the native community, and concentration in areas with lower socio-economic status. 
“Education” refers to access to all levels of schooling, concentration in immigrant-heavy or public and 
otherwise disadvantaged institutions, educational achievement, and treatment by teachers and other 
students. “Health” references self-reported health status, use of health services, and relationships with 
healthcare providers. “Social welfare” includes rates of welfare activity, legal provisions and barriers to 
receiving social welfare, as well as discrimination in the system. “Other institutions” includes treatment by 
and access to police, employment and training agencies, immigration offices, and trade unions. “Racism” 
includes bias encountered on the streets, in shops or in other public spaces, as well as by the media. The 
Index ranges from 7 to 35. Values between 7 and 16 reflect low levels of incorporation, 17-26 show 






























































































South Americans deviate from the organic integration model extended in this 
dissertation, yet they are considered among the most sympathetic groups by Madrilenians 
and have relatively ample social entitlements in the city. Perceptions of Madrid as an 
extension of the homeland lead Ecuadorians to strategically employ local opportunities 
and invest in life in Spain. The Latin Americans own homes in the receiving context and 
intermix residentially with the native community. They utilize the generous healthcare 
and social security systems and can easily navigate other key institutions in the city.  
Despite some discrimination, cultural affinity and a similar social reality bode well for 
the South American’s long-term incorporation prospects (Table VII.1). 
Poles in Dublin are worse off than their Latin American counterparts. As they 
perceive themselves not to belong in the receiving context, the East Europeans resign 
themselves to low income, subpar accommodations, disadvantaged schools, and 
exclusion form the Irish social security system. However, the multiple opportunities 
Poles are granted by welcoming local actors force the newcomers to reluctantly integrate 
in their new home. Open access to the Dublin rental housing market, preferential 
treatment in educational institutions, decent medical coverage, and positive interactions 
with police or courts close the social gap for Polish immigrants in Ireland. As they are 
considered sympathetic by Irish stakeholders, Poles experience little discrimination and 
are likely to enjoy even more plentiful opportunities in the long-term (Table VII.1).  
Bulgarians’ conflicted integration extends beyond economic and political rights to 
Madrid’s social sphere. The Eastern Europeans have low disposable income, inhabit 
crowded subpar accommodations in segregated neighborhoods, and have relatively low 
educational achievement. Use of the generous healthcare system is somewhat limited, 
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prejudiced treatment in immigration offices occurs, and stereotyping in the Spanish 
media is well-established. Nonetheless, as they perceive themselves to belong in the 
receiving context, Bulgarians avail themselves of the Madrilenian social security system 
and aspire to learn Spanish in order to excel in the educational sphere. The Balkan 
workers are satisfied with their access to the generous medical system and other 
institutions like the police and suggest that their European-ness shields them from overt 
racism in the host context (Table VII.1). 
Despite relatively favorable access to some social institutions in Dublin, 
Nigerians in Ireland stand out as the most disadvantaged collective in terms of social 
incorporation. The dissimilar African migrants are blocked in their integration in the 
receiving city. Poverty rates are high, isolation from the rental market is pervasive, and 
residential and educational segregation are the norm among Nigerians. Bullying in 
primary and secondary education, higher costs for medical care, stereotypes in the social 
welfare system, and unfair treatment by police or immigration officers further detract 
from the Africans’ social incorporation. Nigerian immigrants are the most likely victims 
of discrimination by Irish and foreign perpetrators. As exclusion is based on Nigerians’ 
racial and cultural difference from the Irish, it is likely to persist (Table VII.1).  
The remainder of this chapter discusses each indicator of social integration for 
Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid in turn. The 
findings are grounded in statistical data, governmental and non-governmental reports, 
secondary sources, and interviews with the relevant stakeholders in each city. Interview 
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data with the immigrants and their ethnic representatives add richness and detail to the 
discussion.338 
 
VII.2. Disposable Income 
VII.2.1. Disposable Income in Dublin 
While most immigrants in Ireland have lower wages than the native population, 
disposable income is lowest among citizens of the new member states.  To illustrate, in 
2008 the average gross income for an Irish household stood at €51,956 annually. This 
compares to only €39,095 among Eastern European nationals and €45,666 for non-EU 
nationals (McGinnity et al., 2011).  
However, Polish immigrants fare better in terms of their income compared to 
Nigerian workers in Dublin. East Europeans earn monthly net income higher than that of 
Africans by more than twenty euro points (McGinnity et al., 2006). A majority of Polish 
respondents are able to cover their living expenses regardless of their low wages. On the 
other hand, only four in ten Nigerian respondents can provide for all household expenses, 
in view of large families and the tendency of Nigerian women to care for the home (ICI, 
2008). Polish immigrants in Dublin are also less likely to be in poverty. The proportion of 
                                                          
338 In Dublin, additional sources include a study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI, 2008); two 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) reports on immigrant integration (McGinnity et al., 2006, 
2011); analyses of immigrants in the Irish educational system (Curry et al., 2010; Smyth, Darmody, 
McGinnity, & Byrne, 2009); relevant legislation; and data from the Irish census, the National Consultative 
Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), the Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA), and the Dublin City Council.  In the case of Madrid, primary and secondary data are derived, 
among other sources, from integration reports by national, regional and local institutions (Ayuntamiento de 
Madrid, 2010; Bertozzi, 2010, Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; D’Ancona & Martíinez, 2009); various 
analyses of the Spanish National Health Survey (Carrasco-Garrido, De Miguel, Barrera, & Jiménez-García, 
2007; Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 2009, 2012; Solé-Auro & Crimmins, 2008; Villarroel and 
Artazcoz 2015); as well as a number of scholarly papers on segregation in the Spanish educational system 
(Zinovyeva, Felgueroso, & Vazquez, 2013; Teese, Aasen, Field, & Pont, 2006) or housing market 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Mundra, 2012; Blázquez,  Llano, & Moral, 2010; Bosch, Carnero, & Farré, 2011; 
Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012). 
374 
 
Eastern Europeans at risk of poverty is almost the same as that of the Irish and much 
lower than that for third-country nationals (McGinnity et al., 2011).339  
While Eastern Europeans tend to earn less than Nigerian migrants in absolute 
numbers, they employ their income efficiently and are less likely than Nigerian 
immigrants to fall under the poverty line. In fact, most of the Polish respondents in this 
project are very satisfied with their quality of life in Ireland regardless of relatively low 
salaries. Nigerian interviewees, on the other hand, are deeply disappointed with their 
insufficient income.  The East Europeans are assigned a 4 and Africans – a 3 – for this 
component of social integration (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.2.2. Disposable Income in Madrid 
 Like their counterparts in Dublin, immigrants in Madrid have lesser disposable 
income than natives. Generally, gross monthly earnings are lower among immigrant and 
natives than in Ireland. While 18-19% Spaniards were at risk of poverty and 4% suffered 
from extreme poverty in 2003-2007, the comparable numbers for immigrants stood at 29-
31% and 7-13% respectively. Even after socio-demographic characteristics and economic 
profile are accounted for, there remains a 20% “pay gap” between natives and foreigners 
(De Bustillo & Ánton, 2011, p. 673). In Madrid, the gap is even higher, standing at 24% 
(Bárcena-Martín & Pérez-Moreno, 2008).  
 Household and individual income is comparable between Ecuadorians and 
Bulgarians in Madrid. An average monthly wage of €995 is matched by €963 for Latin 
Americans and €958 for Eastern Europeans (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008). Another 
                                                          
339 The percentage of individuals at risk of poverty is highest among non-EU nationals with almost 19% 
compared to 14.3% among Eastern European and 14.1% among the Irish (McGinnity et al., 2011). 
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estimate puts monthly wages for Latin Americans at €939 on average compared to only 
€927.5 for Eastern Europeans. As Ecuadorians live in somewhat larger households, with 
4.15 persons on average as opposed to 3.96 among Balkan migrants, income is 
comparable. Nonetheless, the East Europeans do not earn higher wages if they have 
higher educational degrees, experience in the home country, or even work experience or 
training in Spain (Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012). On the other hand, home country 
work experience results in higher income for Latin Americans (Sanromá et al., 2009).  
While all foreigners earn wages lower than these of natives or immigrants in other 
European countries, Eastern Europeans are more disadvantaged than Latin Americans. 
Monthly wage differentials are negligible. However, experience or education in the home 
or host country only results in income increases among Ecuadorians. In fact, most 
Ecuadorian participants ae satisfied with their wages, especially before the economic 
downturn, while Bulgarian interviewees speak of the artificially low income they receive 
in Spain. Based on relative deprivation, the South Americans are assigned a 3 and the 
East Europeans - a 2 for this component of social incorporation (Table VII.1). 
 
VII.3. Access to Housing 
VII.3.1. Access to Housing in Dublin 
 Access to housing appears less satisfactory among Polish immigrants than among 
Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. Few Poles own their accommodations and most live in 
undesirable neighborhoods predominantly with their compatriots or other immigrants. 
Nonetheless, Nigerians are highly disadvantaged in terms of rental accommodations due 
to their physical difference and cluster in neighborhoods populated mostly by other 
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Nigerian nationals. Both communities feel relatively safe in their surroundings, yet the 
East Europeans are more likely to be satisfied with their location and particular residence. 
More than nine in ten Polish immigrants lived in rented accommodations in 
Ireland in 2006, with only 7% identifying as homeowners (CSO, 2008). In comparison, 
23% of non-EU nationals owned their housing in Dublin in 2010 (McGinnity et al., 
2011). Among respondents in this project, however, almost one fifth either owned or 
were looking to buy residence in Dublin. Still, Nigerian immigrants are much more likely 
to own their residence in Ireland than are Polish workers. Both the Central Statistical 
Institute and the Immigrants Council of Ireland find that 17% of Nigerians own their 
residences with five or six in ten living in rented tenements, and the remainder confined 
to public housing or asylum hostels (CSO, 2008; ICI, 2008). However, home ownership 
among all immigrants is diminishing. The desire to send remittances home is one reason 
for this trend. A more troubling explanation is that economic exclusion translates into 
social exclusion, where the requirement to demonstrate credit and employment history 
poses greater difficulty for immigrant mortgage applicants (National Consultative 
Committee on Racism and Interculturalism [NCCRI], 2008).  
The higher rates of home ownership among Nigerian immigrants in Dublin often 
reflect not Nigerians’ embeddedness in the community, but the biased access to rental 
accommodations the Africans face. According to the ICI, African immigrants are 
severely disadvantaged in securing accommodations from an Irish landlord. When 
identified as Nigerian, they are usually told that the advertised accommodation is no 
longer available, while in reality it remains unoccupied. Sometimes they are directly told 
that Nigerians are not welcome in the residence (ICI, 2008, p. 127). The same experience 
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is shared by this project’s interviewees. Half report discrimination by landlords when 
looking for rental accommodations and all believe that many Irish landlords simply do 
not rent to Nigerians. For instance, after one Nigerian immigrant was told an 
accommodation is occupied, her Irish friend posed as a potential occupant and was 
encouraged to view the residence (Tatiana, 27). Even renting through a housing agency 
proved difficult after the owners realized the potential tenant was black (Ethan, 46). In 
some cases, bias is direct. Landlords would identify Nigerian renters by “their voice” and 
tell them they are unwanted or even address them with racial slurs (Ethan, 46; D25-J; 
Taylor, 30). Unfavorable treatment by landlords is common during tenancy as well, with 
lack of maintenance or unwarranted complaints against African occupants. 
On the other hand, the Polish have unlimited access to rental accommodations. 
Only one in ten of interviewees in this project found securing rented housing difficult, not 
due to discrimination but in view of high prices and demand. In fact, Polish respondents 
believe that Irish landlords prefer and appreciate Polish tenants even to native lessees, 
since the East Europeans are “clean,” quiet, and look after their apartments (Elizabeth, 
36; Steven, 34). Issues with Irish landlords are rare. Problems stem from housing that is 
subpar to begin with, and constitute predominantly neglect to make repairs. Only in one 
case did a participant believe an Irish landlord treated foreign tenants worse than native 
ones and in one instance did a landlord unfairly withhold a tenant’s deposit. Most 
respondents found Irish landlords to be “good,” quick to repair the accommodation, and 
even “fantastic” (Elizabeth, 36). 
Regardless of whether they rent or own their accommodations, both Polish and 
Nigerian immigrants cluster in Dublin’s less desirable areas. Poles are not as isolated as 
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Nigerians. According to one expert respondent, Polish immigrants are “not really a 
minority,” and so “they blend in” and “are pretty spread out” throughout Dublin (D11-L). 
However, because they have limited finances and seek proximity to jobs, Poles remain 
focused mostly in neighborhoods that are immigrant-heavy and of relatively low socio-
economic standing (D1-J; D16-ADMIN). A large proportion lives in new construction on 
the north of the City in communities like Fairview, Clonsilla, Clonliffe, Clondalkin, 
Tallaght, Finglas, Drumcondra, Blanchardstown, and Mulhuddart (D1-J; D18-P; D33-
PO; D34-PO; D38-PO). Other Polish immigrants focus in Dublin’s center, where they are 
closer to jobs, entertainment, and Polish organizations (D5-ADMIN; D9-P; D18-P; D35-
PO). For instance, Poles reside around St. Audeon’s church, which provides mass in 
Polish, around Polish restaurants in Capel and Moore Street, as well as close to Polish 
service organizations (D13-P; D35-PO; D36-PO; D40-PO).  
Similarly, Nigerian immigrants are geographically clustered in Dublin’s less 
prestigious communities. According to expert participants, Nigerian workers live either in 
the inner city in low-cost residences around Parnell Street if they are single or in the 
North West of the city in communities like Balbriggan, Blanchardstown, Mulhuddard, 
and Tallaght if they are married (D11-L; D16-ADMIN; D41-NO; D44-NO). In fact, 
Polish and Nigerian immigrants intersect in Mulhuddart or Tallaght, as well as in the city 
center. In order to establish contrast between the housing situations of the two 
populations, the project focuses on Mulhuddart, Tallaght, Balbriggan, and 
Blanchardstown when discussing the living conditions of Nigerians. For the Polish group, 
the emphasis is on communities with a high concentration of Polish nationals and low 
concentrations of Nigerians nationals, and specifically City Center North (8.5% Polish as 
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opposed to the 1.5% average), Fairview (with 4.6% Polish), Cabra (2.4% Poles), and 
Drumcondra (2.2%) (CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012). 
The communities in which Polish workers concentrate are immigrant-heavy, yet 
ethnically homogenous and predominantly “white.” Polish immigrants are geographically 
integrated with the Irish and live in areas where the percentage of the Irish population is 
similar to, if a little below, the national average. However, the neighborhoods in which 
Polish workers focus tend to be more ethnically “similar” than those preferred by 
Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. The foreign populations in Cabra, Fairview, or 
Drumcondra, for instance, are larger than the average, but are mostly of white ethnicity 
and Lithuanian, British or another European Union nationality. Only the city center offers 
Poles a truly multicultural neighborhood, with foreign nationals making up almost half of 
all residents and non-EU nationals making up one quarter of the population (CSO 2012a; 
Rate My Area, 2012) (Table VII.2).  
 
Table VII.2. National and Ethnic Composition of Poles’ and Nigerians’ 













Sources: CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012. 
 
 









Average 1.5 5.1 3.5 10.2 89.8 89.5 7.1 1.1 
City Center N 8.5 13.6 26.2 50.1 49.9 48.9 28.6 3.2 
Fairview 4.6 10.1 8.2 22.9 77.1 77 16.1 2 
Cabra 2.4 4.9 4.4 11.6 88.4 88.1 8.4 1 
Drumcondra 2.2 5.9 5.5 13.7 86.3 86.1 9.7 1.2 
Tallaght 2.3 3.9 5.7 11.8 88.2 87.2 7.1 2 
Mulhuddart 4.3 8.2 16.3 28.8 71.2 62.6 16.3 13.4 
Balbriggan 0.9 4.7 7.3 14.8 87.2 84.9 6.7 6 
Blanchardstown 2 5.7 9.2 16.8 83.2 79.7 10.1 3.9 
380 
 
On the other hand, the neighborhoods populated by Nigerian immigrants have a 
high percentage of immigrants who identify as black or non-EU. For instance, 16.8% of 
Blachardstown’s population and as high as 28.8% of Mulhuddart’s population is foreign-
born compared to only 10.2% nationally. What is more, non-EU black immigrants make 
up 6% of Balbriggan’s and 13.4% of Mulhuddart’s population compared to 1.1% 
nationally (Table VII.2). This dissertation’s interviewees suggest that they prefer such 
“ethnic” locations. After facing stigma and stereotyping, parents actively seek out estates 
where other African families live, because ethnic families “look out for each other” and 
provide protection for each other’s children. One respondent suggests that before he rents 
any accommodation, he always asks “How many black people live here?” (Ethan, 46). 
However, “multiculturalism” is not always as positive as integration experts make it out 
to be, with the “multicultural” neighborhoods populated by Nigerians also the ones with 
the most racial tensions and highest crime rates. As one respondent put it, “Some parts of 
Dublin, like Dublin 15 where I live, would be multicultural. But is it really multicultural 
in terms of social facilities, in terms of equality of opportunity, or is it only called 
multicultural because people live there together?” (D44-NO). 
The localities inhabited by Polish and Nigerian workers are also of lower socio-
economic status than average regardless of high educational levels. This disparity is even 
more pronounced in the case of Nigerian immigrants. Despite the fact that a large number 
of residents in Mulhuddart or the city center, for instance, have completed tertiary 
degrees, they are employed in trade or other unidentified economic sectors rather than 
prestigious white-collar occupations. The percentages of people in these localities 
identifying as professional or managerial/technical is lower than the average, whereas the 
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percentage of those identifying as semi-skilled, unskilled or other is much higher. Polish 
workers are more likely to live in neighborhoods with residents that belong to the 
professional or managerial classes than Nigerians (Tables VII.3a and VII.3b).  
 
Table VII.3a: Socio-Economic Status of Poles’ and Nigerians’ Communities 









Table VII.3b: Socio-Economic Status of Poles’ and Nigerians’ Communities 







Sources: CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012. 
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Average 9 6.9 32.9 15.4 34.1 17.6 
City Center N 11 14 18.2 18.3 22.2 41.3 
Fairview 11.1 11.9 30.6 14.4 37.8 17.1 
Cabra 8.2 7.8 28.5 17.6 36.1 17.7 
Drumcondra 7.4 13.4 40.6 12.1 27.8 19.5 
Tallaght 11.2 3.5 19.3 17.9 42.4 20.4 
Mulhuddart 11.4 8.8 19.1 16.6 33.3 31.1 
Balbriggan 9.5 6.8 28.6 14.6 36.4 20.5 
Blanchardstown 8.5 8.6 31 13.5 34.3 21.1 
Community Education Employment 
 Vocational Tertiary Commerce 
/trade 
Construction Other 
Average 9 6.9 29.1 10.2 17.4 
City Center N 11 14 32.1 7.2 37.8 
Fairview 11.1 11.9 37.2` 7.4 22.7 
Cabra 8.2 7.8 33.6 7.1 19.4 
Drumcondra 7.4 13.4 33.5 6.1 19.3 
Tallaght 11.2 3.5 34 10.7 20.2 
Mulhuddart 11.4 8.8 37 6.8 21.8 
Balbriggan 9.5 6.8 34.2 9.5 18.1 
Blanchardstown 8.5 8.6 35.1 8 16.7 
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As one moves from to the level of analysis of the neighborhood to that of the 
individual household, Polish workers appear to be more isolated than Nigerian 
immigrants. In 2006, only 9% of Eastern Europeans lived with Irish citizens and another 
9% resided with other immigrant nationalities (CSO, 2008). The remainder lived with 
their compatriots. More than half of Polish respondents here report cohabiting with other 
Polish people. However, these were most commonly their Polish partners and children, or 
other family members. What is more, interviews reported “mixing” with the Irish in 
terms of housing. Indeed, 15% live with an Irish or Western European partner or spouse 
and 27% suggest that they prefer living with roommates who are Irish or from other 
immigrant nationalities. Younger Poles with good English language skills are much more 
likely to live with other nationalities and the Irish.  
Alternatively, Nigerians appear to live mostly in private households with Irish 
nationals, attesting to an assimilation rate much higher than that for Polish nationals.  
However, the majority of these Irish nationals are in fact the Irish-born children of 
Nigerian parents. If Irish-born children are discounted, the rate of residential segregation 
is similar for the two groups (CSO, 2008).  
Furthermore, the specific accommodations of Nigerian immigrants in Dublin are 
low in quality and less safe than those of Polish nationals. Among ICI respondents, one in 
five Nigerians rated their residence as “poor” or “very poor,” whereas 70% of Eastern 
European immigrants characterized their accommodation as “good.” In fact, all East 
European respondents in the ICI study reported living in at least satisfactory 
accommodations (ICI, 2008, p. 127).  
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Among the four national groups studied by the ICI, East Europeans were also the 
community with the largest number of people who felt safe where they lived (ICI, 2008, 
p. 127). Because they actively seek a community with other Nigerian residents, a large 
number of Nigerian residents also felt safe in their neighborhoods and reported being able 
to raise their children there. Nonetheless, a majority of the ICI’s Nigerian respondents 
also suggested they would never feel completely safe due to their racial difference from 
the Irish. Especially those living in the north inner city reported being pelted with eggs 
and stones by young Irish hooligans (ICI, 2008, pp. 129-130). Nigerians were two and a 
half times more likely to be harassed by their neighbors than Eastern Europeans 
according to a 2006 report (McGinnity et al., 2006). 
In sum, Polish workers in Dublin have better access to housing than Nigerians 
immigrants. Few Polish nationals in Dublin own their accommodations, yet the rates of 
home ownership among the East Europeans are on the rise and access to rental 
accommodations is unlimited. On the other hand, Nigerians experience severe 
discrimination in terms of access to rental housing. Polish nationals also tend to live with 
their compatriots in higher rates than Nigerians. However, when Irish-born Nigerian 
children are discounted, intermixing with the Irish is comparable for both populations. 
Both foreign groups cluster in neighborhoods that are immigrant-heavy and of lower 
socio-economic class than the national average. However, the Polish are more spread out 
throughout Dublin. The multicultural neighborhoods preferred by Nigerians are also the 
ones with most racial tensions and high crime rates. Nigerians’ communities are also 
more likely to be of unskilled or semi-skilled social class, while Poles’ areas are more 
likely to have more numerous residents belonging to the professional or managerial social 
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classes. As a result, Nigerians feel somewhat unsafe in their neighborhoods, while Polish 
citizens are very satisfied with their residences. Consequently, the East Europeans are 
assigned a value of 3 and the African immigrants a 2 for this indicator of social 
incorporation (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.3.2. Access to Housing in Madrid 
 Much like in the case of Dublin, immigrants have limited access to housing 
compared to natives in Madrid, leading one team of researchers to talk of the creation of 
“new ghettos” in Spain (Moraga, Ferrer, & Saiz, 2013). However, Ecuadorians’ living 
conditions are more favorable than these of Bulgarians. The South Americans are more 
likely to own their residence, live in integrated or higher income neighborhoods, be 
closer to jobs, and have better access to the rental market than the East Europeans. 
Individual Balkan workers reside in cramped conditions and unmaintained housing 
tenements, due to economic isolation, lack of local knowledge, deficient language skills, 
and prejudice (García-Almirall & Valdivia, 2011).  
 Housing is relatively open to immigrants in Spain as compared to foreigners in 
other Western European receivers. Spain’s metropolitan areas are considered less 
segregated than these in other major European cities (Bosch et al., 2011; García-Almirall 
& Valdivia, 2011). There is little governmental intervention in the housing market, with 
public housing in the country accounting for only 2% of the total. The private mortgage 
and housing economic sectors promote homeownership even among new arrivals (Vono-
de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012). As a result, more than one third of immigrants 
owned a home in Spain in 2007. With generous loans from a number of Spanish banks 
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granted regardless of nationality, foreigners borrowed extensively and purchased a large 
share of homes in 2007 (Amuedo-Dorantes &  Mundra, 2012).  
 Differences between ethnic groups are still significant. Vono-de-Vilhena and 
Bayona-Carrasco (2012) find that Ecuadorians are the fastest group to transition to home 
ownership in Spain. Eastern Europeans are much slower to buy an accommodation in the 
receiving country. Almost half of this project’s Ecuadorian interviewees own their 
accommodations or live with their homeowner family members. The rest transitioned 
from sharing apartments with acquaintances to living in smaller residences with partners 
or family. In comparison, only one in ten of Bulgarian participants own their 
accommodations in Madrid, with the rest living in rented tenements. Given the strong 
“’culture’ of home ownership” in the receiving context, home ownership among 
immigrants signals not only socio-economic stability but also the ability to fit in with the 
native community (Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012).340 
 The Spanish rental market also privileges similar and thus trustworthy Latin 
American immigrants. Ecuadorian respondents report unlimited access to rental 
accommodations. As one interviewee put it, “It is very easy [to find housing], when you 
speak the language, it is very easy” (Kris, 39).341 As another shared, “It is not difficult 
[finding housing] but what happens is that you have to have the money” (Yana, 20).342 
Indeed, none of the South Americans believe they were denied an apartment on the basis 
of their nationality or ethnicity. The Latin Americans are also treated with trust by their 
                                                          
340 As Vono-de-Vilhena and Bayona-Carrasco (2012) report, 85% of Spaniards own their accommodations 
due to the culture of homeownership promoted by the state in the 1950s and 1960s. Even younger natives 
strive to buy homes as a symbol of stability and a prerequisite for strong family relationships.  
341 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Esto es muy fácil, como hablas el idioma, es muy 
fácil.” 




Spanish landlords. Like in the case of the Polish in Dublin, the only issues with rental 
housing are subpar accommodations to begin with, rather than negligent treatment by 
owners. In fact, most find their landlords “very cordial” and ready to fix a broken 
washing machine without “messing” into the tenants’ everyday existence (Lina, 30).343 
 On the other hand, Bulgarians are more likely to experience discrimination in the 
Spanish rental market. As Bosch et al. (2011) find, “property owners use the 
informational content of names to differentially treat immigrants,” a bias that does not 
disappear when immigrants’ socio-economic status is revealed (Bosch et al., 2011). As a 
trade union representative confirms, “immigrants have more difficulties in accessing a 
residence,” since the local “population has been less receptive” and believes “an 
immigrant worker … will break or deteriorate [the apartment]” (M23-TU).344  
Individual mistrust and prejudice, lack of culturally specific or linguistic 
knowledge, as well as poverty, severely limit access to rental housing among Balkan 
interviewees (García-Almirall & Valdivia, 2011). Madrilenian landlords remain 
suspicious of the different East Europeans. As one respondent suggested, apartments are 
rented to Bulgarians only upon a recommendation from a Spanish employer or 
acquaintance. As another summarized, “if you have no secured housing, you cannot find 
one. When they see you cannot speak the language, they don't trust you. That's why 
Latino Americans have no problems, because they are in their own land” (Yana, 50).345 
                                                          
343 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “La verdad es que la relación es muy cordial. No le 
veo nunca. Siempre que le llamo es porque se me ha estropeado la lavadora o porque… Nadie se metía con 
nadie.” 
344 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Tiene más dificultades para acceder a una 
vivienda… Hay muchos propietarios que son reacios a alquilar una vivienda a un trabajador inmigrante 
porque creen que su piso se lo van a estropear, o se lo van a deteriorar. 
345 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ако нямаш намерена квартира не можеш да 
си намериш. Но по принцип нямаш големи възможности сам да си търсиш квартира, заради езика, 
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Exclusion from rental accommodations pushed one tenth of respondents to homelessness, 
with one person sleeping in the foyer of a bank during cold times, for instance. Two in 
ten were forced to live in monastery hostels, like the Auberge San Juan, where conditions 
were similar to these in asylum seeker hostels in Dublin (Chris, 34). Limited access to 
Spanish-owned accommodations also forced the interviewees in the hands of predatory 
Bulgarian landlords who abuse their newly arrived conationals by overcharging them, 
placing them in inhumane living conditions, or expelling them without notice (Gina, 33).  
“Cultural difference, in terms of mentality, in many things” also sours 
relationships between Bulgarians and their landlords, like in the case of Nigerians in 
Dublin (Kevin, 33). Six in ten of this project’s interviewees consider their relationship 
with Spanish or Bulgarian landlords “bad.” “Bad, dirty apartments” (лоши мръсни 
апартаменти), “unhygienic conditions” (нехигиенични услония) or refusal to fix 
broken amenities are some examples of unfavorable treatment (Tonya, 45, Trini, 31).346  
While Ecuadorians have much better access to both homeownership and the 
Spanish rental market than Bulgarians, both cohorts cluster in Madrid’s “new ghettos” 
(Moraga et al., 2013). However, the South Americans are less segregated from the native 
population than the Balkan workers and live closer to jobs and amenities. A majority of 
Ecuadorians inhabit Madrid City, with fewer spreading to nearby towns like Valdemoro, 
San Sebastian de los Reyes, Paracuellos, or Algete to the North of the city. Within 
Madrid, Ecuadorians predominate in numerous districts and neighborhoods, with a 
majority focusing in Villaverde, La Latina, Carabanchel, Puente de Vallecas, Moratalaz, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ако не го знаеш. Като те видят, че не можеш да говориш, не могат да ти имат доверие. Затова 
латиномериканците тука нямат проблеми, защото те са на собствена земя.” 
346 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Проблеми в 
смисъл, че има културна разлика, в мисленето разлика, в много неща.” (Kevin, 33). 
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Chamberí, Tetuan, and Arganzuela (Bosch et al, 2011; Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a; 
M18-AMIN; M32-ADMIN). Among this dissertation’s interviewees, one third live in 
Puente de Vallecas, one third in higher-value areas like Argüelles, and one third – outside 
of the city proper.  
Bulgarians share some neighborhoods with their Latin American counterparts and 
also favor Puente de Vallecas, Carabanchel or La Latina to “chase after jobs” (защото 
всичко е в зависимост от работата) (M8-BO). They further cluster in the Barajas 
airport area and in the city center (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). Unlike the South 
Americans, however, the “reserved” and “individualistic” East Europeans are more 
“spread out” (разпръснати) as they try to avoid compatriots who have abused their trust 
in the past (M1-BO; M2-BO; M3-BO).347 Many Bulgarians choose to live in the belt of 
Madrid and in farther away communities to the East or South, such as Getafe, Alcalá de 
Henares, Coslada, Móstoles, Parla or Villalba (Blázquez et al., 2010; M1-BO; M2-BO; 
M3-BO; M25-TU; M34-TU). Interestingly, there tends to be segregation among 
Bulagrians according to city of origin, with residents of Shumen focusing in Getafe and 
these from Pleven in Villalba (M5-BO; M6-BO). Among respondents, one quarter 
resided in Puente de Vallecas at the time of their interview, one in ten in the city center, 
and six in ten in the outer belts of the city in Getafe, Fuenlabrada, Móstoles or Parla.  
There are no consistent ratings of these areas, as in the Irish case. Nonetheless, it 
is safe to conclude that the neighborhoods where Ecuadorians and Bulgarians live are 
characterized by high concentrations of immigrants. While both cohorts are somewhat 
segregated from natives, the South Americans fare slightly better.  For instance, eight in 
                                                          
347 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Едното е, че ние 
сме резервирани, а другото е, че сме индивидуалисти” (M2-BO).  
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ten Ecuadorians live in Madrid proper, where 15.5% of the population is foreign-born 
(Blázquez et al., 2010). The towns of Valdemoro and San Sebastian de los Reyes 
preferred by the Latin Americans host even lower percentages of immigrants. On the 
other hand, the new suburbs where Bulgarians focus have among the highest 
concentrations of immigrants in the Madrid region (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). 
When one focuses on the particular neighborhoods and districts within the city where 
Ecuadorians concentrate, the average percentage of immigrant inhabitants stands at 
21.4% compared to 22.2% for the areas favored by Bulgarians (Bosch et al., 2011) 
(Table VII. 4). Ballester and Vorsatz (2014) confirm Ecuadorians’ relatively lower levels 
of residential segregation. According to the authors, while the South Americans are less 
than six times more likely to be surrounded by their compatriots than by Spaniards, 
Bulgarians are eight times more likely to live among their conationals. 
While data on the socio-economic profiles of the neighborhoods preferred by 
Ecuadorians and Bulgarians is unavailable, a study by Blázquez (2010) suggests that 
residential patterns privilege the Latin Americans by locating them closer to jobs and 
amenities. All immigrants collectives spend a substantial amount of time commuting 
from their homes to their places of employment in the construction, hotels, restaurants, 
retail, or domestic care close to the Madrid city center. However, Eastern European 
nationals are more likely to experience higher commuting times than other foreign 
cohorts, with Ecuadorians’ commute comparable to that of Spaniards. As longer 
commuting times for the Balkan workers are not suggested to correlate with better socio-
economic profiles of preferred residential areas, they actually imply a worse quality of 
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life and a larger spatial mismatch for Bulgarians in Madrid.348 Echazarra (2010) further 
finds that spatial dependence, or being “stuck” within certain often underprivileged 
residential areas, is higher among nationals of the New Member States (with 0.3) than for 
South American citizens in Madrid (with 0.2). Finally, Ecuadorians are the largest 
foreign nationality in the richest districts of Madrid that have the lowest percentages of 
immigrants, namely Retiro and Salamanca (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010).  
Consequently, Bulgarians’ residential patterns are more likely to limit job opportunities 
and quality of life than these of Ecuadorians. 
 
Table VII.4. Foreign-born as a Percentage of the Population in Ecuadorians’ and 






















Sources: Bosch et al., 2011; Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a. 
 
                                                          
348 Spatial mismatch refers to the mismatch between areas of residence of low-income individuals and 
families and the location of suitable job opportunities. It implies limited economic opportunity, as high 
commuting costs might prevent potential workers from securing far-away employment (Blázquez et al., 
2010).  
Community Ecuadorians Bulgarians 
Tetuán 25.4 - 
Barajas - 15.4 
Chamberí   18.3 - 
Centro - 31.4 
Moratalaz 13.2  
Latina 21.2 21.2 
Carabanchel 25.2 - 
Arganzuela 19.1 - 
Puente da Vallecas 20.9 20.9 
Vilaverde 25.3 - 
Madrid City Average 21.4 22.2 
Móstoles - 14.3 
Alcalá de Henares - 21.5 
Fuenlabrada - 15.4 
Getafe - 16.5 
Parla - 26.5 
Coslada - 24.5 
S. Sebastian de los Reyes 13.9 - 
Valdemoro 14.8 - 
Villalba - 22.7 
Average 19.9 20.9 
391 
 
 South American individuals and households also enjoy better living conditions 
that Balkan workers in Madrid. Bulgarians and other East European migrants are 
cramped together in small living spaces and share residences with numerous other 
tenants, mostly their compatriots. While the average living space per person is 22.2 
square meters according to the 2007 National Immigrant Survey, Eastern Europeans in 
Spain live only in 7.9 square meters on average (INE, 2009, p. 51). A majority of this 
project’s Bulgarian respondents find their living quarters to be “bad” (лоши), 
“unhygienic” (нехигиенични), and even “horrible” (ужасни) (Tangra, 36; Trini, 31).349 
Many report being cramped with “15 other people” or having to share with numerous 
other families to defray costs (Connor, 44).  
 Latin Americans inhabit somewhat more favorable quarters than the Balkan 
migrants. Each person from South America was found to live on 18.9 square meters, a 
figure closer to the average and more than double that for Eastern Europeans. Apartment 
size among Ecuadorians also approximates the average figure and is 2.5 times larger than 
that for Bulgarians, despite a similar household size of around three persons (INE, 2009, 
p. 51). While many of the Ecuadorians respondents in this thesis used to live in cramped 
apartments with other male immigrants upon arrival in Spain, most are currently residing 
with immediate family in favorable quarters. Unsurprisingly, a majority are satisfied with 
their living conditions, unlike Bulgarians.  
In sum, Ecuadorians have better access to housing than Bulgarians in Madrid. 
Housing in Spain is relatively favorable, with few low-quality public tenements, high 
incentives for home-ownership among immigrants, ample areas with affordable housing 
in the belt of Madrid, and lesser segregation between foreigners and natives. Nonetheless, 
                                                          
349 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian.  
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Latin Americans are more likely than Eastern Europeans to own their homes. Their 
language skills and cultural proximity open up access to the Spanish rental market, and 
correlate with good relationships with landlords, more spacious and higher-quality living 
quarters, and higher levels of satisfaction. On the other hand, Bulgarians’ lack of context-
specific knowledge and difference from their hosts engenders mistrust and limits access 
to decent accommodations. The Balkan workers tend to be cramped in relatively run-
down tenements with exploitative landlords, and even live on the streets or in monastery 
hostels until they can get the trust of Spanish owners. While both groups live in 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of migrants, Ecuadorians are more likely to 
intermix with their hosts and be located closer to jobs or resources. Bulgarians are 
“stuck” farther away from job opportunities or amenities, thus perpetuating perceptions 
of isolation among the native population. Consequently, Ecuadorians are assigned a 4 for 
this indicator of social incorporation, while Bulgarians only merit a 2 (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.4. Access to Education 
VII.4.1. Access to Education in Dublin 
 Fewer Poles than Nigerians are engaged in education in Ireland or have children 
in the Irish educational system. Still, enrollment is on the rise, as both Nigerians and 
Poles consider the system one of the least biased spheres of life in Ireland and an 
essential step toward integration. Polish adults experience few barriers in accessing third-
level Irish education due to their EU status and physical similarity to the Irish, yet even 
Nigerian adults are satisfied with education in Dublin. Representatives of both groups 
often remain in the host country due to the contentment of their children with the Irish 
393 
 
primary and secondary educational system. Still, Polish and Nigerian children resemble 
other “newcomer” pupils and cluster in less desirable schools with other immigrant 
children. Budget cuts to language resources in the education system limit Polish students. 
Fewer Polish nationals are in education in Ireland than are Nigerians. While one 
third of the ICI’s Nigerian respondents were enrolled in education, mostly in third-level 
colleges, only about one in ten Eastern Europeans were in the Irish educational system 
(ICI, 2008, p. 101). In 2006, only 2% of Polish workers in the Ireland reported being in 
education, compared to 16% of Nigerians (CSO, 2008). The number of Polish nationals 
in Irish higher education in fact dropped from 539 in 2006-2007 to 512 in 2009-2010. On 
the other hand, the number of Nigerian students increased from 482 to 618 in the same 
years (Education Ireland, 2010). 
Most of this project’s Nigerian respondents attended an educational institution in 
Dublin in the past or were studying at the time of their interviews. Half pursued a college 
degree in Dublin in areas as diverse as psychology, political science and economics. Half 
are or were enrolled in Master’s programs or Ph.D. degrees in areas like globalization 
studies, media communications management, or sociology, mostly in Dublin City 
University. Such high enrollment rates reflect Nigerian immigrants’ recognition of the 
significance of educational achievement for integration in Ireland. As one respondent put 
it, “if you study within this environment, you adapt” (Frank, 34). The respondents in the 
ICI study shared a similar sentiment and suggested that only through education in Ireland 
can one “integrate into the system” (ICI, 2008, p.101).  
Nonetheless, the number of Polish pupils in Ireland is rising. In fact, “Polish” is 
the twelfth most numerous nationality of foreign students in Ireland, just behind 
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“Nigerian” (Education Ireland, 2010). Further, Polish community representatives report a 
“baby boom” of Polish newborn children in Ireland.  In 2010, there were 3,500 Polish 
children born in Ireland and 6,500 new passports issued to Polish infants and children 
from Dublin (Pás, 2010). Therefore, the Polish population to be involved in the Irish 
education system is growing rapidly. One quarter of this dissertation’s interviewees had 
been engaged in an educational program in Ireland at least at one time. More than one in 
ten had children participating in the Irish educational system.  
Polish workers face fewer barriers in accessing higher education than Nigerian 
immigrants. Due to their European Union status, the Polish in Ireland qualify for free 
college education and significantly lower fees than those paid by third-country nationals. 
On the other hand, Nigerian nationals find their access to higher education in Dublin 
discriminatory in view of prohibitive costs. Table VII.5 gives a glimpse of the difference 
in educational fees (Smyth et al., 2009). While Nigerian immigrants can qualify to pay 
the lower EU fees, the requirements of being employed and paying taxes for three of the 
last five years exclude many of the Africans (Citizens Information, 2012).  
 
Table VII.5. Higher Education Fees for Selected Universities in Dublin, 2007-2008  
(in €) 
 
Degree type UCD Trinity UCC 
EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU 
Undergraduate 
arts degree 
0 14,850 0 14,516 0 11,800 
Undergraduate 
science degree 
0 20,000 0 19,020 0 17,000 
Undergraduate 
medicine degree 
0 27,000 0 27,000 0 27,000 
Master of Arts 4,800 9,600 4,244 10,844 4,340 11,620 
Master of Science 6,930 13,860 5,038 12,911 4,340 11,620 
Ph.D. 5,000 10,000 4,244 10,844 5,155 10,310 
 
Source: Reproduced from ICI, 2008, p. 102. 
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Polish immigrants also rarely experience issues with the recognition of previous 
qualifications, unless they are in country-specific fields like law. In these cases, they can 
still obtain recognition more easily than non-EU immigrants after a short recertification 
process. On the other hand, degrees from third countries are rarely recognized due to the 
lack of national guidelines for educational institutions. Many Nigerians have to repeat 
certain educational degrees and incur even higher costs in order to practice their 
profession in Dublin (D13-P; ICI, 2008, pp. 102-103). African respondents cite cost as 
the biggest obstacle to attaining education and integration in Ireland.  
Further, the Polish do not require a student visa when accessing tertiary education 
in Dublin, while Nigerians do. Nigerian migrants not only find the cost high, but are also 
plagued by the numerous limitations of student status, such as the permission to only 
work twenty hours a week (Citizens Information, 2012; Irish Naturalisation and 
Immigration Service [INIS], 2011). EU citizens also have full access to training and 
retraining courses by the Irish employment agency, FÁS, and the European employment 
agency, EPIC. While participation rates disaggregated by nationality are not available, 
FÁS representatives share that with economic recession, large numbers of Poles are 
taking advantage of retraining and language courses (D16-ADMIN; D17-ADMIN; OMI, 
2011b). On the other hand, non-EU nationals like Nigerians require long-term residency 
to access training and educational resources and are thus limited in their vocational and 
educational opportunities (D8-ADMIN).  
 Finally, fewer Polish than Nigerian respondents experience discrimination in 
higher education in Ireland. In 2006, only 2% of East Europeans reported harassment 
based on national origin in schools or universities (McGinnity et al., 2006) (Table VII.6). 
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All of this project’s Polish interviewees are satisfied with their academic careers in 
Dublin and report ample attention from Irish instructors and a “very positive” experience 
(Howard, 28). Education contributes to “self-confidence” and more opportunities for 
Poles who excel in their studies (Devon, 33; Elizabeth, 36; Jennifer, 29; Kevin, 27; Lara, 
32; Miriam, 24). The opportunities for free higher education in Ireland far exceeded those 
in Poland and were dubbed “amazing” (Rick, 45).   
 











Never 47.6% 57.9% 67.3% 78.4% 75.9% 68.4% 
1-2 times 5.9% 2.6% 0% 3.2% 1.6% 3.3% 
3-4 times 1.9% - - 0.5% - 0.7% 
>5 times 4.5% 2.6% 1.8% 1.0% 0.4% 1.9% 
N/A 40.1% 36.8% 30.9% 17.0% 22.1% 25.8% 
 
Source: McGinnity et al., 2006. 
 
On the other hand, discrimination in higher education is pronounced against 
physically-identifiable foreigners like Nigerians. Harassment based on ethnic origin 
occurred among 12.3% of Black Africans in 2006, a percentage much higher than that for 
any other national group in Ireland (Table VII.6). Discrimination is reported by all 
African interviewees in this thesis. Incidents range from less attention by instructors to 
stereotyping by classmates to administrative neglect. Still, most of respondents recognize 
the educational field as the least biased space in Dublin. 
While both Polish and Nigerian adults are relatively satisfied with education in 
Dublin, all immigrant children are disadvantaged in their access to primary and 
secondary schooling. Both ethnic populations are clustered in less desirable schools in 
Dublin, mostly due to the residence patterns (D25-J). In a study with twelve primary and 
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secondary schools in Ireland, Smyth et al. (2009) found that immigrant children make up 
6% of the total student population. According to the study, primary schools that are urban 
and designated as “disadvantaged” have a higher proportion of “newcomer children,” or 
the children of immigrants entering the school system by September 2007. Primary 
schools with a large percentage of immigrant children also tend to have greater 
difficulties in areas, such as behavioral problems, literacy, or learning disabilities. As 
these schools contain a higher percentage of disadvantaged Traveller children, the 
institutions have fewer resources to address cultural, ethnic or national diversity. 
Resource shortage affects both Polish and Nigerian pupils (Smyth et al., 2009).  
Admission policies further limit immigrant children’s access to good educational 
institutions. In the most desirable and oversubscribed schools advantage is given to pupils 
whose family members have attended the school. Immigrant children whose parents are 
recent arrivals are less likely to be admitted. Polish children are better off than Nigerian 
children, however, as admissions policies in oversubscribed schools give priority to 
children with the same religious affiliation as the school’s patron. More Polish children 
are likely to match desirable schools’ religious affiliation, as 90% of Poles in Ireland 
identify as Roman Catholic, compared to 26% of Nigerians (CSO, 2012a; Smyth et al., 
2009, p. 53).  
 Clustering does not translate into much lower educational achievement among 
immigrant children. Still, the lack of English proficiency affects reading and math scores. 
Therefore, Polish pupils with no English language skills perform worse than English-
speaking Nigerian students on standard tests. While English-speaking migrant children 
fall only 2-6 points behind Irish children in reading and math scores, non-English 
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speaking pupils fall behind by as many as 59 and 34 points respectively (Perkins, Moran, 
Cosgrove, & Shie, 2011). Despite the language barrier, Polish pupils immigrant children 
are reported to be highly motivated and to outperform their Irish peers (D25-J). Curry et 
al. (2010) find that all immigrant children perform well in school as they tend to be more 
diligent and respectful of their teachers than their Irish peers.  
Polish school children and their parents are satisfied with the Irish school system. 
According to Curry et al. (2010), Polish and other Eastern European pupils value highly 
the English language instruction they are provided and appreciate the kindness and 
attention of Irish teachers. All of this project’s respondents with school children in 
Ireland report a very positive experience. In fact, parents find the system to be better than 
the one in Poland. They rate teachers’ efforts to accommodate all foreign children as 
“excellent” and even suggest that they are willing to stay in Ireland because their children 
are immersed in their new superior schools (Pás, 2010). Satisfaction is also high among 
Nigerian respondents and their children.  
Both immigrant groups are satisfied with the education their children receive in 
Ireland, because bullying is less common than in other social spheres. Polish students are 
especially capable of overcoming discriminatory treatment by their peers. Curry et al. 
(2010) find that Eastern European students make Irish friends at school quicker than 
African respondents. While they are equally confused and offended at the culture of 
“slagging” in Irish schools as their Nigerian peers, Eastern Europeans are less likely to 
clash with Irish students on issues like religious affiliation. As Irish officials put it, 
“Polish and the other nations from the European Union do not have nearly as many 
problems as somebody African” (D13-P).  
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However, some discrimination persists, as Irish students project their parents’ 
prejudice onto their foreign peers (D7-TU). Discrimination and bullying are more 
common against African students. Most primary and second-level schools have an anti-
bullying policy in place with a strong focus on respect for all students. However, such 
policies deal with racial harassment explicitly only in 56% of second-level schools and 
40% of primary schools. As a result, racially-different children often interact only among 
each other in school to avoid bullying. As few would report bullying incidents, the 
relatively low incidence of bullying on the basis of race is misleading (Smyth et al., 2009, 
pp. 113-114). Indeed, in a survey conducted by the Teacher’s Union of Ireland in 2010, 
46% of teachers reported witnessing racism in the classroom (European Network against 
Racism Ireland [ENAR], 2011; Teachers’ Union of Ireland [TUI], 2010).  
In sum, both Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin have relatively open 
access to the Irish educational system, but racial prejudice disadvantages African 
students. While Polish nationals rarely come to Dublin to study, the number of Polish 
students in all levels of the Irish educational system is on the rise. Poles and other EU 
nationals pay fees for higher education comparable to those for Irish citizens and rarely 
face bullying or harassment at school. They are eligible for multiple training and 
language resources and have an easier time transferring credits or recertifying degrees 
from abroad. On the other hand, Nigerians might have migrated to Ireland to study, yet 
face high educational fees, difficulties in degree recognition from the home country, and 
lack of eligibility for some educational programs. All immigrant children cluster in 
Dublin’s less desirable primary and secondary schools, moreover. Polish pupils appears 
more disadvantaged than their Nigerian peers, as the language barrier results in lower 
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math and reading scores among them. However, as they are deferential to their teachers, 
Polish pupils are likely to make up for any differences in educational achievement. 
Further, they are more likely than Nigerian pupils to overcome prejudice and make 
friends with Irish students. Indeed, racial discrimination is the most significant issue 
affecting African students in all levels of the Irish educational system. Both groups are 
assigned a 4 for this component of social incorporation (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.4.2. Access to Education in Madrid 
Bulgarians are less likely to engage in the Spanish educational system than 
Ecuadorians, with few adults from either cohort returning to education in the host 
country. Still, Bulgarian adults experience larger barriers to entry in the system, in view 
of linguistic differences and the surprisingly difficult process of degree recognition. 
Bulgarians in Madrid are not satisfied with the Spanish educational system, which is 
difficult to adapt to for non-Spanish speaking children, is unambitious or isolating for 
immigrant families with little disposable income, and does not instill appreciation for the 
value of education. On the other hand, Latin American parents consider access to 
education in Spain open and quality satisfactory, yet their children underperform despite 
numerous special provisions and resources.  
Education in Spain is mostly public and free and is compulsory between the ages 
of 6 and 16 (Zynovieva et al., 2014). The three main phases of education include basic 
schooling (including voluntary preschool, primary school and lower secondary education 
(ESO), upper secondary school, and tertiary education (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b). 
Most students are assigned to publically-funded institutions based on residential criteria. 
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Few select private schools or the so-called colegios concentrados (private institutions 
with public funding). At age sixteen, and if they have successfully graduated from lower 
secondary school, students can elect to complete a two-year general baccalaureate or 
enroll in specific vocational training to prepare them for practical employment. Graduates 
of the baccalaureate are awarded a bachelor’s diploma (Titulo de Bachiller) entitling 
them to continue with a tertiary degree (a Master’s or a Ph.D.) or one- or two-year 
advanced technical training. University education is particularly hard to access and 
depends on a national entrance exam (Eurydice, 2015; Teese et al., 2006) 
In view of administrative hurdles, few foreign adults engage in education in 
Spain. In fact, only 2.2% of immigrants nationally and 2.8% of the foreign-born in 
Madrid are enrolled in a program of study. Adult East Europeans are even less likely to 
pursue education than Latin Americans. These trends do not reflect lack of resources in 
the receiving context. Indeed, Madrid boasts a number of educational centers for adults 
(CEPAs), as well as three municipal schools, one state university, twenty-five institutions 
of secondary education, and twenty-five private institutions that cater to the needs of 
adult immigrants (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b).  
As most of the foreign-born are in Madrid to work, few are interested in acquiring 
extra qualifications through tertiary education. The ones enrolled either fill gaps in 
secondary schooling or engage in language study. Two in ten of this project’s Ecuadorian 
respondents engaged in studies past the obligatory basic and lower secondary education 
in Spain. They focused on vocational training in floristry or hairdressing, for instance, to 
expand job opportunities and continue their educational trajectory from the home 
country.  On the other hand, a majority of Bulgarian respondents, aspiring to fit in with 
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their Spanish hosts, concentrated on language courses (M1-BO; M5-BO; M7-BO). As an 
exception to the rule, one in ten of the East Europeans enrolled in other types of adult 
education in Madrid and look to attain tertiary degrees in law, math, or dentistry.  
The two cohorts’ distinct educational paths reflect higher aspirations but also 
more substantial barriers for the Balkan migrants. Latin American participants report “no 
problems” (ningún problema) with transferring qualifications, acquiring knowledge, or 
interacting with classmates and instructors in their course of study (Yana, 20). Bulgarian 
respondents find it hard to navigate the Spanish educational system. Linguistic 
differences are hard to surmount for the East Europeans, with no bilingual or translation 
resources offered to the non-Spanish speaking migrants. Even these who have undergone 
a substantial course of Spanish study at home find delving into advanced subjects in 
Spanish extremely difficult. One Bulgarian representative talked of the “aging tertiary 
educational system [in Spain] which definitely does not predispose to …integration … 
and thus represents a major hindrance” to adult immigrants (M5-BO). Lack of language 
resources made one Eastern European turn to technical employment in the medical field 
as opposed to the study of medicine (Nina, 57). Another respondent was admitted to Juan 
Carlos University in Madrid, yet shared that because he “did not know enough Spanish, 
[he] could not successfully maneuver the university environment” (Sylvester, 29).350 This 
obstacle does not exist for similar South Americans.  
Surprisingly, European Union status does not lead to an easy transfer of previous 
educational degrees for the Balkan newcomers, unlike in the case of the Polish in Dublin. 
                                                          
350 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Spanish and Bulgarian, including: “Тук е 
доста поостаряла образователната система във висшето образование и определено не предразполага 
или поне не толкова силно и не толкова изострено интеграцията и от тази гледна точка, това е едно 
спъване по пътя” (M5-BO), “Защото аз не знаех испански достатъчно, за да мога да устоя на 
маневрите, които се изискват в университетските среди” (Sylvester, 29).  
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The few Bulgarian respondents who attempted to translate high school courses from the 
country and pursue a college or a Master’s degree in Spain all experienced difficulties. 
The procedure was lengthy and took close to twelve months. Significant retraining within 
the Spanish system renders the process costly and even impossible for these not fluent in 
Spanish. In one case, a high school diploma from Bulgaria was “thrown out after 
deliberation,” as “the Bulgarian and Spanish systems do not correspond.”351 The 
Bulgarian participant had to abandon advanced knowledge of math from Bulgaria and 
regress back to the Spanish general educational system (Shay, 56). The transfer of 
degrees is easier for Ecuadorian migrants, whose educational system and linguistic skills 
make them better suited to participate in Spanish education (Sanromá et al., 2009). 
Unlike in the Irish case, individual discrimination plays a lesser role in restricting 
access to adult education in Spain. A report by the Madrid municipal government 
suggests that while 16.1% of immigrants in the city experience discrimination in the 
school system, numbers higher than these even for different Nigerians in Dublin, a 
comparable 15.3% of natives report discrimination in education as well (Ayuntamiento 
de Madrid, 2010). While nationality is not necessarily the source of exclusion from 
education in the receiving city, some Bulgarian institutions suggest that Bulgarians’influx 
into the educational system has produced resentment among Spaniards (M2-BO).  
As in the Dublin case, immigrant children in Madrid are disadvantaged in their 
access to compulsory education and their choice of upper secondary education, despite 
the efforts of Spanish administrators. They perform significantly worse on standardized 
                                                          
351 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian:“Около 1000 евро хвърлихме да преведем 
всичко, занесохме ги в Министерството, разгледаха ги и ни казаха, че не отговаря нашата 




tests, tend to cluster in public schools, and are more likely to take on vocational training 
rather than a baccalaureate. Non-Spanish speaking Bulgarian children with qualified 
parents yet fewer educational opportunities are more likely to feel deprived than their 
Ecuadorian peers.  
The number of foreign-born children in the Spanish educational system is 
growing rapidly at all levels of schooling and in all types of educational institutions. Only 
114,523 in 1997-1998, immigrant children counted 875,091 in 2006-2007. Most foreign 
pupils in the receiving context come from South America. Latin American children are 
more than 50% of Madrid’s immigrant students, with Eastern European children - 16.2%. 
Ecuadorian pupils are the most numerous in the city with 31,258 children, compared to 
2,782 of Bulgarian pupils in Madrid’s schools. Still, both collectives are among the ten 
largest in the host community, with Bulgarian students growing rapidly since 2007 
(Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; Maiztegui-Oñate & Santibáñez-Gruber, 2010).  
Local, regional, and national governments made the education of immigrant 
students a policy priority and have adopted multiple changes to accommodate the 
increasingly diverse student body in Spain (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN; Ruiza, 2011). 
In 2005-2008, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs allocated 120 million euros to 
immigrant integration, 40% of which was dedicated to education (Teese et al., 2006, p. 
20). Madrid, Catalonia, and Andalusia developed temporary reception classrooms, where 
immigrant children receive additional linguistic, social, psychological and educational 
support before they can transition to regular school activities. Spanish schools also hold 
introductory information sessions for immigrant parents to explain the educational 
system. Additional teaching resources and special social support services are eligible 
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within mainstream classrooms (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; Eurydice, 2004; Teese et 
al., 2006). Further, professional development programs are offered to teachers so that 
they can better cater to their diverse pupils. The emphasis is on intercultural materials and 
curricula (Eurydice, 2004; Teese et al., 2006).  
Regardless of these efforts, foreign students in Spain remain disadvantaged. Most 
are concentrated in primary education, with few continuing beyond compulsory 
schooling. To demonstrate, 45% of all foreign pupils were in primary education and 
28.5% in secondary education. Immigrant children in the favorable baccalaureate upper 
educational track are only 0.4% of the total compared to 4.3% in the somewhat limiting 
vocational track. Only 23% of immigrant students express ambition to go to university or 
are confident they will be able to attend higher educational institutions (Maiztegui-Oñate 
& Santibáñez-Gruber, 2010). What is more, foreign pupils are almost exclusively 
concentrated in public schools, with few able to afford paid colegios concetrados or 
private institutions. Only one quarter of foreign students in Madrid were enrolled in 
private or semi-private primary schools in 2004-2007 (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b). 
Eight in ten foreign students attended a public institution at any level of schooling in 
2008 compared to only six in ten natives (Zynovieva et al., 2014). The tendency of 
Spaniards to place their children in private education lead some Spanish administrators to 
talk of the “ghettoization of public schools” (M19-ADMIN). As native students flee 
public schooling, resources are stretched thin to accommodate an increasingly 
intercultural, immigrant-heavy, and economically disadvantaged student body.   
Concentration in less desirable schools translates into lower educational 
achievement among immigrant children. Foreign pupils score more than 50 points lower 
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than their Spanish counterparts on standardized tests in math, reading, and sciences. 
Socio-economic status has something to do with it, with the difference reduced to 36 
points for the math component when parents’ educational and economic background is 
taken into account. However, type of school, immigrants’ concentration in school, 
parental involvement in education, and language matter too (Zynovieva et al., 2014). 
While Ecuadoran and Bulgarian children hold the above obstacles in common, the 
East Europeans experience further challenges than the South Americans. It is telling that 
only 64.5% of Bulgarian children eligible for school are enrolled in education in Madrid, 
as opposed to 92% Ecuadorian pupils (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b). Among East 
Europeans, 13.6% have access to the privileged, resource-rich charter and private schools 
compared to 24.2% of Latin Americans (Anghel & Cabrales, 2010).  
Satisfaction levels differ between the two groups as well. One third of 
respondents from both collectives have children in the Spanish educational system. 
Ecuadorian parents are satisfied with schooling in Madrid, as it is not much different than 
the one in Ecuador, and in fact emphasize the professional and technical opportunities of 
Spanish education. It is not unreasonable to conclude that concentration of Ecuadorian 
children in vocation training has more to do with parental preferences than discrimination 
in the host context. 
On the other hand, three-quarters of Bulgarian parents are dissatisfied with their 
children’s educational experiences. While none report racism, all mention the language 
barrier as a significant obstacle to learning. One parent shared how having to learn 60-80 
words every day heavily burdened her children (Izzy, 40). Despite efforts of enhancing 
multiculturalism in the classroom, indeed, Spain is among the few EU countries that does 
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not promote bilingual or mother tongue education or second language learning (Eurydice, 
2004; Maiztegui-Oñate & Santibáñez-Gruber, 2010). The lack of rigor of the system or 
encouragement by teachers is another barrier for Bulgarian parents who value educational 
achievement. As one respondent put it, “our kids are limited because here they do not 
have subjects like art or music. … the Spanish system is not that rich of information, so 
children learn slower” (Yana, 50).352 As another shared, there is “not much respect for 
education in school” with neither teachers nor Spanish or other immigrant parents 
“putting much effort” into educating (Gina 33; Matt, 42).353 Bulgarian associations also 
speak of the lack of consistency in the system, teachers’ insistence to hold immigrant 
pupils back, or the lack of stimulation by educators (M8-BO). Emphasis on work 
undermines any ambition for higher educational achievement. Spanish public schools are 
considered particularly ill-fitted in addressing the educational needs of Bulgarian students 
who are subject to a language barrier and difficulties in social adaptation, yet have higher 
aspirations than other immigrant pupils (Teese et al., 2006).  
Despite the commendable efforts of Madrilenian officials, the Spanish educational 
system disadvantages both immigrant children and adults. Newcomer children perform 
worse than natives and are concentrated in public schools or vocational tracks. Adults 
rarely enter tertiary education and mostly focus on language acquisition rather than 
academic training. Still, Bulgarian migrants are more disadvantaged than Ecuadorian 
workers. Adults are precluded from university education due to linguistic differences, 
                                                          
352 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Отрицателното за мен остана това, че нашите 
деца са осакатени в едни такива сфери като изобразителното изкуство, като музиката, като 
танцовото изкуство… Испанската система не е толкова натоварена като обем на знания и 
постепенно и постепенно се обучават децата.” 
353 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Може би, защото самите деца много не си 




obstacles in transferring qualifications despite a common European framework, as well as 
a dissimilar system. Children are rarely stimulated by indifferent teachers and their 
ambitions are undermined through emphasis on vocational training. Consequently, 
Bulgarian parents are discontented with education in Spain, even if none report 
discrimination in the system. The cohort merits a rating of 2 for this component of social 
integration. On the other hand, Ecuadorians are satisfied with schooling in Spain. Adults 
are happy to engage in vocational training as a continuation of their educational 
trajectories at home and agree with Spanish teachers about the merits of technical 
education for their children. Discrimination is not significant here. The South Americans 
are assigned a 3 for this indicator of social incorporation (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.5. Access to Healthcare 
VII.5.1. Access to Healthcare in Dublin 
 Like access to education, access to healthcare is also relatively satisfactory for 
Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. Both communities report being very healthy, 
yet Poles are even less likely to be chronically ill or disabled than Nigerians. The Polish 
also have more entitlements within the Irish healthcare system. However, they are 
unaware of their rights and prefer to use Polish health institutions instead of the Irish 
system, which is widely used by Nigerians. Conscious governmental policy rendered 
healthcare services open to any foreign group in Dublin. Yet, discrimination and 
incompetence persist among some Irish providers.  
Polish immigrants in Ireland self-report as extremely healthy. When asked to 
assess their own health status in 2008, 97.8% identified as in “good” or in “very good” 
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health compared to 92.9% among non-EU nationals and 84% among the Irish 
(McGinnity et al., 2011; Nolan, 2012). Poles are also less likely to be disabled than 
African immigrants (CSO, 2008).354 This project’s interviewees confirm the “healthy 
immigrant” hypothesis, where it is the mentally and psychically stronger who migrate in 
the first place, hence they rarely need medical or psychological care (D40-PO). 355 Less 
than one third of Polish respondents discussed their medical history in the first place and 
all of them reported not having to use medical care in Ireland.  
Since they are healthy, Polish workers rarely avail themselves of the Irish medical 
system. Moreover, one fifth of Polish participants report going to ethnic medical 
providers in Ireland when necessary, because “it is easier.” According to the ICI, only 
45% of East European immigrants use health services in Ireland compared to 94% among 
Nigerian respondents (ICI, 2008, p. 76). In 2006, 16.9% of East Europeans had never 
used the Irish medical system compared to only 4.4% among Black Africans. One expert 
interviewee argues that because of cultural norms, many Polish immigrants self-medicate 
and discount mental illness like depression or anxiety (D40-PO).  
Non-use of the Irish healthcare system also correlates with ambivalence about its 
quality among Polish interviewees. Half of all respondents are not fully satisfied with 
their access to medical care, mostly based on the cost. As they did not qualify for a 
means-based medical card, they had to acquire a GP card and were responsible for 
copays. Insurance policies cover emergency care, yet the comparison with free care in 
Poland renders the Irish system less attractive. In certain cases, Polish immigrants 
                                                          
354 3.2% of Nigerians in Ireland are disabled compared to 11% among the Irish and almost none among 
Polish nationals (CSO, 2008).  
355 Nolan’s “healthy immigrant” hypothesis is that immigrants are often healthier than the native population 
as the ones ready to migrate self-select on the basis of health status. Their health status is predicted to 
converge with that of the native population as they settle in the host country (Nolan, 2012). 
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uninformed of their rights were denied a medical card or were overcharged (D35-PO; 
D36-PO). Organizations like CARE are dedicated to helping Poles identify specific 
hospitals that ae not “user-friendly,” especially to immigrants (D35-PO). Still, the other 
half of Polish immigrants is impressed with the quality of healthcare in Ireland. Polish 
participants are satisfied with the ease of acquiring a medical card, the short waiting 
times, and the positive bedside manner of Irish medical personnel. 
African immigrants appear to have better access to, and knowledge of, health 
services in Dublin than the Polish. While they are relatively happy with medical services 
in Dublin, however, they also report severe abuses when receiving healthcare in Ireland. 
Indeed, recent local and national governmental initiatives ensure that comparable medical 
services are available to all foreign workers in Ireland. Health care is universal, even if 
charges apply. Medical cards are granted on a needs basis regardless of nationality and 
are also given to asylum seekers in direct provision. Medical cards provide for free 
inpatient and outpatient care, as well as GP, pharmacy, dental, eye, and maternal care 
(HSE, 2009; Smith & Nolan, 2012). GP Visit Cards are also granted on the basis of 
means and entitle holders to free GP services with patient co-pays (McGinnity et al., 
2011). Further, in 2007 the Health Service Executive developed a National Intercultural 
Health Strategy 2007–2012 (NIHS). The Strategy seeks to create greater inclusion for 
ethnic communities, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the Irish health system. In 
practice, the plan calls for support to service providers in addressing the unique care 
needs of people from diverse cultural backgrounds (HSE, 2008).  
Regardless of these positive developments, only residents are entitled to free 
medical services and the dependents of non-EU citizens might not enjoy full access to 
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free care in Dublin. Among short-term visitors, EU residents pay fees similar to those for 
the native population, while non-EU citizens have to pay full fees. EU citizens do not 
always have to satisfy the means test to receive a free medical card in Ireland, while third 
country citizens do (Citizens Information, 2013b). Therefore, while medical entitlements 
are the same for all nationalities in Ireland, EU nationals are entitled to lesser payments 
than non-EU nationals.  
The quality of healthcare can be subpar, especially with economic downturn. 
Even before the crisis, Nigerian immigrants experienced discrimination much more often 
than the Irish or other immigrants. One fifth reported issues when receiving healthcare in 
2006, compared to 15% of Eastern Europeans (McGinnity et al., 2006). Nigerian 
respondents shared witnessing severe abuses and neglect in the healthcare system. In one 
extreme example, a pregnant Nigerian woman died after she was sent home regardless of 
experiencing severe pains (Isaac, 36).  
In sum, Polish immigrants are healthier than other nationalities in Ireland and are 
entitled to free medical care in Dublin. However, Poles are often unaware of their 
entitlements and avoid using the Irish healthcare system. On the other hand, Nigerians 
avail themselves of medical services in Ireland. Governmental initiatives to render 
service provision sensitive to diverse cultural needs, makes the Irish system attractive to 
“different” African immigrants. However, Nigerian patients are legally disadvantaged as 
third-country nationals and often pay higher fees for the same services than their Polish 
counterparts. They are also more likely to suffer abuses and discrimination in the Irish 
healthcare system, especially with economic downturn. Both groups are assigned a value 
of 3 for this indicator of social integration (Table VII.1).  
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VII.5.2. Access to Healthcare in Madrid 
Access to healthcare is as open in Madrid as it is in Dublin and is satisfactory for 
both Ecuadorian and Bulgarian immigrants. Both the Latin Americans and the East 
Europeans self-report as healthy and both groups are entitled to free medical care and 
multiple rights within the Spanish healthcare system, regardless of legal status. However, 
similar Ecuadorians avail themselves more freely of Spanish health institutions than 
different Bulgarians. They are more likely to receive regular exams from their GP and 
less like to be hospitalized than comparable natives. On the other hand, Bulgarians 
discount illness or self-medicate. The Balkan migrants are disadvantaged by lack of 
context-specific knowledge and some discrimination.  
 The “healthy immigrant” hypothesis holds for the Spanish case, as it does in 
Dublin (Nolan, 2012). According to the 20011-2012 Spanish National Health Survey, 
foreign residents view themselves as healthier than their hosts. While 74.8% of native 
respondents assess their health as “very good” or “good,” 78.6% of immigrants do so and 
a negligible 3.3% of the latter consider their health “poor” or “very poor.” Almost all of 
the newcomers experience no problems with mobility, self-care or performing daily 
activities. Eight in ten immigrants have no psychological or chronic health issues 
compared to seven in ten natives (INE, 2013). Foreign-born respondents also lead 
healthier lifestyles and are less likely to smoke, drink or take medical drugs than 
Spaniards by as many as 20 percentage points (Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 
2009; Carrasco-Garrido et al., 2007).  In a comparative study of eleven European host 
countries, Spain emerged as the only country where immigrants perceive their health to 
be better than that of natives (Solé-Auró & Crimmins. 2008). Nine in ten of this project’s 
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Ecuadorian respondents self-identify as healthy and suggest that their age and habits 
make it unnecessary for them to use the Spanish healthcare system. On the other hand, 
only half of the Bulgarian interviewees who discussed health issues reported to be 
healthy with the other half mostly suffering from work accidents.  
In view of their good health, Ecuadorian respondents did not avail themselves of 
the Spanish medical system, while one sixth of Bulgarian participants did. Regardless, 
access is open to both collectives and the Spanish healthcare system is even more 
generous than the Irish one. Organic Law 4/2000 grants the right to public healthcare to 
immigrants registered on the local population register, the padrón, regardless of their 
legal or employment status (Bertozzi, 2010). Even unregistered individuals can utilize 
emergency and pregnancy care. Local and national integration plans further aim to 
eradicate inequalities in access to health services as a prerequisite for social cohesion 
(Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 2012). Care is free even for life-threatening 
diseases such as HIV and cancer (Burridge, 2012). A 2012 policy restriction, excluding 
illegal immigrants from free medical care in Spain, was not only unevenly implemented 
by local administrators, but was revered in 2015 (Gaffey, 2015).  
Regardless of universally open access, there are important differences in the use 
of healthcare by Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. The 2006 National Health 
Survey suggests that East Europeans are less likely to avail themselves of primary care, 
hospital services or emergency services than are South American migrants or natives. On 
the other hand, Ecuadorians appear to overuse hospital and emergency services.356 
                                                          
356 While 27% of Spanish respondents used primary care in the last four weeks, 26% Ecuadorians and 17% 
East Europeans did. While 8% of the native participants were hospitalized in the last year, 11% of 
Ecuadorians and 7% of Balkan workers were. A 29% rate of use of emergency care by Spaniards, lastly, 
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However, after controlling for socio-economic characteristics, Villarroel and Artazcoz 
(2015) find that Ecuadorian migrants are in fact the most likely among all cohorts to visit 
their primary physicians and the least likely to be hospitalized. On the other hand, Eastern 
European workers have the most limited access to regular primary care among all 
collectives surveyed. Therefore, Ecuadorians have open access to regular healthcare 
services in Madrid, which might prevent them from developing chronic or serious illness 
or having to resort to unstable emergency services. On the other hand, East Europeans are 
somewhat restricted in their access to regular medical care in Spain, and tend to discount 
serious illnesses or self-medicate, a trend that could produce long-term unfavorable 
health effects. Villarroel and Artazcoz (2015) conclude that linguistic difference, 
unfamiliarity with the local context, as well as cultural dissimilarity, present significant 
barriers for the Balkan migrants. Spanish-speaking Ecuadorians aware of Spain’s 
sociocultural reality face fewer hindrances in using healthcare.  
Cultural distance renders this project’s Bulgarian respondents ambivalent about 
the Spanish healthcare system. A majority are in awe of the generous provisions and 
positive bedside manner of Spanish doctors. One female migrant shared that she survived 
cancer due to the free chemotherapy she received in Spain. However, others complain of 
red tape, delays in processing results or scheduling treatments, as well as the improper 
use of expensive equipment. Some discrimination for the different Balkan workers who 
are perceived to burden free health services is reported by Bulgarian organizations (M6-
BO). As the East Europeans “do not speak Spanish … [while] the people in the health 
                                                                                                                                                                             




centers do not speak a language apart from Spanish,” there is “a clash, a barrier,” which 
prevents Bulgarians from receiving the necessary medical care (M17-P; M35-P).357  
To conclude, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians are healthier than their Spanish 
counterparts, much like the Polish in Dublin. Both nationalities have open access to 
universal free healthcare in Madrid. However, Spanish-speaking culturally-proximate 
Latin Americans utilize primary care in larger numbers and ensure long-term stable 
health and fewer serious illnesses or hospitalizations. On the other hand, Bulgarians are 
less likely to avail themselves of healthcare in Spain. While almost universally satisfied 
with professional Spanish doctors and generous services, the Balkan workers still report 
some discrimination and barriers to access. Ecuadorians are assigned a 5 and Bulgarians a 
4 for this indicator of social incorporation (Table VII.1). 
 
VII.6. Access to Social Welfare 
VII.6.1. Access to Social Welfare in Dublin 
Access to social welfare is the most problematic area of social integration for 
Polish immigrants in Ireland. While a large number of Polish workers in Ireland avail 
themselves of the relatively generous welfare system, they still face legal obstacles like 
the Habitual Residency Condition, longer waiting times than natives, and inconsistency 
of decision-making across offices. Nonetheless, Polish immigrants fare better than the 
Nigerian group. Nigerians’ access to welfare is limited by legal provisions, institutional 
and individual prejudice, and widespread stereotypes about their abuse of the system. 
                                                          
357 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Porque hay muchos casos en que el inmigrante no 
habla, no sabe hablar español, y la gente que está en los centros sanitarios, los funcionarios que los reciben, 
no los médicos, no hablan más idioma que el español y se produce un choque, una barrera que para el 
inmigrante hay casos en los que desiste y se va, estando enfermo.” 
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The percentage of Polish nationals claiming social welfare increased substantially 
over the years. In 2004, only 3% of those allowed to work in Ireland filed social welfare 
claims. The number rose to 33% in 2009 (CSO, 2011). Among this project’s 
interviewees, almost half had used the social welfare system in Ireland, mainly claiming 
job seeker allowance or child benefits. Claims among Polish workers are only likely to 
increase with length of stay and the satisfaction of the Habitual Residence Requirement, 
as well as the rise of unemployment with economic downturn.  
On the other hand, welfare claims by non-EU nationals registered a more 
moderate increase with 29% claiming welfare in 2009 compared to 19% in 2004 (CSO, 
2011). While the number of accession state citizens who have access to job seeker’s 
benefits or job-seekers allowance grew forty times between 2005 and 2012, the number 
of non-EU nationals receiving social welfare payments increased three-fold in the same 
period (CSO, 2012b).358 While the discrepancy might indicate that Eastern Europeans are 
harder affected economically by the 2009 downturn, it also reflects the more limited 
access to the welfare system of non-EU nationals (D5-ADMIN).  
Both Poles and Nigerians face obstacles when seeking social welfare in Dublin 
(D27-TU; D34-PO). There are legal obstacles to claiming welfare that affect all foreign 
nationals in Ireland. European immigrants are only at a slight advantage, despite EU 
directives on equal treatment, since national administrative practices trump European 
prerogatives.  
                                                          
358 The Irish Live Register is a monthly record indicating the number of people in Ireland who are 
employed part-time or who are entitled to job seeker’s allowance or benefits.  EU15 to EU27 nationals, the 
majority of whom are Polish, register a much higher activity on the Live Register than any other group. 
Whereas only 1,089 persons from this group were registered in January 2005, the number grew to 42,831 in 
January 2012. On the other hand, non-EU persons, the largest group of whom comprises Nigerian workers, 
have not witnessed such a sharp increase. 4,370 persons were registered in January 2005 compared to 
13,845 in January 2012 (CSO, 2012b). 
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Social welfare is administered by the Department of Social Protection. Payments 
include social insurance payments like disability and maternity payment and job-seeker 
benefit; means-tested payments like job-seeker allowance or supplementary welfare 
allowance; as well as universal payments like child benefits. Receiving the first type 
depends on the contributions one made to the Irish social security system, while the 
second type is means-based and is granted even to those without sufficient social security 
contributions. An “aggregation principle” stipulates that contributions made in other 
countries of the European Union be recognized in Ireland and that Irish contributions 
carry over to the sending country upon return migration (also D2-TU). Non-EU nationals 
with legal residence in Ireland are also afforded rights of “aggregation” and “export” of 
social security payments (EC No 859/2003). However, the Habitual Residence Condition 
(HRC) was introduced in 2004 for both EU and non-EU nationals receiving social 
assistance and child benefits. It precludes Polish and Nigerian immigrants from obtaining 
benefits as it requires a minimum of two-year residency in Ireland before access to 
welfare. HRC renders the process of claiming benefits arbitrary, since grants are made on 
a case-by-case basis and depend on subjective factors like the applicant’s “main center of 
interest” (Department of Social Protection, 2011; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 33-34). The 
fluidity of the Habitual Residence Condition leaves more room for discrimination, since 
decisions depend on the discretion of individual welfare officers (D38-PO).  
While the HRC affects the access to social resources for all foreign populations in 
Ireland, it disadvantages Nigerian immigrants more severely than their Polish 
counterparts. For instance, illegal immigrants or asylum seekers, many of whom 
Nigerians, can never qualify for Habitual Residence and are thus actively precluded from 
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receiving social welfare in Ireland. Nigerians are also obstructed in claiming welfare in 
Ireland by the fear that “becoming a burden on the state” would invalidate their claims to 
residency and citizenship. The fluid requirements of the HRC disadvantage “different” 
Nigerian nationals more severely than their Polish counterparts, as they are stereotyped as 
asylum seekers looking for a quick payout and are discriminated against more often than 
white Eastern European immigrants (D9-P; D13-P). 
Nonetheless, the HRC requirement is the largest impediment to the full social 
inclusion of Polish immigrants in Ireland as well. Polish workers who have spent a 
sufficient time working in Ireland rarely experience difficulties in obtaining job-seeker 
benefits. However, once these benefits expire or in the case of childbirth, the HRC 
applies and social welfare entitlements are more ambiguous (D36-PO; D38-PO; D39-PO; 
D41-NO). In fact, of all the cases filed with the Polish Social and Legal Advice Centre, 
60% concerned social welfare issues, and particularly the refusal of Habitual Residence, 
delays in processing claims, the stoppage of child benefit payments without justification, 
as well as the non-recognition of social contributions made in Poland (SLAC, 2010).  
The HRC affects waiting times or negative responses among this project’s Polish 
interviewees. The waiting period for a social welfare decision is listed as three weeks on 
average. However, according to Polish service providers, Polish nationals wait for a 
decision for eight to nine weeks on average. As the Irish social security administration 
does not have specific guidelines on the times to process welfare applications, individual 
overburdened offices where many immigrants are required to file their applications take 
longer to respond (D36-PO). Child benefits are particularly problematic and could take 
up to three years to grant (D38-PO).  
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The sheer volume of applications is often found to blame (D16-ADMIN; D17-
ADMIN; D21-ADMIN; D38-PO). As one interviewee put it, “the Irish welfare system is 
a total mess,” where offices simply cannot handle the soaring unemployment claims in 
the country (Rick, 45). In the case of Polish workers, communications between the Polish 
and Irish governments in ascertaining employment and contribution records render the 
process even lengthier (D38-PO). While half of Polish participants were granted welfare 
within the three to four week period, for the other half waiting periods for all three types 
of benefits were extensive.  They stretched anywhere between eight months and two 
years. While social security is granted retroactively, the uncertainty often leads to 
depression, inability to meet household expenses and the rethinking of migration choices.  
What is more, with the introduction of the Habitual Residence Condition, Polish 
immigrants receive negative decisions from welfare offices more often and face the 
sudden termination of benefits without justification (D36-PO; D39-PO). Especially with 
economic downturn, written notices of decisions are rarely provided. Refusal of child 
benefits often have no basis, and as an explanation of the case’s reasoning is not 
included, Polish service providers have a harder time appealing negative decisions (D36-
PO; D39-PO). One third of Polish interviewees report that their benefits were either 
terminated “for no reason” or were denied without justification. 
Even during the decision-making process, little information is given to Polish 
claimants. They are told to “wait” and that their application “is being processed’ (Gillian, 
25; Jane, 26). Polish applicants are rarely provided with advice and crucial pieces of 
information about their entitlements. For instance, they are rarely advised that 
contributions made in Poland transfer in Ireland. They are not told that they are entitled to 
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supplementary allowance while waiting for a decision on their applications. Polish 
immigrants are also no longer provided with translations or language help and the amount 
of documents they are asked to include is overwhelming. One claimant had to file six 
times before being successful (Mary, 41). 
Further, since the introduction of the HRC calls for a discretionary, case-by-case 
decision-making process based on five individual factors, there is little consistency 
among Irish welfare offices (D36-PO; D39-PO). Polish service providers readily identify 
individual offices where staff is particularly unhelpful and decisions are often negative 
and unsubstantiated (D35-PO; D36-PO; D38-PO; D39-PO). Still, other offices are 
recognized as extremely helpful to Polish organizations and individuals (D36-PO). 
 Similar difficulties are described by Nigerian participants. Among them, 70% 
claimed social welfare benefits and 50% faced difficulties with obtaining them or were 
refused them altogether. Lack of residency prevented many from obtaining benefits in 
spite of the contributions they made to the Irish social welfare system. Even if they were 
legally entitled to social welfare, the complexity of the process and the numerous 
requirements obstructed a large number of Nigerian immigrants from receiving job 
seeker’s allowance or job seeker benefits. Many quoted the numerous demands made by 
social welfare officers as an obstacle. As one respondent put it, “They may not say, ‘No, 
we are not giving you it,’ but they could make the conditions so hard that it would make 
you forget about it. They just discourage you from applying” (Zach, 32).  
Both Polish and Nigerian workers have increasingly negative experiences and 
interactions at the welfare office. Since the economic downturn affected many of the 
industries where they were employed, the Polish are becoming the majority of clients in 
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the Irish Department of Social Protection (D36-PO). In turn, they are facing an 
increasingly negative attitude there. While in the mid-2000’s social welfare officers 
accommodated immigrant claimants and took the time to translate documents or 
requirements, this is no longer the case. Polish welfare applicants report aggressive and 
rude welfare officers who refuse to explain benefits or tell Polish clients that “they should 
have spoken good English because they have been in Ireland so long” (D40-PO).  
Aggressive or discriminatory treatment is even more common against Nigerian 
welfare claimants. One quarter of Black Africans reported unfavorable or discriminatory 
treatment by the Department of Social and Family Affairs or other Social Services in 
2006, compared to 10% among Eastern Europeans. Among Nigerians studied in the same 
report, more than one third encountered problems when with social services (McGinnity 
et al., 2006, pp. 46, 51).  
“An element of institutional discrimination” exists in Dublin’s welfare office. As 
one NGO representative put it, the attitude among welfare officers is “Here comes a guy 
with an accent, so I have to ask him an extra question” (D41-NO).  If not discrimination, 
there is “at least different treatment” for Polish claimants (D36-PO). Among interviewees 
in this project, 40% felt discriminated against by “rude” social welfare officers. Some 
were even told to go back to Poland instead of claiming benefits in Ireland (Kevin, 27; 
Mary, 41). Unaware of the rigorous HRC, Irish nationals believe that Polish immigrants 
practice “welfare tourism” and migrate to Ireland to only “rob” the Irish welfare system 
(D5-ADMIN; D7-TU; D13-P; D18-P). The Polish are believed to abuse the child benefit 
system in particular (D1-J; D13-P). While some of the stories are realistic, they are 
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exaggerated. The number of Irish nationals cheating the system is ignored altogether 
(D33-PO). Different nationality causes tensions in processing welfare claims (D38-PO). 
Still, Polish interviewees share that compared to similar public administrators in 
Poland, Irish officers are “great” (Ashley, 29). The proliferation of Polish organizations 
dealing with welfare discrimination further cements Polish nationals’ social welfare 
rights and entitlements. Organizations like SLAC, Crosscare, Caidre, Culture, and My 
Mind serve as advocates in advancing social welfare and educate Polish immigrants 
about their rights (D36-PO; D38-PO; D39-PO).  
On the other hand, discrimination and stereotyping among Nigerian welfare 
claimants is ubiquitous. According to Nigerian interviewees, African men rarely rely on 
“the dole” due to their cultural mentality and pride, as well as the limited amounts that 
could be granted (Ethan, 46; Isaac, 36). As one interviewee suggests, there is no welfare 
system in Nigeria and Africans immigrating to Ireland do not arrive with the goal of 
living off of the system (D44-NO).  Participants admit that African women use social 
security in Ireland due to the large number of children they have. However, all agree that 
while the Irish are the most common abusers of social welfare, they tend to blame foreign 
nationals for the drain on social resources. There is high incidence of stereotyping among 
Nigerian immigrants in particular who are all perceived as asylum seekers in Dublin with 
the objective of abusing social welfare. This stereotype is believed to translate into 
unfavorable treatment by social welfare officers. As one interviewee shared, after 
applying for the dole, he heard a racial slur about him. He suggested that officers often 
treat foreigners with “abuse” and that stereotypes affect decisions (Stephen, 36). The 
discretionary nature of decisions is a permit to stereotype and discriminate. 
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In sum, access to social welfare is limited for both Polish and Nigerian nationals 
in Dublin. Waiting times are long, decisions are discretionary and arbitrary, benefits are 
denied or terminated without justification, and negative stereotyping is endemic. The 
introduction of the additional legal requirement of habitual residence exacerbates all 
these issues for both EU and non-EU nationals in Ireland. It is discrimination and the 
belief that all foreigners abuse the Irish social welfare system that most severely limits 
access to welfare in Dublin. While discrimination is being combatted by a slew of Polish 
service organizations, Nigerians continue to be subjected to stereotyping and racism 
when seeking social resources in Ireland. Consequently, Poles are assigned a 2 and 
Nigerians – the lowest value – for this indicator of social integration (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.6.2. Access to Social Welfare in Madrid 
Access to social welfare is not nearly as problematic in Madrid as it is in Dublin, 
since grants are made according to standard rules rather than an arbitrary decision-
making process and there is a national and local emphasis on equality of social rights 
regardless of nationality. However, migrants in precarious or informal employment, 
whose employers did not contribute to social security schemes, are completely excluded 
from the system. This is more often the case for Bulgarian immigrants rather than their 
Ecuadorian counterparts who rarely claim welfare payments to begin with. While 
discrimination is not nearly as pronounced as in the Irish case, the dissimilar non-Spanish 
speaking Balkan workers are more likely to require extra effort in receiving social 
benefits than their South American peers. 
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The social welfare regime in Spain comprises contribution-based nationally-
administered social insurance (unemployment benefits and pensions), regionally-
managed universal programs (healthcare or education discussed elsewhere in this 
dissertation), as well as locally-developed need-based social services. While spending on 
social welfare is generally low compared to other developed countries, social security, the 
foundation of the Spanish welfare state, is better funded than similar programs in the 
majority of EU countries. The National Social Security Institute (INSS) manages 
contributions made by workers and employers to respond to unemployment, accidents in 
the workplace, disability and retirement. Receipt of benefits is contingent on and 
proportional to contributions, except in access to non-contributory pensions and disability 
programs. In Madrid, contributing to the system for one year results in four months of 
unemployment benefits (paro), with some limited protections after social security is used 
up. The waiting period is shorter than the two-year requirement in Ireland, with subsidies 
available even for the unemployed who have worked for less than 12 months. Foreign 
nationality does not preclude access to the system, yet employment in the informal 
economy with no contributions excludes immigrants from payments. Apart from social 
insurance, social services administered by the Department of Family and Social Affairs 
provide minimum care to populations excluded from the social security system in the 
form of home care, non-contributory pensions, minimum insertion income, or food 
banks.  They are open to nationals and foreigners (Angloinfo, 2015; Comunidad de 
Madrid, 2012b; Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011).   
Participation in the generous Spanish welfare system is growing for both 
collectives of interest here with economic downturn. The number of immigrant affiliates 
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with social security remained stable over time, with around 2 million foreign-born 
contributors (10% of the total) between 2007 and 2010 (Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 
2011). However, the number of foreigners using the paro increased from 30,000 or 2.2% 
of all claimants in 2001 to 319,000 or 14.7% of all applicants in 2010 (MTIN, 2010). 
Immigrants also account for 12% of users of social services in the Madrid Autonomous 
Community. Six in ten Latin American and Eastern Europeans in the city of Madrid avail 
themselves of integration resources (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010).  According to local 
administrators, the growing numbers of social benefit claimants reflect “awareness of the 
system” and the inclusion of all immigrants in the city (M19-ADMIN). 
Ethnic communities are satisfied with the social system in Spain. In Madrid, 
68.1% of Latin Americans are content with the quality of social provisions, compared to 
66.9% of Eastern Europeans (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). As one Bulgarian 
respondent put it, “Spain is paradise for the lazy. There are food banks, maybe thirty in 
Madrid, which offer plentiful free food. There are [free cafeterias that offer] social 
activities. You can play chess, tennis, bathe for free. Not only do they give you free food, 
but they serve it for you too… No wonder Bulgarians are not going back” (Devin, 55).359  
Nonetheless, there are differences in access between Bulgarians and Ecuadorians. 
For instance, Ecuadorians are higher net contributors to the social insurance system with 
affiliates rising from 0.4% of the total in 2001 to 1.3% of the total in 2007. On the other 
hand, Eastern Europeans have comprised only 0.4% of all contributors in 2001-2007 
despite rising numbers of new arrivals with EU enlargement, indicating a much higher 
                                                          
359 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Испания е рай за лентяите. Тука има 
хранилки, в Мадрид са може би 30, в които предлагат храна в изобилие. Cоциални дейности. В тях 
можеш да играеш шах, да играеш тенис, да се къпеш, има безплатна баня. Значи не само ти дават 




tendency to be employed underground with no eligibility for social insurance (Moreno-
Fuentes & Callejo, 2011). Consequently, more vulnerable Balkan migrants are more 
likely to use food banks in Madrid but less likely to employ integration resources beyond 
basic subsistence needs (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b).  
Only one in ten of this project’s Ecuadorian respondents used unemployment 
benefits, despite universal awareness and eligibility. One interviewee claimed the benefit 
for a year while resting in the home country upon being laid off in Spain. He shared, 
“You have a right to the paro because you are paying social security for four years and 
you have the obligation to collect it if you find yourself to be unemployed” (Patrick, 
32).360 None of the South Americans report issues with the receipt of the social benefit 
and all consider the process simple despite the long lines.  
Four in ten of the Bulgarians who spoke about this aspect of their life in Spain 
used the host country’s social security system, while six in ten never availed themselves 
of welfare.361 One sixth of all participants are currently receiving some type of assistance, 
be it unemployment benefits or means-based subsidies if ineligible for the paro. 
Satisfaction is relatively high among the Balkan workers. More than one third express 
contentment with the service, since due to the standard requirements, if one is eligible for 
the paro, "they have to give it to you" (Kevin, 33).362 Spanish social security personnel 
are considered “very polite, very nice” and unlikely to cause “issues” (Redford, 36).363 
One respondent was even amazed of local administrators’ proactive efforts to inform her 
                                                          
360 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Tú tienes derecho al paro porque tú estas pagando 
la seguridad social cuatro años y tienes la obligación a cobrar si te quedas desempleado.” 
361 One Bulgarian representative suggests that stereotypes form the home country that only “the poor and 
the gypsies” (в социалните служби отиват бедни, цигани) claim social security have resulted in lesser 
claims of the benefit by Bulgarian workers (M1-BO) (Author’s translation from Bulgarian).  
362 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Те са длъжни да ми ги дадат.” 
363 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Испанците са много вежливи хора, много 
топли… няма проблеми.” 
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of her eligibility for a disability-based pension (Nina, 57). In fact, Bulgarian workers 
admit that the generosity of the system resulted in some abuse by their compatriots who 
would work illegally in the home country, yet travel periodically to Spain to maintain the 
appearance of unemployment and their access to payments (M2-BO). 
While not nearly disadvantaged as immigrants in Dublin, however, Bulgarians 
still experience barriers to securing social protections. More than one third of the Balkan 
workers lament being excluded from the system on the basis of their precarious 
employment in Madrid’s underground economy. As Spanish stakeholders put it, “they are 
illegal, they do not have the right to social security, to the majority of provisions, they 
don’t collect paro and have no economic means of survival” (M18-ADMIN; M36-
ADMIN).364 Another third perceive discrimination in their receipt of benefits. Unlike in 
the Irish case, there is no politicization of the abuse of the unemployment system, since 
benefits are contingent on contributions. In fact, immigrants are proven to be net 
contributors to the system. However, there remain certain perceptions of the “excess 
stress [immigrants] put on social services” in view of “their precarious employment, 
lower salaries, [and] lack of family and social networks” (M16-P; Moreno-Fuentes & 
Callejo, 2011). There are concerns of social welfare tourism and welfare dependency that 
lead to resentment and exclusion among natives (Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011). For 
instance, when inquiring about social security contributions, one Balkan immigrant was 
told, “If you don’t like the system here, go to your own country” (Pam, 39).365 Another 
was purposefully misled about filing deadlines as to be unable to file for benefits (Hunter, 
                                                          
364 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son ilegales, no tienen derecho a la seguridad 
social, no tienen derecho a la mayoría de las prestaciones, no cobran el paro, no tienen medios económicos 
para subsistir.” 
365 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз ходих да питам социалния работник и тя 
ми отговори: „Ако не ти харесва, иди си в твоята държава”. 
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29). Regardless, stereotypes of welfare abuse and institutional or individual 
discrimination in social welfare provision are much less widespread among foreigners in 
Spain than among both Poles and Nigerians in Dublin. 
In sum, access to social welfare is relatively open to both Ecuadorians and 
Bulgarians in Madrid. Standard requirements, short waiting periods, multiple local 
resources, and little discrimination contribute to relatively plentiful social benefits and 
high level of satisfaction among immigrant claimants in Spain. Still, East Europeans are 
somewhat disadvantaged in claiming social welfare compared to Latin Americans, as 
their tendency to be employed in the underground economy effectively excludes them 
from social provisions. What is more, the different Balkan workers are more likely to 
experience subtle discrimination or be told to “go home” instead of abusing Spanish 
resources. Consequently, Bulgarians are assigned a 4 for this indicator of social 
incorporation, while Ecuadorians merit the highest value (Table VII.1).   
 
VII.7. Access to Other Institutions 
VII.7.1. Access to Other Institutions in Dublin 
While their experience with the Irish social security administration is negative, 
Polish workers in Dublin fare well in their relations with other governmental institutions 
like the Irish employment agency, FÁS, or the police. Africans, on the other hand, are 
highly disadvantaged in their interactions with Irish immigration services or the Garda.  
To illustrate, in 2006 only 7.8% of Eastern European respondents reported being 
treated poorly by the Irish police, the Garda, a figure that compared to 21.9% among 
Black Africans and 25% among Nigerians. East Europeans were also less likely than 
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African migrants to have poor interactions with the Department of Justice or other 
immigration services. Finally, East European did have relatively poor experiences with 
the Irish National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS), but they still fared better 
than Black African immigrants (McGinnity et al., 2006, pp. 47-49) (Table VII.7).  
In fact, Polish organizational representatives suggest that public services and 
governmental institutions in Ireland are far superior to those in Poland. As one expert put 
it, “this country is more for the people … In Poland, the law is important. Here, the 
person is important and law exists to serve the person” (D37-PO). Still, ethnic 
representative criticize the fluidity of administrative structures in Ireland, as well as the 
reliance on discretion in the decision-making process (D35-PO). Due to the subjectivity 
of Irish governmental institutions, discrimination can occur in individual cases, especially 
in the employment agency and particularly after the economic downturn. 
Most of this project’s Polish respondents rate their interactions with Irish 
institutions as “very positive.” Only 14% had negative experience with an administrative 
office in Ireland, while 62% report positive interactions and “friendly” public employees. 
Some of the interviewees are actually very satisfied with the access they have to high-
ranking public officials in Dublin. One shared an anecdote of the Irish President attending 
Polish church services to encourage Polish immigrants to remain in Ireland with the crisis 
(Rick, 45). Another participant discussed her ability to set an appointment with the 
Minister for Integration to discuss her professional development in Ireland (Mary, 41). A 
third spoke of his access to his local representative and the Minister of Trade in a dispute 








* Figures for Nigerians refer to those experiencing discrimination at least 1-2 times. INIS stands 
for Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service.  




On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants report widespread institutional 
discrimination. Half of this dissertation’s interviewees experienced poor treatment by 
institutions in Dublin. One respondent, who migrated to Ireland as an EU dependent, 
talked about the aggressive employees at the immigration office. She suggests that 
immigration officers treat immigrants with disrespect and assume that all Nigerians in 
Ireland are asylum seekers and should be happy to be in the country (Tatiana, 27). 
Another was refused a new residency card even though he fulfilled all requirements 
(Stephen, 36). Some reported that permit applications would take longer to process in 
their case on the basis of skin color and nationality.  
Male African respondents all encounter issues with the police. In some cases, the 
police would be too slow to provide Nigerians with assistance or would discount or 
                                                          
366 The remaining participants in McGinnity et al. (2006)’s survey did not provide any information about 
harassment in Irish institutions based on ethnic origin.   
 Never  1-2 times 3-4 times >5 times 
 Garda FÁS INIS Garda FÁS INIS Garda FÁS INIS Garda FÁS INIS 
Black 
African 70 57.2 68.4 11.4 5.2 15.1 2.4 - 1.7 5.9 0.7 4.8 
White 



























Asian 89 83.3 83.3 3.8 3.3 8.9 0.2 0.2 1.2 - 0.2 1.7 
East 
European 76.5 67.2 73.8 5 7.3 10.8 0.8 - 2.3 0.8 0.8 3.5 
Nigerian*    22 - 25       
Total 79.8 71.1 75.9 6.6 5.1 11.3 0.9 0.2 2 1.8 0.5 2.9 
431 
 
minimize their call for help. For example, one Nigerian supermarket clerk rarely received 
police assistance in cases of theft in the store on account of his accent when he called to 
report the crime (Zach, 32). In other cases, police officers would racially profile Nigerian 
immigrants.  One respondent, for instance, shared that after reacting to racial comments 
by an Irish proprietor of a car shop, he was the one “rough-handled” and arrested by the 
Garda for disorderly conduct (Taylor, 32).  
Racial profiling is particularly severe in the relationship between the Garda and 
black Nigerian immigrants in Dublin (D11-L; ENAR, 2011). The Garda’s Racial and 
Intercultural Office was created in 2000 to remedy issues of racial discrimination by Irish 
policemen. The main mission of the Unit is to provide sensitivity training and prepare 
police officers to better address the problems of ethnic communities, as well as to 
establish connections with such communities through ethnic liaison officers. It is also 
meant to remedy one of Nigerian’s biggest concerns – that “they are not being listened 
to” (D11-L). Nonetheless, the Unit remains understaffed with 350 employees. Nigerians 
migrants and other ethnic persons continue to mistrust the police who can also act as 
immigration officers. As the Garda are not covered by Equality Legislation, their actions 
remain particularly suspect for Africans in Dublin (ENAR, 2011). 
On the other hand, Polish immigrants have limited or positive experiences with 
the Irish police or court system. As one Gardai shares, while he has interactions with the 
Polish community, Polish immigrants in Dublin rarely commit crimes or experience 
racist crimes (D11-L). Few of this project’s respondents had any interaction with Irish 
police, but the ones who did find the Gardai friendly and helpful. While they concede 
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that the courts deliberate for long periods of time and are “stressful,” Polish interviewees 
also have trust in the Irish court system and its fairness (Devon, 33).  
Polish workers also make extensive use of the Irish employment agency, FÁS. 
Most of their experiences are positive. More than one third (38%) of the subjects who 
discussed their interactions with Irish institutions stated they have used FÁS in search of 
employment or access to retraining courses in Ireland. The majority (63%) find this 
institution useful and the employees “helpful” and “positive.” They obtained jobs through 
the agency or were accepted to courses in their field of desired employment. Only 10% 
report poor interactions with individual officers. Especially with economic crisis, they 
were put down when looking for employment. A FÁS employee tore up one respondent’s 
carefully-crafted resume and told him “it was no good” (Rick, 45). Another participant 
was told by a FÁS employee that all Eastern European women come to Ireland to “live 
off Irish tax payers” (Sarah, 33). Still, such cases are the exception rather than the rule.  
Exchanges with the main trade union, SIPTU, are extremely rewarding for Poles 
as well.  In the case of disputes with employers or employment agencies, SIPTU 
representatives are reported to fight for workers’ rights regardless of membership. As one 
person put it, SIPTU “works pretty hard to inform as many people as they could about 
their rights. And when you have some information about your rights and have SIPTU, 
you can … fight” (Kathryn, 27). 
In sum, Polish immigrants have better access to immigration, economic, and 
security institutions in Dublin than their Nigerian counterparts. While some Polish 
workers are treated poorly by the Irish Training and Employment Agency, most Poles in 
Ireland have positive experiences when reporting a crime, looking for training, or 
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securing a permit. The East Europeans are assigned a 5 for this component of social 
incorporation. On the other hand, Nigerians are particularly likely to be stigmatized and 
abused by the Irish Immigration and Naturalisation Service or racially profiled by the 
Garda. They are only assigned a 1 for this indicator of social integration (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.7.2. Access to Other Institutions in Madrid 
Like their Polish counterparts in Dublin, Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid 
are generally satisfied with their interactions with public institutions, such as the police 
and courts, the Foreigner’s offices, or the major trade unions. However, Bulgarians are “a 
passive collective” that is less likely to benefit from relatively benign local public 
servants and which is more likely to encounter negative treatment when dealing with 
immigration services (M5-BO).367 While Ecuadorians are more likely to be targeted by 
the police than their East European peers, the South Americans are well attuned to 
Madrilenian administrative offices and take advantage of their inclusive attitude.  
According to a survey by Madrid’s municipal government, Latin Americans are 
more likely to experience discrimination than Eastern Europeans when dealing with local 
officials, even if both groups fare better than Africans. In general, immigrants’ 
relationships with the police or public administrators are satisfactory and similar to these 
of natives. The percentages of natives and foreign-born experiencing negative treatment 
by law enforcement or city halls are low and differ by less than 2%. However, one fifth 
of Latin Americans report some discrimination by Madrilenian police forces compared to 
one tenth of East European workers. 13% the South Americans perceive unfavorable 
                                                          
367 Author‘s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “пасивен колектив.” 
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treatment in public offices compared to 7.5% among Balkan immigrants (Ayuntamiento 
de Madrid, 2010). 
While Ecuadorian respondents are indeed prone to question their relations with 
Madrilenian law enforcement, Bulgarians are much more likely to experience subpar 
treatment from other public officers or to find benevolent local administrators useless, 
overly bureaucratic, and extremely slow. The East Europeans shy away from Spanish 
institutions altogether (M5-BO).  
This project’s Ecuadorian participants find the Madrilenian police officer “cold” 
and “on edge” when dealing with Latin Americans (Lina, 30; Patrick, 32).368 They agree 
that the police are effective and quick to intervene in accidents or confrontations, but a 
majority also suggest that police officers “are accustomed to catching Latinos” in their 
daily duties (Patrick, 32).369 Individual interviewees have been stopped by police officers 
and asked for papers, yet are quickly released after showing the necessary documents. 
Still, there is a certain perception of racial profiling among Ecuadorians, who believe law 
enforcement officers to “generalize” and assume some wrongdoing when interacting with 
the “law-abiding” South American community (Lincoln, 32).370 Nonetheless, ethnic 
representatives concede that it is African migrants who are most disadvantaged in their 
relations with the Spanish police (M9-EO). 
While Eastern Europeans are less likely to experience discrimination at the hands 
of Spanish police forces or be stopped for a document check, Bulgarian respondents are 
                                                          
368 Author’s translation from original quote  in Spanish: “Pero el trato es demasiado frio, es la policía” 
(Lina, 30), “Hay veces que algún policía es un poco borde” (Patrick, 32).  
369Author’s translation from original quote  in Spanish: “Ellos ya están acostumbrados a coger latino.” 
370 Author’s translation from original quote  in Spanish: “No, pero generalizan. Aprovechan que unos 
latinos son malos y a otros o a todos los generalizan. Yo también estoy en contra de la gente mala, que hace 
el desorden, pero lo generalizan todo.” 
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conflicted about their relationship with law enforcement in Madrid as well. Some report 
no issue with the law (Xander, 20). One Balkan restaurant employee even recalls being 
driven home by police officers at 3 am after missing the last bus from work (Sylvester, 
29). On the other hand, two-thirds of respondents who spoke of their interactions with 
Madrilenian law enforcement encountered some problems. They reporte being profiled 
and stopped for drug checks or for perceived traffic violations frequently. One respondent 
was shocked after witnessing police beat a disabled Eastern European man at a long line 
for documents. Bulgarians are also somewhat disenchanted with the court system. While 
proceedings are found to be relatively fair, courts and public lawyers are considered slow, 
“unprofessional,” and  disposed to treat their Bulgarian clients “as immigrants” 
(Sylvester, 29).371 Public officials and ethnic representative concede that stereotypes of 
Bulgarians’ criminality and a tendency to equate the Bulgarians with the Roma 
population produce tensions and discrimination by police officers, as well as lack of 
confidence and trust in the police among the immigrants (M7-BO; M27-L). 
 The Spanish-speaking and culturally-attuned Ecuadorians might have strained 
relationships with police officers in Spain, but they can easily navigate Foreigner’s 
Offices and local ministry branches when looking to issue or renew permits or secure a 
tax identification card (Número de Identidád de Extranjero, or NIE). Local stakeholders 
admit that managing the informal, complex, and decentralized Spanish administrative 
system is best done through word of mouth information to identify immigrant-friendly 
offices and employees when seeking or renewing documents (M24-TU; M33-TU). 
Therefore, use of public offices “has been easier for people who speak Spanish, for 
                                                          
371 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Самата адвокатката беше 
непрофесионалист…. Тя е доловила нещо и с визията, че аз съм емигрант.” 
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people from Latin America who come to ask and tell another compatriot” (M25-TU; 
M34-TU).372 Indeed, while some Ecuadorian participants find immigrant offices “hectic” 
(frenéticos) or bad at explaining forms or instructions, they hold that administrators 
“serve [Latinos] very well” (nos atienden muy bien ellos) (Ethan, 39). Since foreigner’s 
offices are “accustomed to dealing with Latinos” (están acostumbrados ya a tratar con 
muchos latinos), a majority of Ecuadorian respondents rate their interactions with them as 
“neutral” (neutrales) at worse and “perfect” (perfectos) at best (Lina, 30; Patrick, 32). 
Even the South American respondents who perceive some negativity when obtaining 
papers concede that administrators are “by no means racists” (no es que sean racistas) 
and are often “very friendly” (muy amables) (Kris, 39; Patrick, 32). All Ecuadorians find 
the bureaucracy in Spain “quick” (rápido) and generally effective (Yana, 20).373 
 On the other hand, non-Spanish speaking Bulgarians are lost in the confusing 
Spanish administrative system and are conflicted about their interactions with 
immigration officers. One fifth of the interviewees found Madrilenian administrators to 
be “polite” (вежливи), to “do their job” (вършат си работата), and to “treat everyone 
the same” (държат се с всички еднакво) (Jack, 28; Tanner, 64; Tonya, 45; Xander, 20). 
However, one sixth of the Balkan migrants perceived negative treatment when dealing 
with immigration authorities, with one person sharing that Madrilenian administrators 
“treat us like dogs” (държат се с нас като с кучета) (Sylvester, 29). The East 
Europeans would be denied benefits, put under more scrutiny and higher requirements, 
and accused of purposefully cheating the system. As one participant put it, “when you tell 
                                                          
372 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Quizá la aproximación ha sido más fácil para la 
gente que hablaba español, para le gente de América Latina que se acerca a preguntar, que se lo cuenta a 
otro compañero.” 
373 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quotes in Spanish.  
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them you know English but not Spanish, they immediately start to make faces and create 
drama. They are huge language nationalists. When they see a foreigner, they look at him 
with contempt” (Xavier, 20).374  
 Bulgarians also have a much harder time than their South American counterparts 
in navigating the highly bureaucratic and complex process. The confusing requirements 
for documents, the conflicting instructions given by decentralized offices, and ineffective 
employees “drinking their coffee” (пият си кафето) while lines are bulging render 
obtaining papers “a nightmare” (кошмар) (Pam, 39; Sylvester, 29). Interactions with 
immigrant services are excruciatingly slow. A majority of the Balkan participants 
describe “the insane lines” wrapping around the infamous Diego de Leon Street and 
“sleeping on the streets for days” in tents, on carton boxes, or bare mattresses to obtain 
documentation (Anna, 36).375 While a NIE should take one month to issue and work 
permits 3-4 months to issue or renew, permit issuance or renovations prior to EU 
accession often took eight or more months on average (Angloinfo, 2015; M24-TU; M25-
TU; M34-TU; M35-TU).  
 Finally, Madrid’s trade unions advocate for foreign workers and provide training, 
juridical help and employment resources, regardless of nationality or membership (M23-
TU; M24-TU; M25-TU; M26-TU; M34-TU; M35-TU). However, Eastern Europeans 
find syndicates foreign, “useless,” and even “annoying” (Hunter, 29; Van, 30).376 On the 
other hand, Ecuadorians use the benevolent actors frequently, leading SIPTU 
                                                          
374 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Точно, че и от 
езика са супер големи националисти. Като видят например някой чужденец и го гледат едва ли не с 
пренебрежение, че не знае техния език или нещо такова” (Xanvier, 20). 
375 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Опашките за 
луди, където останаха в историята, километрични… Хората отиваха и спяха на улицата дни 
наредллл” (Anna, 36),  
376 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Да, ходихме в Профсъюза и нищо не стана” 
(Hunter, 29), “Не мога да ги понасям, много са ми досадни” (Van, 30).   
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representatives to conclude that “Latin Americans are very unionist” (M24-TU; M33-
TU).377 
 In sum, Ecuadorian migrants have better access to immigration, economic, or 
security institutions in Madrid than their Bulgarian counterparts. While the South 
Americans have somewhat strained relationships with law enforcement officers, the 
similar Spanish-speaking immigrants can easily navigate foreigner’s officers and 
strategically employ the help of trade unions. They are assigned a 4 for this component of 
social incorporation. Balkan migrants are not as likely to be stopped by police and find 
public officials polite. However, the different East Europeans experience discrimination 
at the hands of immigration officers and are lost in the lengthy, complex, and inconsistent 
procedure of obtaining documentation. They find public offices ineffective and are 
unable to take advantage of benevolent local actors like SIPTU. Bulgarians are assigned 
an intermediary value for this indicator of social integration (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.8. Racism and Discrimination  
VII.8.1. Racism and Discrimination in Dublin 
Finally, Polish immigrants in Ireland are much less likely than their Nigerian 
counterparts to experience racism or discriminatory treatment. Polish workers face 
discrimination in the economic sphere and in their access to some social resources. 
Nonetheless, they experience little discrimination in their interaction with the Irish public 
or individual administrators and are rarely the victims of racist crimes. On the other hand, 
Nigerians encounter racism in the cultural, social, and economic spheres in Dublin. 
                                                          
377 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “La gente latinoamericana es muy sindicalista.” 
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Discrimination takes the form of bullying and exploitation in the workplace or inadequate 
access to healthcare, for instance. However, Nigerians are also the casualty of verbal 
abuse and even physical assaults on Dublin’s streets and are the primary target of 
scaremongering and stereotyping by the Irish media. 
The system to report racism in Ireland is fragmented and inadequate (D25-J). The 
National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), the main 
body responsible for reporting on racism in Ireland, was eliminated in 2007. The Garda 
collects statistics on racist crime, yet as a representative of the Racial, Intercultural, and 
Diversity Office shared, few immigrants report racially-motivated attacks to the police 
due to mistrust (D11-L). Furthermore, Garda figures do not show discrimination in access 
to resources. Other institutions, like the Central Statistical Office, the Dublin City 
Council, or the Equality Tribunal, only collect data on the number of incidents in a 
specific sphere and do not include any details about the victim or the perpetrator of 
racism, in fear of identification. Consequently, documentation, the first step of resolving 
instances of discrimination, is insufficient or nonexistent.  
The responsibility of reporting on racism, moreover, shifted from the Justice 
Department to the Office of the Minister for Integration (OMI) that was created in 2007. 
While more sympathetic to the migrant than its predecessor, the OMI is severely 
underfunded and spread thin between service provision, documenting discrimination, and 
issuing broad statements on equality (D29-ADMIN). Monitoring and enforcement 
agencies, like the National Employment Rights Authority in the case of work 
exploitation, are understaffed and communicate with employers rather than with the 
immigrant worker. Thus, abuses remain unreported and workers – vulnerable (D27-TU).  
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Table VII.8. Poor Treatment Based on Ethnic Origin in Dublin’s Public Spaces, 
2006 (in %)  
 
 Restaurant, pub or club Shop Street or public 
transport 
Violent crime  
EE BA Avg EE BA Avg EE BA Avg EE BA Avg 
Never 88.5 79.8 86.4 86.5 69.7 82.8 75 46.7 65 92.3 88.5 89.6 
1-2 




























times 2.3 6.5 3.1 2.7 7.2 3.6 3.5 16 7.9 0.8 1.4 1 
 
EE stands for East European; BA denotes Black Africans; N - Nigerians and Avg is the average 
among all nationalities. 
Source: Reproduced from McGinnity et al., 2006. 
 
With these deficiencies in mind, it is still clear that Eastern Europeans experience 
less racism than African workers in Ireland (D5-ADMIN). For instance, in 2006, East 
Europeans were much less likely than Nigerians or other Black Africans to face 
discrimination in a shop, in a restaurant, in a bar or club, on the street, or in public 
transportation. Eastern Europeans were also less likely than Nigerians to be the victim of 
violent crime in Ireland (McGinnity et al. 2006) (Table VII.8).378 
The interview data confirms that Polish workers are rarely the subject of 
xenophobia in Ireland, while Nigerian immigrants experience racism daily. As one expert 
put it, “There are not many racist incidents against the Polish because they look like us. 
They are not identifiable, so they don’t have as many problems” (D11-L; D18-P). On the 
other hand, “discrimination” based on “the color of their skin” is the main issue for the 
Nigerian community in Dublin (D13-P; D42-NO). The African group is considered 
                                                          
378 Nigerians in particular were much more likely to experience poor treatment based on their ethnic origin 
than any other national group. For example, 35% were discriminated against in shops in Dublin compared 
to 9% on average. More than half (53%) faced discrimination on the street or in public transportation, 
compared to 21% on average. 10% were the victims of violent racist crime, compared to 1% on average 
(McGinnity et al., 2006).  
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“worse off” than other immigrants as it is subjected to “racist attack, abuse, maltreatment 
from law enforcement agents, discrimination in work place, everything” (Taylor, 30). 
Racism is so pervasive among the community that one official suggested that Nigerians 
would perceive discrimination even where it does not exist (D44-NO).  
When prompted about racism, Polish immigrants rarely report instances of racial 
discrimination, even if they have heard of others being abused (D39-PO). Among 
participants, 45% were the victim of some instance of discrimination in Ireland. 
However, they tend to refer to exploitation at work more frequently rather than to 
harassment based on national or ethnic origin. Indeed, half of all incidents occurred in the 
workplace, with few occurring on the street, in public institutions, or on public radio.379  
Discrimination against the Polish manifests itself in subtle forms. High-profile 
crimes against the Polish community have occurred in Ireland. In fact, two Polish men 
were murdered viciously in 2008 and another Polish immigrant was killed in 2010. 
Nonetheless, police, Polish representatives, and Polish respondents deny that the murders 
were racially-motivated (D11-L; D25-J; D29-ADMIN; D37-PO; D38-PO). Intoxication 
or drug abuse, as well as lack of education are considered the culprits of crime against 
Polish nationals, rather than racial prejudice (D9-P).  
It is not violent crime but verbal abuse or unfavorable remarks that are the most 
common form of discrimination against the Polish in Ireland. Especially with economic 
downturn, some Polish workers are told to “stop taking Irish jobs” and to “go home” 
(D13-P). Among respondents who were the victim of discrimination, three quarters 
experienced verbal abuse, with one case of refusal of service, one physical attack, and 
                                                          
379 It is important to note that many Polish immigrants discount experiences of discrimination and explain 
them away as “normal.” Therefore, the incidence of racism among the Polish might be higher (D39-PO). 
442 
 
one person perceiving being treated differently in shops and restaurants on the basis of 
his nationality.380 In half of the cases, Polish participants were told to “go back” to their 
own country. In two cases, respondents were told to “f* off” or were addressed rudely on 
the basis of their nationality (Nadine, 27; Peter, 32).  
On the other hand, all of this project’s Nigerian respondents report racism or 
discrimination in Dublin, with biased treatment occurring in most aspects of their lives. 
All Nigerian participants experience discrimination in private and public institutions, 
including work, school, the police station, or the immigration office. In some cases, 
discrimination is subtle. For instance, in everyday transactions like parking in a public 
lot, Nigerians would hear quips about their being “always after money” (D44-NO). They 
also report that Irish would give them “looks” if they spoke too loudly in public or would 
spit on the ground when they saw Africans passing by (D44-NO’ Zach, 32). The most 
common form of racism is verbal abuse for African and Polish interviewees alike (D11-
L). For instance, two respondents were told to “F* off” because they drove too nice of a 
car for an “ethnic person” (D44-NO; Stephen, 36). Participants were addressed with 
profanity and racial slurs by clients calling on the phone in a bank or taking their taxi. 
Most were yelled at to “go back to [their] f*ing country” and were called “nigger” on the 
street, in public transportation, when looking for accommodations, or in private 
businesses. Systematic discrimination prompted one interviewee to conclude about 
Nigerians, “We are at the lowest rung in the society” (Zach, 32). 
Racism against African immigrants in Dublin can also be direct and severe, 
however. One third of respondents were physically assaulted at work or on the street, as 
                                                          
380 However, the respondent who was attacked does not believe his nationality provoked the attack. He was 
attacked by a group of aggressive teenagers who wanted to create tension regardless of the victim’s 
nationality (Ted, 28). 
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strangers slapped them or threw ice balls at them. One respondent active in the public 
sphere reported being placed in “racially-motivated” “life-threatening” situations more 
than once in Ireland (D42-NO). A high-profile murder of a Nigerian youth in Tyrrelstown 
was perceived to be racially-motivated, unlike in the Polish case (D25-J).  
Not only the forms but also the underlying causes of discrimination differ 
between the two populations. Most incidents against the Polish are based on the 
misconception that they are “taking Irish jobs” (D4-P; D7-TU; D9-P; D36-PO; D39-PO; 
D41-NO). Polish respondents agree that the Irish public harbors some resentment against 
the Polish, since with economic downturn Irish relatives and friends have lost their jobs, 
while Polish workers remain employed. The competition for scarce resources produces 
stereotypes about this group. For instance, the issue of fraudulent social security claims is 
used to justify biased treatment against Polish workers in Dublin (D18-P). As economic 
fortunes rise, stereotyping of the East Europeans is less common. 
On the other hand, racial and cultural dissimilarity from the Irish is the main 
cause of discrimination against African immigrants. Visual differences render Nigerians 
an easy target of racism, especially in a homogenous and “white” country like Ireland 
(D11-L; D13-P; D18-P; D41-NO).  Common misconceptions about Nigerian migration, 
such as their abuse of the asylum system, illegal status, criminality, or poor work ethic, 
further fuel racism towards this group (D44-NO). Even the name Nigeria invokes a 
number of negative stereotypes, such as “bogus” status (D9-P; D18-P; D25-J; D42-NO). 
Racism towards Nigerian migrants in Ireland is exacerbated because it is rarely 
addressed. When racism is subtle and occurs in the form of “bad attitude,” it is hard to 
prove or resolve (D44-NO). On the other hand, overt racism is rarely reported due to 
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mistrust in the police, fear that the Gardai will act as immigration agents, and belief they 
will do nothing to remedy the situation (D11-L).  
The Irish media reinforces and perpetuates the negative stereotypes of Nigerian 
migrants in Dublin. News publications are generally silent on migration to Ireland, in 
effect glossing over the fact that Dublin is a multicultural city (D41-NO, D42-NO). 
Nonetheless, media outlets are more vocal on the Nigerian community than on the Polish 
one and portray the former in a negative light (D1-J; D11-L; D25-J). Especially right-
leaning publications like the Irish Independent adopt a tough stance on immigration and 
mimic the Department of Justice’s language of control (D25-J). Public figures are 
particularly “irresponsible” in their discourse of Nigerians (D43-NO). As the media 
branded Nigerians “sponges” abusing the system, the African community in Dublin is 
prevented from “being taken as a serious, hard-working group of people” (D44-NO; 
Taylor, 30). It was the media that institutionalized the link between black skin color, 
Nigerian nationality, asylum seeker legal status, laziness, and fraud of the social welfare 
system (D1-J; D42-NO). As one interviewee put it, “the Western media doesn’t consider 
Africa good just generally. Most of them are sitting down drinking coffee and writing 
about Africa and they haven’t even been there. So they think Africa is all about war, 
disease, AIDS, and other negatives” (Zach, 32). Nigerian representatives are concerned 
that such irresponsible language and stereotyping might translate into a far-right political 
party in the new immigration country of Ireland (D41-NO; D43-NO). A case in point is 
the right-leaning Emmett Oliver using the Irish Independent as a platform to lament the 
severe impact of non-EU immigrants on Irish service jobs, a claim that guises cultural 
and racial concerns in economic terms (D11-L; D27-TU). 
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The Irish media also created some negative stereotypes about Polish immigrants 
in Dublin (D26-ADMIN). For instance, in 2004 news publications drummed up the issue 
of abuse of child benefits by Polish workers. Irish media outlets also report on the higher 
incidence of car accidents caused by reckless Polish drivers (D32-PO; D35-PO; D39-
PO). Sensationalist stories, such as Polish immigrants hunting and eating Irish swans, 
were also reported (Kevin, 27; Richard, 34). Nonetheless, as politicians tried to capitalize 
on stereotypes of the East Europeans, they undermined their political position and in fact 
lost electoral votes. When the mayor of Limerick “played the race card” by arguing that 
unemployed East Europeans should be “sent home”, news outlets published a passionate 
rebuttal by Polish groups (D41-NO). Some newspapers also publicized the plight of 
Polish workers trying to fulfill the Habitual Residence Condition (D1-J). As the Polish 
community has its own press in Ireland in newspapers like Polska Gazeta, Gazeta, or the 
Polish section of the Irish Herald, it has ample opportunity to rectify its image in the host 
country (D38-PO).  
Indeed, the Irish media are generally silent or favorable towards on the subject of 
Polish immigrants in Dublin.381 As the Polish community is perceived to fit into normal 
life in Ireland, the media only report on the Polish in the case of a “crisis,” such as the 
murder of Pawel in 2010 (D32-PO; D37-PO). Irish newspapers address the issue of the 
Polish with empathy and fascination at their cultural similarity and strong work ethic 
(D1-J; D17-ADMIN). The media tout Polish immigrants who invigorate lackluster 
churches or bringa comfortable sense of cultural diversity to the city (D1-J; D32-PO). 
More than half of respondents agree that Irish newspapers are quite positive in their 
                                                          
381 One third of the interviewees either do not consult the Irish media or suggest that Irish newspapers are 
no longer concerned with the Polish community, despite the initial fascination with this national group. 
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evaluation of the Polish community, described as hard-working, culturally similar, and 
interested in their new home.  
In sum, Polish immigrants in Dublin are less likely to be the victims of racism or 
discrimination than their Nigerian counterparts. Polish workers experience some 
exploitation in employment and less than perfect access to social resources. With 
economic downturn, Polish immigrants are told to “go home” and stop taking Irish jobs. 
However, as economic fortunes in the receiving country improve, the East Europeans are 
mostly regarded with empathy in public and media discourse. The cohort is assigned a 3 
for this component of social incorporation. On the other hand, Nigerians experience 
racism and racially-motivated crime in restaurants, bars, shops, public transportation, or 
on the streets of Dublin. They are not only verbally abused but sometimes physically 
assaulted on the basis of their skin color and nationality. The negative stereotypes 
perpetuated by the Irish media severally disadvantage this phenotypically different group. 
This collective is assigned a 1 for the final indicator of social integration (Table VII.1).  
 
VII.8.2. Racism and Discrimination in Madrid  
While Latin Americans in Madrid are more likely to perceive racism or 
discriminatory treatment than East Europeans, the South Americans are also rated as the 
most sympathetic and familiar group in the city. Balkan workers engender indifference 
among Spaniards. Both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians face some discrimination in the work 
place or in their access to social services. Ecuadorians are profiled by police and could be 
the target of verbal abuse or “looks” on the street or in other public spaces. Bulgarians 
also perceive different treatment in public spaces or economic and social institutions, 
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especially with economic downturn. However, neither collective is the subject of physical 
assaults or overt forms of racism. The Spanish media is more harmful in the case of the 
Balkan migrants, by tying the newcomers to organized and violent crime and rising crime 
rates in the receiving city. 
 The Spanish system of combatting racism and promoting equality is weak and 
hardly independent. Instances of discrimination are only recorded if they include 
prejudice on the basis of ethnicity, race, and religion. Hence, Latin American and 
Maghrebi migrants are more likely to benefit from the system than East Europeans, for 
instance. Bias on the basis of nationality is not officially deemed racism, therefore 
excluding numerous immigrant collectives, including Bulgarians. The Council for the 
Promotion of Equality of Treatment and Non-Discrimination of Persons by Racial or 
Ethnic Origin, the main body charged with combatting discrimination, was only created 
in 2009 without political debate or input from civil society. It is mainly suited to 
investigate instances of discrimination. However, it has no authority to help victims in 
concrete ways and fails to provide juridical assistance, local resources for reporting and 
support, or alternative mediation procedures for traumatized victims. Unsurprisingly, 
despite anti-discrimination legislation and governmental efforts at equality, Spain ranks 
as 21 out of 31 OECD countries and only receives 49 out of 100 points in the MIPEX III 
immigrant integration report (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011). 
 Regardless of institutional shortcomings, instances of racism are relatively rare in 
Spain. There were 381 racist crimes committed in 2013, compared to 109 in Ireland, an 
incidence per 1,000 of natives lower than in the Irish case (Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], 2015). Four in ten of all foreigners in Madrid have 
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never been the victims of racism, with only one quarter suffering prejudice more than two 
times. The majority of biased treatment occurs in the workplace, moreover, reflecting the 
perception of immigrants as an economic threat rather than an essentially different 
“Other” whose dissimilarity can never be reconciled with the Spanish way of life 
(Bertozzi, 2010, p. 28). Despite the downturn, Spaniards remain generally tolerant of 
newcomers in their midst with 70% viewing migration in very positive terms, and only 
13% perceiving foreign cohorts as a negative (Comunidad de Madrid. 2012b). 
Acceptance in spheres as distinct as work and study, common living spaces, and even 
personal relationships is high and ranges between 74% and 90% in 2008. What is more, 
violence against the foreign-born is not more widespread than that against the native 
population (D’Ancona & Martínez, 2009, p. 314).  
 






Older EU Asia Africa 
Work 32.5 27.1 19.8 14.5 30.9 
Neighborhood 19.3 15.8 10.3 17.1 22.5 
Police 21.3 9.3 16 8.1 18.2 
School 20.6 13.1 5.9 7.7 11.2 
Administration 13.6 7.5 8 5.8 9.7 
Public 
transport 16.1 5.7 4.6 5.5 7.1 
Sport fields 6.8 3.3 2.8 2.8 1 
  
Source: Reproduced from Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010. 
 
When one turns to the two groups of interest to this dissertation, it appears that 
Latin Americans are much more likely to experience discrimination in all spheres of life 
in Madrid than are Eastern Europeans. In some cases almost twice as many South 
Americans than Balkan migrants perceive prejudiced treatment in areas as diverse as the 
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school, public transportation, or by the police (Table VII.9) (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 
2010). Interestingly, Ecuadorians are also among the best liked nationalities amidst 
Spaniards and engender much more sympathy and kinship by the native population than 
other immigrant collectives. To demonstrate, 11.8% of respondents in a 2008 report by 
OBERAXE were most sympathetic to Latin American immigrants, while only 1.4% 
found strong affinities with East Europeans. On the other hand, Moroccans, Romanians 
and East Europeans ranked among the least sympathetic groups in the country (D’Ancona 
& Martínez. 2009, p. 328). In Madrid, older EU migrants were considered the most 
sympathetic group (index of 6.8), but South Americans were a close second (index of 
6.3), and Eastern Europeans ranked closer to the lower end of the spectrum with an index 
similar to that of Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan immigrants (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 
2010). Finally, good relations between Latin Americans and Spaniards prevail in 
Madrid’s neighborhoods, public spaces and shops. In fact, South American migrants are 
the most likely cohort to experience positive or at least cordial interaction with their hosts 
on Madrilenian streets, in public parks and gardens, or on squares and plazas, where 
social interaction often occurs (Table VII.10).  
 
Table VII.10. Relationships in Madrid’s Public Spaces, 2008 (in %)  
 
 Neighborhood Streets, parks, plazas Shops 
Good Bad Cordial/ 
indifferent 
Good Bad Cordial/ 
indifferent 
Good Bad Cordial/ 
Indifferent 
Latin 
America 71.4 1.7 26.9 64.1 0.7 35.2 58 0.3 41.7 
Eastern 
Europe 75.5 0.5 24 61.7 0.3 38 60.4 0.3 39.3 
Older 
EU 
83 0.6 16.4 67.1 0.2 32.7 72.2 0.5 27.3 
Africa 76.8 4.3 18.9 55.2 0 44.8 59.4 0.9 39.7 
Asia 70 2.3 27.7 48.2 0.3 51.5 54.3 0.7 45 
 
Source: Reproduced from Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010. 
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The interview data suggest that Ecuadorian migrants experience mostly positive 
relationships with the local population. The South Americans face some discrimination in 
their access to the economic and social spheres, or at the hands of Spanish police. 
However, they are rarely the target of violent crime and are more likely to hear about 
instances of racism than experience it first-hand. One third report subtle racism. “Lack of 
confidence” by employers, or “someone always saying something on the street” are the 
most common forms of discrimination (Lina, 30; Patrick, 32).382 However, most 
respondents concede that they faced no personal injustices or “aggressive” (agresivas) 
treatment (Lina, 30). As Spaniards are “very friendly” (muy amables) and Ecuadorians 
“share many things with them” (compartimos con ellos muchas cosas), discriminatory 
treatment is the exception rather than the rule (Ethan, 39; Kris 39). Spanish stakeholders 
and ethnic representatives conclude that “there are no large problems of racism, of 
segregation” for the South Americans (M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN).383  
Much like their Ecuadorian counterparts, Bulgarians in Madrid rarely experience 
overt discrimination or acts of aggression on the basis of their nationality. However, the 
Balkan migrants and their representatives are more aware of discrimination than the 
South American collective. Half of the participants who spoke on the issue, and a 
majority of ethnic representatives, perceived biased treatment, even if rare and mild. 
Most commonly, while people are “outwardly polite” (уж възпитани), they do have “an 
attitude” (различно отношение) to the Balkan migrants and “look at them differently” 
                                                          
382 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Spanish, including: “Eso sí, alguien 
siempre dice algo en la calle… Pero luego cosas más agresivas, la verdad es que no tuve la oportunidad de 
pasar” (Lina, 30), “Me he sentido un poquito discriminado en la desconfianza que tenían mis jefes” 
(Patrick, 32). 




(гледат ни накриво) (Izzy, 40; Sasha, 33). Especially older and lesser educated 
Madrilenians might “make a face” at Bulgarians or “give them bad looks” on the street, 
in public transportation, or at work (Idris, 30; M3-BO).384 Occasionally, verbal abuse is 
reported, with natives sending the East Europeans “back home” or swearing at the 
newcomers for “taking Spanish jobs” (Idris, 30; M2-BO).385 Calling the newcomers 
“búlgaro” with disdain is the most common form of discrimination in Madrid’s public 
spaces (Sylvester, 29). As negatively is mostly connected to the economic situation of the 
receiving country, some ethnic associations suggest that “there has not been an issue with 
human rights violations” and discrimination should be discounted (M2-BO).386 However, 
community representatives also concede that “Spaniards will never accept us as 
‘Spanish’” and “as equals” (M7-BO; M8-BO). Thus, eventual economic boom might not 
reduce bias against the culturally-different Bulgarians. 387 
 The Spanish media reinforces the stereotypes associated with the Balkan cohort, 
while it is neutral or positive when it comes to Latin Americans. The autochthonous 
public interprets the negatives of migration pervasively as “crime and insecurity” 
(delincuencia e inseguridad) (33%), followed by “problems of integration and cultural 
clashes” (problemas de integración y choque cultural) (11%), “competition for work” 
(competividad en el mercado de trabajo) (11%), and “too many people” (exceso de 
                                                          
384 Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: “Ами ако те 
разберат, че си чужденец ти правят една физиономия” (Idris, 30), “Доста хора се чустват гледани с 
лошо око” (M3-BO).  
385 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ами ако те разберат, че си чужденец 
ти правят една физиономия, някои са по- некултурни и те пращат да си вървиш на майната си и да 
си вървиш в страната и да не им взимаш работата.” 
386 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Големи конфликти не сме срещали, не е 
имало проблеми с човешки права.” 
387 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Bulgarian: “Ние никога няма да станем испанци, 
те никога няма да ни приемат като испанци” (M7-BO), “Не сме равни, но гледат с малко по- друго 




inmigrantes) (10%).388 Crime, moreover, is associated with the East of Europe, and less 
so with Colombia, Peru, Chile, or Morocco (D’Ancona & Martínez, 2009, p. 225).  
Local media outlets capitalize on the connection between immigration, rising 
crime rates, and xenophobia (Álvarez, Gutiérrez, & González, 2012, p. 8; Fernández, 
Manavella, & Ortuño, 2009). While the Spanish press is somewhat indifferent to the 
Balkan migrants, credit card fraud, car robberies, mafia connections, and calls for natives 
to beware of suspicious Bulgarians are common frames in Spanish media discourse (M1-
BO). Ethnic associations and Spanish stakeholders acknowledge the media’s fundamental 
role in institutionalizing the link between Eastern Europeans and violent crime in the 
country, including severe beatings, rape, or murder (M3-BO; M20-ADMIN; M33-
ADMIN). They speak of the “amplification” and “exaggeration” of Bulgarians’ violence, 
aggression and tendency to participate in large criminal organizations (M17-P; M35-
P).389 Even when news stories are more benevolent, like a piece on Bulgarian males’ 
scheming airport customers, they still impact the public’s opinion of the East Europeans 
as “mafia” who should “go back to where they came from” (M3-BO).390 
 Media outlets could capitalize on the illegality of some Latin Americans in 
Madrid. However, the second line of interest in recent publications are instead 
sensationalist stories of boats full of irregular North African and Sub-Saharan immigrants 
                                                          
388 Other associations include competition for social resources (competividad por las ventajas sociales) 
(3%), poverty, marginality, begging (pobreza, marginalidad, mendacidad) (3%), lowering wages 
(abaratamiento del mercado de trabajo) (3%), imposing their culture on Spaniards (imposición de su 
cultura) (2%). 1% of the Spanish find “everything” (todos) wrong with migration and 3% consider nothing 
to be wrong with the phenomenon, with 21% giving no response (D’Ancona & Martínez, 2009, p. 240). 
(Author’s translation from original text in Spanish).  
389 Author’s translation derived from original quote in Spanish: “Cuando se habla de la criminalidad 
muchas veces no se sabe si son los medios de comunicación que suelen confundir a veces las cosas y se 
amplifican mucho más…Es decir, ya no es que entren a una casa a robar estando los habitantes dentro, sino 
que encima hay una violencia física muy exagerada.” 
390 Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Много от коментиращите статията испанци 
бяха на мнение, че емигрантите трябва да си ходят там, откъдето са дошли.” 
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trying to storm Spanish borders (Fernández et al., 2009; M9-EO). Thus, instead of 
negativity, “performances, parties… people representing their countries, their customs” 
fill the news about Ecuadorians in the receiving context (Ethan, 39).391  
 In sum, Ecuadorians appear more likely to experience discrimination in Madrid 
than their Bulgarians counterparts. However, they are also the best liked foreign 
collective in tolerant Spain. The South Americans boast positive or at least cordial 
interactions with the autochthonous community and only face subtle and rare instances of 
discrimination in the receiving city. They are assigned a 4 for this indicator of social 
integration. Bulgarians are also unlikely to be the victims of racist crime and mostly 
experience discrimination in the forms of looks, attitude or negative comments on the 
part of Spaniards. However, as the media perpetuates the image of the Bulgarian as 
violent, aggressive, and criminal, prejudice against the East Europeans is likely to persist 
beyond economic downturn. The Balkan cohort is assigned an intermediate value for this 
indicator of social incorporation (Table VII.1).   
 
VII.9. Conclusion  
In conclusion, Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in 
Madrid are disadvantaged in their access to social rights and resources, with social 
incorporation for all four groups lagging behind integration in the political or economic 
domain. Differences among the four cohorts are more subtle than in other spheres, with 
contextual variations between Spain and Ireland minimizing the gap between the two 
Eastern European cohorts especially. Nonetheless, relative differences remain. 
                                                          
391 Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Por ejemplo, cuando hay actuaciones, fiestas, por 
ejemplo el día de la hispanidad, salen también representaciones de los diferentes países, se logra ver como 
representa la gente a sus países, sus costumbres. En el periódico, en las noticias, van firmando.” 
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Surprisingly, non-EU Ecuadorians enjoy more social rights than European Bulgarians in 
Madrid and white Catholic Poles fare better than more established quasi-colonial 
Nigerians in Dublin. Nigerians are pronouncedly worse off than the other three 
collectives, even though their access to education or medical care is actually open and 
comparable to that of the other immigrant groups. The South Americans are most attuned 
to opportunities and entitlements in the Spanish social sphere, despite low performance in 
education or discrimination. Once again, culture, identity and belonging play a 
fundamental role in determining social integration patterns.  
Ecuadorian migrants in Madrid deviate from the organic iintegration model 
extended by the dissertation. They have relatively low disposable income, concentrate in 
public schools or vocational tracks in Madrid and perform poorly in school, and 
experience some discrimination by Spanish police forces, local administrators, or in the 
receiving city’s streets. Nonetheless, the similar Latin Americans still rank the highest on 
the social incorporation index constructed by this author (Table VII.1). The familiar 
South Americans receive more sympathy from their hosts than any other immigrant 
community in the city and are rarely the subject of racist crime or negative framing by the 
media. Since they view Madrid as an extension of their home country, Ecuadorians invest 
in owned accommodations in the receiving context and intermix with natives in the 
neighborhood more often than other foreign collectives. They utilize the generous 
healthcare system in Spain regularly, make adept use of the social security system, and 
strategically employ other benevolent institutions in the city.  
Poles in Dublin and Bulgarians in Madrid occupy an intermediary position in 
terms of social incorporation (Table VII.1). Welcomed Poles who nonetheless perceive 
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themselves as isolated in the receiving city do not strive to increase their disposable 
income, concede to subpar rented housing away from their Irish hosts or disadvantaged 
immigrant-heavy schools, and rarely combat discrimination in the arbitrary Irish social 
security system. However, the East Europeans still fare better than their Nigerian and 
Bulgarians counterparts and experience reluctant integration in their new home with the 
help of ethnic and native organizations. Indeed, the Polish rarely fall beyond the poverty 
line. Open access to rental accommodations by eager Irish landlords ensures residence in 
desirable neighborhoods. Little bullying, language resources and preferential admission 
policies in semi-private religious institutions serve to close the educational gap with the 
local population. Access to the police, the courts, the employment agency, or the Irish 
trade unions makes up for discrimination in other social domains. The Eastern European 
immigrants are rarely the victims of racism in Ireland, as the press portrays them in a 
positive light. 
Bulgarians, who meet with indifference in Madrid despite their aspirations to fit 
into their new home’s life, follow the conflicted integration model extended in the thesis 
and score similarly to, if somewhat lower than, their Polish counterparts (Table VII.1). 
The different Eastern Europeans have low disposable income. They inhabit crowded 
subpar accommodations in segregated, immigrant-heavy neighborhoods and are less 
likely to own their residences than other collectives. Few language resources and lack of 
encouragement by native teachers lead to low educational achievement. Use of the 
generous healthcare system is somewhat limited, prejudiced treatment in immigration 
offices occurs, and stereotyping in the Spanish media is well-established. Nonetheless, as 
they perceive themselves to belong in the receiving context, Bulgarians avail themselves 
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of the Madrilenian social security system and aspire to learn Spanish as to excel in the 
educational sphere. The Balkan workers are satisfied with their access to the generous 
medical system and other institutions like the police or local administrators and suggest 
that their European-ness shields them from overt racism in the host context. 
Finally, despite relatively favorable access to some social institutions in Dublin, 
such as health and education, Nigerians in Ireland stand out as the most disadvantaged 
collective in terms of social incorporation (Table VII.1). The African migrants 
experience blocked integration due to their racial and cultural difference from the Irish. 
While Nigerians’ disposable income is high, home ownership is somewhat satisfactory, 
and access to medical services is decent, exclusion by local stakeholders severely limits 
social rights for the ethnic community. Poverty rates are high, isolation from the rental 
market is pervasive, and residential and educational segregation are the norm. Bullying in 
primary and secondary education, higher costs for medical care, stereotypes of abuse of 
the social welfare system, and unfair treatment by police or immigration officers all serve 
to compound deficiencies in the Africans’ social incorporation. Nigerian immigrants are 
the most likely victims of discrimination and racism by Irish and other perpetrators, as 
the Irish media and political officials perpetuate this group’s negative image.  
Surprisingly, tolerant Spain, explicitly focused on the social incorporation of its 
immigrants, provides fewer resources for the social inclusion of its foreign-born than 
homogenous exclusionary Ireland. Educational and anti-discrimination provisions are 
weaker in Madrid than in Dublin, for instance. Local identity perceptions can partly 
explain the anomaly. Language nationalism precludes the introduction of key resources 
for non-Spanish speakers in Madrid’s classroom and explains the low achievement of 
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Bulgarian immigrants, for instance. Focus on Madrid’s Latin American population which 
can navigate the similar social system relatively easily obscures more substantial 
subjective obstacles in front of other foreign populations in the city. Self-image as a 
tolerant country with ample free resources for all residents obfuscates the need for extra 
protections for different non-Iberian immigrants. Immigrants’ self-identification provides 
for the other piece of the puzzle. Even if Poles are granted innumerable resources for 
social integration in Dublin, they are unlikely to employ the generous healthcare system, 
for instance, if they perceive no stake in the receiving community. Awareness of cultural 
boundaries and ethnic communities’ self-perceptions is paramount for local stakeholders 







CONCLUSION: CONTESTING THE “EUROPEAN DREAM” 
 
 Migrants are in Europe to stay. They travel to countries that previously sent 
workers abroad. They come from ever more diverse sources and include both post-
colonial and post-communist newcomers. They are conscious actors who contest host 
communities’ political, economic and socio-cultural space. Just as European receivers, 
and especially new migration locations, are hard pressed to accommodate their de facto 
multicultural societies, xenophobia is on the rise among previously tolerant publics and 
elites. Even the migrant workers so necessary to close labor and demographic gaps on the 
Continent are politicized and racialized to justify exclusion or differential treatment. 
Despite the urgency of the migration issue, however, the literature continues to struggle 
with pinpointing the determinants of immigrant reception and incorporation, especially 
among the first generation and in new immigrant receiving countries. Emphasis on 
economic costs and benefits, the structure of institutions in the receiving context, the 
electoral success of right-wing parties, the outlook and genesis of citizenship laws, or the 
decline of host state sovereignty leaves larger issues of what actually contributes to the 
integration and inclusion of foreigners unanswered.  
This study set out to fill the gaps left by the literature. Using the cases of Poles 
and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, it provides a 
response to three research questions: 1) How do Western European receiving societies 
construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant?; 2) Why do immigrants belong or 
fail to fit in?; 3) How do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants’ perceptions 
affect incorporation outcomes? By synthesizing theory and methods from the fields of 
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political science and sociology, exploring innovative cases at the local level of analysis, 
bringing migrant agency back to considerations of integration, and turning to the 
understudied role of culture, the project demonstrates that identity politics influence both 
the reception and incorporation opportunities before immigrant communities.  
 
VIII.1. Executive Summary  
Just as immigration policy is shifting up to the supranational level, local identity 
characteristics are increasingly prominent for immigrant reception. Publics and elites in 
cities receiving immigrants justify the welcome or exclusion of the newcomers not so 
much on the basis of economic utility, as much as in view of how well foreign workers fit 
into the locality’s ideal identity. As Chapter III establishes, strong work ethic, white 
European ethnicity, Catholicism, English language skills, historical affinities, and 
friendly disposition, are the characteristics that frame kinship between the Irish and the 
Polish, while also reasserting these positive qualities in Dubliners’ own self-
identification. Nigerian immigrants are in turn narrated as fundamentally different on the 
basis of the same traits, where the coexistence of the two immigrant groups makes these 
categories even more meaningful. In the case of Madrid, Ecuadorians are admitted in 
view of their common existence with Spaniards in an Ibero-American space. They share 
with their hosts the Castellan language, historical ties, be those colonial or more recent 
parallels of emigration and a spirit of reciprocity, Catholic religion, extroverted 
disposition and social interaction patterns, as well as cultural rituals. Despite Bulgarians’ 
European white ethnicity and similar historical trajectories, the Balkan migrants are 
constructed as different or at least dubious by Madrilenians as they are serious, criminal, 
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authoritarian, Orthodox, ethnically suspect, and participants in different customs and 
interaction patterns. In all four cases, commonalities between desirable immigrant 
populations and natives are emphasized or invented while connections with undesirable 
collectives are downplayed. Even though race/ethnicity, religion, language, history, 
disposition/culture, and work ethic are crucial markers of similarity or difference across 
all groups, local context determines which identity variations matter more. “Hard work” 
and white European ethnicity are highly significant in the case of Dublin, for instance, 
while common language and cultural habits are essential in the case of Madrid.  
While receiving societies create a climate of welcome or exclusion for foreign 
workers, based on perceptions of migrants’ cultural distance or proximity to local 
identity, immigrant agency matters too. What the newcomers do with the opportunities 
presented to them depends on their own conception of belonging and isolation in host 
cities. The cultural categories established in public discourse underlie the foreigners’ 
sentiments as well. According to Chapter IV, rigid cultural self-identification and 
embeddedness in ethnic networks, as well as temporary migration plans with an 
economic rationale, preclude commitment to life in Dublin among Polish workers. 
Ethnoracial differences and their effects undermine the ability or will to belong among 
Nigerian migrants in Ireland. Both groups place little stake in utilizing opportunities or 
combatting obstacles to incorporation in Dublin. Linguistic, historical, and cultural 
commonalities render Madrid an extension of the motherland for Ecuadorian workers. 
Consequently, the South Americans stay in the receiving city, interact with natives, and 
build their future in both Ecuador and Spain. Strong national self-identification and 
intense nostalgia for the homeland are counteracted by a common European destiny with 
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the Spanish and concern for presenting the family unit with more opportunities abroad in 
the case of Bulgarians. As they deem the receiving city the ideal image of their own 
currently corrupt homeland, the Balkan migrants aspire to fit into Madrid’s life.  
 










Inclusion-exclusion dynamics shaped by the host society interact with 
immigrants’ own perceptions of welcome-rejection and stake in receiving cities to lead to 
different integration outcomes in the political, economic, and social spheres. When 
foreign communities are welcomed and see themselves to belong in their new homes, 
they are likely to both have opportunities to fit in and actually employ these opportunities 
to adapt to life in the receiving context. On the other hand, when immigrants are excluded 
and do not consider themselves to belong, they face obstacles to incorporation, which 
they are unlikely to overcome. Culture and identity underlie these outcomes.  
As Chapters V-VII demonstrate, Ecuadorians are better poised to adapt to life in 
Madrid than the other three cohorts of interest, as they are both welcomed and believe to 



















































calls organic integration in all spheres of life in Spain. As Chapter V argued, similar 
Ecuadorians are the beneficiaries of open entry into the Spanish labor market, a fast-
tracked naturalization process, periodic regularization programs, and ever more liberal 
political participation rules. They naturalize in large numbers, vote in local elections, 
unionize and found a number of civic associations to signal their belonging in the 
receiving city. According to Chapter VI, the Latin Americans might be exploited in the 
economic sphere, yet face little discrimination in recruitment or in their interactions with 
employers and coworkers. They work mostly according to qualifications and education, 
are employed even in crisis, have adequate workplace conditions, and are satisfied with 
their professional development in Madrid. Transition to Madrid’s economic sphere is 
smooth for the Spanish-speaking, Iberian newcomers with knowledge of the informal 
work relationships which characterize Spain. Chapter VII shows that despite relatively 
low disposable income, concentration in disadvantaged educational institutions, and some 
discrimination by Spanish police or in Madrid’s streets, Ecuadorians are rarely the 
subject of racist crime in Spain or negative treatment by the media. The South Americans 
are relatively integrated in the receiving city’s residential sphere and own their 
accommodations. Since they are invested in life in the city and perceive Madrid as their 
second home, Ecuadorians utilize the generous healthcare system regularly, make adept 
use of the social security system, and strategically employ other institutions in the 
receiving community.  
On the other hand, Nigerians are most disadvantaged in their incorporation 
outcomes among the four cases. They experience blocked integration, since their lack of 
belonging in Dublin reinforces the discourse of exclusion they face in the host city 
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(Table VIII.1). As Chapter V shows, the Africans might vote and run in Dublin’s 
elections and set up ethnic associations, yet they rarely hold public positions of power. 
Political activity rates remain low, with interpretations of legal status and recent policy 
developments stripping this group of political entitlements. Chapter VII demonstrates that 
Nigerian immigrants have the lowest employment rates and highest unemployment rates 
among the four populations discussed in the dissertation. The racially different African 
migrants face profound economic obstacles, like severe deskilling, pervasive 
discrimination in recruitment, and highly inferior working conditions and workplace 
relationships, which they are unable and unwilling to combat.  Thus, they exhibit very 
low levels of job satisfaction and even desperation with their economic status in Dublin. 
As Chapter VII details, exclusion extends to the social sphere. Nigerian immigrants might 
own their residences in Dublin, yet live mostly with other Nigerians in less desirable 
neighborhoods. They experience institutional and subjective barriers to accessing rental 
accommodations, educational institutions, social welfare offices, or other governmental 
institutions like the police. The Africans are subjected to overt and pervasive racism in 
the receiving context.   
Poles in Ireland and Bulgarians in Spain occupy an intermediate position in terms 
of integration outcomes. The Polish in Dublin undergo reluctant integration and 
represent the second best outcome among the four groups, as their lack of belonging in 
the host city is counteracted by the eagerness of the Irish to include them (Table VIII.1). 
According to Chapter V, privileged legal status, a plethora of legal and policy 
entitlements, and a number of welcoming Irish political actors are pulling the similar East 
Europeans into Dublin’s political life. Therefore, despite their own perceptions of 
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difference and low naturalization, voting or unionization rates, Poles are being drawn into 
Irish political parties and civic institutions. As Chapter VI shows, Polish workers rarely 
work according to qualifications in Ireland, even if downward occupational mobility 
tends to occur in the home country rather than upon migration. The East Europeans face 
exploitation and worse working conditions than natives, which they are unwilling to 
contest in view of their low stakes in the city. However, the welcomed Poles are recruited 
by Irish employers, are treated favorably by native managers, coworkers, and customers, 
and remain at work even during downturn. Unsurprisingly, they are very satisfied with 
their work in Ireland, earning the name “contented proletariat.” According to Chapter 
VII, Poles in Dublin have low disposable income, rarely own their accommodations, 
concentrate in disadvantaged schools, and have limited access to social welfare. 
Nonetheless, the East Europeans have open entry into the Irish rental market and are 
granted resources to overcome the educational gap. They are rarely the victims of racism 
and have full access to the healthcare system, the police, the courts, the training and 
employment agency, or Irish trade unions.  
Finally, Bulgarians, who view themselves to belong in Spain, yet face indifferent 
or negative reception by their hosts, undergo conflicted integration in Madrid (Table 
VIII.1). As Chapter V shows, despite European Union citizenship, Bulgarians are 
disadvantaged by local, regional and national legal and policy developments and are 
granted few resources for political incorporation. Thus, the Balkan workers rarely 
naturalize or participate in local elections or trade unions. However, they set up a 
disproportionately high number of ethnic associations in Madrid to express their 
belonging in the city. According to Chapter VI, natives’ mistrust and the language barrier 
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limit access to the Spanish labor market for the Eastern Europeans and translate into 
downward occupational mobility, subpar working conditions, and some bullying by 
Spanish employers. However, Bulgarians workers eager to belong are satisfied with work 
in Madrid and fight for their labor rights. As Chapter VII demonstrates, the different 
Balkan workers are relatively segregated residentially from the Spanish and occupy 
crowded accommodations. They are granted few language or other educational resources, 
and have low disposable income. Still, a stake in their new home leads Bulgarians to 
avail themselves of the generous Madrilenian social security system and aspire to learn 
Spanish as to excel in the educational sphere. The Balkan workers are satisfied with their 
access to the medical system and other institutions or local administrators and suggest 
that their European-ness shields them from overt racism in the host context. 
 
VIII.2. Theoretical and Methodological Implications  
The findings carry several theoretical and methodological implications for 
migration and European scholarship. In particular: a) culture and identity should be 
brought back into migration studies; b) immigrants should be considered conscious actors 
whose decisions and perceptions matter for incorporation outcomes; c) the local level of 
analysis is increasingly important with policy supranationalization and the resurgence of 
nationalism in Europe, especially in new immigrant receivers; d) a cross-disciplinary 
theoretical and methodological approach can only benefit migration scholarship.  
First, the cases of Dublin and Madrid attest to the role of culture and identity in 
determining reception and integration outcomes on the Continent and beyond. The 
findings show that culture and ethnicity increasingly determine how key European 
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stakeholders talk about and deal with the issue of migration, and what happens to diverse 
immigrant communities after they are admitted. This rising importance has not been fully 
reflected in current migration scholarship. Immigrant reception is rarely the focus of 
inquiry, with immigration policy and border control taking center stage instead 
(Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). Inclusion and exclusion are discussed from the perspective 
of the economic costs and benefits of migration (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Miles 1986, 
1987), the ethnic capital of immigrant communities in the form of social networks 
(Massey et al., 1987; Zhou & Logan, 1989), or the preferences of national interest groups 
(for ex., Freeman, 1995). Numerous studies continue to track the rise of Europe’s right-
wing parties and their effects on the mainstream political process (Golder, 2003; 
Kitschelt, 2007). While these perspectives offer rich contributions to understanding 
immigrant reception, they leave gaps as well. For instance, the economic approach cannot 
explain why cheaper yet different Bulgarians workers have a more limited access to 
Madrid’s labor market than more expensive but familiar Ecuadorian laborers. Social 
networks cannot account for differences in reception among immigrant populations 
arriving in host societies in the same time frame or for the fact that the best established 
among the four groups, Nigerians in Dublin, is also the most disadvantaged. Studies of 
the lifecycle of extreme right parties omit considerations of the cultural underpinnings of 
the politics of resentment and have little to offer in countries with no nationalist parties. 
Explicit consideration of how perceptions of identity and cultural dynamics influence 
reception discourses and actual outcomes therefore can only enrich the existing literature.  
Scholarship on immigrant incorporation can benefit from discussion of culture 
and identity as well. Currently, the focus falls on citizenship rules (Brubaker, 1992; 
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Howard, 2006), the structures of national institutions (Etzinger, 2000; Ireland, 2000), or 
the declining ability of the liberal state to exclude, include, or incorporate altogether 
(Hollifield, 1992; Soysal, 1994). The main questions are how specific integration policies 
affect immigrant political participation and ethnic conflict (Givens, 2007). However, 
policy often fails to achieve its intended goals and can be implemented very differently in 
different contexts. The deterioration of Bulgarians’ rights in Madrid with European 
Union citizenship is a case in point. Incorporation in spheres other than the political 
matters too, with belonging demonstrated to actually be a prerequisite for political and 
other participation rather than its effect. Local institutions treat distinct immigrant 
communities in profoundly different ways despite standard rules. Declining sovereignty 
actually makes identity politics more significant, where perceptions and emotions matter 
as much as legal rules or institutional outlook. In fact, discussion of incorporation should 
inevitably be linked to study of reception and inclusion-exclusion as both are underlined 
by the same cultural dynamics. It is commonsensical that the climate in which an 
immigrant arrives would define long-term opportunities to fit in, yet the proposition is 
rarely empirically followed by the literature. This study is an attempt to do just that.  
Second, the thesis makes a case for immigrant agency in determining 
incorporation outcomes. As shown above, current scholarship on immigrant integration 
focuses on the characteristics of receiving state and pays little heed to the immigrant as a 
subject who chooses to acquire citizenship, buy an apartment, or look for a job that better 
fits his or hers qualifications. The sociological and anthropological literature has a lot to 
contribute here by focusing on the individual integration process. However, even the neo-
assimilation and segmented assimilation models emphasize newcomers’ “human capital” 
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and objective characteristics (Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes and Zhou, 1993). Immigrants’ 
ethnicity, culture, or self-identification are rarely analyzed, even though these attributes 
have a role to play in immigrants’ preferences, motivations, and actions in the host state 
(Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Berger et al., 2004). Furthermore, few authors emphasize the 
intersection between migrants’ strategies and perceptions and the institutional and 
discourse landscape of the receiving society (Diehl & Schnell, 2006). The interaction 
between immigrant claims-making and the host state’s political opportunity structures 
eclipses the significance of “cultural” opportunities structures (Guigni & Passy, 2004). 
As Carmel and Cerami (2011) put it, surprisingly little attention is given to “emotions” 
and how they drive preference formation and limit policy. The thesis incorporates 
considerations of culture, identity, emotions, and immigrant belonging and perceptions as 
to address gaps left by the literature. 
Third, the project demonstrates the rising significance of local-level analysis. 
Issues of immigrant reception and incorporation are usually studied at the national (for 
ex., Castles & Miller, 2009; Messina, 2007) and supranational levels (Geddes, 2001; 
Lavenex, 2006). They are mostly surveyed for European countries that have received 
large numbers of immigrants historically (for Germany, for ex., see Euwals, Dagevos & 
Roodenburg, 2010; Kahanec & Tosum, 2009; for France, consult Bleich, 2005; Weil & 
Crowley, 1994; for the UK, examples include Boswell, 2011, 2012; Favell, 1998). Less 
attention is dedicated to the local level (except for instance Jørgensen, 2012; Money, 
1999) or to new immigrant receivers like Ireland (except for ex. Fanning, 2002, 2011 or 
Lentin & Moreo, 2012) or Spain (except for ex. Arango, 2009; Calavita, 2005). However, 
turning to the local level is paramount with rising resentment of Europeanization and 
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supranationalization among European publics and resurgent nationalism in European 
immigrant receivers (Brändlin, 2013). As the case of Madrid demonstrated, for instance, 
local perceptions and policy implementation can easily counteract the effect of 
nationally-crafted programs. It is also imperative to study new immigrant spaces like 
Dublin and Madrid that are yet to make the mistakes of traditional host contexts, yet have 
a lot to contribute to understanding of the dynamics and future of European institutions.  
Fourth, the dissertation points to the benefits of a cross-disciplinary approach to 
the study of immigrant reception and integration. Sociological and anthropological 
refernces concerning individual characteristics, as well as issues of identity, context, and 
boundaries, enhance a political science literature focused on policy construction and the 
national state. For instance, while boundary work is commonly evoked to explain access 
to political membership in the nation-state (Zolberg, 1981), it is even more fruitful in 
elucidating local integration patterns. The focus on the immigrant embodied in the 
sociology literature might explain how individual agency thwarts exemplary institutional 
and policy arrangements. Most significantly, the ethnographic approach and qualitative 
discourse analysis so common in sociology and social anthropology bring depth and 
richness to a political science discipline largely dedicated to a quantitative, large-n 
method. Especially when surveying the local level, national and supranational public 
opinion polls offer a great starting point of analysis, yet fail to introduce nuance or even 
identify the attitudes and outcomes for specific migrant nationalities. Especially when 
combined with interviews of all key stakeholders and a sampling of the secondary 
literature, even a limited number of semi-structured interviews are crucial in providing 
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richness and insight into preference and perception formation and variation (Maxwell, 
2008). In their turns, preferences and perceptions are what drive policies and outcomes.  
Two additional contributions merit brief mention. The thesis is original, as it 
focuses on the first generation in its discussion of incorporation outcomes. While the 
integration process is a long-term endeavor that might only yield results for the children 
of immigrants, the perceptions and achievements of first-generation migrants are crucial, 
since they affect the incorporation trajectories of generations to come. As numerous 
studies have shown, if the first generation never “catches up” with natives, then the 
children of the foreign-born begin their journey to life in the receiving country from a 
disadvantaged position (Barban & White, 2011; DeVoretz, 2006). Moreover, the 
dissertation is unique as it juxtaposes Spain with Ireland rather than other Mediterranean 
countries. The comparison is fruitful since Dublin and Madrid have more in common 
than acknowledged by current scholarship. Looking at the two cities provides additional 
evidence for the relationship between culture and immigrant integration.   
 
VIII.3. Practical Implications 
Each of this dissertation’s theoretical implications has practical consequences.  
First, if culture and identity matter for immigrant reception and incorporation outcomes, 
current integration programs in Europe and beyond might be misguided or simply 
ineffective. Even if national and supranational legal and policy rules present a fair way to 
treat ethnic and immigrant communities, their local implementation is likely to be 
characterized by individual and institutional discrimination, be it positive or negative. 
Chances are, however, that even national policies contain built-in inequalities among 
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immigrant communities based on cultural and identity perceptions. More importantly, 
discrimination often will occur regardless of rules or policies.  Ensuring equal and open 
access to all spheres of life for immigrant collectives, therefore, might not simply be a 
matter of constructing equitable institutions or writing standard and liberal rules. 
Multiculturalism and tolerance might continue to be just a dream short of the redefinition 
of local (and national) identity and its internalization by native publics and elites. The 
European project, some argue, is one such chance of inculcating a more inclusive identity 
among Europeans. However, supranationalization often produces exactly the opposite 
result and leads to resentment of foreign impositions, the rise of right-wing parties and 
even more exclusion for foreign groups considered unable to fit in (Messina, 2014).  
States are ill-served by focusing solely on border control and specific admission rules 
when dealing with immigration. If reception is grounded in cultural dynamics and is 
intimately related to long-term integration outcomes, a holistic approach to the migration 
phenomenon will better resolve issues of exclusion and conflict in receiving societies. 
Second, if immigrant agency and perceptions are crucial in the incorporation 
process, there might be little receiving states, cities, and neighborhoods can do to 
optimize integration outcomes. Indeed, even if there are plentiful resources for 
assimilation before immigrant communities, exclusion by publics or lack of belonging by 
immigrants committed to their home state or profoundly alienated in their new 
environment might thwart integration initiatives. Integration resources, therefore, are best 
directed not just at ensuring open access to institutions, but also at fostering kinship 
between hosts and newcomers.   
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Third and finally, while Europe is becoming an ever stronger and deeper Union, 
local dynamics might significantly counteract policy, discourse, and identity 
supranationalization and harmonization. The “shifting down” Guiraudon and Lahav 
(2000) describe as a mechanism to pursue national immigration prerogatives of control 
more effectively might not compliment the simultaneous “shifting up” to the European 
level but rather contradict it. Indeed, local identity is often defined as radically different 
from national image and historical tendencies and is constructed in opposition to external 
pressures from institutions like the EU. The continuous and even rising significance of 
the local level carries important implications for the future of Europe, therefore. If local 
identity variations define migration discourses and outcomes, then the dream of a Europe 
“unified in peace and democracy” might never materialize (EEC, 1957).   
 
VIII.4. Limitations and Future Research Trajectories  
 While this project makes contributions to migration and European studies, it 
represents only the first step in establishing the significance of identity for immigrant 
incorporation and is not without its limitations. For one, the dissertation does not claim to 
discount alternative explanations of immigrant reception and incorporation. Neither does 
it claim to assess their relative significance compared to identity politics or their 
interaction with cultural factors. The thesis is only dedicated to showing that culture 
matters. How do economic cost-benefit calculations relate to perceptions of belonging? 
Does the nature of social networks alter opportunities for integration? What factors 
motivate radical right actors and how do these actors affect local identity perceptions? 
These are questions that need to be addressed by future research endeavors.  
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Moreover, the study does not claim to firmly establish a causal relationship 
between local identity on the one hand and reception, perceptions and incorporation on 
the other. The project demonstrates a correlation between culture and incorporation. To 
establish a more robust connection, future work will extend the argument to other case 
studies, comparing traditional and new immigrant receivers. It will also focus on 
following up with current interviewees, including migrants who chose to return to their 
home countries. Exploring how culture affects reception and integration in smaller cities 
other than state capitals is a productive future direction of research as well. Finally, 
turning to culturally-homogenous host spaces even further East that are only now their 
immigration regimes will provide a crucial test for the significance of identity politics in 
immigration studies.    
Next, the thesis discusses reception discourses, attitudes, and climate. It does not 
purport to talk about policy formation, even though attitudes and perceptions are the 
starting point to the creation and implementation of policy. Further, it does not claim to 
discuss how local dynamics affect the national or supranational level. Looking for the 
mechanisms through which discourse and perceptions translate into specific rules and 
through which local discourses migrates “up” and “out” is a fruitful task that would 
enhance limited yet highly significant previous such efforts (for ex., Money, 1997). 
The data underlying the dissertation are limited as well. The thesis employs a 
small number of semi-structured qualitative interviews with different local stakeholders. 
Interviews with immigrants are not representative of larger ethnic communities. 
However, they are not meant to be. Instead, they reinforce findings from the survey of 
community leaders, native administrators, and local publics. In combination with reports 
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and secondary sources, they provide a crucial level of nuance and richness to the findings 
and hint at how attitudes and perceptions form among foreign populations (Maxwell, 
2008). Nonetheless, future work will employ larger-scale surveys and interviewee pools 
to better understand the mechanisms behind the formation of perceptions of belonging 
among immigrant populations abroad.  
The thesis raises other important questions: Does European Union citizenship 
have any consequences for immigrant belonging or integration outcomes? Can it be 
counterproductive and how? Does exclusion lead to ethnic mobilization and under what 
conditions? Where is the European project headed? Future research will focus on 














Trade union  5 
Politician/city councilor 5 
Employment/training agency 3 
Migration, municipal 2 
Migration, national 2 
Journalist 2 
Law enforcement 1 
European Commission 1 
Researcher 1 
Polish organization 9 































Table A.3. Immigrant Respondents in Dublin  
  
Group Polish Nigerian Total  
Male 12 10 22 
Female 25 2 27 
    
18-34 years old 24 5 29 
35-44 years old 6 5 11 
45 years old or older 7 2 9 
    
Arrived before 2000 2 2 4 
Arrived 2000-2004 26 7 33 
Arrived 2005 or after 9 3 12 
    
Admin/white-collar 7 5 12 
Store/sales 7 1 8 
Cleaner 6 1 7 
Taxi/driver 3 1 4 
Construction 3 0 3 
Bar/restaurant 3 0 3 
Nanny 2 0 2 
Factory 2 0 2 
Other low-skilled 2 1 3 
Unemployed/N/A 2 3 5 
TOTAL 37 12 49 
 
 




















Trade union 6 
Politician 3 
Anti-discrimination 3 
Migration, municipal 2 
Migration, regional 1 
Migration, national 1 
Law enforcement 1 
European Commission 1 
Researcher 3 
Bulgarian organization 9 





























Group Bulgarian Ecuadorian Total  
Male 20 6 26 
Female 19 4 23 
    
18-34 years old 17 7 24 
35-44 years old 9 3 12 
45 years old or older 13 2 13 
    
Arrived before 2000 2 2 4 
Arrived 2000-2006 26 7 33 
Arrived 2007 or after 11 1 12 
    
Construction 12 3 16 
Interna (domestic care) 9 0 9 
Store/sales 2 2 4 
Bar/restaurant 2 1 3 
Security 3 0 3 
Admin 1 2 3 
Driver/taxi 0 2 2 
Student 2 0 2 
Other low-skilled 5 0 5 
Unemployed/housewife 3 0 3 
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LEGAL STATUS CLASSIFICATIONS IN IRELAND AND SPAIN 
 
Table C.1. Certificates of Registration Types, Ireland 
 
Stamp Category 
1 Non-EU nationals with employment or business permit 
1A Non-EU nationals in full time training (no other employment permitted) 
2 Non-EU national students (limitations to work permission) 
2A Non-EU national students (not permitted to work) 
3 Non-EU nationals not permitted to work 
4 People permitted to work without a permit, incl. non-EU nationals,  
spouses of Irish/EU nationals, parents to Irish-born child (ICB),  
leave to remain, refugees, non-EU intra-company transfers, temporary  
doctors, non-EU nationals with work visas 
4 EU FAM Non-EU national family member to EU citizen (no permit required to 
work) 
5 Non-EU nationals in Ireland for eight years and permitted to remain  
without time conditions (no permit required to work) 
6 Irish national with dual citizenship 
 
Source: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (amended from Table 6, O’Connell & 
Joyce, 2009, p. 10). 
 
 There are several migrant legal classifications in Ireland. EU immigrants benefit 
from the most entitlements and are generally guided by European Union directives rather 
than national or local policy. They can reside in Ireland freely if they are self-sufficient, 
employed, or self-employed. On the other hand, all non-EU nationals in Ireland for more 
than three months must register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) and 
receive an immigration stamp denoting their category of entry (O’Connell & Joyce, 2009, 
pp. 9-10) (Table E.1).  
Third country nationals have several mechanisms of migration to Ireland. Labor 
migrants, especially highly-skilled ones, possess the strongest entitlements after EU 
nationals. They are granted either a work permit or a work visa, codified in the 
Employment Permits Acts of 2003 and 2006. The 2006 Act also created a green card 
category for the highly skilled (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19). Work permits were issued 
for lower-skilled occupations, like services or agriculture, and were non-transferrable and 
tied to a specific job and employer. They still warrant a Stamp 1 certificate issued by the 
GNIB. The employer applied for the permit and had to demonstrate the impossibility to 
fill the position with workers from Ireland or the EU through a labor market test. 
Employees had to apply for a new permit if changing jobs and could only do so after 12 
months of continuous employment. Work permit holders could apply for family 
reunification only after residing in the country for one year. After the 2007 overhaul, 
more occupations were closed to work permits, and only those earning €30,000 or more 
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could apply for such authorization.392 Prior to the EU enlargement round of 2004, there 
were few foreign workers with employment permits in Ireland, and most of those came 
from non-European countries (ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 9, 19). 
The number of work permits rose dramatically from less than 7,000 in 1999 to 47,551 in 
2003, however, mostly due to East European migration in anticipation of EU enlargement 
(DETI, 2010).  
The Employment Permits Act 2003 codified a work visa scheme for specialists in 
the medical, information technology, and construction sectors. Under this permit type, 
foreign workers could change employers within their sector, renew after two years and 
bring along their dependents after only three months (ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et 
al., 2011, p. 9). The 2006 Employment Permits Act replaced the work visa scheme with a 
green card system. Green cards are issued to those earning more than €60,000 or those 
earning €30,000-€59,999 in eligible occupations, and are granted directly to the 
employee. As it allows for immediately family reunification, requires no market test, and 
is renewed indefinitely after two years, the green card scheme is the closest proxy for 
long-term residency in Ireland (Employment Permit Act, 2006; ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; 
McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19; Quinn, 2010, p. 30).  
Another legal designation in Ireland carrying fewer rights than EU citizenship or 
labor migration is that of a foreign student. Third-country nationals could apply for a 
student visa from their home country, pay for their courses in advance, often at fees triple 
those for Irish and EU students, and receive s Stamp 2 certification. Student visa holders 
must be enrolled in full-time recognized study, which includes English language courses, 
have limited work permission, carry no family reunification privileges, and cannot apply 
their time spent in Ireland toward naturalization requirements. Students’ rights were 
improved in 2007 as the Third Level Graduate Scheme permitted students to remain in 
Ireland in search of employment for six months after completing third-level education. 
However, in 2009 positive developments were reversed as the time a student could 
remain in Ireland was capped and a two-tier system was introduced, with only those 
earning degrees eligible for immigration entitlements. A substantial number of students 
registered in Ireland in 2009, mostly in pursuit of English language studies. Still, more 
than one third of foreign students in Ireland come from within the European Union (ICI, 
2008, p. 70; McGinnity et al., 2011, p.10; Quinn, 2010, p. 30).  
Asylum seekers enjoy even fewer rights than student visa holders. Asylum 
seekers apply for refugee status with the Office of the Refugee Applications 
Commissioner (ORAC) and could appeal negative decisions at the Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal (RAT). If their appeal is rejected, they could apply for subsidiary protection 
(McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). In the case of refusal, the Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform makes a discretionary decision on whether the person will be deported 
or granted a Leave to Remain. While awaiting a determination, asylum seekers fall 
outside the scope of integration policy. They are dispersed to lower-income or small 
homogenous communities. Applicants are not allowed to work and are housed in direct 
provision facilities, where they are provided meals and a weekly allowance of €19.10 per 
adult and €9.52 per child. Direct provision centers raise concerns with asylum seekers’ 
health, safety, and future inability to integrate in the larger society. The process is 
                                                          
392 If earning a salary smaller than €30,000 per year, immigrants were only eligible for work permits in a 
very restricted list of occupations (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19). 
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disorienting as there is no single procedure when processing protection claims in Ireland 
and the one codified in the 2010 Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill has not yet 
been passed or enacted (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). If successful, asylum seekers are 
granted refugee status, leave to remain or subsidiary protection. They receive a 12-month 
renewable residence permit. Refugees have similar rights to those of Irish and European 
citizens (ICI, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12; RIA, 2010).  
A related status is that of a parent of an Irish-born child. No longer granted 
residency after the Citizenship Referendum of 2004, parents of children born in Ireland 
prior to 2005 were given permission to stay under a special scheme (IBC/05) with rights 
similar to those who were granted Leave to Remain. IBC immigrants are obliged to work 
and their status is renewed after two years, yet they remain in a precarious position with 
unsure rights, as their status is discretionary (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71).  
The least stable immigrant characterization in Ireland is that of undocumented 
migrant. The Migrant Rights Center estimated that there were around 30,000 
undocumented migrants in Ireland in 2010, even if this number is hard to verify. 
Undocumented migrants do not hold social or political rights and are subject to 
deportation. Still, a temporary scheme was introduced in 2009 to deal “in a humanitarian 
way” with those who became undocumented through no fault of their own, granting them 
four months to seek employment or an employment permit. Unfortunately, the scheme is 
not permanent, leaving undocumented immigrants in an extremely precarious situation 
(ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 11-12).  
Similar legal classifications exist in Spain as well. EU immigrants are supposed to 
benefit from the most entitlements and are generally guided by European Union 
directives rather than national or local policy. They can live in work in the host country 
without a visa or a permit. However, even EU nationals need to register with local 
authorities and obtain a residence certificate, which requires proof of financial means and 
valid health insurance. EU citizens are entered in the Central Register of Foreign 
Nationals and receive a Foreigner’s Identity Number (NIE) which they must carry at all 
times. EU citizens are also encouraged, if not required, to register with the General Social 
Security Fund in exchange for tax benefits (EMN, 2011; Expatica, 2014).  
Prior to 2003, nationals of countries with bilateral agreements with Spain did not 
need to obtain a visa to Spain if they would reside and work in the country for no longer 
than three months within a six-month period (Jokisch, 2007). All other non-EU nationals 
require a visa to enter Spain, which has to be obtained prior to entry in the host country. 
There are several entry mechanisms, with labor migrants at the center of the permit 
regime. Labor migrants can enter Spain in two ways: through the general worker regime 
and or via the yearly contingents. Immigrants are attracted to fill jobs for which 
Spaniards are unavailable based on a hard-to-fill occupations catalog, where occupations 
mostly fall within medium and low-skilled economic sectors. Additional need for 
workers in seasonal occupations is satisfied through the yearly quotas, mostly fulfilled 
through bilateral agreements with specific sending countries (MTIN, 2009).  
Foreign workers’ rights depend on length of residence (Table E.2). Seasonal 
workers (Type A permit) are only entitled to work in the host country for nine months 
within a period of one year and must sign a pledge that they will return to their home 
country. Nonetheless, those who abide by this pledge and their legal obligations are likely 
to be recruited in subsequent years, where a worker hired in Spain for four years has an 
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expedited entry into permanent residence and work in the receiving context. Initially, 
standard work permits (Type B) entitle their third-country holders to only perform jobs in 
a specific profession, sector and geographic area for a limited time period, yet as the 
permit is continuously renewed, foreign employees are granted more flexibility, 
culminating in a permanent residence permit and freedom of residence and employment 
in Spain (Iabogado, 2015; MTIN, 2009). While all foreign workers in Spain tend to be 
recruited directly from origin countries to specific locations and jobs in Spain, the special 
jobseeker visa authorizes its holder to freely move about the country while seeking 
employment for three months. Ministerial Order reserves a number of such visas for the 
sons, daughters and grandchildren of Spaniards in Latin America (EMN, 2011). 
 
 
Table C.2. Work Permit Types, Spain 
 
Type Category 
A Seasonal worker (9-month time limit) 
B Initial permit for 1 year and 2-year renewal  
(geographical, sectorial, job limitations) 
C After Type B renewal  
(valid for any job across Spain) 
D Self-employed initial permit 
 (1-year and renewal for 2 additional year) 
E Long-term (3-year) permit for self-employed, 
 after Type D renewal  
F Shuttle workers (daily return to home country)  
(for 5 years, renewable) 
Permanent Any professional activity in Spain  
(renewed every 5 years, after Type C or Type E) 
Extraordinary Non-EU nationals who have helped Spanish 
economic and cultural progress (renewed every 5 
years) 
 
Source: Author from EMN, 2011 and Iabogado, 2015. 
 
 
These coming to Spain for family reunification can join their relatives, including a 
common law partner, after these relatives have resided in Spain for one year and have 
obtained authorization for a subsequent year (renewed Type B permit) (Table E.2). There 
is no waiting period for the family reunification of EU nationals. The beneficiaries of 
family reunification are classified in a way similar to the worker migrant already in Spain 
and can work in the country without obtaining a permit. Family members obtain a 
permanent residence card after only three years (EMN, 2011).  
A subsequent legal designation in Spain carrying fewer rights than EU citizens, 
labor migrants or their families is that of foreign student. While EU students do not need 
a visa for Spain, they still require registration with local authorities. Third-country 
nationals could apply for a student visa from their home country, provided that they can 
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prove they have been accepted to a program at an officially recognized institution in 
Spain. Only these coming to study for more than six months are allowed to work in 
Spain, yet substantial limitations apply (Expatica, 2014).393 The only special entitlements 
for foreign students in Spain are granted to these graduating in the medical profession, as 
their participation in Spanish residency is promoted. Additionally, researchers are 
allowed to enter Spain and work there temporarily. Researchers are treated as temporary 
work and residence permit holders and are allowed employment in Spain for no longer 
than three months (EMN, 2011).  
Asylum seekers are dealt with according to European directives. The procedure is 
expedited, with claimants having one month to apply with the Oficina de Asilo y Refugio 
(OAR), entitled to be notified of a decision within six months, and allowed to appeal a 
negative decision with the Spanish courts. Unsuccessful applicants are immediately 
deported. These awaiting a decision are not subject to direct provision or dispersal, unlike 
in the Irish case, even though public assistance is available. They are, in fact, entitled to 
work after six months in Spain. These recognized as refugees by the Ministry of the 
Interior are granted rights similar to these of natives and EU citizens and enjoy privileged 
access to Spanish nationality (Ministerio del Interior, 2010).  
Finally, irregular migrants hold more rights in Spain than in Ireland. They could 
potentially be granted residency rights, if they can demonstrate social, family, or labor 
ties to receiving localities. Irregular migrants who have been in the country for a two-year 
period and have worked for at least six months regardless of current position; these who 
have ties to Spanish residents and have engaged in cultural and social integration 
programs; as well as the parents of Spanish children or children of parents who are 






                                                          
393 While family members can visit foreign students during their academic career in Spain, they are not 
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